This is an astonishing true tale of espionage, journeys in disguise, secret messages, double agents, assassinations and sexual intrigue. Alexander Burnes was one of the most accomplished spies Britain ever produced and the main antagonist of the Great Game as Britain strove with Russia for control of Central Asia and the routes to the Raj. There are many lessons for the present day in this tale of the folly of invading Afghanistan and Anglo-Russian tensions in the Caucasus. Murray's meticulous study has unearthed original manuscripts from Montrose to Mumbai to put together a detailed study of how British secret agents operated in India. The story of Burnes' life has a cast of extraordinary figures, including Queen Victoria, King William IV, Earl Grey, Benjamin Disraeli, Lola Montez, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx. Among the unexpected discoveries are that Alexander and his brother James invented the myths about the Knights Templars and Scottish Freemasons which are the foundation of the Da Vinci Code; and that the most famous nineteenth-century scholar of Afghanistan was a double agent for Russia.
When reading Flashman, the average reader must ask whether such characters as Alexander Burnes really existed. They did, achieving in real life feats which a modern James Bond could only envy. Mr Murray is a master of his craft, bringing this hero to life against a background which the author knows intimately.
This book combines the adventurous tales of life as a diplomat and spy in some of the most wild and dangerous lands of the planet, with a detailed and critical history of British expansion into North West India and Afghanistant in the 1830s.
Reference is made to the remarkable and rich culture of the region, and also the traditional trade routes across a huge swathe of Eurasia. However, the book is not sparing in its detailed descriptions of the sadistic violence and the chaotic misrule which made life even more harsh than it needed to be, and a few examples are given to suggest that little has changed in modern times. The book also notes that important cultural changes were taking place at the time of this history, as the Wahabi interpretation of Islam introduced an increasingly oppressive and puritanical aspect into public life.
What dominates, however, is the appreciation that this huge region was not one accustomed to central government but rather broken into tribal territories, protective of their specific traditions and given to frequent changes of alliance and rivalry. Afghanistan itself, in so far it could be said to exist as a country rather than an association of tribes, was incapable of supporting a central government from its own resources, unless it were to annexe more affluent neighbouring territories, so the British concept of imposing firm government in whatever form was never realistic. [One can assume that this remains an issue today.]
The primary British justification for invading and seeking to control Afghanistan was to defend its Indian territories against the threat of Russain expansion into central Asia, in alliance with Persia. The book documents the reality that the Russians were not capable of carrying out such a threat, offered Palmerston a solution based on mutual recognition of the independence of the central Asian states between their respective (Russian and British) empires, while the Persians were similarly fully prepared to enter an agreement with the British. Britain's First Afghan War therefore had no shred of strategic justification or logic. One of its consequences may actually have been to induce Russia to proceed with further expansion into central Asia, the opposite of Britian's stated policy aims.
One minor issue in the book is its frequent, wide eyed comments on the role of the small Scottish town of Montrose in producing so many significant individuals in the administration of the Indian Empire. Craig describes the importance of personal references in order to secure contacts and advancement - it would be very difficult to enter into social interaction without the necessary "introductions." He also identifies the role of nepotism, by which senior figures appointed their own family members to supporting roles, securing their careers. In such a system I do not see why it is at all surprising that the small town of Montrose is so well represented among the small British elite in Imperial India. Once a small group is established in positions of power it can support a self reproducing oligarcy based on family and personal connections. Some, not least Alexander 'Sikunder'Burnes, rose to the occasion and made the most impressive use of their opportunities. Others, to be honest, were totally inept and disgracefully irresponsible. I can be impressed by Burnes but this history is not at all supportive of the system of oligarchy, privilege and nepotism it describes.
I enjoy finding examples of archaism. One chapter takes time out to discuss Scottish freemasonry, to which the Burnes family was deeply committted. This includes demonstrating that Burnes was the original author of some of the key ideas in the tiresome best seller The DaVinci Code. Freemasonry enjoys playing with ancient symbols, to which it applies its own meanings. The discovery of such ancient symbols by Burnes in ancient sites around the Indus and Afghanistan confirms that the ancient symbols are ancient symbols but does not confirm, as Burns imagined, that freemasonry is correspondingly ancient. If I were to write my name in ancient Greek script that would not prove that I am an ancient Greek.
The author has, of course, served as a British diplomat in precisely this region of the world and has criticised Britain's recent involvement in Afghanistan itself and the self styled War on Terror with particular penetration. He is able to point out quite a few parallels between the First Afghanistan War and the latest, always to the lasting shame of the British policy makers. I have to be impressed that a British diplomat, albeit one sacked for the crime of speaking the truth to power, can give such a critical and honest account of this dismal episode in the history of Britain's empire. This book shows that, whether as a diplomat or a historian, Craig Murray has a deep interest and understanding for the region and it would have been no bad idea for British political leaders to have paid more attention to his advice.
I have some criticisms. The book needs more and better maps to be properly readable - why on earth is it assumed that we will have a decent atlas to hand whle reading, and in any case names and other significant details, notably national and other administrative boundaries, change radically over time, so we need a map of the relevant time period. Also, it is murderously difficult to keep track of the characters and their names. Each chapter could probably do with a list of characters and their status, though I imagine few authors would take the trouble. Tiresome requests I agree, but then again, it might enable more readers to get through the text with a less blurred and confused grasp of the plot details. It would be nice, really, to go back to the style of a Dickens novel, where each chapter has a synopsis of the coming plot.
"There was nothing unusual in the replacement of an existing ruler by British military force, installing a rival family as a puppet. This was the standard EIC [East India Company] mode of operation from its displacement of Chanda Sahib by Muhammad Ali as Nawab of the Carnatic in 1752. Some of the worst impreialist aggressions, such as the destruction of the Tipu Sultan and his court at Mysore, are written of by historians as though they were desirable steps on the road to progress, and as though a very rich and complex culture were barbarian. Indeed, had the British occupation of Afghanistan been a military success, condemnation of Auckland by historians would have been muted. Immoralit was clearly perceived when it failed to advance British interests. Sir Penerel Moon's monumental The British Conquest and Dominion of India details twenty-seven usurpations by the british in India before we get to Dost Mohammed. The most recent had been the annexation of Oudh in 1837, involving the installation by armed force of a puppet monarch. During the occupation of Kabul, the british also deposed the ruler of Kurnal and took Aden. Historians of the fiirst afghan War have in beneral neglected the connected usurpation of Mehrab Khan of the vast territory of Kelat. In short, the invasion of Afghanistan was no more morally reprehensible than general British policy in India, merely less successful." [pp233,234]
"The only evidence for Pottinger's heroics was allegedly in his journals, which were the basis of the account of 'The hero of Herat' by the doyen of British Indian historians, Sir John Kaye. But this evidence disappeared in one of thise infamous Victorian study fires, in which papers embarrassing to the imperial narrative were apt to vanish. It seems likely that this fire is where Alexander Burnes' private diaries disappeared too, with their evidence of religious scepticism (and perhaps sexual adventure).... The same conflagration took private papers of those martyr icons of Victorian India, Henry Lqrence and John Nicholson. It is very probably Kayes was destroying evidence of sexual and religious unorthodoxy." [p247]
One would expect the autor, as an experienced diplomat, to have a healthy interest in the process of claiming back expensess. Things in the early 19th entury were far worse. In the field, agents and diplomats were routinely obliged to make decisions and incur substantial costs from their personal resources, which would have to be reclaimed later as expenses with supporting documentation, a requirement that was surreal in the conditions they operated under. Empires live on their accounting - some of the oldest documents in the world are surviving accounts of Mesopatamian empires, indelibly inscribed on clay tablets. The commerica origins of the EIC made accounting even more central to its culture. The pressure on Burnes over accounts was a major worry; if the government repudiated his bills be could be ruined. Moorcroft and Gerard both died penniless for this very reason. Burnes had already lost money redeeming Gerard's bills. Mohan Lal's life was devastated by government refusing to refund payments made in the last days of the Kabul garrison. Edward Stirling's expenses were turned down entirely. Stoddart's Herat accounts were repudiated and many of Arthur Conolly's bills remained unhonoured at his death. The entire story of the Great Game has this strange undercurrent. [p250]
"Girishk was the centre of conflict for British forces in 2002 - 14, where scores of British troops died fighting the Douranis. The false appellation 'Taliban' was part of the propaganda of the 'War on Terror'. They were just locals fighting British invaders, yet again." [p291]
"Sending and receiving of secret messages was Burnes' stock-in-trade. These were written on small squares of paper, often hidden in plain sight, for example as a prayer amulet. At the other extreme these could be rolled up in a setion of quill pushed into the anus. other common methods were to bake the message in a chapati, which could be swallowed, or scrunch it into a pistol wad which could be quickly fired away. the messengers or chaprasis adopted various disguises 'beautifully', including as naked holy men." [p334]
"Masson's only biographer, Gordon Whitteridge, rejects the allegation .... Sir Gordan was a Foreign Office man educated at Cambridge in the 1930s, and thus congenitally unable to recognise a Russian spy." [p344]
"Considering all the actions of the First Afghan War as a whole, it is not the case that HM regiments or Company European regiments - to be blunt, white troops - fought better for the British than their Indian, Gurkha or Afghan counterparts, despite that being (still) the common portrayal in British histories." [p345]
"The most important single factor in determining the fate of the British in the field was the presence or absence of artillery... Where artilery was absent, the loss of firepower and range was crucially debilitating to British forces. The afghan jezzail had twice the range of the standard British musket and als outranged the comapny force's small number of rifles. British military technology was seventy years out of date... The musket was not supposed to be individually accurate; its purpose was to pour a volley into the massed ranks of an enemy formation at close quarters. The Afghans had more sense than to fight that way,..." [p345]
Sikunder Burnes by Craig Murray. This biography of Alexander Burnes is a tour de force of research and scholarship. Craig Murray's easy writing style immediately captures the attention and holds it, as we learn about the young man’s braveery, intellect, and breadth of knowledge, combined with such an engaging personality that he gains the trust of many influential people engaged in the so-called ‘Great Game’, which of course was anything but a game to all except the few who benefitted. His travels to a multitude of different regions of the Indian sub-continent and surrounding lands, risking his life and freedom on wild rivers, across deserts, through mountainous regions among people wisely wary of British interest in their land, seem almost the stuff of fiction. Burnes’ value as mapmaker, spy, accurate recorder of social and topographical details, and his prescient suggestions and ability to foresee problems and solutions, were very important in assisting the British to pursue their ever-expanding hegemony. As remarkable as his intellectual and physical skills, was Alexander’s ability to navigate military/political plots, intrigues and schemes that were intended to ensure British control over vast swathes of Asia. Unfortunately, like every profession, the military/political world is rife with jealousy, governed by wealth and influence that can promote incompetence instead of wisdom, as for example Macnaghten who failed to understand Burnes’ assertion that, while power can be gained through brute force, subsequent stability depends on mutual respect of person and custom, resulting in tragedy. Despite the inclusion of a myriad of local tribes and leaders, and the international plots and schemes of Turkey, Russia and others, the reader will not become confused, because of the excellent. comprehensive index to names and places, all linked to the text. This, together with the footnotes makes the work an invaluable reference work. The success of British Colonial warmongering was assisted by a compliant press that gave unquestioning support to those who ‘fed’ them, even to tarnishing Burnes’ name, to save the name of a charlatan. Little different from today’s main-stream-media’s support for sabre-rattling, empire building, character assassinations and warmongering. This excellent book clearly demonstrates that those who ignore the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.
Craig Murray tells the story of Alexander Burnes, a lad from Montrose who secured a commission with the British India Company at the age of 16 and played a prominent role in The Great Game, the struggle between the British and Russian empires for domination of Central Asia.
Burnes won fame with his published account of the commercial mission he led to Bhukara in what is now Uzbekistan in 1832, as a cover for the gathering of intelligence on the region. In 1837, against the background of mounting concern that Herat might fall to a Russian-backed Persian army, the Governor General of India, Lord Aukland, put Burnes in charge of a second mission into Afghanistan. He was cordially welcomed at Kabul by Dost Mohamed Khan, the reigning Emir, and treated with him with a view to securing his alliance with the British. However, Burnes’ efforts were fatally undermined when the Governor General back in Simla concluded that removing Dost Mohammed and restoring Shah Shuja ul-Mulk to the throne in Kabul would suit British interests better. Against his better judgement, Burnes accompanied the British Army of the Indus which invaded Afghanistan for this purpose in 1839. He was murdered by a mob in Kabul shortly before the disastrous British retreat from the city in January 1842.
Murray shines a brutal light on the haughty incompetence of those in charge of British Imperial policy at the time. Lord Palmerson, Aukland, and his adviser, Sir William McNaghten, fare particularly badly under his withering scrutiny. Understandably, given his experiences as British Ambassador in Uzbekistan, Murray is tempted into comparisons with events in our own time. Chapter headings include ‘Regime Change’ and ‘The Dodgy Dossier’.
There are a few typographical errors which could have been eliminated by more careful proof reading. For example, Lieutenant Robert Leech, one of Burnes’ close colleagues and companions on his later missions, disconcertingly intrudes himself on his first trip up the Indus in 1831 (p.71), presumably standing in for Ensign John Leckie.
Murray is sympathetic to Burnes, partially due to Burnes' Scottish heritage, partially due to Burnes having had to deal with similar issues as a representative of the British crown. Murray as an ambassador in Uzbekistan, Burnes as an envoy in British India and Afghanistan, during the first half of the 19th century, during the height of the Great Game.
The chess game between Russia and Britain, with the objective control of Central Asia, is one of the most fascinating chapters in recent history, particularly well documented in Hopkirk's The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. Burnes played an important and not much highlighted role in this, and his life story, up to his murder in Kabul, is fascinating.
But, Murray's retelling is too wordy, contains way too much detail, and ends up being too tedious too often. Bits and pieces are captivatingly put down on paper, including Burnes' initial rise and move to India, and the British military advance towards Kabul, against Burnes' advice, being two of those. But it's not enough to save the book.
The detail and research is evident, but writing slightly disjointed. However, it is evident a lot of work went into this astonishing history. It is a disturbing read in the sense of waste, pilage, and politics amounting to evil but illuminating how the extremely wealthy regimes in central Asia lived and how women were exploited in fulfilling a subservient sexual and entertaining role. The vast loss of animal and human life due to politics (10,000 camels in one case) is extraordinary and it is sad how Burnes worked his talents so hard only to realise he too was a pawn and perhaps a double dealer himself yet without the moral gumption to leave the service and the high pay.
The author has his own axe to grind so difficult to know how his interpretation of Burnes reflects his inner motives. It is sad how colonialism was so destructive. As Burnes' personal papers did not survive, it is difficult to know the entire character of Burned and the author is somewhat presumptuous. The only other theme that wasn't followed up was the Masonic issue. One chapter explored this, but it was unclear about the Masonic revival in this area.
This book should have “those that don’t learn from history are doomed to repeat it” stamped all over it and given to all those inept politicians that dragged us into the recent illegal war with Afghanistan.
This book is fantastic, extremely well researched and adds huge amount of new material to a subject and a period that’s already been well documented.
With all due respect you can't call one master of the craft, when he died prematurely while on mission. Such august titles are reserved for those been there, done this and survived to regale his grandchildren and students with stories. True Master ends his games on his own conditions and more often than not victoriously. IMHO.