The War Managers

by Douglas Kinnard

In 1947 Douglas Kinnard sent out an extensive questionnaire to the 173 Army generals who had managed the war in Vietnam. A surprising sixty-seven percent of them completed the questionnaires, with many adding pages of comments. Kinnard then personally interviewed twenty of the respondents and supplemented the data with research from the files of the Army's military history center. The War Managers is the astonishing result of Kinnard's analysis of the responses of these men. Kinnard had focused on such central issues as the quality of both American and Vietnamese troops, the generals' own chains of command, the influence of the media, civilian authority, U.S. objectives, the importance of the "body count," and many others. What emerges from the generals answers, compiled in an absorbing manner in this book, is a uniquely fascinating and penetrating view of the Vietnam War from the perspectives of the U.S. Army generals who commanded there.

Genres: History, Military History, War

240 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1977

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Awesome book that I wish I had read at CGSC before my last three deployments. Not sure anything would have changed on the ground, but I would have my eyes opened wider. Interesting concept in the book that WWI, WWII, and Korea were all linear wars with clear front lines. Vietnam hit us as a non-linear conflict. No front line and no protected rear area… everything was game in a guerrilla war. Probably not since the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898 did the Army, and the U.S., face such a complication. No wonder the military and the country struggled to figure this out. Many insightful notes in the book but the top ones are below.

-Officially it ended on April 30th, only hours after the last Americans were helicoptered off the United states embassy roof… the Nixon illusion of Vietnamese nation had been shattered. Obviously, we had diluted ourselves with the military capability of South Vietnam. PJK: Same happened in Afghanistan.
-The United States created an army similar to its own - designed, at least as structured, to fight wars in Europe or of the Korean type. Furthermore, such an army could not long be supported by the Republic on its own and in any case was not the proper instrument for fighting a counterguerilla war. P8. Similar case could be made in AFG although considerable effort was made on AFG SF forces.
-It is possible for lower level soldiers and officials to fight a war without being sure of their objectives, but that almost 70% of the army generals who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives mirrors a deep seated strategic failure: the inability of policymakers to frame tangible, attainable goals. P25.
-Not all external forces in South Vietnam were American. Washington perceived a need to show flags of friendly countries in South Vietnam, much as in Korea during the war there. Under pressure from the United States four Free World countries, as they were termed, contributed combat forces beginning in 1964, aggregating in 1969 a peak strength of 70,000 troops. P37. PJK: the US has included coalition warfare in most of our larger operations ever since.
-During the NSC meetings on April 1st and 2nd 1965 the President had approved Westmoreland’s use of ground force units as far out as 50 miles from the bases in order to support South Vietnamese forces and keep the enemy off balance. P39. PJK: understandable but still a constraint that I’m sure the enemy figured out quickly.
-The United States forces simply pushed the South Vietnamese out of the war and took over the combat effort. In part this Americanization of the war was encouraged by the many technological innovations introduced by United States forces. These innovations include various types of aircraft, naval vessels, and detection devices which at that point only United States personnel could operate and in the long run only United States personnel could maintain. P44. PJK: similar to AFG.
-A conscript army in an unpopular war must minimize casualties if it is going to sustain even marginal public support…. The total munitions employed by the United States Vietnam was greater than tonnages employed worldwide in the 1941 to 45 war… p46.
-When United States forces were committed in 1965, a high-level debate arose in Washington as to whether some kind of US - GVN command should be formed… the proposal was not unlike arrangements in the Korean War, where the United States commander in fact commanded all of the fighting forces. P56. PJK: very interesting idea; I wonder if this would have helped in Iraq and Afghanistan.
-My own guess is that this would have worked only if Westmoreland had received the kind of powers Eisenhower had in World War 2, which would have eliminated the “business as usual” embassy and replaced it with political advisors to COMUSMACV. p57.
-(Vice Admiral Mack) He blamed the American failure in Vietnam on close minds and the suppression of dissenting opinion at the nation's highest military and political levels. “They may have been the best - whatever that means - they may have been bright, but most of them were wrong.” P116.
-Many pointed out that all plans for a contingency the size of the Vietnam conflict were based upon a reserve mobilization. Others spoke of the drastic effects on the active forces, worldwide, brought about by the personnel turbulence caused by 8 years of operations in Vietnam. P117.
-During the Berlin crisis, unlike previous mobilizations, reservists were unable to see any clear and present danger to this country, the result was an enormous outcry at having their careers and families disrupted by being called active duty. Vietnam was not the same as Berlin in many respects, but it was similar to Berlin in regard to skepticism that there was a danger to the United States. P118.
-April 11th (1968) the Secretary of Defense announced the order to active duty in May of 24,500 personnel, the bulk of whom were already personnel. P122.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 3 out of 5]

This might be one of the strangest surveys ever: a review of about 200 American general who served in Vietnam, conducted by one of their own, about their opinions of a war that had not yet finally been lost.

The picture that emerges is one of a dissatisfaction with the war in general, with specific management tools (body counts, ticket punching), and especially the South Vietnamese military and American media. Despite this, the generals thought they lead well, did the best they could, and that failure for the war rests elsewhere. Kinnard tries to make the case that these generals were in fact introspective, but for all the strengths of the survey, the war managers come off looking more for scapegoats than lessons learned. The anonymous commentary from the respondents is the most interesting part of the book, but the survey methodology is perhaps not the best approach to get at the mindset of American generalship in 1974.

[Bruce]

American military leadership failed to understand the nature of the Vietnam War; failed to adopt the correct counterstrategy toward the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese who succeeded in making the war a test of wills instead of strength. Moshe Dayan reputed to have said 'foreign troops never win the hearts of the people.' No matter how generous our [US:] military support and assistance, a country that is not politically adhesive and lacks legitimacy cannot achieve stability.