Orden Mundial: Reflexiones sobre el carácter de las naciones y el curso de la historia

by Henry Kissinger

“Dazzling and instructive . . . [a] magisterial new book.” —Walter Isaacson, Time
 
Henry Kissinger offers in World Order a deep meditation on the roots of international harmony and global disorder. Drawing on his experience as one of the foremost statesmen of the modern era—advising presidents, traveling the world, observing and shaping the central foreign policy events of recent decades—Kissinger now reveals his analysis of the ultimate challenge for the twenty-first century: how to build a shared international order in a world of divergent historical perspectives, violent conflict, proliferating technology, and ideological extremism.

There has never been a true “world order,” Kissinger observes. For most of history, civilizations defined their own concepts of order. Each considered itself the center of the world and envisioned its distinct principles as universally relevant. China conceived of a global cultural hierarchy with the emperor at its pinnacle. In Europe, Rome imagined itself surrounded by barbarians; when Rome fragmented, European peoples refined a concept of an equilibrium of sovereign states and sought to export it across the world. Islam, in its early centuries, considered itself the world’s sole legitimate political unit, destined to expand indefinitely until the world was brought into harmony by religious principles. The United States was born of a conviction about the universal applicability of democracy—a conviction that has guided its policies ever since.

Now international affairs take place on a global basis, and these historical concepts of world order are meeting. Every region participates in questions of high policy in every other, often instantaneously. Yet there is no consensus among the major actors about the rules and limits guiding this process or its ultimate destination. The result is mounting tension.

Grounded in Kissinger’s deep study of history and his experience as national security advisor and secretary of state, World Order guides readers through crucial episodes in recent world history. Kissinger offers a unique glimpse into the inner deliberations of the Nixon administration’s negotiations with Hanoi over the end of the Vietnam War, as well as Ronald Reagan’s tense debates with Soviet Premier Gorbachev in Reykjavík. He offers compelling insights into the future of U.S.–China relations and the evolution of the European Union, and he examines lessons of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taking readers from his analysis of nuclear negotiations with Iran through the West’s response to the Arab Spring and tensions with Russia over Ukraine, World Order anchors Kissinger’s historical analysis in the decisive events of our time.

Provocative and articulate, blending historical insight with geopolitical prognostication, World Order is a unique work that could come only from a lifelong policy maker and diplomat.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, International Relations, Political Science, Economics, World History

431 pages, Hardcover

First published September 9, 2014

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Chris Ziesler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I approached this book with a little trepidation.

My two previous experiences with Kissinger's earlier books were: Diplomacy, which I found pithy, insightful and very enlightening; and his three volume memoirs which I found to be overwhelming in their level of detail and which eventually defeated my best efforts to read them.

Which Kissinger would be the author of World Order?

I worried unnecessarily. World Order is a master class on Foreign Affairs given by a virtuoso on the subject.

Kissinger's grasp of the historical and cultural background of the present world situation is comprehensive and deeply learned. His central theme is the perennial interplay between legitimacy and power which he illustrates by examining the evolution of order in successive sphere's of influence: Europe, the Middle East, Asia, the United States. He also dissects how certain key international relationships have arisen and are developing: US-Iran, China-India, Islam with the Christian West. He concludes by assessing what role technology plays now and likely to play in the future.

His leitmotif and touchstone is the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years War, which led to a new concept of the nation state which he calls the Westphalian system. The reason this system is significant is that, "The Westphalian system spread around the world as the framework for a state-based international order spanning multiple civilizations and regions because, as the European nations expanded, they carried the blueprint of their international order with them."

He examines how and why this system worked in Europe in the succeeding centuries, how it came to define modern international relations, and to what extent it applied to other parts of the world during different epochs.

He is at his most engaging and entertaining when he his introducing the vast array of characters who populate this narrative. He peoples his story with a thousand and one fascinating characters: Augustine of Hippo, Richelieu, Bismarck, Kautilya, Palmerston, Sayyid Qutb, Sadat, Mao Zedong, all described in such detail as to seem to be personal friends of Kissinger, or, if not friends, at least the best of enemies.

Kissinger's keen insights and analysis are dispassionate and profound. They are often based on his unequaled direct experience of many of the situations his discusses from the eternal conflict in the Middle East through the reappearance of Islam as a world force to the renaissance of the ancient civilizations of China and India as global powers.

His greatest contribution as a commentator is his ability to place current world affairs deftly into their proper historical context. He combines the insight of a learned historian with the statesman's meticulous grasp of naked realpolitick.

This book is a worthy successor of Diplomacy, and should be highly valued for its clear-sighted, unsentimental, and highly-informed view of current world politics

[Gary · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book has a deep knowledge and eloquence about the history of foreign policy and diplomacy. But its analysis of recent events is rendered treacly by his almost embarrassing unwillingness to say a bad word about any modern president -- and particularly those who have asked him for advice and counsel. Of course, this is the man who was famous for his withering comments about almost everybody and everything, so this gently gently approach not only rings false but robs his comments of any real punch. On the Middle East he essentially throws up his hands in despair and takes refuge in the Huntingtonian thesis of a clash of civilizations and perhaps the inevitability of war. The Islamists' radical denunciation of the Western Westphalian state system -- a phenomenon that could accurately be applied to Germany, France and China at various times in the past -- now makes it impossible to engage. Thus, he essentially dismisses the nuclear talks with Iran on the ideological grounds that the Leader's revolutionary statements mean they can't be trusted. This coming from a man who negotiated with the Soviets and Mao himself. He never addresses Obama's proposal to rebalance US policy toward Asia while reducing US involvement in regional conflicts in the Middle East -- actually a very Kissingerian notion that reflects the purposes of the Nixon Doctrine of which he was a major architect -- but any positive word in that direction would put him at odds with both the Republican leadership and Israel (both of whom generally escape notice in this book). He raises truly important questions at the end: How you can build a modern Westphalian world order in this age when communications and economic globalization are destroying the very borders on which the European state system was founded? His solution -- that these enormous forces must be subjected to international rules and brought under the control of responsible statesmen -- is appealing but lacking in even a rudimentary roadmap. He does stress repeatedly that the Peace of Westphalia was possible only after the ravages of the Thirty Years War had nearly reduced the system to rubble and the statesmen involved were prepared to make decisions out of sheer existential necessity. Perhaps the catastrophes of the modern Middle East will eventually result in such a sober conclave when all the fight has been drained from all parties. But there is no sign that we are there yet.

[Callum's Column · Rating 4 out of 5]

Beginning in Europe, Kissinger outlines four somewhat competing systems of world order. The Thirty Years War, a continuation of sectarian conflict from the 16th-century Reformation, concluded with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. States were henceforth considered sovereign, and aggressor states were to be checked by other states through the balance of power. The Westphalian system spread around the world via European colonisation and mostly underpins contemporary international relations. This said, power politics is not the sole calculus of the current American-led world order.

Alongside Westphalianism, American world order is underpinned by Wilsonianism--i.e., liberal internationalism. American-Wilsonianism, however, has met resistance in the Middle East because Islamic fundamentalists consider non-Islamic orders illegitimate. This is akin to pre-Westphalian Europe where non-Catholic orders were considered illegitimate by the Holy Roman Emperor. Moreover, China aims to restore the hegemonic world order it held prior to the century of humiliation. This is contrary to America's rules-based world order. America is consequently attempting to thwart China's rise through balance of power calculations.

Although published in 2014, some sections of this book are already out of date. For instance, a chapter is designated to the Iran Nuclear Deal, which was perfunctorily torn up by the Trump Administration. Kissinger also analyses recent technological developments but does not mention the possible effects of artificial intelligence (he has just published a book on this subject, though). Nonetheless, Kissinger remains the most consequential practitioner and theorist of international relations in the post-war era. This book is recommended to all individuals seeking to understand contemporary international relations and its historical contingencies.

Addendum:

I wrote the original review about 18 months ago. In the last two months, the American-led liberal international has, and continues to be, torn apart by the current Trump Administration. Traditional allies no longer perceive America as a reliable partner and may even pose a threat—e.g., Denmark's territory of Greenland. President Trump does not care for liberalism. I suspect the world is returning to a Westphalian balance of power politics. This makes America and the West weaker. However, as America's perception of being a "city upon the hill" quickly fades, the idea of the West with American involvement may also be evaporating.

[Saadia B. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Concept of World Order was defined and its implementation determined in Europe. Before that, with no means of interacting with each other on a substantial basis and no framework for measuring the power of one region against another, each order vowed its own as unique and defined others as barbarians.

The structure established in the Peace of Westphalia which represented the first attempt to institutionalise order on the basis of agreed rules and limits and to base it on a multiplicity of powers rather than the dominance of a single country. Westphalian system spread around the world as the framework for a state based international order spanning multiple civilisations and regions.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, America emerged as the new super power. China followed suit with its emerging economy, today China and America are both indispensable pillars of the world order - historically both have exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards the international order they now anchor.

The essence of building a constructive world order is that no single country whether US or China is in a position to fill by itself the world order leadership role that US occupied after Cold War period when it was materially and psychologically preeminent. American policy is to prevent hegemony in Asia while China's policy is to keep potentially adversial forces from its borders.

American foreign policy reflects the conviction that its domestically self-evidently universal and its application at all times is salutary. The openness of American culture and its democratic principles made US a model and refugee for millions. However its compulsion to attack Afghanistan and later on Iraq is one challenge which has no answer to it. The wreck has left the world in havoc. Facts are rarely self explanatory: their significance, analysis and interpretation at least in the foreign policy world depend on content and relevance. Hence the concept of truth is relativized and individualized, losing its universal character.

The Westphalian system followed by US today did not supply a sense of direction, it dealt with methods of allocating and preserving power but gave no answer to the problem of how to generate legitimacy. The structure of the 21st century world order lacks in 4 important dimensions:
1. The nature of the state itself
2. Political and economical organizations of the world are at variance with one another
3. Absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues
4. American leadership has been indispensable, tries to sought a balance between stability and advocacy of universal principles not always reconcilable with the principles of sovereign noninterference

For US, the quest of world order functions on two levels:
a) The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with a recognition of the reality of other regions histories and cultures
b) A purposeful American role will be philosophically and geopolitically imperative for the challenges

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[Olga · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is a fundamental work (both in size and significance) overviewing the attempts made by monarchs, polititians, military leaders etc. throughout the human history to create some kind of 'order' or a (fragile) balance of power in the world where this act is next to impossible because of the profound differences in values, cultures, religions, geostrategies among the major players. This is very sad.

The first step towards creating a better world is imagining one.
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Power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have.
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The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously.
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Peace is more than just the absence of war. It is the presence of justice and stability.
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Only the paranoid survive.
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The future is not a gift. It is an achievement.
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Diplomacy is the art of restraining power.
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A country that demands moral perfection in its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.
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In the long run, national interest and moral values should converge.
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One must always be prepared to negotiate, but never from a position of weakness.
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History teaches by analogy, not by example.
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Disorder is the natural state of the world; order is the result of human effort.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading Henry Kissinger is like listening to Dr. Mengele give tips on handling stress. He's revolting, strangely fascinating, and informative. This book is truer today than when it was written. Kissinger suffered the fate of Cassandra during his last years. He was prophetic, perceptive, and unheeded. Writing WORLD ORDER a dozen years ago, he warned us the contemporary world was marked by extreme disorder and would slide into chaos, anarchy, and hostile power blocks of competing states unless some means to restore a balance of power with legitimacy was found and practiced by statesmen willing to forsake temporary gain at home for a global equilibrium. Alas, No! WORLD ORDER examines the forbidding diplomatic landscape of the twenty-first century, how disorder emerged from a concept of order dating back to the seventeenth century, and the goals and strategies of today's major players. This book is also a study in Murphy's Law: Everything Kissinger assumed in 2014 could go wrong with U.S. foreign policy has gone wrong in 2026. Fasten your seat belts. It's going to be a bumpy ride.


The world has experienced periods of order before, sometimes lasting close to a century. Kissinger defines this troublesome term in a two-fold manner: balance of power and legitimacy. First, world order is based on an equilibrium among major states, with the proviso that they keep minor states in line or prevent them from posing a threat. The balance of power must be neither too tight nor too expansive. A club of nations that is too restrictive has no room for a rising power to join in the future. That newcomer will be tempted to enter the ranks of the major powers by force, or what commentators have recently taken to calling "the Thucydides Trap", invoking ancient Athens and Sparta. Germany tried that gambit in two world wars with disastrous consequences for all concerned, and China might be led down that path today. A balance of power too broad gives its members too much maneuvering room to strike out at rivals. This is not a danger when a power intervenes in its own backyard; the Monroe Doctrine proclaiming American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the Brezhnev Doctrine that held sway over Eastern Europe for four decades are sharp examples, but when a nation embarks on intervention far from home in a place of no consequence to its national security, the balance is endangered. Kissinger cites Soviet intervention in the Middle East and Africa in mounting threats to the global equilibrium during his time in office (1969-1977). An equilibrium, however, is not good enough to keep the peace. A world order must also enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its participants and acceptance by outsiders. The players inside the consortium must agree to the rules: Mutual respect for sovereignty and each other's territory; a reasonable expansion of firepower each year; no interference in the domestic affairs of other members; and institutions to which rival powers may submit disputes for arbitration. These rules must seem legitimate and useful. Every state balances its own claims and objectives against the threat of punishment. In the proper balance, war is too costly to contemplate. Should the balance of power be deemed illegitimate, chaos is bound to ensue. The French revolutionaries of 1789 saw no reason to respect the European order then regnant. They felt it their right and duty to export the French Revolution to other lands ruled by monarchs and other despots. Iran, in Kissinger's eyes, has posed the same threat since its own revolution of 1979. The ayatollahs regard all states, including Muslim ones, to be illegitimate if they are ruled by something other than a Shiite republican theocracy.

World order exists for its own sake and not in pursuit of a higher objective, not even something noble like democracy or justice. That is why the United Nations, quite useful in areas like education and health, has proven highly ineffective at keeping the peace. Lofty goals must be matched by crafty appeals to self-interest. The first successful balance of power in the West, forged at Westphalia in 1648 after the horrific Thirty Years War, diffused the religious tension that had started and fueled the war by letting every German prince pick between Catholicism and Protestantism for his subjects. The Westphalian peace was not a crusade to enthrone Christianity in Europe or anywhere else. The second triumphant effort, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 following the Napoleonic Wars, brought defeated France back into the league of European nations with an extra-continental agent, Great Britain, guaranteeing the balance of power on the continent. Why does such a world order not prevail today? Kissinger's culprits are many, ranging from nations to causes to technological breakthroughs. There is nothing so dangerous, he observes, as a country that mistakes itself for a cause: France in 1789; Russia after 1917; and the Ottoman Empire until it ran out of gas before the gates of Vienna in 1783. Ideologues, individuals and peoples who elevate absolute truth above self-interest are the greatest danger to world order. The Chinese, Russians, Israelis and Arabs can be reasoned with and, within limits, one may make concessions to them. Not so the Iranians, who are bent on a mission to convert the world to Shiite Islam. Their mirror image are Sunni fundamentalist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and those further on the fringe, who aim to topple all states not ruled by Sharia law. Communism has lost all legitimacy and most adherents, but Islamism, of both Shia and Sunni varieties, must be contained, defanged, and only then possibly reconciled to any proposed world order.

Other carriers of world disorder may be less of an immediate threat yet no less worrisome. The rise of non-state actors, from non-governmental organizations to multinational corporations, hinders any attempt at a balance of power before the fact. Worse still for the world if these actors are armed, be they Islamic holy warriors, Hezbollah is a prime example for Kissinger, African warlords, or Latin American guerrillas. Such actors are having a field day due to porous borders that fuel transnational conflicts. In Africa, tiny Rwanda has grabbed a significant chunk of its giant neighbor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by launching an ethnic-based army into contested territory. Proxy wars like this are much more common in the post-Cold War world precisely because no major power exists to squash them. The technology of war has made weapons both cheaper and more lethal than at any time in human history. Africa is awash in guns, and even criminal gangs, including narcos, can go to war with their own states and across borders. A balance of power rests on the power of the state to exercise sovereignty over its own people, yet many states have lost all authority to enforce the law. Kissinger sadly concludes that we are on our way to the "state of nature" described by Hobbes in LEVIATHAN, of "a war of all against all", both between states and inside them. Such confrontations have the power to turn nuclear sooner rather than later. Kissinger advocates keeping the club of nuclear powers restricted to the seven nations that admit possession of nukes: the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, and conceding de facto admission to the two that do not, Israel and North Korea. Other nations must follow the example of South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina and stop their programs, though he admits this sounds like "nuclear apartheid". Developments in information technology, the internet, social media, and cell phones, by providing instant access and pseudo-analysis of politics and diplomacy, have accelerated the process of global breakdown and made it worse. K. sounds weirdly post-modern when he bemoans the loss of individual identity and the habits of reflection and nuanced understanding to the juggernaut of the PC.

Kissinger's take on how the world arrived at a state of near anarchy starts with result and works its way back to cause. First comes an overview of the players contending for regional and at times global reach. When he became Secretary of State in 1973, Kissinger said it would be "The Year of Europe" in American diplomacy, until crises from Indochina to Chile to the Middle East turned his attention elsewhere. That's how he views Europe today, beautiful and irrelevant. The great achievements of the European Union (EU) and its predecessor, the Common Market, along with NATO, were economic recovery after 1945, with American help during the Marshall Plan, and returning Germany to its rightful place inside Europe rather than an existential danger from the outside. However, NATO lost its raison d'etre after the Cold War, and eastward expansion towards the frontiers of Russia is a dubious project, at best. The EU, without an army and under an American nuclear shield, must rely on the model of integration and humanitarian missions abroad to stay relevant, and those are hardly the marks of a great power. Oddly, Russia merits little space in this Kissinger opus. A Eurasian power without fitting in neatly in either continent, Russia has largely withdrawn from Soviet-era engagements in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and, to paraphrase what Dean Acheson said about post-war Britain, "lost an empire and not found a role". Asia too, K. ponders, is busy trying to be born in a new world. The Japanese cannily utilized their defeat and occupation in 1945 to move into the U.S. camp during the Cold War while severely restricting their own defense forces in obedience to the American-written constitution. Both moves allowed Japan to focus almost exclusively on economic expansion. But today Japan's Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union, is extinct, China poses no military threat but instead has turned into a major economic rival, and many Japanese question the validity of such close ties to America. One thing that might inflame Northeast Asia is the eccentric state of North Korea. Finding it impossible to compete economically with the South, the North is a rogue state armed with nuclear weapons that is adept at blackmail. The Kim dynasty is an embarrassment and burden to China, but the Chinese find its troublemaker role useful in any dealings with the U.S. and Japan. The North knows it could never survive an armed confrontation with the South and the U.S. and is willing to bet neither of these parties dares risk such a confrontation. This is a perfect formula for stagnation on the Korean Peninsula. India is a strange fruit in world affairs. Indian neutrality in the Cold War allowed the Nehru family to play off the superpowers against one another while India developed its own nuclear arsenal. In the twenty-first century, border disputes with China, the constant threat of nuclear war with Pakistan, and little influence outside the subcontinent keep India from contributing to world order for now.

Kissinger is an old China hand, and devotes dozens of pages to the puzzling Middle Kingdom. Communist China has inherited the messianic pretense of the Chinese Empire, "the center of the World" while dropping, under Deng, its policy of isolation. Still, these two strains in the Chinese weltanschauung contradict each other; since China is too good for the rest of the world, why integrate with it? Nevertheless, Kissinger credits Deng and his successors with developing a foreign policy that while not contributing to world order does not, at the moment, cause global disruption either. The Chinese characteristically hold back from full confrontation while exerting power. China fought a war with Vietnam in 1979 to contain Hanoi. Beijing's border skirmishes with India have never reached critical mass. Taiwan in an issue the Communist leaders are willing to put off the table for future resolution. Chinese claims on island territory in the Pacific are not backed by a strong navy. Above all, Chinese diplomatic and trade disputes with the West, starting with the U.S., are kept within bounds by Beijing lest they harm the Chinese economy. China, unlike Germany in the twentieth century, may be admitted to the concert of nations peacefully and in due time.

The Middle East has been the problem child of U.S. foreign policy at least since 1967, and is at the same time the site of Kissinger's greatest triumphs; the disengagement accords between Egypt, Syria, and Israel from 1973-1977, and still in force, K. notes with pride. Why then, has there been no lasting peace? The parties in this conflict are intransigent in different ways. The Israelis are tough on the issue of ceding any of their territory. The Arabs, Egypt and Jordan aside, (this was before the Abrahamic Accords) withhold recognition of Israel until the Palestinian question is settled. But, a Palestinian state cannot be established until the Israelis are guaranteed safe borders, bringing the question back to land. The Saudis, with their rich desert kingdom, substantial Shia minority, and unable to defend their borders, want only gradual change in the status quo. The Joker in this deck is Iran. A country and a cause on the cusp of building an atomic bomb is the nightmare scenario for both Arabs and Israelis. The Iranians must curtail their regional ambitions before the U.S. may cautiously engage them in talks. It remains to be seen, K. cautions, whether Iran is truly willing to negotiate the future of its nuclear program or just buying time by making small tactical concessions.

The world has reached a stage of near anarchy because the U.S. gradually lost its axial role in the balance of power forged after 1945. Kissinger sees this failure in philosophical terms. From the founding of the republic Americans have been torn between wanting to see their model of peaceful democracy take hold overseas, typified by Woodrow Wilson at Versailles, and striking a balance of power between foreign nations and the U.S., a path favored by Theodore Roosevelt. Americans regard the making of such a balance as a dirty business best left to Europeans, yet they cannot easily discard it either. Franklin Roosevelt brilliantly blended these two rivers during the Second World War, though he was naive to entrust the future of peace to the United Nations. Truman crafted a world order after 1945 built around military alliances, starting with the Truman Doctrine in Western Europe. NATO contained the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991, and gave Europeans the security they needed to recover. However, he acted disastrously in Korea by first authorizing a takeover of the North in the name of democracy, and then limiting the war to the defense of the South in the face of Chinese intervention. Eisenhower was an apt player of balance of power politics, negotiating with Khrushchev from a position of strength, but unfortunately under Kennedy and Johnson the U.S. launched a crusade in Vietnam to build a free nation in the South while bombing but not invading the North. America lost more than a war in Vietnam, K. lectures. It lost confidence in itself to have a foreign policy at all. Many "critics of the war" thought the U.S. was the evil party, and not just in Indochina. It would be better to retreat and remain safe and pure at home. Moralism, Kissinger's bete noire, had returned to plague America. The time had come for a return to realpolitik. Kissinger pats himself and Nixon, "something of a Wilsonian", on the back for rearranging the world after 1969. Vietnam war nothing but a eyesore in U.S. foreign policy. Bombing the North and propping up the South was required to gain time for the U.S. to evacuate Indochina. The real challenge was to negotiate with Russia and China separately and get them to see each stood to gain more by building bridges with America than in propping up proxies abroad. China proved the tougher target. Nixon never interfered in Chinese domestic affairs, criticized human rights violations by the Communists, or promoted American democracy to Mao. A de facto alliance between Washington and Beijing against Moscow, and later strong economic ties between them worked best at preserving the peace in Asia, and still does.

Kissinger's assessment of U.S. wars since 1945 is stark and sobering. In only one war were American objectives reached. Korea ended in a tie; Vietnam was lost; the Persian Gulf War, limited by George H.W. Bush to expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and nothing more, came to fruition; the Iraq War, launched by his son, turned disastrous when the U.S. undertook nation-building; and the Afghanistan War, still going on when this book was published, is headed in the same direction. What went wrong with all these ventures, save one, is what Kissinger on one occasion called "confusing foreign policy with missionary work". America can certainly declare principles for which it stands, liberty, democracy, self-determination, human rights, and propose them at international forums like the United Nations. In fact, few nations would follow America's lead if it did not. But, to make these principles the operating tool and goal of American diplomacy, and insist that other nations adopt them too, is a recipe for frustration and disaster.

Kissinger ends his survey of world disorder with a worst-case scenario: America and other developed states confront the specter of isolationism. A nationalist demagogue employing the tools of the information age and sucking up to the electorate by offering short, painless solutions to national and international problems is elected and proceeds to withdraw from the world, turning his country into a fortress while other nations do the same. Such a world would split up into rival power blocks and zones of interest, and that is the very opposite of a balance of power. Europeans thought that way at the start of the twentieth century and a world war followed consequently. Europe and America dissolved into isolationism in the Twenties and the result was Hitler, militarist Japan, and another world war. American power went into decline after Vietnam and the world lost the one nation that could keep enemies at bay. Are we on the brink of another war? Kissinger thinks for now the powerful states will trade insults and shoot tariffs, not artillery shells at one another, but he still believes in the power of reason. Who yet does?

[Laura Noggle · Rating 2 out of 5]

“Once you've been to Cambodia, you'll never stop wanting to beat Henry Kissinger to death with your bare hands. You will never again be able to open a newspaper and read about that treacherous, prevaricating, murderous scumbag sitting down for a nice chat with Charlie Rose or attending some black-tie affair for a new glossy magazine without choking. Witness what Henry did in Cambodia - the fruits of his genius for statesmanship - and you will never understand why he's not sitting in the dock at The Hague next to Milosevic. While Henry continues to nibble nori rolls and remaki at A-list parties, Cambodia, the neutral nation he secretly and illegally bombed, invaded, undermined, and then threw to the dogs, is still trying to raise itself up on its one remaining leg.”

— Anthony Bourdain, from his book *A Cook's Tour: Global Adventures in Extreme Cuisines*

[Domhnall · Rating 5 out of 5]

I do not share many opinions with Kissinger - and he will not be very troubled to hear this - but given that he has played such an important part in world politics, and has been directly engaged in decisions as serious as war and peace, it is well worth while to see the myths by which he lives.

The first two chapters set out his understanding of power politics. "No truly global "world order" has ever existed. What passes for order in our time was devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago at a peace conference in the German region of Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of most other continents or civilisations... The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other's domestic affairs and checking each other's ambitions through a general equilibrium of power... Division and multiplicity, an accident of Europe's history, became the hallmarks of a new system of international order with its own distinct outlook." He contrasts this system with the Russian project of that time, to impose a single, autocratic ruler and a unified religious orthodoxy over a continually expanding empire; with the Chinese Emperor holding sway over "All Under Heaven," the pinnacle of a cultural hierarchy radiating from the centre of the world in the Chinese capital outward to all of humanity; with Islam's vision of a single, divinely sanctioned governance uniting and pacifying the world. Kissinger argues that in time, the USA also departed from the Westphalian model, instead advocating liberal democracy and free market economics as a universal aspiration to be actively promoted and even imposed. He never actually seems to criticise the USA's actions, but it is hard not to use his theoretical framework to identify major problems.

Kissinger's sweeping survey of the use made in Europe of the Balance of Power, not to prevent war but to restrain its violence and scope, is to my mind very clever, culminating in a snappy explanation for the outbreak and consequences of the First World War. With his model in mind, it becomes terribly easy to see the strategic disaster of the way that war was ended, failing to draw either Germany or Russia into the new order, installing a string of small and hard to defend states along their borders, virtually inviting the great powers to snack on them at leisure. He contrasts this with the 1815 peace after the defeat of Napoleon, when France was immediately restored to its proper place in the order of things.

He moves on to give a dry and not very useful account of the Middle East and modern Islam, in which Israel is hardly noticed, before a much more lively chapter about Iran. This is both informative and, to my surprise, respectful of the Iranian approach to diplomacy. Quite simply the Iranian strategy is to seek the complete removal of American and Western influence from the region and to replace the colonial legacy with a restoration of Islamic culture. It is not difficult to consider this account as one that would be compatible with the sentiments in Edward Said's Orientalism, as others too have observed. Of course, Kissinger does not dwell on the negative aspects of America's role in the region. Although this comes later in the book, his account of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are brief but not without insights. His discussion of Afghanistan especially give a strong impression that he has no patience with American fantasies about the introduction of a western style democracy into a land of diverse local tribes, lacking traditions of even centralized government, and he implies that stronger neighbours will almost certainly intervene in time, reiterating the violent cycle.

His discussions of Japan and of India are succinct. He has far more to say about China, not least to emphasize the continuity of modern and historic Chinese diplomatic strategies, but he talks about Mao in such bland terms that we have to assume he is being diplomatic himself. This does not matter - we have other sources for that.

Two chapters directly concerned with the history of the USA give a very clear exposition of the major events of the past two centuries and offer some good insights, notably in his brief discussion of the Vietnam War and the domestic US opposition to that. He is not at all embarrassed to describe the various expressions of American "exceptionalism" which to my mind are in fact unpleasant. He quotes Thomas Jefferson: "We feel that we are acting under obligations not confined to the limits of our own society. It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members." This is a thread running through the story of the USA, heard for instance in President Reagan's speech about the USA as a "City on the Hill." I have no problem with the idea that the world should watch and learn from America's experience, albeit many of those lessons are starkly negative, but I do object to the delusion that the world offers no reciprocal lessons for the Americans.

The book closes with a review of some implications of new technologies, most importantly nuclear weapons and proliferation, but also cyber warfare and the political impact of the internet and search engines. "For most of history, technological change unfolded over decades and centuries of incremental advances that refined and combined existing technologies. Even radical innovations could over time be fitted within previous tactical and strategic doctrines: tanks were considered in terms of precedents drawn from centuries of cavalry warfare, airplanes could be conceptualised as another form of artillery, battleships as mobile forts, and aircraft carriers as airstrips. For all their magnification of destructive power, even nuclear weapons are in some respects an extrapolation from previous experience." He goes on from this to worry that computers and the internet might present insoluble problems but that is hardly the lesson to draw from the lines just quoted.

He seems specifically worried that the role of serious minded foreign policy experts might be undermined and a lower calibre of politician attracted to high office. "What once had been substantive debates about the content of governance will reduce candidates to being spokesmen for a marketing effort... The candidates' main role may become fund-raising rather than the elaboration of issues. Is the marketing effort designed to convey the candidates' convictions or are the convictions expressed by the candidate the reflections of a "big-data" research effort...? If the gap between the qualities required for election and those essential for the conduct of office becomes too wide, the conceptual grasp and sense of history that should be part of foreign policy may be lost..."

This book will certainly help to give us a better "conceptual grasp and sense of history." It does paint a pretty picture of American activities on the world stage, and omits mention altogether of some difficult topics - notably Israel, or Central America - but to be fair it leaves enough material to permit a more challenging interpretation. If he were forced to be honest, I am confident he would agree that America's role as a "City on the Hill" is simply not in keeping with the Westphalian values which Kissinger presents as such an excellent model for a new world order. He does not advocate a perfect world, but one that we can all live in, with our diverse values and priorities. I like that model and much to my surprise, I very much liked Kissinger's book.

[Maciej Nowicki · Rating 4 out of 5]

World Order is an impressive study that focuses on the geopolitical distribution of power. The book methodically provides a multitude of studies enhanced by anecdotal personal experience of the author.

Worth to say that Henry Kissinger served as the 56th Secretary of State under presidents Nixon and Ford and as the National Security Advisor for six years. During that time he pioneered the policy vs the Soviet Union. He orchestrated the opening of relations with China and negotiated the Paris peace accord which accomplished the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.

Anyway, the book covers roughly 400 years of diplomatic geopolitical and military history and five continents. The author focuses predominantly on Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the US. The chapters detail the regional history and a perspective on cultural differences that create fracturing in understanding and negotiation. In the beginning, we receive a tract describing the distribution of power in Europe and how the Peace of Westphalia gave the model for stability. From this point on, the author refers to the Westphalian model regularly.

World order is also a comprehensive analysis of the challenges of building international order in a world of differing perspectives, violent conflicts, burgeoning technology and ideological extremism. In addition, the book states many great questions which might be really suprising, but the most important one is... (if you like to read my full review please visit my blog: https://leadersarereaders.blog/world-...)

[Syed Fathi · Rating 3 out of 5]

As oppose to many mainstream media - many regards Kissinger as a war criminal. The architect of many US-backed coup and war around the world especially during his tenure as national security advisor during Nixon's presidency. The most memorable and shameful of all was the US war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which minimum estimate put the death toll at at least 4 million people.

Having this fact in mind, it is a hypocrite at a maximum level when in the book, Kissinger mark US role in the global order as "acting for all mankind", he talked about how US would go into war to spread democracy, freedom and its value, while in reality it supported various coup and suppressive regimes for their national interest. But one thing I admire him most, is his effort to justify all wars no matter how shameful it was, even if it was popularly oppose domestically.

The book also show case Kissinger's strong belief in the American Exceptionalism, phrases like "US was not simply a country but an engine of God's plan and epitome of world order", "international society was like a frontier settlement without an effective police force", "America would emerge as the decisive guardian of the global balance and international peace", "American idealism and exceptionalism were the driving forces behind the building of a new international order" was everywhere in the book.

Having said all these, it does not mean that the book lack some good quality in term of knowledge and thought. His explanation on how Europe overcome their war torn countries and resolving to eventually develop Wesphalian system was helpful and easy to understand. His analysis on Japan, China and India will help reader to understand why nations treat their foreign policy differently. Lastly, his conclusion on the rising power of social media also will guide readers on the question why we tend to diverge on the definition of truth.

[Trish · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book that begs to be studied, not just read. Kissinger has spent his career thinking about world order and in this book he looks both forward and back, eliminating much of the static in the view we have of historical events. The result is a clear outline of national interests, power, and its balance through recent history, centered especially on the U.S. perspective, its intents and its perceived responsibilities. The discussion is helpful, and useful. However, in eliminating the “noise” from the systems and structures he presents, Kissinger may lead us to think within the framework he has created. In looking forward, a new world order must be something outside any previous framework: “wisdom counsels that a different path must be chosen. To undertake a journey on a road never before traveled requires character and courage…” The cyber world developing around us changes everything.

A reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge to statesmanship of our time.

Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia after the Thirty Years’ War of 1618-48 in which nearly a quarter of Central Europe’s population was decimated, we see the structure of world order based on national sovereignty:

The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation to reality, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s ambitions through a general equilibrium of power. No single claim to truth or universal rule had prevailed in Europe’s contests. Instead, each state was assigned the attribute of sovereign power over its territory. Each would acknowledge the domestic structures and religions vocations of its fellow states as realities and refrain from challenging their existence. With a balance of power now perceived as natural and desirable, the ambitions of rulers would be set in counterpose against each other, at least in theory curtailing the scope of conflicts. Division and multiplicity, an accident of Europe’s history, became the hallmarks of a new system of international order with this own distinct philosophical outlook. In this sense the European effort to end its conflagration shaped and prefigured the modern sensibility: it reserved judgment on the absolute in favor of the practical and ecumenical; it sought to distill order from multiplicity and restraint.

Although China had little involvement with the world and no interest in the Westphalian system of order for centuries, it adheres to and calls on its principles now, when that system of beliefs is being eroded and perhaps even abandoned by the West. Kissinger points out that the Westphalian system of world order based on precepts of national sovereignty and non-interference in other nations’ affairs, is not working in the way it had been for centuries. Kissinger suggests that while in Asia states still adhere to the Westphalian model, the system is breaking down in Europe where economic and military interests are grouped while political power is based on the nation. In the Middle East, a radical Islamic group seeks to operate regionally, ignoring state boundaries. Since 2001 the United Nations has adopted new responsibilities that directly challenge Westphalian principles: asserting the “the responsibility to protect and intervention as a duty of care” even within the boundaries sovereign states. The cyber world features asymmetric power imbalances in which one laptop outside the boundaries of a nation can disable powerful national and international systems.

Regarding technological changes that have changed our notion of speed, and information, Kissinger says

Cyberspace has become strategically indispensable…The history of warfare shows that every technological offensive capability will eventually be matched and offset by defensive measures, although not every country will be equally able to afford them, Does this mean that technologically less advanced countries must shelter under the protection of high-tech societies?...Nor is it possible to base deterrence in cyberspace on symmetrical retaliation, as in the case with nuclear weapons…In the end, a framework for organizing the global cyber environment will be imperative…
The dilemma of such technologies is that it is impossible to establish rules of conduct unless a common understanding of at least some of the key capabilities exists. But these are precisely the capabilities the major actors will be reluctant to disclose…In this manner, asymmetry and a kind of congenital world disorder are built into relations between cyber powers both in diplomacy and strategy. The emphasis of many strategic rivalries is shifting from the physical to the information realm, in the collection and processing of data, the penetration of networks, and the manipulation of psychology. Absent articulation of some rules of international conduct, a crisis will arise from the inner dynamics of the system.

I guess we have Snowden to thank for revealing that “all is known.” Warfare can now move to the psychological: What is it you think you know? There is perhaps no better time to think about the imperative for establishment of a new world order. Kissinger suggests that America must retain her moral compass but not abandon her sense of realism.

Society needs to adapt its education policy ultimate imperatives in the long-term direction of the country and in the cultivation of its values. The inventors of the devices that have so revolutionized the collection and sharing of information can make an equal if not greater contribution by devising means to deepen its conceptual foundation. On the way to the first truly global world order, the great human achievements of technology must be fused with enhanced powers of humane, transcendent, and moral judgment.

The suggestion that the technologists that bring us our systems for connection be involved in “deepening its conceptual foundations” is an interesting one. But perhaps more importantly, we need to move as the people of one nation to make that understanding of the internet's uses and abuses a part of our moral and ethical decision-making. These things can be taught.

The task ahead seems insurmountable, and the tasks addressed without knowing the outcomes of our choices. Kissinger reminds us that

the Westphalian system was drafted by some two hundred delegates, none of whom has entered the annals of history as a major figure, who met in two provincial German towns forty miles apart (a significant distance in the seventeenth century) in two separate groups. They overcame their obstacles because they shared the devastating experience of the Thirty Years’ War, and they were determined to prevent its recurrence. Our time, facing even graver prospects, needs to act on its necessities before it is engulfed by them.

Kissinger leaves us with a series of questions we need to ask ourselves in order to frame an outline to begin discussing this issue in earnest. It is a gift. Elder statesmen are rare beings, and whatever else he may have been called, Kissinger can claim that title. He is now an old man, an old man with long vision. He helps us by reminding us to get a grip, look within, take stock of our urgent responsibilities to our children, to be brave and take the steps needed to preserve and protect our country and our liberty.

To this point, I have addressed and quoted only the first and final pages of this book. In the rest of it, Kissinger gives us distilled observations, opinions, and insights from a lifetime of looking at historical underpinnings and the foreign affairs of nations, and of our own. There is no flab in these pages. It is enlightening. Kissinger was at his influence apogee in the Nixon administration and he speaks longingly of Nixon’s willingness and ability to think in strategic terms:

Nixon treated foreign policy as an endeavor with no end, as a set of rhythms to be managed. He dealt with its intricacies and contradictions like school assignments by an especially demanding teacher.

We have that teacher in this book, challenging us to lead.

I listened to the Penguin Random House Audio of this title, read with appropriate pacing and gravitas by Nicholas Hormann. Listening helped to bring some elements of the discussion into clarity. I supplemented listening with the text, published by Penguin.

[Elham Yaghoobi · Rating 1 out of 5]

افتصاحی که در ورق طلا جلد شده😁!!
کتاب بسیار کند جلو میرفت و از یه جایی به بعد نتونستم ادامه‌اش بدم!!! یک ستاره هم بخاطر اطلاعات جدیدی هس که بدست آوردم از دیدگاه یه سیاستمدار کهنه‌کار آمریکایی درباره جهانه!
اینکه آمریکا نقش پدر رو برای جهان داره و اونه که به جهان نظم میده و کشورها رو هدایت میکنه. نظم آسیا هم توسط آمریکا و اروپا داده شده و آسیا خودش به تنهایی تو باقالیا بوده و جنگجو و جنگخو!
جالبه هرجا که بریده‌هایی از کتاب بود که کلیی ازش تعریف کرده بودن نهایت از فصل یک و دو بود اگه وارد فصل سه و چهار و پنج میشدید مدام کلیشه‌ی آقایی و سروری آمریکا و بدبخت بودن بقیه مردم جهان میخورد تو صورتتون! بدون کوچکترین اشاره به جنایت آمریکا تو ژاپن یا جنایت انگلیس در هند و چین و..!
جالبه که این کلیشه الان که تو دوران کرونا هستیم واقعا دیدنیه!! همه دنیا یکجوریم نه آقایی هست نه گدایی:))

[Ahmed Taher · Rating 3 out of 5]

إحنا طيبين أوي يا خال :( ..
This book should've been named "The American order"!

[Andrew · Rating 2 out of 5]

A certain fellow reader was recently so right in a recommendation that I rushed to this.

Prematurely.

Now, it's not Dr. Kissinger's fault that I've studied Europe and India and China, and learned about Westphalia and the Arthashastra and George Macartney's embassy to China, and didn't need to hear about it again. But, frankly, anyone reading Kissinger shouldn't be new to these ideas and so there's not a lot of original material or even analysis here. Balance of power, American exceptionalism, contemporary multipolarity. Seen it. Heard it. And read it better elsewhere.

So, not his best work. Check out Diplomacy instead.

Also on Twitter and Tumblr

[Chet Herbert · Rating 3 out of 5]

Excellent beginning; astute historical analysis, especially regarding the evolutionary nature of the balancing of power, legitimacy, and order in Europe from the seventeenth century Peace of Westphalia, through the Congress of Vienna in the wake of Napoleon's wars, up to collapse of order with the First World War. Kissinger is at his weakest in presenting a shockingly whitewashed and rhetorically idealistic foundation of United States' concept of order as "Acting for All Mankind". . . a cherry-picked, feel-good, American Exceptionalism story ([America] expanded across a continent in the name of Manifest Destiny while abjuring imperial designs; exerted a decisive influence on momentous events while disclaiming any motivation of national interest. . ." so much for Realism, Henry) leaving out inconvenient things like, say, atrocities committed against American Indians, brutal suppression of Filipino resistance after American acquisition of the islands during the Spanish-American War, or the frequent intervention of the U.S. government on the behalf corporate interests world-wide (United Fruit in Guatemala? or messy regime change in Iraq [or Chile, eh Henry?]) Kissinger is better with his brief global summations, emphasizing that nations play better together when they have a vested interest to do so and that it's probably important to have an understanding of the historical, cultural, religious, and psycho-social make-up of nations one is dealing with because wishful thinking or willful ignorance isn't a very effective foreign policy strategy.

[Emiliya Bozhilova · Rating 2 out of 5]

Имах значително по-високо мнение за Кисинджър преди да прочета негова книга, случи се да е тази. Дори от неласкавите портрети, които му бяха обрисували противниците му, включително Ориана Фалачи и нейното прочуто интервю, пак очаквах повече дълбочина.

Вместо това се озовах с една от онези пропагандни листовки от времето на Студената война, възхваляваща другата страна на барикадата, вместо социалистическия рай. Или с една от онези сектантски листовки от времето на Прехода, които ловяха заблудени души, а самите секти - накрая - бяха забранени за щастие, но не и преди да нанесат много вреди.

Месианската, дадена от Бога и от силата на тоягата, мисия на Америка дори не е нужно да се коментира. Световният полицай е и световен мисионер - спасява нации и души, като ги предава на огъня, ако трябва. Нищо ново. Хей, доктор Кисинджър, та Вие сте ветеран в тази игра, и нищо ново? Куп кухи фрази.

Саудитска Арабия е разгледана почти с любов. Тя е вечният, необходим съюзник на САЩ, който не бива да бъде притесняван с неприятни намеци за свободи или права. За разлика от брата-близнак Иран (само дето е шиитски, а не сунитски), който пък е коварен и подмолен.

Точни наблюдения има за ислямския радикализъм, който е наднационален и негова цел е целият свят. Такава е обаче и целта на външната политика на САЩ. Идейно разликата трябва да е огромна, но след прочита такава просто липсва. А се надявах на обратното.

Концепцията за Вестфалския мир от 17-ти век за мен беше нова, и е ценна с тезата за равновесието на конкуриращи се сили като удачен механизъм за баланс и поддържане на ред на европейската сцена.

Имаше интересни исторически наблюдения за Европа, Индия и Китай. Но като цяло схематични, а Европа е привидяна изцяло в прегръдката на Големия Брат.

Войната във Виетнам е щрихирана изцяло от защитна позиция - тя (войната), видите ли, била разумен дебат, но не била доразбрана... Оценките на Кисинджър за бойните действия в Ирак и Афганистан са в пълен синхрон с предаванията на CNN за мироопазващата война и бодрото изстрелване на ракети в кадър.

Ролята на Кисинджър на официалната сцена е приключила през 1977 г. Какъв късмет за всички!

***
🇺🇸”Външната политика на Америка отразява убеждението, че вътрешните и принципи очевидно са универсални сами по себе си и че е добре да се прилагат винаги и навсякъде”

🇺🇸 За Виетнамската война и участието на САЩ:
”Правителствата, които вкарват Америка в Индокитай, са съставени от личности със значителна интелигентност и умение, които внезапно се оказват обвинявани в престъпна лудост и нарочни лъжи.”

🇺🇸 За политиката към Ирак, Иран и региона:
”В тези условия Америка трябва да реши как да постигне най-доброто съчетание между сигурност и моралност, осъзнавайки, че няма как да постигне и двете.”

🇺🇸 “Американският идеализъм и изключителност са движещите сили, стоящи зад изграждането на един нов международен ред.”

🇺🇸 “Изпълнен от убеждението, че разпространението му би обединило цялото човечество, ислямът е едновременно религия, мултиетническа държава и нов световен ред.”

🇺🇸 “САЩ имат достатъчно исторически и геополитически основания да насърчават ЕС и да го предпазват да не се измести към един геополитически вакуум.”

[Orestis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ένα εξαιρετικό βιβλίο για όσους ενδιαφέρονται να καταλάβουν το υπόβαθρο πίσω από ορισμένες αποφάσεις των σημερινών κρατών. Ο Κίσινγκερ μας ξεναγεί στον κόσμο της παγκόσμιας διπλωματίας και γεωπολιτικής.
Στις σελίδες του θα δούμε την ίδρυση της τάξης στην Ευρώπη στην βάση της ισορροπίας δυνάμεων μέσω της συμφωνίας ης Βεστφαλίας και της Βιέννης, για να τερματιστούν οι εχθροπραξίες που είχαν ρημάξει την ήπειρο κατά των τριακονταετή πόλεμο. Την ελαστική ισορροπία στην ανατολική Ασία. Την αιώνια ανισορροπία στην μέση ανατολή. Την αιώνια αμφιταλάντευση των ΗΠΑ ανάμεσα στις αρχές του Τζέφερσον και του Γουίλσον και την ανάγκη της για παγκόσμια ισχύ.
Βλέπουμε τον κόσμο από τα μάτια του Κίσσινγκερ και η προσωπικότητα του δεν θα μπορούσε να αφήσει την αφήγηση ανεπηρέαστη. Δεν αναφέρει ουτε μια φράση για τα οικόνομικα συμφέροντα των ΗΠΑ. Τα συγχωνεύει όλα στην λέξη "ισχύς". Είμαι της αποψής ότι τα οικονομικά συμφέροντα διαφέρουν από τα γεωπολιτικά.
Κατά τα άλλα, μεταφέρει όλη την γνώση που χρειάζεται ο σύγχρονος άνθρωπος για να καταλάβει τι γίνεται στον κόσμο σήμερα. Διαβάστε το με κριτική σκέψη και ανοιχτό μυαλό.

Soundtrack βιβλίου: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9Grm...

[أنس برادة · Rating 4 out of 5]

كتاب يخرج زبدة نظر هنري كينسنجر للنظام العالمي عبر فصول عدة ابتدأ بأوروبا و مسارها المحدد لهذا النظام منذ سلام وستفاليا إلى أوروبا العالمية الأولى مرورا
بتحولات القرن الثامن عشر و التاسع عشر ، انتقل إلى الحرب العالمية الثانية و هواجس السلام في الإتحاد الأوروبي و تماسكه .
في الفصل الثالت يحاور الشرق الأوسط منذ بزوغ فجر الإسلام ثم يقفز إلى الحركة الإسلاموية المعاصرة و مواقع عدة دول فيه ، السعودية و إيران خصوصا ثم يمر على تعددية آسيا و كيف يفهمها و خصوصا الصين و الهند .
يعطف على نظرة أمريكا للنظام العالمي بين الواقعية و المثالية و هما النظريتان اللتان تتجاذبان السياسة الخارجبة الأمريكية ، ثم في فصل أمريكا قوة عالمية مترددة ينتقد حروب أمريكا منذ انتصارها في الحرب العالمية الثانية و يبين مشاكلها الإستراتيجية و عواقبها على دور أمريكا في العالم .
له فصول بعد ذلك في التكنولوجيا النووية و تكنولوجيا المعلومات و تأثيرها في النظام العالمي .
كتاب له حظه من النظر في تعريف النظرة الأمريكية إلى النظام العالمي .

[Ahmed Abdelhamid · Rating 1 out of 5]

Skewed!

The book promotes an American propaganda view of world-history in pursuit of World order...

for instance,
For Mr Henry, Iran was in love with US politics, until their revolution. Then they changed the course, but now we (Iran and US) have to get back together. As if the revolution, was not in fact to get rid of this "love-affair", or that the current Iran is still in revolution against the whole world-order.

Even though, in many sections of the book Mr Henry showed a great deal of insight, but always the US propaganda version of history-present politics pop-up.

I thought reading for a journalist is the worse thing a one could do with his time, but politicians beat that!

[Viet Nguyen · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Trật tự thế giới” (World Order) của Henry Kissinger là một quyến sách rất hay! Hay đến nỗi tôi thấy mình phải viết một bài review dài thật dài về quyển sách này, vì nó đã cho tôi rất nhiều bài học về chính trị, lịch sử, quan hệ ngoại giao giữa các nước. Cộng thêm đây là một trong những cuốn sách đầu tiên tôi đọc về quan hệ quốc tế, nên kiến thức vẫn còn có vẻ hơi nông, rating cao một phần là do tôi được “khai sáng” :) Nếu đọc thêm những review khác trên Goodreads này thì thấy Kissinger là môt nhân vật đầy tranh cãi. Nhưng nếu chỉ xét về nội dung và bỏ qua các kiến thức nền thì tôi thấy vẫn nên cho sách rating cao vì sự logic cao và cái nhìn tổng quan của tác giả.

Sách bắt đầu từ châu Âu, với một sự kiện quan trọng là hoà ước Westphalia năm 1648 kí giữa các nước sau 30 năm chiên tranh tôn giáo. Nó quan trọng vì nó thiết lập nên hệ thống trật tự thế giới mới ở Châu Âu, dựa trên khái niệm các quốc gia có chủ quyền tồn tại bên cạnh nhau. Trong hoà ước Westphalia, một số các nguyên tắc gồm có: sự xâm lược giữa các nước bị kiềm chế bởi tính toán về cân bằng quyền lực, và một chuẩn mực mới được thiết lập chống lại việc một quốc gia can thiệp vào tình hình bên trong một quốc gia khác. Về sau này, khi ảnh hưởng của châu Âu lan rộng khắp thế giới, những nguyên tắc Westphalian này, đặc biệt là khái niệm quốc gia có chủ quyền, bắt đầu trở thành trọng tâm của luật pháp quốc tế. Trật tự Westphalia được nói lại xuyên suốt sách vì nó rất phổ biến trên thế giới hiện nay, nhưng nó không phải là duy nhất, và phần sau của cuốn sách miêu tả những trật tự thế giới khác có mâu thuẩn với nó.

Trớ trêu là mặc dù châu Âu là nơi sản sinh ra trật tự Westphalia, cộng đồng này giờ lại đang rời xa nó. Sau nhiều thế kỉ bị chiến tranh tàn phá, các nước châu Âu giờ đang hướng tới một lục địa hoà bình và thống nhất: mỗi nước thành viên chủ động kiềm chế sức mạnh của mình và cam kết không tranh chấp lãnh thổ. Thế nhưng vì mục tiêu này, Châu Âu đang bị đặt ở thế khó trong hoàn cảnh thế giới hiện nay: Các nước hoặc các khu vực khác không có được cam kết quyết tâm như vậy mà vẫn đang ra sức gia tăng sức mạnh và tầm ảnh hưởng, như Trung Quốc, Iran. Nếu châu Âu không tham gia vào tiến trình xây dựng trật tự thế giới, nó có khả năng sẽ bị nhấn chìm.

Sau châu Âu là đến thế giới Hồi giáo. Thế giới Hồi giáo có một cái nhìn khác hẳn về trật tự thế giới: Hồi giáo chia thế giới thành hai, một bên là thế giới Hồi giáo, bên kia là phi Hồi giáo, và nhiệm vụ của thế giới Hồi giáo là biến phần còn lại thành thế giới Hồi giáo trong một sứ mệnh jihad ( thánh chiến). Quan niệm này tất nhiên mâu thuẫn với trật tự Westphalia, vì những khái niệm như “nhà nước” là không được công nhân trong Hồi giáo, chúng chỉ là những khải niệm thế tục, không chính thống. Thế giới hồi giáo được miêu tả chỉ trong một chương sách, có phần hơi ít so với sự phức tạp của nó. Tôi biết được thêm một số kiến thức như là cuộc xung đột giữa hai nhánh hồi giáo Sunni và Shia. Nguồn gốc sâu xa của sự chia rẽ này là tranh cãi xoay quanh ai là người nối nghiệp nhà tiên tri Mohamed để lãnh đạo Hồi giáo sau cái chết của ông. Hiện tại ở Trung Đông, dòng Shia được lãnh đạo hay chịu ảnh hưởng từ Iran và bao gồm: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, và vùng Địa Trung Hải, còn dòng Sunni được lãnh đạo bởi Ả-rập Saudi, và bao gồm Ai Cập, Jordan, các nước vùng Vịnh, và vùng bán đảo Ả-rập. Chương này có nói qua về Israel, nhưng theo tôi là đã không đi sâu vào vai trò của Israel trong khu vực (một nước Do Thái nhỏ bé giữa một quần thể các nước Hồi giáo!)

Sách dành hẳn một chương để nói về Iran và mối quan hệ với Mỹ. Năm 1979, Giáo chủ Khomeini sau một thời gian sống lưu vong ở nước ngoài đã trở về đảm nhận vai trò “Lãnh đạo tối cao” của cuộc cách mạng chống lại Shah Reza Pahlavi. Ông ta làm vậy dưới danh nghĩa tấn công lại trật tự khu vực thời đó: Học thuyết Khomeini coi các quốc gia có chủ quyền là không chính danh vì chúng “khong dựa trên luật lệ của thánh thần”. Mục tiêu của Khomeini là hướng tới lật đổ tất cả các chính phủ trong thế giới Hồi giáo và thay thế chúng bằng một chính phủ Hồi giáo duy nhất. Kể từ đây, mối quan hệ giữa Iran với Mỹ và phương Tây trở nên đối địch. Hiện tại, Iran đang đều đặn gia tăng khả năng hạt nhân của mình và phương Tây găp nhiều khó khăn trong việc đàm phán với nước này.

Phần tiếp theo của cuốn sách nói về châu Á. Châu Á là một khu vực phức tạp với nhiều thành phần khác nhau. Thế nhưng trật tự thế giới trong thế kỷ 19 và nửa đầu thế kỷ 20 chủ yếu là do châu Âu thiết lập. Có thể nói, ngoại trừ Nhật Bản, châu Á là một nạn nhân chứ không phải một người chơi trong trật tự quốc tế do chủ nghĩa thực dân sắp đặt. Sau khi trật tự châu Âu sụp đổ sau hai cuộc thế chiến, các nước châu Á đã vượt lên khỏi trật tự cũ qua nhiều cuộc chiến tranh đẫm máu để dành quyền tự chủ. Sau những thay đổi này, các nước châu Á lấy các nguyên tắc của Hoà ước Westphalia làm tiền đề cho chính sách đối ngoại của mình: các quốc gia được coi là đơn vị cơ bản của chính trị quốc tế và trong nước.

Hai quốc gia được nhắc đến trong chương về châu Á là Nhật Bản và Ấn Độ. Với Nhật Bản, vị trí địa lý ở trên quần đảo ngoài khơi đã giúp nước này xây dựng truyền thống và văn hoá đặc biệt trong biệt lập. Trong quá khứ, Nhật Bản vay mượn nhiều từ tôn giáo và văn hoá Trung Quốc nhưng biến nó thành riêng của mình. Nhật Bản cũng không chịu nằm dưới sự ảnh hưởng của Trung Quốc mà phát triển thành một thế lực đối trọng: đã có lần Nhật Bản xâm lược Triều Tiên đến tận gần biên giới TRung Quốc, TRung Quốc đã phải huy động quân để đẩy lùi Nhật. Sau thất bại này, Nhật chuyển sang trạng thái biệt lập. Nhưng khi Mỹ đề nghị được thông thuơng, Nhật Bản đã cân nhắc thông minh và bắt đầu gia nhập vào trật tự thế giới, trở thành một cường quốc hiện đại theo Westphalia. Sau khi bại trận trong Thế chiến 2, Nhật Bản một lần nữa lại chấp nhận sự sắp xếp của các nước thắng trận, đặc biệt là cấm các hành động quân sự, để đổi lấy sự phát triển trong dài hạn. Với Ấn Độ, tóm gọn chính sách đối ngoại hiện nay của nước này là chú trọng vào lợi ích quốc gia, không theo phe phái nào.

Trung Quốc được ưu tiên một chương sách riêng. Trung Quốc có khái niệm lâu đời nhất, rõ ràng nhất và khác biệt nhất so với những ý tưởng của hệ thống theo Hoà ước Westphalia. Từ khi thông nhất bởi Tần Thuỷ Hoàng đến nay, Trung Quốc luôn nghĩ mình ở trung tâm của trật tự thế giới. Các xã hội khác chỉ được nhìn dưới quan hệ triều cống với Trung Quốc mà không thể được xếp bình đẳng.

Sách có hai chương nói về quan điểm của Mỹ về trật tự thế giới. Như trong sách đã tóm tắt: “Thấm nhuần niềm tin rằng xu hướng của mình sẽ định hình vận mệnh toàn nhân loại, kể từ khi lập quốc Mỹ đã đóng một vai trò nghịch lý trong trật tự thế giới: quốc gia này mở mang lãnh thổ trên toàn lục địa với danh nghĩa Vận mệnh hiển nhiên trong khi tuyên bố từ bỏ bất kỳ mưu đồ đế quốc nào; gây nhiều ảnh hưởng quyết định tới các sự kiện trọng đại trong khi tuyên bố không thừa nhận bất kỳ động cơ lợi ích quốc gia nào; và trở thành siêu cường trong khi chối bỏ bất kỳ ý định tiền hành quyền lực chính trị nào”. Mỹ vì thế được gọi là “siêu cường nước đôi”. Chủ nghĩa lý tưởng và chủ nghĩa thực dụng luôn đi song song với nhau trong suy nghĩ của Mỹ. Các đời tổng thống Mỹ luân phiên chuyển đổi giữa hai chủ nghĩa này.

Kissinger có lẽ ủng hộ quan điểm về vai trò đặc biệt của Mỹ trên thế giới. Đọc sách này là lần đầu tiên tôi biết về giai thoại “Thành phố trên đồi” của Ronald Reagan trong bài phát biểu nhậm chức của Tổng thống này (xem ở đây: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pi...). Bài phát biểu này cũng là một khẳng định về những giá trị ưu việt của nước Mỹ. Giờ tôi có thể hiểu được phần nào suy nghĩ của người Mỹ, nhưng tôi không đồng ý rằng nước Mỹ không có gì phải học hỏi từ những nước khác.

Sách kết thúc bằng cái nhìn của Kissinger về ảnh hưởng của khoa học kỹ thuật với trật tự thế giới hiện nay. Chiến tranh hạt nhân khiến các nước không thể tùy tiện xâm phạm lãnh thổ của nhau vì nguy cơ hạt nhân có thể là tận diệt của nhân loại. Chiến tranh mạng là một hình thức mới hơn của việc can thiệp vào lãnh thổ của nước khác. Mạng xã hội tạo ra một hình thái liên quốc gia (transnational) mới mà nhân loại cần làm quen. Công nghệ hiện đại đem đến khả năng vô hạn về lưu trữ, truy xuất thông tin, điều này sẽ có ảnh hưởng đến khả năng ra quyết định của con người, ví dụ trong bầu cử… Nhưng Kissinger cho rằng, nhiều thông tin hơn chưa chắc đã phải là có khả năng thông tuệ cao hơn. Tôi thích luận điểm này của tác giả.

Cuối sách, tác giả vẫn tin vào trật tự Westphalia, nhưng có vẻ như thời nay chúng ta bắt đầu phải nghĩ tới cách tiếp cận những hình thức trật tự thế giới khác.

[Martin, I stand with ISRAEL · Rating 1 out of 5]

I wasn’t sure what I was getting into when I chose to read this book. I fell asleep 💤 a couple of times while reading it.

Henry Kissinger is very bright man and I am sure he knows what he is talking about in this book. However, life is just to short to trudge through a book that will put you asleep over time.

[Mostafa Bushehri · Rating 4 out of 5]

هنری کیسینجر وزیرخارجه سابق ایالات متحده و از افراد مشهورِ دورانِ حاضر در زمینه سیاست خارجی است؛ چه از وی بدمان بیاید چه خوشمان، او دیپلماتی کارکشته و فردی با دانش و هوش سرشار در علم سیاست است.
کیسینجر در آخرین اثر مکتوب خود به مفهوم "نظم جهانی" پرداخته است. کیسینجر معتقد است تاکنون هیچ نظمی شکل نگرفته است که مصداق تمام و کمال نظم جهانی باشد و چیزی که امروزه به عنوان "نظم جهانی" شناخته میشود حدود چهارقرن پیش در اروپای غربی بر اساس صلح وستفالی بنیان نهاده شده است. در آن زمان یک نبرد فرقه‌ای و شورش سیاسی منجر به یک جنگ سی ساله خانمان سوز گردید که در نتیجه آن یک چهارم جمعیت اروپای مرکزی از بین رفتند.
اما این آرمانِ هرگز استقرار نیافته‌یِ برپایی نظم جهانی وی را سرخورده از تلاش برای دستیابی به این امر نمیکند.
صلح وستفالی که شروعی شد بر همزیستی مسالمت آمیز دولت‌های اروپایی نه یک دیدگاه سراسر اخلاقی، بلکه ارائه دهنده راهکاری عملی برای کنار آمدن با واقعیت بود.
همان گونه که از عنوان فرعی کتاب پیداست کیسینجر به تاریخ اهمیت فراوانی میدهد و به همین خاطر به دنبال پیدایش و استقرار نظم و درس گیری از برپایی انواع نظم‌های جهانی به اعماق تاریخ سرک میکشد.
شروع او باسقوط امپراتوری رم است و با رسیدن به قرون وسطا و جنبش پروتستان، که او آن را پایانی بر مفوم نظم جهانیِ مبتنی بر پاپ و امپراتور میداند، به سراغ جنگ‌های سی ساله اروپایی میرود. او پس از بررسی تاریخ اروپا به سراغ دیگر مناطق دنیا میرود.
مقصد بعدی او خاورمیانه است. خاورمیانه‌ای که مهد اسلام است و در سده هفتم و هشتم میلادی درصدد برپایی نظمی جهانی بر پایه اسلام بود.
در فصل بعدی او به تبیین جایگاه ایران در مفهوم نظم جهانی میپردازد. او رویکرد ایران به نظم جهانی را به 3دوره تقسیم میکند؛ ایرانِ امپراتوری، ایرانِ قبل و بعد از انقلاب اسلامی.
در فصل بعدی او به سراغ شرق آسیا رفته با و بررسی تاریخ مللِ چین، هند، ژاپن به نقش این کشورها در مفهوم نظم بین المللی میپردازد.
در فصول بعد او به سراغ آمریکا که به عبارتی میتوان سرمنشا نظم جهانی کنونی دانست میرود. او نقشی راهبردی و تعیین کننده در برپایی نظم جهانی برای آمریکا قائل است. نظمی که از 1948 با بسط دموکراسی، آزادی و تجارت آزاد در دنیا شروع شد و درنهایت با پیروزی بر رقیب خود یعنی کمونیسم به قله رهبری رسید. اما او نقش راهبردی و نه رهبری برای آمریکا قائل است و معتقد است که برای برپایی نظم جهانی اقدامات یک کشور کافی نبوده و نیاز به ارتباط و همکاری با سایر ملل نیز هست.
در فصل پایانی او به سراغ تسلیحات هسته‌ای و عصر انقلاب اطلاعاتی رفته و برای تکنولوژی و فضای سایبری نقشی تعیین کننده در ارتقا یا نابودی نظم جهانی کنونی قائل است. او معتقد است برای رسیدن به نخستین نظم واقعا جهانی دستاوردهای بزرگ انسان در زمینه فناوری میبایست با افزایش توانایی قضاوت اخلاقی و انسانی همراه گردد.

هدف امروزه ی دولتمردان جهان باید حفظ تعادل و در عین حال زنجیر بستن بر پای دیوِ جنگ و رام کردن خوی جنگ طلبی باشد و میبایست برای رسیدن به این هدف سری هم به سیلاب خروشانِ تاریخ زنند.

پ.ن: امتیاز 4 نه به ترجمه ضعیف کتاب و همچنین نداشتنِ فهرست اعلام بلکه به خاطرِ میزان دانش کسب شده از پیرمردِ دیپلمات، هنری کیسینجر، است.

[Jack · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kissinger can write a book. His wisdom and depth of understanding are phenomenal. He discusses the concept of world order. Or what we perceive as world order based off of the Westphalian system of states from 1648. Now we progress through that of empires and their disintegration after World War I. What next...in reality not much except a hiatus of hostilities which broke out fully in World War II. The next great phase is that of the Cold War, NATO, the rise of the oil states, and the post-colonial era where the colonies threw off the yoke of the colonial masters. The monoliths were the Soviet Union and the US. They divided the world in a way. The free and those of the communist block. Mixed in this was the subtle rise or the whispers of radical Islam. The mixing of the lineup of Islamic nations versus the rest do us...the European nations and the US where it remains today. I could go on and on. A fantastic book written by one of the greatest of statesman...maybe the last...Henry Kissinger.

[Vigan Rogova · Rating 2 out of 5]

In general, the book was below my expectations and what it's title suggests. The first chapters on Europe, its history is thoroughly explained and I learned a lot of interesting facts. The same goes for last chapters on American Presidents, their doctrines and visions which I liked a lot.

However, the middle of the book is of the poor value. The author goes briefly on Middle East and Asia... there is a lot of "take and leave" of subjects without really giving a sense of it. Given the actuality, I would expect more thorough view on this area of the world and thoughts on its future, as a former Secretary of State. The author gives a lot of accent to Westphalia Treaty comparing it to Middle East and Asia order which is odd to me!?!

As I finished the book I got un empty feeling of it.

[Mahya danesh · Rating 3 out of 5]

هنری کسینجرتو ان کتاب از نظم هایی که در ادوار مختلف بر جهان حاکم شده مثل (موازنه قوا و دوقطبی زمان جنگ سرد و هژمونی امریکا ) حرف میزنه و پذیرش متفاوت مناطق مختلف از این نظم به ویژه در خاورمیانه و حتی یه فصل متفاوت برای ایران.
توی این کتاب احساس کردم تمایل و تاکید کسینجر بیشتر روی دو شکل از نظم بود یکی موازنه قوا که از پیمان وستفالی اغاز شده و یکی هژمونی امریکا بعد از فروپاشی شوروی.
کتاب روان نوشته شده و ترجمه خوبی هم داره ولی به نظرم زیادی درباره امریکا نویسنده غلو کرده ،انگار که رسالت امریکا پیامبری و اطلاح و نظم سازی در جهانه و بقیه موظف به اطاعت از اون .
هرچند من خودم موافق یک سری اصول و هنجارهای جهانی هستم ولی به شیوه معتدلانه چون به قول خود کسینجر پیاده کردن این نظم توی هر نقطه از جهان قرار نیست یک پاسخ مشابه بده گاهی خودش ایجاد بی نظمی‌و‌ به وجود اومدن گروهک هایی مثل القاعده میکنه .
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خلاصه که خوندنش واسه بچه های روابط بین الملل و علوم سیاسی واجبه ولی بقیه اگه صرفا علاقه دارن بخونن ،با نخوندنش شاید چیز خاصی رو از دست نداده باشن
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راستی این چه طراحی افتضاحی بود که برای جلد داشتن😄ادم بدش میومد سراغ کتاب بره😅😅

[Stetson · Rating 4 out of 5]

My introduction to Henry Kissinger came as a child while watching The Man with the Golden Gun, one of the more ridiculous yet enjoyable James Bond films. Please indulge this tangent:

While on an exotic vacation in Thailand with his wife, small-town Louisianian Sheriff J.W. Pepper re-encounters James Bond while he's in pursuit of the titular villain, Francisco Scaramanga. Bond gives chase with Pepper as an accidental stowaway. Pepper performs a number of physical hysterics along with some (off-)color commentary. Bond misses his man at the end of the scene and Pepper is detained by Thai police who were alerted by the wild chase. As he's led away in indignation, Pepper invokes the name of Henry Kissinger.

For many years, I continued along with this vague sense of Kissinger. It wasn't until late in high school or early in college that I then began to hear his name used. Instead of in Pepper's I'll-call-my-rich-powerful-daddy way, this time it was primarily in hatred. The name was closely associated with war criminal. I would also hear this allegation levied after hearing similar things about George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld. My gut-reaction was dismissal. These sounded like ridiculous claims. Having read and learned significantly more about these issues, I still largely dismiss these claims. However, I've also come to accept that geopolitics is not for the faint-of-heart. Unfortunately, it is a Machiavellian gauntlet with the highest stakes. Kissinger had a set of unique personal qualities and an essentially Forest Gump-like set of circumstances that turned him into perhaps the most powerful diplomat since Otto von Bismarck.

In World Order Kissinger provides a tour of world history from his perspective. This whirlwind tour lays out the premises for his diplomatic vision that of a balance of major powers. Kissinger ascribe to this Realist notion of international diplomacy in which sovereign states pursue their goals with the Westphalian system of nations, checking each other from pushing to far of an advantage and syncing up on shared interests. In some ways, this idea seems to be an extension of Montesquieu's "separation of power" concept on to the world stage. To me, with no real expertise, this seems like a reasonable concept that have a natural alignment with competitive and collaborative dynamics (game theory). However, it does seem a bit fuzzy as well.

Kissinger has an authoritative and persuasive voice. I see what makes him a deft diplomat in his writing. I don't think I entirely share his vision, but it also seems a bit foolish to question his perspective on things without thorough and well-substantiated rebuttals ready. World Order is definitely an edifying read. International issues tend to be of little interest to the median American. It would behoove us to pick up more of his and similar titles. Current and future generations will need figures like Kissinger. I am concerned we may not have those with the mettle and skill for it anymore.

[Marco Pavan · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book is monumental... Like a monumental pile of shit. It's a combination of a copy/paste from text books and a modern history analysis done by a 6 year old kid. The chapter of the middle east and the analysis of Iran alone are completely anachronistic. The criticism on Iran policies is hilarious: not once it was mentioned that Mossadegh government was overthrown by tue CIA to bring back the Shah, who was responsible for a massacre. The criticism is all for the Ayatollah - for which there is certainly a lot to talk about, but you simply can't reasonably critique without admitting culpability that most of the current political instability in the middle east is heavily caused by American actions.

Then there is this ridiculous explanation of world order based on Westphalian principles, and America's mission to promote democracy around the world: it's not order, it's hegemony. America hasn't exported much besides oppression and wars.

It's a very empty book, without facts, just a blanket celebration of American doctrine and propaganda.

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 4 out of 5]

От теоретична гледна точка "Световен ред" е апология на концепцията за "баланса на силите" в международните отношения.

Макар и почти никога да не съм се съгласявал с тезите на Кисинджър, винаги ми е харесвало как пише. След изказванията му за нуждата Украйна да отстъпи територии на Русия, за да сложи край на войната (което ми се иска да отдам на преклонната му възраст), много се почудих дали изобщо да прочета книгата.

Все пак го сторих и не мога да кажа, че съжалявам. Във вече неблизкото минало, като студент, следвах именно в това направление и прочитът на "Световен ред" ми даде шанс да си припомня някои позабравени факти и гледни точки. Книгата върви бързо и не уморява с прекалена абстрактност. И "Световен ред", и magnum opus-ът "Дипломацията" (която е по-ориентирана към историята на международните отношения и значително по-обемна) обаче препоръчвам да се четат критично. Кисниджър далеч не е най-безпристрастният анализатор на световните дела...

[Bakunin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this book to be a gem.
Kissinger describes from a historical perspective why we have the global challenges that we have today. He generalizes a tad in my view but in doing so also allows the reader to get a much firmer grasp of what each nations foreign policy is really about.
In Kissingers view, the modern world was formed in the aftermath of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 where the concept of the sovereign state was invented. Foreign embassies were established in different countries and foreign policy became largely a matter of trying to keep the power balance between these different countries. The hegemony of this type of order came to be challenged both by islamism and communism and it remains a question for the 21st century as to which system of dealing with conflicts will prevail.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Henry Kissinger requires no introduction…but here it is anyway. Kissinger is among the most astute participants in the foreign policy debates of the 20th and early 21st centuries. He has been at the table throughout the post-WWII Russian acquisition of eastern Europe, the Cuban Missile crisis, the Cold War, the collapse (and potential re-emergence) of Russian strength, and the new Islamist disruptions in the Middle East. As Nixon’s Secretary of State he played a central role in the early1970s American-Chinese rapprochement. His view that western institutions—democracy, free markets, religious tolerance, separation of church and state— translate poorly to non-western countries has been demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Kissinger's emphasis on national interest as a guide to policy—to the near exclusion of moral and humanitarian interests—irks many, but it offers a stable lens for guiding policy in a world where morality isn't absolute. He believes that any “world order” is a web of international understandings providing a tenuous and fragile balance of current national interests, constantly threatened by changes in perceived interests and departures from agreed-upon rules, and not greatly affected by sporadic attempts to build good will—good will is fine but it doesn’t bring home the bacon. To Kissinger, a stable world order requires two things: legitimacy (the acceptance of each state by other states) and power (the ability to redress aggressions by individual states)

The World Order is Kissinger’s latest (2014) contribution to the geopolitics of Planet Earth; his last was the very enlightening On China (2012, see review). I am inclined to highlight things I want to remember, and in this book the pages are strikingly yellow. We get a deep and thoughtful trip through world history and the institutions and ideas that framed the notion of “world order” in each of the major regions: United States, Europe (including Russia), the Middle East (with emphasis on Iran and Islam) , South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Far East (China and Japan); sorry Australia, Africa, South America. The differences in approaches to foreign policy are skillfully outlined, and at the end we better understand why it is so difficult to obtain mutually beneficial agreements that serve both religious and secular interests.

Consider Kissinger’s description of the notion of world order in Europe. The Pax Romana, a world order maintained by force in which a single powerful entity—Rome—held the power and mediated disputes between the regions and local city-states, was based on a simple rule: national interest—what was good for Rome was good for the empire. Rome suppressed dissent and extracted resources from its hinterlands, but it kept the peace for centuries. The division of the Empire between the Orthodox eastern (centered in Constantinople) and the Rome in the 4th century weakened the Empire. Invasions by “barbarians” resulted in collapse of the Roman empire and a slide of western Europe into feudal Only the rise of the Catholic Church provided a restoration of order as the Pope mediated them on a rule of national interest—what was good for the Vatican was good for all. Essentially, the Church and the Pope replaced Rome and the Emperor. Once again, a balance of power was re-established--force (the moral force of excommunication and the military force of fealty to the Pope) kept order.

Kissinger marks the beginning of a decentralized European order at the Peace of Westphalia that ended the 1618-48 Thirty Years War between western Europe, begun as a religious dispute over which state should have its prince elected as Holy Roman Emperor, the conflict spread to include all of Europe and to draw in the Ottoman empire. The Peace restored order by creating the notion of equal sovereign states operating maintaining a balance of power: If any state became aggressive outside its borders, other states would oppose it until balance was restored, at which time sovereignty for all nations—even former aggressors—would be honored.

In post-Westphalian Europe there were numerous conflicts, most notably the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. In each of those, England used its vast navy to counter the aggression and Russia played an important role with its land forces. However, WWI toppled the Westphalian system of checks and balances: that “accidental” war restored no balance as the British-American-Russian forces and the German-Austrian forces beat each other into a bloody stalemate that ended in the punitive Treaty of Versailles that severely infringed on Germany’s sovereignty with limitations on military forces, outrageous reparations, and forced abdication of the Kaiser. No longer would the vanquished return to its former status as an equal and sovereign state. Not until the Pax Americana after World War II did a world order reemerge.

After Europe, Kissinger turns our attention to the Middle East and the rise of Islam. The Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire maintained balance until 1453, when the Ottoman Turks took Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire became the key player in the Middle East and Islam became the official religion and the source of the Empire’s foreign policies. Once again, a central power equivalent to the old Roman Empire provided order. But the requirements of Islam were different from the requirements of Christianity at that time—though not much different than those of earlier Christianity with its inquisition and crusades. Islam forbade compromise with nonbelievers except as a temporary tactical practice; Islam forced conversions at the pain of death; Islam recognized no other religion—a nonbeliever was automatically an atheist. The pluralism and tolerance that Europe had developed was anathema to Islam. A notion of order had risen that was implacably bent on expansion and conquest.

The Islamic world order lasted until the end of World War I, when the victors attempted to re-establish the Westphalian system of equal sovereign nations and balance of power by drawing the borders of newly-created nations that lacked legitimacy, ersatz states like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and, later, Pakistan. The core of the Ottoman Empire—Turkey—became a secular state in 1923 under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; it has long struggled to remain secular. Of the new states only Iran (and Turkey) had a long political tradition and, ironically, Iran’s was not in Islam. The Iranian state was formed from what had been Persia, with a long cultural history and with Zoroastrianism as its primary religion. Unlike Islam, Zoroastrianism stressed good deeds, was of a secular hue, and was generally tolerant. This philosophy prevailed under the Shah until the 1979 Iranian revolution crushed it, with consequences of which we are well aware.

Before turning to the United States, Kissinger discusses China and Japan. Much of the discussion of China is a summary of his 2012 On China, particularly its belief that it was the master of All Under Heaven and its reliance on a tribute system in place of force: other states were vassals whose awe at China’s magnificence would bring them to the Emperor’s feet. His awe was expressed by ritual gifts in which the tribute-giving state received more tribute in return. The tribute system allowed China to buy the docility of its neighbors and it provided a barter system of international trade as an alternative to the western market system. China was supremely indifferent to the doings of distant states, focusing its attention on the neighboring states. China also eschewed expansion because it already owned the world—the Emperor was already Master of All Under Heaven. Its isolation began breaking down with the two opium wars in the mid-19th century, followed by the intrusion of western powers onto its soil. The ultimate collapse came with the communist revolution’s ascendancy in 1949.

One could go on and on…and I already have. This is a very serious book well worth reading by anyone interested in how the world got to here, and where it might go. A slam-dunk five stars.