Recounts two precedent-setting impeachment cases that strengthened the concept of separation of powers and further defined the institutions of American government
William Hubbs Rehnquist was an American lawyer, jurist, and a political figure who served as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States and later as the Chief Justice of the United States. Considered a conservative, Rehnquist favored a federalism under which the states meaningfully exercised governmental power. Under this view of federalism, the Supreme Court of the United States, for the first time since the 1930s, struck down an Act of Congress as exceeding federal power under the Commerce Clause.
Rehnquist presided as Chief Justice for nearly 19 years, making him the fourth-longest-serving Chief Justice after John Marshall, Roger Taney, and Melville Fuller, and the longest-serving Chief Justice who had previously served as an Associate Justice. The last 11 years of Rehnquist's term as Chief Justice (1994–2005) marked the second-longest tenure of one roster of the Supreme Court.
At a time when ‘impeachment’ is as much a buzzword as ‘the wall’, I have taken time to explore the former topic through a detailed, academic lens. The idea of a constitutionally-entrenched means of removing certain figures in the American political system is not new by any means. There have been many impeachment trials—and even some successes—though they receive little fanfare in the history textbooks. Former (and late) Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court (USSC), William Rehnquist, offers up a historic look at two significant impeachment trials of the 19th century, those of USSC Justice Samuel Chase and President of the United States Andrew Johnson. Rehnquist seeks not to offer a legal analysis of the rights and wrongs done in these trials, but to provide a thorough context that led up to events, the House debates over Articles of Impeachment, and the Senate trial.
In exploring the Chase impeachment, Rehnquist offers the reader a thorough backstory about the legal decisions that led House members to consider him unfit to serve on the High Court. These included refusal to hear witnesses in certain cases or lack of proper instruction to a grand jury in another case. Interestingly enough, Rehnquist points out that none of these actions took place when Chase was on the USSC, but rather in the years when he served in lower courts. The Articles were presented by a vindictive House and taken to the Senate, in hopes of a quick conviction. Many of the Articles were highly legalistic, perhaps losing their impact on the non-legal minded senators who sat as the congressional jury. Rehnquist shows in detail how the evidence was presented and what arguments were used to sway senators, before the voting began. With the severity of the act, a super-majority of two-thirds would be needed to convict, something that did not occur. There were, however, significant divisions within the American political system in the lead-up to the trial, which only deepened in its aftermath.
Shaken, but not toppled, the American state moved forward from the Chase Impeachment and into the ravages of slavery and how that tore apart the fabric of the country. Rehnquist offers a brilliant exploration of how the country used its constitutional foundation to either justify or deny the right of slavery in the country, which fuelled divisiveness in a country that was just shedding the mantle of infancy. With drums of conflict beating in the background—and soon in the foreground—the country elected Abraham Lincoln to guide them, though the selection was highly divisive across the regions. By the end of the US Civil War, the country was strongly divided and literally bloodied, only made worse when its so-called unifier was assassinated shortly after the formal truce had been signed. With Lincoln gone, it was Andrew Johnson who took over the reins of power, which led to years of conflict as the US Congress tried to right itself with legislation seeking to reconstruct the country under this new acceptance of all being equal and slavery being abolished. As Rehnquist explores through historical documentation, Johnson did little to assuage the climate of hostility, fanning flames and trying to assert his right to rule in his own way. Firing Cabinet officials and replacing them without seeking Senate consent—something enshrined in the Tenure of Office Act—while also developing his own form of reconstruction that contradicted much of the legislative plans enacted by Congress. Rehnquist explores how these clashes led House Republicans to begin drafting Articles of Impeachment, eleven in all. When they were approved, the case went to the Senate to be adjudicated. The impeachment trial proved a political spectacle that saw many of the divisions within the newly reassembled United States exacerbated. When the voting began, Johnson was saved from impeachment by a single vote, though only a few of the Articles were ever voted upon, leaving many others to wither away before the trial was closed.
I had heard much about Rehnquist’s book when reading the more recent academic discussions surrounding impeachment, but had never taken the time to read it. As I mentioned before, the book seeks not to analyse impeachment from a legal standpoint—though, who greater to offer a detailed analysis than the more senior juror in the United States at the time?—but rather a historic snapshot of events that actually took place. Rehnquist spends much time offering actual excerpts from newspaper headlines, articles, debates on the floor of the House of Representatives, as well as transcripts from the formal impeachment trials of both men. The reader is permitted to view some of the strongly worded arguments surrounding the Articles of Impeachment, as well as a little more of the context that would offer a well-grounded understanding of events and circumstances. Of note, Rehnquist does mention that both impeachments of which he writes were brought about my legislatures with a majority of members from the opposing party. This is not to say that impeachment is solely a political weapon, but the impetus to bring it about sometimes requires partisanship. Even in modern American politics, while many can see that the current president is paving the way to his ouster, a Republican House of Representatives did not act and the current (at time of this review) GOP majority in the Senate would not take the bold move and remove their renegade party leader. Penned and published seven years before Rehnquist would have to sit as figurehead arbiter of a presidential impeachment, many have said that this book helped substantiate the author’s knowledge of the nuances of impeachment proceedings. What I find most refreshing is that the text is written in such a way that the layperson can grasp and synthesise the concepts and that it is not a tome dripping with academic analysis that only the scholarly might enjoy. Impeachment has long been discussed and does occur more regularly than a few sitting presidents over the years, something that Rehnquist does hint at throughout. But it is nice to see factual presentation rather than overly partisan and esoteric verbiage to explore one of the more exciting parts of the American constitutional rule book. We shall see if impeachment remains a buzzword for the American public over the next little while. One thing’s for sure... doing so would not cost the American public upwards of $6 billion and likely lead to a shutdown. But... I digress!
Kudos, Chief Justice Rehnquist, for this masterful piece of work. While I admit to not agreeing with much of your sentiments during your time on the bench, I could not be happier with this piece of historical analysis.
Former Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist explores the impeachment process of removing federal officials from office. He starts with the attempted impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase by the Thomas Jefferson Administration. I do not think he clearly lays out the charges against Chase. What they dealt with was the conduct of Justice Chase in three separate trials. Chief Justice Rehnquist describes the various charges as somewhat unusual but not worthy of impeachment. He boils the impeachment charges down to the politics of the day.
Thomas Jefferson’s presidency swept Republican/ Democratic Party (to which he belonged) into congress. With a Democratic/ Republican controlled congress and presidency there was only one branch of government that could spoil President Jefferson’s policies of lack of military defense, state’s rights, and agrarian economics. That branch was the judicial branch. All the judges at the time were appointed by President Washington and Adams since their Federalist party had been in charge of the government for the first twelve years of our countries existence. As a consequence most appointed judges held similar views as the president’s who appointed them. Justice Chase was no exception. When he criticized a Jefferson policy, the president reacted with the previously unused power of impeachment. He contacted congress and told the House of Representatives to bring up charges against Chase.
The Senate conducts a trial and Chase is acquitted of the charges, in a lopsided manner. Samuel Chase is the only Supreme Court Justice to ever be impeached. Rehnquist summarizes that his acquittal assured the Court of its independence from the executive branch up and until our times.
As Rehnquist moves into President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment proceedings he gives a concise history of events leading up to the President’s impeachment. He actually starts with the beginnings of American slavery and chronicles the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas/ Nebraska Act, the Nat Turner uprising, the formation of the Whig party and Republican party. He details Lincoln’s rise to the top of the Republican Party and the other abolitionist politicians of the day. President Johnson’s impeachment stems from his own party’s disapproval of his political agenda. Andrew Johnson was picked as Abraham Lincoln’s vice president as a reward for being the most prominent political supporter of Lincoln’s war policies, as a Tennessee Senator, from a confederate state.
He becomes, unexpectedly, President after Lincoln’s assassination in 1865. In the midterm elections the following year the radical Republican wing of the party took control of congress. The radical Republicans wanted a quick integration of the former slaves with equal rights guaranteed to them. Johnson, on the other hand, disagreed with their view. He appointed leaders state governments to run the former Confederate states and let them run their respective states as they wished. Some former confederate states in turn enacted “black codes” which denied freed blacks the right to testify against whites, to serve on juries, join state militias, and the right to vote. This infuriated the radical republican controlled congress. Johnson’s Secretary of War Edwin Stanton sided with the radicals of his party. As Stanton’s disapproval of Johnson policies became more open his survival as Secretary of War became more vulnerable.
The congress realized this, and they being a big Stanton supporter, passed the “Tenor of Office Act” in order to protect Stanton from dismissal. The Act required that since the President needs Senatorial approval to appoint a Cabinet member he also needs Senatorial approval to remove a Cabinet member from Office. Johnson quickly tests the new law and fires Stanton. The radical Republican controlled House of Representatives responds with charges against President Johnson.
After three months President Johnson is acquitted. One reason was because Stanton was not appointed by President Johnson. He was a holdover from Abraham Lincoln’s administration. The Tenor of Office Act did not clarify if an appointment made by a predecessor needed Senatorial approval for dismissal.
The Tenor of Office Act lasted until 1926 when it was finally overturned by the Myers vs. The United States decision. Ironically it was a former president who presided over the court in this case. William Howard Taft as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court authored the courts majority opinion declaring the Tenor of Office Act invalid.
Mr. Rehnquist then discusses the Whig Party sweep of the congress and presidency with theTippecanoe and Tyler too campaign of 1840. Tippecanoe refers to William Henry Harrison. Harrison as the hero of the Tippecanoe victory over Native American Indians was drafted into the new Whig Party to be its presidential candidate. He was the governor of the North West Territory which entailed territory west of Ohio. In order to balance the ticket the Whigs picked a recently converted to the Whig party eastern vice president - John Tyler. John Tyler was a well educated Virginian Senator while Harrison was a politically naive and came from well outside political circles. This fact mattered little until Harrison unexpectedly died just one month after his inauguration.
When Tyler assumed the presidency, he vetoed the Whig controlled congresses legislation. In particular, he vetoed one of the Whigs major party platform issues –Funding for the National Bank. The Whigs actually revised the Bank legislation to meet Tyler’s objections. When the new Bank legislation reached President Tyler he vetoed it again. An irate congress talked of finding charges for impeachment but couldn’t find any. They did however kick him out of their party. The Democrats rejected him as well, and he became one of only three presidents to serve without belonging to a political party.
Mr. Rehnquist next talks about President Nixon’s problems during the Watergate scandal of the 1970’s. Members of President Nixon’s Reelection Committee broke into the Democratic Party Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in order to wire-tap their strategy room. They got caught. The question still remains if President Nixon authorized it. The President denied that he made any attempts to thwart the investigation. But then it was discovered that Whitehouse conversations were being recorded. After a court battle, these tapes were turned over to investigators. On the tapes, they found the President and his Chief of Staff, in fact, discussing ways to obstruct the investigation. This doomed the President.
When Senators told him that they had enough votes to convict when he was impeached, he decided to resign and became the only president in history to resign.
Mr. Rehnquist concludes that these important cases are what kept our three branches of government separate but equal.
“Grand Inquests” is a study of perhaps the two most significant impeachment cases tried in the United States Senate. The acquittal of Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Chase ensured judicial independence while the acquittal of President Andrew Johnson accomplished the same for the executive branch.
Declaration of Independence signer Samuel Chase was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1796. After the Supreme Court asserted the right to determine the constitutionality of statutes in Marbury v. Madison, the Jefferson Administration sought to rein in Federalist appointed jurists. Chase’s conduct while serving as a District Court (trial level) Judge, a common occupation of Supreme Court justices of the day, provided a target. Author William Rehnquist draws on his judicial experience to explain the allegations, the facts on which they are based and his analysis of their merits.
Andrew Johnson succeeded to the presidency in 1865 on the death of Abraham Lincoln. Soon at odds with Republicans in Congress, his 1867 dismissal of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in violation of the Tenure of Office Act provided the facts on which impeachment charges could be brought. As in the Chase case, the unwillingness of some majority senators to convict in spite of the evidence supporting acquittal, albeit possibly influenced by bribes, enabled Johnson to complete his term.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has crafted a tome that places the impeachments in their historical and legal contexts. It is much more than a legal review but is written in a style that is understandable to a wide variety of readers. He draws the conclusion that a conviction of Chase would have established a precedent that would hold judges accountable for the substance of their decisions, whereas the acquittal preserved their independence. The impact of Johnson’s acquittal is more difficult to ascertain, given the unique nature of the Civil War, but it would be a century and a quarter before a president would be impeached. I recommend “Grand Inquests” to those seeking insights into these two landmark political/legal cases that helped shape the checks and balances in our national government.
Rehnquist does a good job of analyzing the articles of impeachment in the cases presented against Associate Justice Samuel Chase (1805) and President Andrew Johnson (1868). Most of the material linking these sections together is rote and derived from a handful of dated but colorful secondary sources (Henry Adams, Samuel Morison), but when Rehnquist actually gets to the sections about the nature of the charges (chargeable crimes OR a vote of no confidence, as William Branch Giles (1805) and Charles Sumner (1868) had hoped), he does good work. He notes that the actions of recusants in both cases - Dem-Reps for Chase, Reps for Johnson - ensured the process wouldn't devolve into pure politics, though he speculates that the fact that impeachment is a mere majority vote in the House could lead to future impeachments that serve as spectacles/ways to damage presidential reputations/etc. He would, ironically enough, preside over one of these affairs, and the Trump administration would feature two more of them (and we're likely to see a few more ineffective photo-op impeachments in the next few decades).
Not nearly as good as "All the Laws But One," and written in such a way that it appears clear he had separate clerks writing sections of this prior to dealing with the subject matter he found interesting (Rehnquist was a "work smarter not harder" type and wasn't one to waste words).
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a very good book on the Chase and Johnson impeachments. Filled with background and history and why the outcomes saved the court and executive, respectfully, it is a worthy read. I read the original that was not updated for the Clinton impeachment over which Rehnquist presided. It is worth a read especially in these times.
A delightful and well-reasoned legal, political, and historical analysis of the first two major impeachment trials and their impact on American governance, improved by the later career of the author in presiding over the second presidential impeachment trial. But some of the historical context proved extraneous.
Very interesting story\stories. Two different impeachments 63 years apart, one a judge and one a U.S. president. Shows how these two impeachment processes and outcomes affected the relationship of the 3 branches of government.
With what is going on in 2019, it is a very timely read.
I meant to read this book 20-some years ago, in light of then-recent events. Instead, I finally got around to reading it now, in light of current (fall of 2019) events.
It hasn't aged well.
Firstly, there is so much background and context here, it overwhelms the recounting of the two impeachment cases this book purports to be about. The actual impeachment and trial of Samuel Chase gets two chapters. Andrew Johnson's is dispatched in just one.
And the rest? Well, for one, understanding the Johnson impeachment, Justice Rehnquist tells us, requires "a brief examination of the American attitude toward Negro slavery over a period of two and a half centuries." And then we are treated to chapters upon chapters of the history of the United States from 1619 onward, through colonial times, the antebellum period, the Civil War and beyond.
Yes, context and background are important, but not to this extent. At times, the book feels like a history of the U.S. with a few chapters on impeachment thrown in.
Ultimately, and where the book begins to feel dated, is when Rehnquist concludes that the two acquittals were a victory for judicial and executive independence, respectively. Modern historians, with better, more focused books on the subject, have adopted more nuanced views on whether the Johnson impeachment was justified.
But the topper is when Rehnquist asks this of the impeachment process: "Would the dominant role played by political parties make the Senate a partisan tribunal, which would be willing to undermine the fundamental principles of the Constitution in order to remove a political enemy from office [or in order to protect a political ally from being removed]?" His answer: "Remarkably... no."
Our most recent experiences with impeachment in these hyperpartisan times make that conclusion seem downright quaint.
So if you're looking to this book for insight into impeachment in our times, sadly, this book's time has passed.