AN HONEST APPRAISAL OF GITMO BY ONE WHO SERVED THERE
Erik Saar was an army sergeant and translator who served in Guantanamo Bay from December 2002 to June 2003, supporting intelligence and interrogation operations. He wrote in this 2005 book of his first day, when he thought, “I felt as if history was taking a snapshot. I was standing in a place completely unique in the American experience.” (Pg. 46)
At an orientation session, an army psychiatrist told new arrivals, “the psychiatrist explained the need to guard our emotions at the camp, and to be careful that we didn’t allow the detainees to manipulate us. He also warned against developing sympathetic feelings for them…. This was all the training we would get on the emotional ramifications or working at Gitmo. Forty-five minutes of an army psychiatrist’s fancy PowerPoint presentation were supposed to ready us to confront individuals who we’d been told have helped plot the attacks of 9/11 and to deal with the mental states of men undergoing intense interrogation while in captivity on foreign turf. Then again, this was the army way…” (Pg. 49) He adds. “I was about to walk into the midst of nearly fifty men, all bound by an alleged hate for the United States, who I had no doubt would kill me if they had the chance.” (Pg. 51)
He observes, “The practice of Islam permeated the camp. Not only was there the taped call to prayer five times a day, but a stenciled arrow in each detainee’s cell pointed toward Mecca, and prayer mat
and cap and a Koran had been issued to each captive… I wondered how the Arab American Muslims on our team must feel finding themselves among these radicals.” (Pg. 54)
An experienced fellow linguist named Vanessa told him, “Everyone in this van falls into one of two categories… Those in one group force themselves to believe that every detainee here was somehow partially responsible for 9/11. That allows them to justify their hatred toward these men and detach themselves emotionally…. The other linguists … become more and more sympathetic every day to the detainees’ circumstances. They ponder and argue about whether or not there are innocent men here… They think the psych techs are idiots. And they believe the doctors don’t really care… My advice, Erik… is to find a happy medium. Don’t view each detainee as someone who helped 9/11, because it’s not true. But at the same time, you can’t get emotionally involved when it comes to these men.” (Pg. 55-56)
He notes, “Three things helped the detainees get through the tedium of the blocks and the stress of endless hours of interrogation: their faith, their brothers---though not all of them got along, not by a long shot---and whatever conversation, chaos, and altercations with their captors they could create, watch, or participate in. Islam was their primary source of strength, and I have to admit that in these circumstances, their devotion was impressive. The extreme nature of their beliefs, however, and the notion that we might actually be hardening those beliefs, was troubling… If the detainees weren’t radicals when they got here, there was a good chance they would be when they left---IF they left.” (Pg. 68)
Of the detainees, “this sense of hopelessness was created by design. The captives were supposed to believe that the only way to end their internment was through complete cooperation with their interrogators, and only catch being that some of those who seemed most tormented by their indefinite stay were those who weren’t being interrogated.” (Pg. 90)
He admits, “I was starting to wonder whether our war on terror would be counterproductive. I’d seen how [it] was breaking down the will---and the will to live---of some of the detainees, but I’d also seen how for others it seemed only to have strengthened their resolve and their solidarity against their American oppressors… I had to question how effectively we were isolating the actual evildoers.” (Pg. 107)
He acknowledges, “When I volunteered, I had a vision of what I thought Gitmo should be… a well-oiled, smartly run facility where our best intelligence personnel sucked information out of the worst terrorists we have captured so we could turn around and capture even worse ones, keeping American shores safe. Yet that picture wasn’t matching up with what I was seeing… the signals that something wasn’t right… were just too glaring to ignore.” (Pg. 122)
He summarizes, “I had a hard seeing how it was serving our goals in the war on terror. And it had strengthened the resolve of many of them as much as it had broken the spirit of others. The fact that we had been imprisoning an unknown number of men for more than a year who had no significant connections to terrorism was to my mind a very bad fact. We had to hold to our higher standards or we’d undermine everything we stood for. Fighting the terrorists was going to require a loner range, smarter strategy than we seemed to be deploying.” (Pg. 138)
He does comment, however, that “we did indeed have some pretty bad actors at the camp, people who likely would have gone to come lengths to contribute to additional attacks, and we had ample reasons to think they were terrorists or terrorist facilitators… Others were hardly terrorist operatives, but had useful info they were sharing…” (Pg. 147)
He laments, “Had someone come to me before I left for Gitmo and told me that we would use women to sexually torment detainees in interrogations to try to sever their relationship with God, I probably would have thought that sounded fine. And if someone had spelled out for me the details of the interrogation I had just participated in, I probably would have approved. But I hated myself when I walked out of that room, even though I was pretty sure we were talking to a piece of s-it in there. I felt as if I had lost something… We lost the high road. We cashed in our principles in the hope of obtaining a piece of information. And it didn’t even f-king work.” (Pg. 228)
He concludes, “Why hasn’t any leader been held accountable for the failure that is Guantanamo Bay? Why are they allowed to make all the excuses? … Why were people with little or no training placed face to face with alleged terrorists who shared many of their religious convictions and who would do anything to have an ally on the inside?” (Pg. 241) He continues, “To me, Gitmo represents failure on two fronts. The first failure is a moral one… the use of questionable tactics on the detainees at Gitmo and elsewhere is morally inconsistent with what we stand for as a nation… The second argument is more practical. The price we are paying for Gitmo is too high given the meager results we are getting. Guantanamo is a rallying cry throughout the Arab and Muslim world, and even some of our closest allies oppose us in this venture… the minimal intelligence we are gathering… is not worth the harm we are doing to our international reputation… It’s difficult to see how the United State, in good conscience, can hold other nations to standards we’re not meeting ourselves.” (Pg. 248-249)
This book will be “must reading” for anyone wanting to know more about Guantanamo Bay---although one might want to “balance” this book with, say, Gordon Cucullu’s ‘Inside Gitmo: The True Story Behind the Myths of Guantanamo Bay.’