This is a remarkably even-handed analysis about how the Cold War, which ended late in the last century, has reappeared in this century. Robert Legvold contends a new Cold War exists, though it clearly differs in some respects from the first Cold War, and that both sides contributed to this conflict over the quarter century since the collapse of the USSR.
The poisoned relationship prevents cooperation on matters of mutual interest, such as defeating ISIS, controlling nuclear arms, and addressing climate change, among other things. It also creates greater risk of full blown strategic rivalry and of military confrontations that spiral out of control.
While nationalists in the United States and Russia see the conflict in black and white terms, and apportion blame accordingly, Legvold assigns blame and credit to both sides. A professor emeritus at Columbia University, he argues that improving the relationship between the two countries requires each side to recognize how it has contributed to the conflict. It’s always easier to cast stones, however, than to accept responsibility. On the other hand, understanding what one’s side could have done differently “offers insight into what might yet be done better.”
Legvold offers examples of steps each side took that contributed to rising tensions, and where alternative policies could’ve accomplished goals without undermining trust. On the Russian side, annexing Crimea was “a historic mistake.”
On the U.S. side, he notes that “major powers do not respond graciously to hostile alliances pushing up to their borders.” (Recall the American reaction to Soviet weapons in Cuba.) The U.S. and its NATO partners were meddling in Ukraine, with the prospect of extending the alliance there, as had been done with Poland and the Baltic states. The famous American diplomat George F. Kennan described this NATO expansion as the most dangerous foreign policy decision that the US had made since the end of the Second World War. “It shows so little understanding of Russian and Soviet history. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia.” Expansion will certainly “inflame the nationalist, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.”
Legvold explains how the conflict can be defused, but only if both sides take the necessary steps. While he is not optimistic that the new Cold War will end soon, a potential change agent is Donald Trump, whose flattering words for Putin are unprecedented coming from leaders in either of the two political parties. Mitt Romney, the GOP nominee in 2012, called Russia the number one strategic threat to the USA, while John McCain has repeatedly called for stronger measures against Russia.
Yet the Trumpian call for cooperation with Moscow has not aroused opposition among rank and file Republicans, (though it has from the GOP foreign policy establishment). Trump supporters I have conversed with express willingness to follow their candidate’s proposal for reconciliation with Russia. I can’t help suspect they would be more reluctant if the call for cooperation had come from a Democrat.
This book contains an informative analysis of what caused the first Cold War, and what led to its end, with Gorbachev getting the most credit. It also offers a roadmap for defusing the new Cold War, if and when both sides see the imperative to do so. It also will require American leadership to recognize the validity of Legvold’s words:
“It is the natural inclination of every major power both to assume that it is entitled to pride of place within its region and, when possible, to enforce it. This is historically true of the United States” -- The Monroe Doctrine comes to mind – “and will be of China and India in coming years. And so too is it of Russia.” ###