“The Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791 as part of the U.S. Bill of Rights, prohibits “excessive” bail and fines as well as “cruel and unusual punishments.” It was modeled on two earlier legal instruments—the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776—that also prohibited “cruel and unusual punishments.” The former was a by-product of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a revolution that overthrew King James II of England, a Catholic, and installed Dutch stadtholder William III of Orange-Nassau and his wife, Mary II, as England’s new king and queen.118 After being presented to William and Mary in February 1689, the English Bill of Rights was read at their coronation on April 11, 1689, before it passed Parliament—and received royal assent—on December 16, 1689. Drafted by George Mason in May 1776, the Virginia Declaration was unanimously adopted by a state convention in Williamsburg, Virginia, on June 12, 1776, less than a month before the issuance of the American Declaration of Independence.”
“In the late eighteenth century, America’s founders and framers avidly read Enlightenment texts, including On Crimes and Punishments.151 George Washington and Thomas Jefferson bought copies of Beccaria’s book in 1769, and John Adams passionately quoted Beccaria in 1770 while representing British soldiers accused of murder following the Boston Massacre. “I am for the prisoners at the bar,” Adams said in an opening line, “and shall apologize for it only in the words of the Marquis Beccaria: ‘If by supporting the rights of mankind, and of invincible truth, I shall contribute to save from the agonies of death one unfortunate victim of tyranny, or ignorance, equally fatal, his blessings and tears of transport shall be sufficient consolation to me for the contempt of all mankind.’ ” John Quincy Adams, the son of John Adams and the sixth U.S. president, later remarked on the “electrical effect” Beccaria’s words—as spoken by his father—had on jurors and spectators”
“The answer is that the matters I have discussed, such as lack of reliability, the arbitrary application of a serious and irreversible punishment, individual suffering caused by long delays, and lack of penological purpose are quintessentially judicial matters. They concern the infliction—indeed the unfair, cruel, and unusual infliction—of a serious punishment upon an individual. I recognize that in 1972 this Court, in a sense, turned to Congress and the state legislatures in its search for standards that would increase the fairness and reliability of imposing a death penalty. The legislatures responded. But, in the last four decades, considerable evidence has accumulated that those responses have not worked.
Thus we are left with a judicial responsibility. The Eighth Amendment sets forth the relevant law, and we must interpret that law. We have made clear that “ ‘the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.’ ”
For the reasons I have set forth in this opinion, I believe it highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. At the very least, the Court should call for full briefing on the basic question.
With respect, I dissent.”