Finding an accessible account of the great man's life in English has been hard, but this is it. Christopher de Bellaigue brings Mossadegh to life in all his dramatic contradiction, going beyond hagiography to form a fascinating three-dimensional picture of the last leader of democratic Iran. The first couple chapters largely focus on the nineteenth-century background of Qajar Iran into which Mossadegh was born, and oh my god is it chalk-full of names. While it gets pretty impossible to keep track of everyone, this is largely to establish the degree of interconnectedness of between late Qajar bureaucracy. (Did you know Mossadegh was born into Qajar nobility? I sure didn't.) The bewildering variety of titles and monikers the nobility took on makes it pretty daunting to remember who everyone is, as they mixed long Persian names with Arabic titles and thank god they stopped doing that after the Qajars were deposed. The protagonist slowly works his way up the bureaucracy with a reputation for honesty and impartiality, while absorbing Western legal theory and human rights during long stints in Europe. After an unusually long time biding his time, he comes to be the leading voice of opposition to the Reza Khan government, while often applauding its many achievements. Here his personality really comes through, as he goes back and forth between shunning any claim to leadership and denouncing the regime in the harshest terms, only burnishing his reputation. While scathing the government from the floor of parliament, he frequently weeps publicly and faints on the spot, while spending long periods in bed nursing his seemingly always-ailing body. There's a dramatic performativeness to all of his politics, and yet not even his enemies can doubt his sincerity. When he finally accepts his position as prime minister, Mossadegh has built up an unrivaled reputation in the country and leads his National Front to victory, dominating even hostile MPs in an almost LBJ-like manner and basking in the genuine affection of the Iranian population. However, the balance of forces during the late 1940s and 50s in Iran is so much more complicated than I expected. On the one hand we have the conservative clergy and on the other the Tudeh, the pro-Moscow communist party. Add to this a rather cowed and shy Mohammed Reza Shah and throw in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and a hostile British embassy for good measure. Though we often associate the Iranian clergy with Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 Revolution, an earlier generation of Ayatollahs threw in their lot with Mossadegh for quite a while and helped bring him to power. Though Mossadegh himself was anything but an Islamist, he managed to make common cause with them on the grounds of patriotism. Yet while the religious element was instrumental in sweeping him to power, he also maintained a complex, if more distant, relationship with the communists. Navigating between these forces was never going to be easy, and herein lies the great tragedy. Mossadegh was genuinely weary of Soviet Influence (and the Tudeh by extension) and tried to keep Iran in the orbit of the West, but also picked a life-or-death struggle with Britain. To this end, he hoped to lean on the Americans for help, and this proved his ultimate undoing. This book does a wonderful job laying out all the details of the oil nationalization, its intellectual undergirding, the push-pull with Downing Street, and the various rounds of negotiation. Oil became the rallying cry of national unity, the one thing capable of of uniting communists and nationalists and clergy in the strangest of alliances. Yet when the decree was finally signed, Iran faced years of embargo and found itself on the receiving end of crippling sanctions with an economy unraveling. Yet the county by and large remained with him, and after a brief hiatus Mossadegh returned for a more radical second term, putting into motion land reforms, pro-worker legislation, and reforming education. Amid the economic crisis, British and American intelligence inserted themselves, splitting off the conservative clergy, painting Mossadegh as a communist, and forming a pro-Shah opposition. At the same time, Mossadegh, a lifelong royalist, made moves to undermine the Shah's limited authority and assert himself at Mohammed Reza's expense. When a first attempted coup quickly fizzled out, it seemed the Nationalists had defeated the forces arrayed against them, but sadly they didn't take enough action. While Mossadegh played a little hard and fast with the rules when he shut down parliament and ruled by decree, he could never bring himself to take off the kid gloves with his opponents, such was his respect for individual rights. It is tempting to think what could have happened had he given his police more leeway to arrest the coup-plotters when they had the chance, and maybe leaned on the Tudeh and Moscow more to help him. Yet he insisted on not alienating the Americans (as they were already actively plotting his downfall). The men who had tried to topple him by and large remained at liberty, and once again activated their networks, oiled by MI6 and CIA money. They set about recruiting elements of the army and even assassinating and torturing his chief of police and other loyal elements. This left him and his inner circle ultimately exposed even as they planned to push forward with the most radical moves. As they prepared Iran to transition functionally to a republic, reactionary forces, having regrouped quite openly, obliterated his residence and seized control of Tehran, executing many of his allies shortly after. He and his entourage climbed and crawled through several houses and walled gardens and tragicomic fashion before finally being apprehended. Kept in solitary for years, he never recanted and took every opportunity to attack the Shah and General Zahedi whenever he was granted a court appearance. He was so good that the regime eventually stopped publishing these altogether. While he whiled away his remaining years in house arrest, the tragedy kept unfolding. Here the author is even handed: Mossadegh, while perhaps being blinded by his own ideals, also refused to concede an inch to the British on the issue of nationalization. There was a point when he probably could have obtained a deal, achieving nationalization in all but name, and turned it down. It was have reopened the flagging economy, and probably no one but he could have done it. Yet the British too refused to back down, even when it hurt their own profitability. De Bellaigue again and again drives home the fact that by the 50s the British had rapidly declined in relevance and power and seized upon the oil issue to prove they still had it in them. In 1953 maybe they did. Yet by 1956, at the time of the Suez Crisis, the old European powers proved themselves completely unable to really do anything without American assistance.
Mossadegh has been one of my heroes for years, and I relish the opportunity to learn more about his life and times, as well as the world of 1950s Middle Eastern Politics. Driven between a rock and a hard place, many a leader tried to chart a way between the US and the USSR and died on that cross. Though largely unknown in the West today, Mossadegh loomed larger than life in his own time, even in American public consciousness. To his own people he was a giant, and across the Muslim world he emerged as a rockstar (see his reception by the people of Cairo), in many ways precipitating the struggles of neighboring countries to decolonize and reassert sovereignty. His legacy could be especially helpful in modern Iran, where nuance is in short supply. One can be both a faithful Muslim and a secular champion. One can be terrified of power and then ride it for all it's worth. One can fight the good fight, and lose. And yet his opponents, fighting the bad fight, all lost too, in their own time. Somewhere, underneath decades of history, there is an Iran that is unafraid and willing to fight for both its sovereignty and the essential rights of its people, two things that have come to seem mutually exclusive in recent Iranian history. Mossadegh shows us that they are not.