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Powder River: Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War
The Great Sioux War of 1876–77 began at daybreak on March 17, 1876, when Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds and six cavalry companies struck a village of Northern Cheyennes—Sioux allies—thereby propelling the Northern Plains tribes into war. The ensuing last stand of the Sioux against Anglo-American settlement of their homeland spanned some eighteen months, playing out across more than twenty battle and skirmish sites and costing hundreds of lives on both sides and many millions of dollars. And it all began at Powder River.
Powder Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War recounts the wintertime Big Horn Expedition and its singular great battle, along with the stories of the Northern Cheyennes and their elusive leader Old Bear. Historian Paul Hedren tracks both sides of the conflict through a rich array of primary source material, including the transcripts of Reynolds’s court-martial and Indian recollections. The disarray and incompetence of the war’s beginnings—officers who failed to take proper positions, disregard of orders to save provisions, failure to cooperate, and abandonment of the dead and a wounded soldier—in many ways anticipated the catastrophe that later occurred at the Little Big Horn.
Forty photographs, many previously unpublished, and five new maps detail the action from start to ignominious conclusion. Hedren’s comprehensive account takes Powder River out of the shadow of the Little Big Horn and reveals how much this critical battle tells us about the army’s policy and performance in the West, and about the debacle soon to follow.
Powder Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War recounts the wintertime Big Horn Expedition and its singular great battle, along with the stories of the Northern Cheyennes and their elusive leader Old Bear. Historian Paul Hedren tracks both sides of the conflict through a rich array of primary source material, including the transcripts of Reynolds’s court-martial and Indian recollections. The disarray and incompetence of the war’s beginnings—officers who failed to take proper positions, disregard of orders to save provisions, failure to cooperate, and abandonment of the dead and a wounded soldier—in many ways anticipated the catastrophe that later occurred at the Little Big Horn.
Forty photographs, many previously unpublished, and five new maps detail the action from start to ignominious conclusion. Hedren’s comprehensive account takes Powder River out of the shadow of the Little Big Horn and reveals how much this critical battle tells us about the army’s policy and performance in the West, and about the debacle soon to follow.
- GenresHistory
472 pages, Hardcover
Published June 15, 2016
17 people are currently reading
68 people want to read
About the author
Paul L. Hedren
26 books9 followersA native Minnesotan, Paul Hedren retired from the National Park Service in 2007 after nearly thirty-seven years as a park historian and superintendent at such storied places as Fort Laramie National Historic Site, Wyoming, the Golden Spike National Historic Site in Utah, and the Niobrara National Scenic River in Nebraska.
Paul is also a lifelong writer and the author of scores of scholarly and popular articles plus eleven books, with stories largely focusing on the Great Sioux War of 1876-77 and particularly that conflict’s subtleties and consequences. Paul’s won numerous writing awards including a Spur from the Western Writers of America, the Vivian Paladin Award from the Montana Historical Society, and the Herbert Schell Award from the South Dakota State Historical Society. In 2011 his book After Custer: Loss and Transformation in Sioux Country won a prestigious Wrangler Award from the National Cowboy & Western Heritage Museum, and also the Sills Book Prize from the Custer Battlefield Historical & Museum Association.
Paul is also a lifelong writer and the author of scores of scholarly and popular articles plus eleven books, with stories largely focusing on the Great Sioux War of 1876-77 and particularly that conflict’s subtleties and consequences. Paul’s won numerous writing awards including a Spur from the Western Writers of America, the Vivian Paladin Award from the Montana Historical Society, and the Herbert Schell Award from the South Dakota State Historical Society. In 2011 his book After Custer: Loss and Transformation in Sioux Country won a prestigious Wrangler Award from the National Cowboy & Western Heritage Museum, and also the Sills Book Prize from the Custer Battlefield Historical & Museum Association.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
July 2, 2018
When it comes to the history of the conflict between the Plains Indians and the United States Army there are very few historians as knowledgeable and thorough as Paul Hedren. I find myself turning to his books when I want to understand some aspect of this long, brutal period of history in the 'Westward Expansion'.
Mr. Hedren did a monumental bit of research in finding out the truth behind the 1876 Powder River Campaign. This event seems largely forgotten today yet it was literally among the opening events of the Great Sioux War or sometimes referred to as the Black Hills War. As such this relatively unknown military campaign was not a shining moment for the United States Army. Hedren spends about a third of the book detailing the repercussions and court martials that resulted from the battle of March 17th, 1876.
One of the many lessons to be learned from this book was in the elaborate preparations the Army made for this expedition. They literally strived to be ready for any event once the expedition left Fort Fetterman. General Crook's strategy was fairly simple; to use the inclement weather as an opportunity to surprise the 'hostiles' in their winter camps. One of the initial problems was the Army wasn't really ready for this same severe weather. The soldiers were not properly fitted out for the blizzard like conditions they would encounter. Frostbite would be the worst enemy of the campaign.
Another lesson was in the failure of leadership in the face of adversity. After Crook detached Colonel Reynolds there were several lapses in judgement on the part of Reynolds and other officers under his immediate command. He failed to follow Crook's orders as it pertained to using, rather than destroying, the Cheyenne meat and fur supplies. This was in the face of Reynold's own troops suffering both from poor rations and protection from the severe weather. They were unable to secure the Cheyenne pony herd even though they did manage to initially capture much of it. They also abandoned a wounded soldier to the Cheyenne. Reynolds made this final decision on the basis that he might lose more men attempting to rescue the man. Of course the logic might be up for debate on this last decision but the overall damaging effect on the morale of his men was undeniable.
So court martials resulted, careers ended, the Northern Cheyenne found themselves aligned with the Sioux and not much of what General George Crook intended actually took place. I can only recommend Hedren's book if you want to understand this more completely. If you're particularly interested in the history of the Black Hills the book is especially valuable in how well Hedren explains these events in relationship to the 1876 Gold Rush. Remember, up until this time the Army was officially tasked with keeping the prospectors out of the Black Hills. While the expedition was being outfitted there were merchants literally selling gold prospecting supplies to prospective miners within eye sight of the Army!
Please do pick up this book. It is well worth the read.
Mr. Hedren did a monumental bit of research in finding out the truth behind the 1876 Powder River Campaign. This event seems largely forgotten today yet it was literally among the opening events of the Great Sioux War or sometimes referred to as the Black Hills War. As such this relatively unknown military campaign was not a shining moment for the United States Army. Hedren spends about a third of the book detailing the repercussions and court martials that resulted from the battle of March 17th, 1876.
One of the many lessons to be learned from this book was in the elaborate preparations the Army made for this expedition. They literally strived to be ready for any event once the expedition left Fort Fetterman. General Crook's strategy was fairly simple; to use the inclement weather as an opportunity to surprise the 'hostiles' in their winter camps. One of the initial problems was the Army wasn't really ready for this same severe weather. The soldiers were not properly fitted out for the blizzard like conditions they would encounter. Frostbite would be the worst enemy of the campaign.
Another lesson was in the failure of leadership in the face of adversity. After Crook detached Colonel Reynolds there were several lapses in judgement on the part of Reynolds and other officers under his immediate command. He failed to follow Crook's orders as it pertained to using, rather than destroying, the Cheyenne meat and fur supplies. This was in the face of Reynold's own troops suffering both from poor rations and protection from the severe weather. They were unable to secure the Cheyenne pony herd even though they did manage to initially capture much of it. They also abandoned a wounded soldier to the Cheyenne. Reynolds made this final decision on the basis that he might lose more men attempting to rescue the man. Of course the logic might be up for debate on this last decision but the overall damaging effect on the morale of his men was undeniable.
So court martials resulted, careers ended, the Northern Cheyenne found themselves aligned with the Sioux and not much of what General George Crook intended actually took place. I can only recommend Hedren's book if you want to understand this more completely. If you're particularly interested in the history of the Black Hills the book is especially valuable in how well Hedren explains these events in relationship to the 1876 Gold Rush. Remember, up until this time the Army was officially tasked with keeping the prospectors out of the Black Hills. While the expedition was being outfitted there were merchants literally selling gold prospecting supplies to prospective miners within eye sight of the Army!
Please do pick up this book. It is well worth the read.
June 7, 2019
At last, an account worthy of the event.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews