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Cold War International History Project
Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War
“By a wide margin the best book about [Carter’s] presidency that’s yet appeared.” —Christian Science Monitor In the mid-1970s, the Cold War had frozen into a nuclear stalemate in Europe and retreated from the headlines in Asia. As Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter fought for the presidency in late 1976, the superpower struggle overseas seemed to take a backseat to more contentious domestic issues of race relations and rising unemployment. There was one continent, however, where the Cold War was on the point of flaring Africa. Jimmy Carter in Africa opens just after Henry Kissinger’s failed 1975 plot in Angola, as Carter launches his presidential campaign. The Civil Rights Act was only a decade old, and issues of racial justice remained contentious. Racism at home undermined Americans’ efforts to “win hearts and minds” abroad, and provided potent propaganda to the Kremlin. As President Carter confronted Africa, the essence of American foreign policy—stopping Soviet expansion—slammed up against the most explosive and raw aspect of American domestic politics—racism. Drawing on candid interviews with Carter, as well as key U.S. and foreign diplomats, and on a dazzling array of international archival sources, Nancy Mitchell offers a timely reevaluation of the Carter administration and of the man himself. In the face of two major tests, in Rhodesia and the Horn of Africa, Carter grappled with questions of Cold War competition, domestic politics, personal loyalty, and decision-making style. Mitchell reveals an administration not beset by weakness and indecision, as is too commonly assumed, but rather constrained by Cold War dynamics and by the president’s own temperament as he wrestled with a divided public and his own human failings. Jimmy Carter in Africa presents a stark portrait of how deeply Cold War politics and racial justice were intertwined. “An impressive historical work in every respect.” —Choice “Her writing flows, and she places Carter's Africa policy within the larger context of US foreign policy and politics.” —International Journal
913 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 28, 2016
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About the author
Nancy Mitchell
2 books2 followersNancy Mitchell is professor of history at North Carolina State University.
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April 3, 2017
Jimmy Carter in Africa
In Jimmy Carter in Africa, Nancy Mitchell examines the 39th president’s foreign policy in Africa as a means to offer a dramatic reassessment of his time in office. Her analysis focuses in particular on two important events; the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia. In Rhodesia Carter’s strategy was well-planned and carefully enacted- events in Ethiopia developed far more rapidly, making the war a useful way of analysing the reaction of the administration to crisis moments.
The book focuses on Jimmy Carter more than it does on Africa. Mitchell feels that the public, and indeed academic, view of Carter carries with it a number of misconceptions. In particular, she dislikes the idea that Carter had a confused foreign policy, one dictated by the struggle between his warring advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. Rather than being dominated by these two men, Mitchell states that Carter was in fact firmly in control. Confusion stemmed from the inability of the president to ably articulate his policies to the people, which in turn arose due to his non-ideological approach to issues. Rather than being a naïve liberal dominated by his conception of human rights, Mitchell argues that Carter was as much of a Cold Warrior as the other détente era presidents, Nixon and Ford. As evidence for this she cites his Africa policy- his cynical courting of militant Somalia in 1977 and his fear of a communist-back faction winning the struggle in Rhodesia. Fear of Cuban intervention dominated US foreign policy thinking following Kissinger’s disastrous adventure in Angola. Another Cuban victory would have massively undermined US prestige in the world- Carter applied a form of domino theory to his policy- If Rhodesia fell, would South Africa be next?
Carter showed a deep interest in events in Rhodesia, and himself and close advisor Andy Young were already planning their future policy towards the nation in 1976 (in contrast to another misconception, that Carter came to Washington as a provincial farmer with little knowledge of world affairs). Mitchell states that what so enticed Carter about Rhodesia was race, in particular the similarities which the president believed existed between the function of white-minority rule there and his own upbringing in segregated Georgia. Whilst Mitchell acknowledges the historical flaws in this conception, she notes that it was vital as the frame through which the president and Andy Young saw the world. It enabled both men to defend their policy against vicious attacks from the House of Representatives and the belated despair of America’s failing British ally.
In the Ogaden War, the Carter administration responded in a more confused and contradictory manner. The reason for this, in Mitchell’s argument, was that Carter was too controlling a leader- he insisted on making all decisions, and he did so slowly, problematic in such a crisis (as in Iran two years later). Still, she makes the point that there really was no practical way for the US to intervene in the conflict, pointing out the ridiculousness of Brzezinski’s plan to use Saudi/ Iranian troops against the elite Cuban regiments. The war in Ethiopia was also a black-black conflict, lacking the important racial element which brought Carter’s attention to the South of the continent. Still, Mitchell points out that the “defeat” of the US in the war, although used as another example of Carter’s weakness, actually hurt the Soviets more. They lost a key naval base in Somalia, the pride of their African empire, and gained only impoverished Ethiopia.
Overall, I found Jimmy Carter’s Africa policy to be an effective way of revaluating the president, at the same time as being honest as to his weaknesses. When he had the time, Carter could develop effective policies which advanced US aims in the Cold War without sacrificing American lives. In moments of crisis, however, his lack of ideology and insistence on control led to a confused foreign policy and accusations of weakness from the growing neoconservative movement. Whilst I disagree that Zimbabwe can be considered much of a success story following Mugabe’s tyranny, America certainly came out of the Carter years with a better position on the African continent than it had held four years previous, regardless of Reaganite rhetoric.
In Jimmy Carter in Africa, Nancy Mitchell examines the 39th president’s foreign policy in Africa as a means to offer a dramatic reassessment of his time in office. Her analysis focuses in particular on two important events; the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia. In Rhodesia Carter’s strategy was well-planned and carefully enacted- events in Ethiopia developed far more rapidly, making the war a useful way of analysing the reaction of the administration to crisis moments.
The book focuses on Jimmy Carter more than it does on Africa. Mitchell feels that the public, and indeed academic, view of Carter carries with it a number of misconceptions. In particular, she dislikes the idea that Carter had a confused foreign policy, one dictated by the struggle between his warring advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. Rather than being dominated by these two men, Mitchell states that Carter was in fact firmly in control. Confusion stemmed from the inability of the president to ably articulate his policies to the people, which in turn arose due to his non-ideological approach to issues. Rather than being a naïve liberal dominated by his conception of human rights, Mitchell argues that Carter was as much of a Cold Warrior as the other détente era presidents, Nixon and Ford. As evidence for this she cites his Africa policy- his cynical courting of militant Somalia in 1977 and his fear of a communist-back faction winning the struggle in Rhodesia. Fear of Cuban intervention dominated US foreign policy thinking following Kissinger’s disastrous adventure in Angola. Another Cuban victory would have massively undermined US prestige in the world- Carter applied a form of domino theory to his policy- If Rhodesia fell, would South Africa be next?
Carter showed a deep interest in events in Rhodesia, and himself and close advisor Andy Young were already planning their future policy towards the nation in 1976 (in contrast to another misconception, that Carter came to Washington as a provincial farmer with little knowledge of world affairs). Mitchell states that what so enticed Carter about Rhodesia was race, in particular the similarities which the president believed existed between the function of white-minority rule there and his own upbringing in segregated Georgia. Whilst Mitchell acknowledges the historical flaws in this conception, she notes that it was vital as the frame through which the president and Andy Young saw the world. It enabled both men to defend their policy against vicious attacks from the House of Representatives and the belated despair of America’s failing British ally.
In the Ogaden War, the Carter administration responded in a more confused and contradictory manner. The reason for this, in Mitchell’s argument, was that Carter was too controlling a leader- he insisted on making all decisions, and he did so slowly, problematic in such a crisis (as in Iran two years later). Still, she makes the point that there really was no practical way for the US to intervene in the conflict, pointing out the ridiculousness of Brzezinski’s plan to use Saudi/ Iranian troops against the elite Cuban regiments. The war in Ethiopia was also a black-black conflict, lacking the important racial element which brought Carter’s attention to the South of the continent. Still, Mitchell points out that the “defeat” of the US in the war, although used as another example of Carter’s weakness, actually hurt the Soviets more. They lost a key naval base in Somalia, the pride of their African empire, and gained only impoverished Ethiopia.
Overall, I found Jimmy Carter’s Africa policy to be an effective way of revaluating the president, at the same time as being honest as to his weaknesses. When he had the time, Carter could develop effective policies which advanced US aims in the Cold War without sacrificing American lives. In moments of crisis, however, his lack of ideology and insistence on control led to a confused foreign policy and accusations of weakness from the growing neoconservative movement. Whilst I disagree that Zimbabwe can be considered much of a success story following Mugabe’s tyranny, America certainly came out of the Carter years with a better position on the African continent than it had held four years previous, regardless of Reaganite rhetoric.
July 14, 2020
This is an outstanding work of history. Mitchell sets a new standard in multi-archival research to give an incredible set of perspectives on Jimmy Carter’s Africa policy. Quick disclaimer: The author was my teacher and is a good friend, but I still believe that a huge amount of praise is warranted.
The book looks at Jimmy Carter’s policy towards Africa, but focuses primarily on the issue of Rhodesia. Mitchell also looks in some detail at the crisis in the Horn and to a lesser degree at the Shaba I & II crises, but Rhodesia takes up the bulk of the book. She visited archives in multiple countries and had access to files from the Cuban archives, giving us a very broad range of sources that are used to present detail and nuance. Because it covers a lot of territory, it is hard to distill the book’s into a few ideas, but there are a few that stand out.
The first is that Carter was a very good planner for policy, but his lack of ideology and his centralization of decision-making made reacting to crises more difficult. As a result, the crisis in the Horn and the Shabas were seat-of-the-pants diplomacy that lacked coherence and “then what” planning, whereas Rhodesia, even with the shifting sands of international politics, was largely consistent and more successful.
The shifting situation was a constant thorn to Carter, so even though he had a plan, implementing it was a problem. The big one was the “Internal Settlement” set up by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith. That settlement included elected black leadership, but with very limited power. This meant that Carter could accept this fig leaf and placate his critics in the United States, but alienate most of Africa (Nigeria being the most important because it supplied 10-15% of US oil imports), or he could reject it, stay within international law and work towards an agreement that would end the civil war. The British were waffling on the subject, which made the American decision-making process even more difficult. Other things that complicated Carter’s plans were the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, the British election that brought Margaret Thatcher to power, a change in leadership in South Africa (who was needed to put pressure on Smith) and increased pressure from the U.S. Senate to end sanctions. Carter was able to overcome all of these to maintain sanctions, build trust among most of the participants (never Smith) to allow negotiations to go forward.
The culminating event was negotiations at Lancaster House. Lord Carrington masterfully pushed through negotiations, using the threat of removing sanctions to pressure the black African leaders of the Patriotic Front (rivals Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU) and the promise of lifting sanctions to pressure the new Rhodesian PM, Abel Muzorewa. Muzorewa was much more willing to agree because he thought Mugabe and Nkomo would walk away, making him look the reasonable one, which would get sanctions removed. He also thought that if worst came to worst, he would win an election (he wouldn’t). Carter’s role in Lancaster House has been minimized by historians, but U.S. pressure on all sides, as well as trust built up with most participants, pushed the final agreement to fruition. The result was new elections, which Mugabe won handily. This wasn’t what anyone expected, but seemed to work out well at the time (it would go bad a couple of decades later).
Another major theme is that Carter was a Cold Warrior at heart, although he viewed the Cold War differently than many Americans. He was criticized for being soft of communism, but he had a more realist view of it than most ideologically driven Americans, so his policies didn’t make sense to a large portion of the public.
In addition to the actual explaining historical events, the book also provides good insight into how government works. I was struck by three issues: 1) How to sell policy to the public to gather political support. 2) How decisions actually made in government. 3) How negotiations between governments get things done.
Selling policy was a weakness of Carter’s which allowed the press to paint an inaccurate picture of him being weak and waffling. He liked to “speak from the heart” and talk about “the right thing to do” which sounded good but made him sound naïve and soft. When he started portraying his policies as in the national interest, he had much more success.
Internal decision-making was at two levels: the elites (Carter, his Secretary of State, National Security Advisor and UN Ambassador), and the grunts at the State Department and NSC. The upper levels make the decisions and the grunts do the details. This meant that the grunt were continually working on the Anglo-American proposals even when the elites were worried they were dead. This might seem like a waste of time, but it ended up working out by laying the groundwork for Lancaster House. The agreement there wasn’t exactly the Anglo-American Proposals, but it was close. Also, among the elites, Mitchell takes issue with the idea that Carter was manipulated by his fighting main advisors. Their disagreements were generally productive and Carter made all of the decision on major issues.
Looking into international diplomacy might be where Mitchell is at her best. She explores the Anglo-American relationship the most, but also looks at the perspective of African states that had an interest in the conflict. Trust building (which Carter was good at with African leaders, if not with the British) was a major part of his success, which is particularly remarkable considering Henry Kissinger had largely discredited the United States in the region. And each country had its own priorities. Carter wanted to support a transition to true majority rule in Rhodesia, which would end the guerilla war and was the right thing to do. This was also important because if the Soviets and Cubans got involved, the United States might be forced to side with South Africa against the rest of southern Africa. Britain wanted to be done with Rhodesia, which meant getting it to a place where the international community would recognize it. They toyed with accepting the Internal Settlement, but were convinced that the rest of the world would not accept it as it was and they would face diplomatic and economic consequences if they moved on their own. Zambia and Mozambique wanted to help black Africans gain control, but were being ruined by the cost of supporting the guerillas and keeping sanctions on Rhodesia. South Africa wanted to maintain white rule, but thought of Rhodesia as a potential chip to get international pressure of them. So Carter’s problem was harnessing these objectives to achieve his own.
Mitchell also discusses that although this was one of Carter’s big successes, he got no benefit from it. Some liberals supported him, but many African Americans, whose support was crucial for Carter’s victory in 1976, cared much more about jobs than Rhodesia, so this didn’t win them back. Conservatives attacked him for it and used it to paint a picture of him being naïve and weak on communism. Historians have rarely been kinder because of the disaster that Mugabe became as president of Zimbabwe, even though he seemed to do a good job for the first decade.
All-in-all, this is an excellent book, although it is quite long. It is amazingly detailed in what the participants said and did at each stage. It is very well-written and the last chapter even feels like a climax where the race is on to finish negotiations before sanctions are removed and/or talks break down. You have to be committed to the subject to get through it, but anyone who is interested in how diplomacy actually works should read this book.
The book looks at Jimmy Carter’s policy towards Africa, but focuses primarily on the issue of Rhodesia. Mitchell also looks in some detail at the crisis in the Horn and to a lesser degree at the Shaba I & II crises, but Rhodesia takes up the bulk of the book. She visited archives in multiple countries and had access to files from the Cuban archives, giving us a very broad range of sources that are used to present detail and nuance. Because it covers a lot of territory, it is hard to distill the book’s into a few ideas, but there are a few that stand out.
The first is that Carter was a very good planner for policy, but his lack of ideology and his centralization of decision-making made reacting to crises more difficult. As a result, the crisis in the Horn and the Shabas were seat-of-the-pants diplomacy that lacked coherence and “then what” planning, whereas Rhodesia, even with the shifting sands of international politics, was largely consistent and more successful.
The shifting situation was a constant thorn to Carter, so even though he had a plan, implementing it was a problem. The big one was the “Internal Settlement” set up by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith. That settlement included elected black leadership, but with very limited power. This meant that Carter could accept this fig leaf and placate his critics in the United States, but alienate most of Africa (Nigeria being the most important because it supplied 10-15% of US oil imports), or he could reject it, stay within international law and work towards an agreement that would end the civil war. The British were waffling on the subject, which made the American decision-making process even more difficult. Other things that complicated Carter’s plans were the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, the British election that brought Margaret Thatcher to power, a change in leadership in South Africa (who was needed to put pressure on Smith) and increased pressure from the U.S. Senate to end sanctions. Carter was able to overcome all of these to maintain sanctions, build trust among most of the participants (never Smith) to allow negotiations to go forward.
The culminating event was negotiations at Lancaster House. Lord Carrington masterfully pushed through negotiations, using the threat of removing sanctions to pressure the black African leaders of the Patriotic Front (rivals Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU) and the promise of lifting sanctions to pressure the new Rhodesian PM, Abel Muzorewa. Muzorewa was much more willing to agree because he thought Mugabe and Nkomo would walk away, making him look the reasonable one, which would get sanctions removed. He also thought that if worst came to worst, he would win an election (he wouldn’t). Carter’s role in Lancaster House has been minimized by historians, but U.S. pressure on all sides, as well as trust built up with most participants, pushed the final agreement to fruition. The result was new elections, which Mugabe won handily. This wasn’t what anyone expected, but seemed to work out well at the time (it would go bad a couple of decades later).
Another major theme is that Carter was a Cold Warrior at heart, although he viewed the Cold War differently than many Americans. He was criticized for being soft of communism, but he had a more realist view of it than most ideologically driven Americans, so his policies didn’t make sense to a large portion of the public.
In addition to the actual explaining historical events, the book also provides good insight into how government works. I was struck by three issues: 1) How to sell policy to the public to gather political support. 2) How decisions actually made in government. 3) How negotiations between governments get things done.
Selling policy was a weakness of Carter’s which allowed the press to paint an inaccurate picture of him being weak and waffling. He liked to “speak from the heart” and talk about “the right thing to do” which sounded good but made him sound naïve and soft. When he started portraying his policies as in the national interest, he had much more success.
Internal decision-making was at two levels: the elites (Carter, his Secretary of State, National Security Advisor and UN Ambassador), and the grunts at the State Department and NSC. The upper levels make the decisions and the grunts do the details. This meant that the grunt were continually working on the Anglo-American proposals even when the elites were worried they were dead. This might seem like a waste of time, but it ended up working out by laying the groundwork for Lancaster House. The agreement there wasn’t exactly the Anglo-American Proposals, but it was close. Also, among the elites, Mitchell takes issue with the idea that Carter was manipulated by his fighting main advisors. Their disagreements were generally productive and Carter made all of the decision on major issues.
Looking into international diplomacy might be where Mitchell is at her best. She explores the Anglo-American relationship the most, but also looks at the perspective of African states that had an interest in the conflict. Trust building (which Carter was good at with African leaders, if not with the British) was a major part of his success, which is particularly remarkable considering Henry Kissinger had largely discredited the United States in the region. And each country had its own priorities. Carter wanted to support a transition to true majority rule in Rhodesia, which would end the guerilla war and was the right thing to do. This was also important because if the Soviets and Cubans got involved, the United States might be forced to side with South Africa against the rest of southern Africa. Britain wanted to be done with Rhodesia, which meant getting it to a place where the international community would recognize it. They toyed with accepting the Internal Settlement, but were convinced that the rest of the world would not accept it as it was and they would face diplomatic and economic consequences if they moved on their own. Zambia and Mozambique wanted to help black Africans gain control, but were being ruined by the cost of supporting the guerillas and keeping sanctions on Rhodesia. South Africa wanted to maintain white rule, but thought of Rhodesia as a potential chip to get international pressure of them. So Carter’s problem was harnessing these objectives to achieve his own.
Mitchell also discusses that although this was one of Carter’s big successes, he got no benefit from it. Some liberals supported him, but many African Americans, whose support was crucial for Carter’s victory in 1976, cared much more about jobs than Rhodesia, so this didn’t win them back. Conservatives attacked him for it and used it to paint a picture of him being naïve and weak on communism. Historians have rarely been kinder because of the disaster that Mugabe became as president of Zimbabwe, even though he seemed to do a good job for the first decade.
All-in-all, this is an excellent book, although it is quite long. It is amazingly detailed in what the participants said and did at each stage. It is very well-written and the last chapter even feels like a climax where the race is on to finish negotiations before sanctions are removed and/or talks break down. You have to be committed to the subject to get through it, but anyone who is interested in how diplomacy actually works should read this book.
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