The Last Days of Stalin

by Joshua Rubenstein

A gripping account of the months before and after Joseph Stalin’s death and how his demise reshaped the course of twentieth-century history.Joshua Rubenstein’s riveting account takes us back to the second half of 1952 when no one could foresee an end to Joseph Stalin’s murderous regime. He was poised to challenge the newly elected U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower with armed force, and was also broadening a vicious campaign against Soviet Jews. Stalin’s sudden collapse and death in March 1953 was as dramatic and mysterious as his life. It is no overstatement to say that his passing marked a major turning point in the twentieth century.The Last Days of Stalin is an engaging, briskly told account of the dictator’s final active months, the vigil at his deathbed, and the unfolding of Soviet and international events in the months after his death. Rubenstein throws fresh light onthe devious plotting of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and other “comrades in arms” who well understood the significance of the dictator’s impending death;the witness-documented events of his death as compared to official published versions;Stalin’s rumored plans to forcibly exile Soviet Jews;the responses of Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles to the Kremlin’s conciliatory gestures after Stalin’s death; andthe momentous repercussions when Stalin’s regime of terror was cut short.“A fascinating and often chilling reconstruction of the months surrounding the Soviet dictator’s death.” —Saul David, Evening Standard (UK)“A gripping look at the power struggles after the Red Tsar’s death.” —Victor Sebestyen, The Sunday Times (UK)“Stalin’s death in March 1953 cut short another spasm of blood purges he was planning, but triggered only limited Soviet reforms. To some Westerners it promised an extended period of peace, but others feared it would leave the West even more vulnerable. Joshua Rubenstein’s lively, detailed, carefully crafted book chronicles a key twentieth-century turning point that didn’t entirely turn, revealing what difference Stalin’s death did and didn’t make and why.” —William Taubman, author of  The Man and His Era

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Russia, Biography, Audiobook, Politics, Russian History

299 pages, Kindle Edition

Published May 31, 2016

About the author

Joshua Rubenstein is an associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. He was a staff member of Amnesty International USA from 1975 to 2012. He lives in Brookline, MA.

Reviews

[Boudewijn · Rating 4 out of 5]

The stalinist paradox: the fact that Soviet policy became frightened by demons of its own invention, thus its self induced hysteria over Western attack let it into a policy that, in turn, solidified the Western world against it, as nothing else could have done. Rinse and repeat and there you have Stalin’s recepy: fictional enemies everywhere, saboteurs and spies and plots everywhere and Stalin as the only one to prevent it.

Just before Stalin died, he had arrested his doctor’s and was ready to start to pave the way for nationwide antisemitism, pogrom’s and thousands of deaths. But luckily Stalin died, because there were no doctor’s left. They were either already dead or in prison.

With Stalin gone, was there an opportunity to reach a thaw in the Cold War? According to Rubenstein, there could have been one, was it not for American’s suspicion and hesitancy to find out what the Kremlin’s new leaders had in mind. In any case, the window of opportunity was probably narrow after the outbreak of the East-German riots the same year. They shook the Kremlin’s confidence, reinforcing its determination not to allow popular discontent to challenge its hegemony in the Eastern European states.

Within Russia, with the new collective leadership, there still would not be any tolerance for any challenge to the one party rule, not within the Soviet Union, or the broader empire. Chroetsjov and his successors, still being proud communists, did condemn Stalin’s crimes and yet preserve enough of the dictatorship to maintain their power and authority. It meant the Russian population had to endure another 40 years of dictatorial rule, before Gorbatsjov decided to stop arresting people for their non violent activities or beliefs, release remaining political prisoners and do away with censorship, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union all together.

A great book describing the events leading to and after Stalin’s death and the missed opportunities that came with it.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A clear, well-researched and readable narrative of Stalin’s last days.

Rubenstein vividly covers the fabricated “Doctors Plot" (which led to the arrest of Stalin’s personal physician and prevented him from treating Stalin), the Soviet leadership’s skepticism of Stalin’s anti-Semitic leanings, the fear among the doctors treating Stalin, the reaction and intrigue of the Soviet leadership, how quickly Stalin’s comrades reversed some of his policies after his death (even before Khrushchev’s secret speech), and the debate among Western leaders over whether Stalin’s death was an opportunity for some kind of thaw (a chance they blew, Rubenstein argues). He also describes how the security apparatus and protocols Stalin developed throughout his career ironically ended up preventing others from giving him proper medical attention.

The narrative is accessible, engaging and dramatic, and Rubenstein does a great job capturing the tension and anxiety of the time, although the narrative can get a bit dry at times. He also contends that Stalin was planning a new purge shortly before his death, but the evidence for this seems somewhat thin.

A concise, interesting, and informative work.

[Kuszma · Rating 4 out of 5]

Képzeljük el, hogy ezt Agatha Christie írja meg: dácsájában halva találják Bárczi Benőt... illetve a kommunista cárt. Úgy fest, természetes körülmények között hunyt el – de Poirot gyanakszik. Kiknek lehetett érdekében eltenni őt láb alól? (Jó vicc – kiknek nem?) Ki a tettes? Az amerikai titkosszolgálatok? Csakhogy őket mintha teljesen váratlanul érte volna az esemény. A cionista orvosok, akik ellen koncepciós pert készített elő? (Naná, miért nem rögtön Soros György?) Berija, aki amúgy is gyanúsan viselkedik? (Nem mindegy? Berija sem fogja megélni az új évet.) Malenkov? Hruscsov? A mindig megalázott Molotov? Ki tudja. A kis szürke agysejtek tanácstalanok. Megfejtés: szinte látom, ahogy – pont, mint Agathánál – ott állnak egy pohár grúz bor fölött sorban mind: Dulles az amerikai titkosszolgálattól, Eisenhower, Churchill, a zsidó orvosok, a teljes szovjet politikai vezetés, a gulág rabjai, a tisztogatások áldozatainak rokonai, lengyelek, baltiak, finnek és a többi milliók, hogy szépen, sorban mind egy csepp mérget cseppentsenek a pohárba. Sztálin pedig gyanútlanul felhörpinti.

Jó kis kötet. Kiválóan olvasható, gördülékeny, informatív és élvezetes. Gócpontjában Sztálin halála, ebből kiindulva tekintjük át az előzményeket és utózmányokat. Mindenekelőtt az ’52-es év eseményeit az újabb monstre pertervezettel, ami ezúttal a zsidó orvosokat, és bizony magát a zsidóságot célozza meg – tanulságos lecke azoknak, akik kíváncsiak rá, hogy kell antiszemita kampányt bonyolítani úgy, hogy közben végig tagadjuk annak antiszemita voltát (ami annál is könnyebben megy, mert Izrael állam is habozik bármit is a szemünkre vetni, hisz politikai számítás is van a világon). Aztán a halál következményeit: az utódok taktikázását a hatalomért és a kül- és belpolitikai stabilitásért, valamint a nyugat reakcióit – az óvatoskodást és hitetlenkedést. Mert bár Rubenstein könyvének borítóján a hangzatos „A halál, amely megmentette a világot” reklámfelirat virít, de hát pont ez a lényeg – hogy ez a halál nem mentette meg a világot. A legjobb indulattal is csak annyit állíthatunk, hogy bizonyos szovjeteket megmentett, hisz puhított a rendszer agresszivitásán. De a hidegháború nem ért véget, mert úgy fest, Sztálin halálára Amerika a legkevésbé sem volt felkészülve – mintha örökéletű szörnynek gondolták volna, kolosszusnak, aki az idők végezetéig ott áll majd a túlsó parton. Tervek és átfogó koncepció híján pedig a lehetőség a gyökeres változásra elmaradt, a szembenállás pedig bő harminc évre konzerválódott. Eljátszhatunk a gondolattal, hogy egy konstruktívabb (vagy épp ellenkezőleg: agresszívabb) Eisenhower mennyiben alakíthatta volna át ebben a történelmi pillanatban a XX. századot – Rubenstein mindenesetre tárgyilagosabb annál, hogy ilyesmibe bocsátkozzon. Tény, hogy ha valaki profitált az eseményből, akkor az nem Eisenhower, hanem inkább Hruscsov, aki egy ilyen ingatag időszakban (mert egy diktatúra életében nincs ingatagabb időszak a diktátor halálánál – kevés zsarnokság éli túl a zsarnokot) latba vetette minden ravaszságát, összekovácsolta a bűnben fogant vezetőséget, megszilárdította az államot, és még legveszedelmesebb ellenfelét (Beriját) is eltávolította az útból. Ügyes voltál, Nyikita. De azért ne feledd, hogy egyszer neked is kitelik az időd.

[Siv30 · Rating 3 out of 5]

לסקירה מפורטת בעברית, קישור לבלוג שלי -

https://sivi-the-avid-reader.com/הימי...

[Peter Kavanagh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating not only for the information about the circumstances of his death but also the aftermath in the USSR and in the western alliance. Worth reading for even for those who have a good grounding in soviet history.

[Stratos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Χρήσιμο για όσους ασχολούνται με την ιστορία και την πολιτική......

[Johnny · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was unaware of anything like politics when Stalin died in 1953. Still, I was toddling around and have vague impressions of the first three years of my life so there is a fascination with the history and events of the early ‘50s (as well as the decade and a half before—for some reason). The Last Days of Stalin practically jumped off the shelf and into my hands. I knew that he had died of natural causes and that surprised me almost as much as when an alleged mafia don dies of natural causes. I knew that there were big demonstrations after his death, but not only did I not know the tenth of it, I seem to have overestimated how much of the emotions displayed were bureaucratic hypocrisies and how much was genuine sorrow (although the fear of the unknown may have contributed to those tears and grim expressions). Before reading this, I had no clue of how the succession worked.

The Last Days of Stalin didn’t disappoint. From the introduction with its quotation from writer Andrei Sinyavsky (“Stalin was inside everyone, like the hammer alongside the sickle in every mind.” p. ix) through its demythologizing of Stalin’s alleged detailed plan to send Russia’s 2.5 million Jews to Birobidjian (80-84) and the ugly disasters at the viewing in Red Square to the removal of Stalin’s body from Lenin’s mausoleum where the corpse had rested in state (As Sinyavsky was again quoted, “As a body of a saint is surrounded by miracles, so is Stalin’s surrounded by murders.” (originally in Goodnight, p. 25, but p. 109 here), this is a fascinating snapshot of a time of chaos and opportunity.

Rubenstein doesn’t mince words when he speaks of the lost opportunities for peace and cooperation in the immediate period after Stalin’s death. Whereas Eisenhower perceived the radical events taking place in the Kremlin as hopeful signs of diplomatic rapport, his own advisers sabotaged his hope—especially John Foster Dulles (p. 165). I had always heard people speak of the then Secretary of State in hushed tones as though he were a great man. Apparently, this was because he was perceived as a strong Cold Warrior, though he actually may have been rather cowardly enough to believe that the entire western network of alliances hinged on fear of Soviet aggression (pp. 187-8). Ambassador to Moscow Charles Bohlen wrote of Dulles that “he believed if Americans were seen in friendly conversations with Russians, the will to resist Communism would be weakened throughout the world.” (quoted on p. 188). Would Soviet-U.S. relations have normalized under Stalin’s immediate predecessor, Malenkov? Or would Khrushchev’s machinations have brought an inevitable consolidation of power in dictatorial form? If the former, the window for such rapprochement certainly closed in a hurry.

The machinations documented by Rubenstein were interesting to read about, though one never wishes to experience them from the other side of the gun. Laventri Beria undermined Molotov by asking Hungarian Communist leader, Matyas Rakosi, why there were 1.5 million persecutions [obviously more sinister than prosecutions] undertaken in a country of 9.5 million inhabitants (p. 195). Such figures would imply that circa 16% of Hungary’s population in 1953 was “treasonous.” Perhaps, this unwarranted persecution led to the rebellion about three years later. But it wasn’t long until Khrushchev manipulated opinion against Beria and, because Beria controlled the Secret Police, used the armed forces to arrest him and escort him to his place of incarceration. It took 12 armored personnel carriers, 20 T-34 tanks, 23 mobile artillery systems, and 48 military support vehicles to escort Beria to the secret bunker where he was imprisoned—a place of which even the MGB and KGB were unaware. Khrushchev later gave orders for his execution (p. 209).

Meanwhile, in the German Democratic Republic, Walter Ulbricht (head of the satellite state we knew as East Germany) tried to follow Stalin’s playbook and raise the quotas for laborers with no concomitant wage increase. Riots and strikes followed, forcing Ulbricht to withdraw the new quotas (p. 198). Lest anyone think anything was lacking in the Communist ideology, Communist Party radio asserted that uniformed American officers “had directed the demonstrations from radio cars in West Berlin.” (p. 202). Some things never change. And people are worried about fake news via the Russian Television (RT) channel on the Internet, today.

One would think that people who lived through the Cold War and the height of those years of Mutually Assured Destruction would be more knowledgeable about the history on “the other side.” If so, this child of the latter half of the 20th century hasn’t lifted his burden. Yet, Rubenstein’s book – though its scope is narrow – provides a wonderful structure for anyone who, like me, wants to fill in the gaps or for those who came to this planet later than me and want to know what the big deal was. It is a fascinating volume and should give pause to those who underestimate the current administration in the former Soviet Union. I am so glad I read this book.

[Nigel Kotani · Rating 3 out of 5]

I enjoyed and was frustrated by this book in equal measure.

I enjoyed it because it's well-written, gripping and informative about an absolutely fascinating event in recent world history. A genuine page-turner in the non-fiction genre: probably my favourite type of book.

It's not really about the last days of Stalin, though. Only about 25-33% of it is, with the rest being about the immediate aftermath of his death, which is as it should be as it's a more interesting story than the build-up to his death anyway.

What frustrated me is that the immediate period after Stalin's death is a fascinating story of an internal power struggle between Khrushchev and Beria, with the former eventually winning out and having the latter executed, before going on to take the country in a more liberal direction than under Stalin. The book deals with that story, but not in much detail, instead concentrating on the more global reaction to Stalin's death.

What the book basically deals with is Stalin's last major public speech (in which he warned of an imminent clampdown on 'saboteurs'), the Doctors' Plot (the repression of a group of Jewish doctors) and how Israel reacted to it, Stalin's death, how the US, UK and France reacted to Stalin's death, the politburo's move towards liberalisation and detente, the US's dogmatic refusal to respond in a positive way to the Soviet Union reaching out to it, unrest in the Eastern European states and its suppression, and Beria's downfall.

All good stuff, but basically too global in its scope and not really a book about the effect of Stalin's death in the Soviet Union itself, which I think I'm entitled to expect from a book with its title, and which I think is a more interesting story and power struggle than that of John Foster Dulles blocking Eisenhower's moves towards rapprochement.

A good book (borderline very good), but not what I was expecting or as good as it could have been had it had a more Soviet and less global focus. Plotting and backstabbing in the Politburo would have been a much better story than US indecision.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 4 out of 5]

I felt I should add that this book has no connection with the absolutely brilliant 2017 film 'The Death of Stalin'. Oddly although the film takes enormous liberties it is in many ways a more informative portrayal of post Stalin Soviet Union than this book - April 2024).

There is a great deal of good in this book but it fails through broadening the subject of the book to take in not just an examination of the Soviet Union at the time of Stalin's death and the immediate aftermath but broadens it to try and include USA government and newspaper responses and how his death affected the USSR's satellites in Eastern Europe, USA policy to them, Soviet policy to them and the repercussion all these had on continuing the cold war.

It is too much and it can't all be dealt with in sufficient depth or knowledge. The result is a lack of focus leading to broad superficial conclusions about how and why Soviet government developed as did after Stalin and how the USA responded to it.

I am still giving it four stars because there is much that is good in the book and it should lead you to other better books.

[Tariq Mahmood · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic read of probably the last remaining Iron Men of the Great War. Stalin was a ruthless leader with an iron grip over millions of people. But this book details the infighting between his cronies. The West led by Eisenhower only did lip service, without taking any concrete steps for global peace. Churchill did try to take the initiative but was too physically weak and insignificant to make any visible dent. The inner-circle used their common hate of Stalin's right-hand man Bernia to solve their leadership tussle.

[Nikola Jankovic · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pregled perioda pre i nakon Staljinove smrti, sa maksimalnim fokusom na sve zajedno godinu dana. Počinje sa poznatim poslednjim satima nakon pijanke u dači, pitanjima koliko dugo bi još živeo da njegovi pomoćnici nisu bili toliko prestrašeni, pa nisu smeli da uđu u sobu ni kad su već sumnjali da nešto nije u redu... Deluje mi da je čovek već bio prilično bolestan, ali možda su mogli da mu produže život još godinu-dve.

Nastavlja se uvidom u sve dublju Staljinovu paranoju poslednjih meseci života (progon Jevreja i zavera doktora), ali je najveći deo knjige posvećen uticaju njegove smrti na društvo. To što se dešavalo tih dana u SSSR 1953., naravno podseća na ono što smo mi slušali o Titovoj smrti. Cela Rusija je plakala - polovina od tuge, druga polovina od olakšanja. "Čovek bi pomislio da je svemir prepukao, a ne da je umro jedan čovek," napisao je Solženjicin. Rečiti su i opisi Moskve u danima pred sahranu, sa stotinama na smrt pregaženih ljudi u stampedima i gužvama, kad je stotine hiljada želelo da vidi telo velikog vođe.

Do prvih promena u u sovjetskoj politici dolazi brzo, pa se prve greške iz prošlosti javno priznaju već nakon mesec dana. Neki potezi su nestrpljivo očekivani, ali ipak preuranjeni - za nekoliko nedelja iz gulaga je pušteno oko milion zatvorenika, pa imamo tu priču o gradu u kom je 1,200 zavorenika na slobodi u krvavom piru od nekoliko dana ubilo 800 građana.

45 dana nakon smrti, Pravda objavljuje kritiku "vladanja pojedinačnog vođe", a Beria je kao vođa KGB, iste godine osuđen i streljan u roku od 6 dana. Neke promene su brze, ali ne radi se o potpunom priznavanju prošlosti - do Hruščovljevog poznatog tajnog govora i osudi Staljinovog režima, ipak su morale da prođu 3 godine.

U svakom slučaju, Staljinova smrt je u tim danima viđena kao prelomni trenutak hladnog rata - Amerikanci su maltene očekivali kapitulaciju SSSR, potpuno otvaranje granica, izlazak Crvene Armije iz Poljske, Čehoslovačke i Mađarske. Istorija nas uči da se to nije desilo, i da se uprkos mnogo otvorenijem pristupu zapadnoj kulturi, puštanju većine političkih zatvorenika na slobodu i priznanju grešaka i zločina koji su se desili za vreme staljinizma, hladni rat nastavio u istom obimu, a podizanjem berlinskog zida i kubanskom krizom se i pogoršao. Čerčil je u to vreme pokazao da ima neki osećaj za svetsku politiku, pa je pokušao da poveže dve velesile i da premosti jaz, ali autor smatra da je Ajzenhauer u to vreme propustio priliku da pokrene ozbiljne pregovore i okonča hladni rat. Prva poseta Hruščova SAD dešava se tek 6 godina kasnije, 1959. godine.

Sama knjiga je detaljan prikaz dana koji su imali velik značaj za istoriju 20. veka, ali uprkos kritici (i) zapadnih političara, čini mi se da je propuštena prilika da se Staljinove odluke i njegova celokupna politika sagledaju izvan ograničenja na crno i belo. Svako ima određene motivacije za svoje odluke, a pogotovo kod Staljina bi bilo zanimljivo čitati na tu temu. Ne volim poređenja Hitlera i Staljina kao diktatora, ne čini mi se da mogu da uđu u istu rečenicu kad se porede zločini koji su nastali na osnovu njihovih vladavina, ali... Ian Kershaw je odlično prikazao Hitlera, siguran sam da negde postoji i knjiga koja je isto to uradila za Stalljina.

[Andrew Davis · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting and well written account of Stalin’s last years, his demise, funeral and further developments after his death. Especially interesting were the relations of the events in DDR, arrest and trial of Beria and the strikes in the Gulags organised by the political prisoners who were demanding an amnesty.

Notes:
Stalin when discussing his successor, saw only Bulganin as the worthy one. He dismissed Beria because he was not Russian, but Georgian. Khrushchev was a worker. Malenkov could only follow someone else’s lead. Kaganovich wasn’t Russian but Jew. Molotov was too aged. Voroshilov not up to it.
Khrushchev recalled how Stalin had grown increasingly hostile to Molotov and Mikoyan, because of their support for increasing the state’s investments in agriculture.
The Doctors’ Plot revolved around deaths of Shcherbakov in 1945 and Zhdanov in 1948. Nine doctors were listed, six of them Jewish.
After Stalin’s death Malenkov seemed to be securing the three most important positions within the Soviet hierarchy: the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the head of the Party Presidium and the Secretariat of the party itself. This was quickly changed when on 21st of March was announced that Malenkov resigned as secretary of the party. He remained the premier. Beria was the head of the internal police. Khrushchev was announced as the first secretary. Molotov was restored as foreign minister, Bulganin the defence minister.
Beria reported to the Presidium that 2.5 million political and non-political prisoners were kept in the Gulag. On 27th of March an amnesty for the one million of criminal prisoners was announced.
Events in the East Germany started in June 1953. On 11th of June the communist officials acknowledged their mistakes and agreed to abolish forced collectivisation, safeguard private enterprises etc. Soon after they announced the release over five thousand prisoners accused of small criminal crimes. On 15th of June when a group of workers attempted to approach premier Grotewohl, they were turned away. The next day the workers took to the streets. With the regime unwilling to negotiate. Two days later the workers attacked symbols of communist power. When 25 thousand converged on the House of Ministries, martial law was declared and the Soviet tanks moved to protect the building. Facing with hostile demonstrators, Soviet troops started firing into crowds of unarmed people. At least 120 demonstrators were killed and 200 seriously wounded. Well over 3,000 people were arrested. Strikes spread to other towns. By 20th of June most of the unrest subsided.
Removal of Beria started on 26th of June 1953, when Bulganin, as minister of defence arranged a small group of senior military officers, and had them briefed by Zhukov about the plot. Malenkov, as chairman of Presidium opened the meeting of Presidium and announced that the agenda would focus on Beria’s activities. He accused him of violating the principle of collective leadership and proposed to remove him as minister of state security. The others too accused Beria of promoting himself at others cost. On secret signal Zhukov entered with the other officers and took Beria into custody. They moved him to Lefortovo prison and then to a secret military bunker. Two weeks later they called a plenum of a Central Committee and accused Beria of wanting to see Germany united. On 10th of July Pravda broke the news of Beria’s downfall. On 18th of December a closed-door trial of Beria begun. It was presided by marshal Konev. Beria was found guilty and shot dead on 23rd of December 1953.
The large-scale amnesty in March 1953 did not include any political prisoners. With Stalin dead and Beria discredited they became restless. In May, the prisoners in Norilsk camp, engaged in copper and nickel mining started refusing to work. Soon about 16 thousand out of 70 thousand went on strike. They were offered better working conditions but instead the prisoners demanded a review of their cases and amnesty. Troops descended on the camp and hundreds were killed. Similar unrest happened in Vorkuta, where 50 thousand prisoners worked in the coal mines. When 15 thousand refused to work, the guards killed hundreds. In the spring of 1954 the prisoners revolted in Kengir. They got crushed with tanks and army soldiers. Gradually, the political prisoners started to be released. By January 1959 only 11 thousand political prisoners remained in the camps.

[[Name Redacted] · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book surprised me by actually being 33% about how the Soviets and their leaders brutalized, betrayed and lied about even those Jews who had been ardently supporting the "Workers' Revolution" since its initiation. But that proved to be a welcome surprise because it revealed (as has often been the case since I first reached the doctoral level) that much of what undergraduates are taught by their university professors is really ideologically-driven pseudo-history molded to push a particular social/political agenda. The biggest takeaway from this book for me, for example, is that Prof. Gennady Estraikh, the former-Soviet who taught my "Soviet Jewish Life" class at NYU, was either woefully brainwashed regarding the USSR's treatment of and attitude towards Jews...or willfully whitewashing and misleading us. Because BOY OH BOY was the picture he painted rosier than the blood-soaked reality.

[Meir Javedanfar · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very detailed and interesting book about the political world of Stalin before he died, how those who were closest to him feared him, the terrible discrimination of Russian Jews, and the USSR immediately after his death.

Also very interesting information about riots in East Germany in the early 50s and how worker's rights were so often abused in the USSR and its satellite states. This is in direct contrast to the image which the Soviet leaders often tried to portray.

Last but not least, interesting information about the how the US was so reluctant and apprehensive about overtures made by the Soviets after Stalin's death.

[Nicholas Bilka · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'd like to claim high minded intellectual purposes for choosing to read this book at this time, but truthfully the impetus was having just seen the very funny Death of Stalin . Given that motivation, I was mildly disappointed that the book did not cover the events shown in the movie quite as extensively as I liked, but that is more an issue with myself than the book. It did confirm several of the details in the film (the button under the table that Malenkov pressed, Beria's attempt to cover up his past by being a strong liberalizer), but focuses closer on other events in the USSR in those years, as well as the international community reaction to the demise of the Soviet dictator.
One striking issue covered in the book is just how ill prepared the US was to deal with the inevitable change in leadership that would occur after Stalin's death. While the event had been anticipated with relish throughout the post war period, there was little in the way of concrete planning for what the US would do in response. Part of the reason for this is that the US lacked intelligence inside the highest reaches of the Soviet government. The book shows that there is some evidence that leaders in the US thought that Stalin was more liberal than he was, and was forced into being who he was by a hardline Politburo.
Additionally, the US was slow to react the rapid changes that the collective leadership in the Soviet Union that may have provided an opportunity to bring some form of detente to the nascent cold war. Certainly having such a hard core anti-communist like John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State and a Mccarthyite atmosphere at home couldn't help. Even as ardent a Bolshevik hater as Winston Churchill urged the US to come to the table for a chance at rapprochment of the 3 powers, but the Eisenhower administration demurred. Perhaps Soviet leadership wouldn't have had the political capital to make far reaching concessions, but would it have been worth a try?
Overall, it's a well written book that includes coverage of period/aspect of US/Soviet relations that is worth examining.
PS- One fun piece of trivia from the book is that the New York Times apparently referred to Lavar Kagonovich's sister as Stalin's third wife numerous times in print in the 1940's and 1950's despite this apparently not being the case.

[Sarthak Bhatt · Rating 3 out of 5]

The US vacillating after the death of Stalin, john foster Dulles with his belligerent moralism refusing talks with the new soviet administration and plenty of other interesting stuff is covered in this book. The US had maybe 2 or 3 months after Stalin's death to thaw down the cold war(or maybe even end it?!?!) But all kinds of factors played in and the berlin uprising of June 53 ended any hope for peace. A good book to read if you know a bit about Stalinist policy and have seen the incredibly funny "Death of Stalin".
Ps-- after they caught beria they ripped off his belt and cut his pants button so Beria had to hold his pants by his hands, denying him a chance to cause trouble. These Russians were the first trollers 😂😂

[Kristo Oks · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hea, lihtsas keeles kirjutatud analüüsiv ülevaade Stalini surmast, selle põhjustest, asjaoludest ja tagajärgedest, tema surma järgsest võimuvõitlusest Kremli võimuladvikus, kommunistliku Idabloki elanike suhtumisest Kremli ülemvõimu ja lääneriikide tegevusest peale Stalini surma.

[Denise · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting, well researched and gripping narrative of Stalin's last days and the months that led up to them.

[Zoreslava Ninovska · Rating 3 out of 5]

Особисто для мене ця книжка схожа за стилем на "Злет і падіння третього рейху" Вільяма Ширера: помітно, що автор журналіст, а не історик. Мушу відзначити, що журналісти пишуть цікавіше, але історики- обґрунтованіше. Тому книжка цікава, але дуже оглядова, без особливих глибин занурення в документи епохи. Мені не вистачало цитат та покликань на джерела, з яких автор робив висновки. Але в цілому сподобалось. Хочу також навести кілька цитат, які мене збентежили:
"Фізик Андрій Сахаров теж емоційно згадував ті березневі дні. "Люди боялись, що ситуація погіршиться, але як могло бути гірше? Деякі з них, у тому числі й ті, хто не мав жодних ілюзій щодо Сталіна та його режиму, були стурбовані можливістю загального розвалу, усобиць, ще однієї хвилі масових репресій, навіть громадянської війни"...Сахаров також писав у березні дружині: "Я перебуваю під впливом смерті великої людини: я маю на увазі його людяність". У мемуарах, написаних через багато років, він був змушений визнати, що "мав залежність від (...) загальної скорботи і почуття тотального панування смерті". Сахаров відчув необхідність вибачитися перед читачами, пославшись на те, що така реакція була спільною для всієї країни"

[PyranopterinMo · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is quite an interesting book. Stalin's heirs realized the enormous problems resulting from one man absolute rule, they published a major article about it, they tried to limit it in Eastern European countries including East Germany and Albania, and ... they mostly failed.
This book covers a list of topics from Stalin's post-war attack on jews and fairly clear signs of a major shakeup of his key followers. There is a discussion of the autopsy, funeral chaos, key discussions on the Russian, American, Chinese, and British sides, various revolts including in East Germany and in some of the Gulags.
This book combines a lot of different topics that happened in those key years, the end of the Korean war, Eisenhower and a period of extreme U.S. distrust of Russia, Russia's hydrogen bomb test, on top of a drastic change in Russia's leadership.
Much more interesting than I expected and more relevant.

[Mindy Greiling · Rating 3 out of 5]

An fascinating slice of political life in the Soviet Union just before, during and after Stalin died. The book reveals how Eisenhower and his administration ignorantly bungled this small window of opportunity where they could have reunified Germany decades earlier and possibly established a more peaceful world. Readers also get a behind-the-scene look at how Khrushchev succeeded in grabbing power and foisting blame for his own actions during the brutal Stalin regime onto a comrade, who was executed.

The author tantalized me by mentioning that Kruschev's wife was a positive influence on him but then never mentioned her again. That is my main criticism of the book: I would have liked the players to be more rounded out, including more about their wives and families.

It was interesting to me to read just how ignorant most people were then about Russia and the Soviet Union. I wonder just how much better are we today.

[Jarrod · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kind of a forgettable book. It stars with the death of Stalin and works backwards, but then later talks about what happened after he died. A bit confusing. Stalin didn't like Jews, thought they were oppressive and went after them. He also maintained a firm grip on power and eliminated most of his threats - perceived or actual. A bit of paranoia cloaked his cult of personality and it shows in his legacy, especially with the de-stalinization of the Soviet Union after his death.

Rubenstein talks about the Doctor's plot and goes into great detail regarding the happenings there. He also covers the west's thoughts after his death and what it would mean and how to respond.

It's concise and informative.

[Brandon Montgomery · Rating 3 out of 5]

There are better, less biased historians of the Soviet Union (Fitzpatrick comes to mind,) but this is an adequate account of "The Doctor's Plot" Stalin's death, and the international jostling that followed. Unfortunately, the book book is mostly from Washington's perspective, with Eisenhower and his cabinet taking up way more space than they should've been allotted.

[Daniel Kukwa · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's an easy read, and exceptionally well researched, but it doesn't quite do what it says on the cover. This is less a book on the last days of Stalin and much more on the aftermath of Stalin's death and the worldwide response, politically and socially. If there had been as much in the lead up to Stalin's death as there was post-Stalin, it would have been much more satisfying.

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book about the political events and world reactions in the lead-up, during and aftermath of Stalin's demise. Highly recommended, especially if you enjoyed watching the film "The Death of Stalin"

[Gal · Rating 2 out of 5]

נראה כי בשנתיים האחרונות ידיעות ספרים החליטו להורדי את איכות התוכן שלהם בזאנר העיון הפוליטי וההיסטורי כמו שמצטייר מספר זה.

[Jimmy · Rating 4 out of 5]

The publisher Yale University Press have published some really interesting works on Stalin including a really good one I enjoyed titled Stalin: New Biography of A Dictator. In this book the author Joshua Rubenstein explores the death of Stalin as well as the weeks leading up to his death and the weeks following his death. This book is well-researched, insightful and interesting. Below are some of the highlights.


Since first learning about how Stalin died I remain fascinated with reading how this evil man who was so powerful and frightening in life died so helplessly and ironically. I say died ironically because the very security measures and protocols Stalin demanded upon those who served and protected him ended up being the very thing that prevented him from getting any help as he laid on the floor of his room dying. While he lying on the ground helpless just outside the door of his room bodyguards, government officials and servants were afraid of entering in and bothering the leader, lest they suffer terrible consequences from Stalin. I also appreciated the fact that the author critically interacted with the primary sources of witnesses’ account of what happened and also argued why a particular account was less likely than others’ account, etc.

This book was insightful in showing what the USSR was like during the last few weeks before Stalin’s death. It is downright horrifying to read of how many people lived in perpetual fear of Stalin including political leaders and faithful Communist Party members. And the fear was not irrational for the book gives many accounts of people being unjustly killed or sent to labor camps. In particular the story of Stalin’s agenda against the Jews stood out to me largely because I did not know much about it. Stalin’s agenda against the Jews was further atrocious because it followed not even a decade after the end of World War Two and no doubt the memory of the Nazis’ holocaust would have been on the mind of conscious Russians. The book discussed the Doctors’ Plot which was Stalin’s malicious campaign against Jewish doctors who took care of Communist officials including his own personal physician. The Doctor’s Plot was basically a lie concocted by Stalin that there was a conspiracy of Jewish doctors secretly poisoning and hurting Communist leaders as undercover agents of Capitalism, Zionism and enemies of the people. The book discussed how detrimental this lie was, not only with the innocent doctors who were tortured to give confessions of crimes they didn’t commit but also for other innocent doctors whose names these tortured doctors were forced to give to authorities as “conspirators.” Furthermore the news in the USSR of the Doctor’s Plot led the average citizen of the USSR to view their own doctors with suspicion and this lead some to avoid seeking medical help and treatment for serious health problems and sickness. Again it is horrifying and beyond comprehension to picture what it is like to live in Stalin’s Soviet Union.

I also enjoyed the book’s discussion about international reaction to Stalin’s death in the days and weeks that followed. In hindsight the struggle of US intelligence trying to speculate what the death of Stalin means in terms of the Cold War and their attempt of trying to discern the intention of political statements from the Kremlin were laughable. It goes to show you that there is nothing new under the sun with intelligence officials being wrong in their interpretation and speculations. It was also interesting to see Churchill’s willingness for the West to have peace talks with Soviet leadership after Stalin’s death which was somewhat unexpected as this was not the direction Churchill pursued with Nazi Germany in the 1930s before World War Two.

The last chapter of the book presents a riveting account of Khrushchev’s rise to power after the death of Stalin. Khrushchev conspired along with others to remove Beria from power. Beria at that time was in charge of a lot of important parts of the government ranging from the state security agency called the NKVD and the country’s nuclear program. Since Beria was quite powerful Khrushchev and his accomplice had to move slowly and carefully. But move they did and boldly. It didn’t help Beria that many officers in the military didn’t like him for purging thousands of military officers as part of Stalin’s reign of terror. Thus there were military officers willing to assist Khrushchev.

Overall a great read though it was somewhat depressing.

[Ο σιδεράς · Rating 3 out of 5]

Η αλήθεια είναι ότι δεν ξεχωρίζει για τη λογοτεχνικότητα του, θα μπορούσες  να το χαρακτηρίσεις και δημοσιογραφικό πόνημα. Όμως θα μπορούσε να είναι, λόγω θέματος,   μια φανταστική κωμωδία καταστάσεων, εάν οι ρόλοι δεν αφορούσαν πρόσωπα που υπέγραψαν  τόσα και τέτοια εγκλήματα.  Επιμένω πάντως ότι, εάν κάποιος θα μπορούσε να ξεχάσει πόσο αίμα είχε βάψει τα χέρια όλων αυτών των τoβάριτς  τότε θα του ήταν αδύνατο να συγκρατήσει τα γέλια του - κι έχει μία αξία το να μπορείς να γελάσεις μ’ αυτούς τους τύπους.

Προσωπικά δεν κατάφερα να ξεκαθαρίσω το κατά πόσο οι επίγονοι του Γεωργιανού Σήφη μάχονταν πρώτιστα  για την εξουσία, μία διαδικασία που προϋπόθετε  ως πράξη τον στραγγαλισμό των λοιπών δελφίνων, ή μάχονταν για τη σωτηρία της ζωής τους, ενός αγώνα του οποίου η επιτυχία προϋποθέτει την ανάληψη της εξουσίας (και το: off with their Head των άλλων). Ωραία πράγματα, την ίδια ώρα μάλιστα που σ’ ένα μακρύ νησί του Αιγαίου έκτιζαν «Παρθενώνες» δοξολογώντας (πολλοί)  τον Πατερούλη. Για να πω την αλήθεια, το γέλιο δεν κατάφερα να το συγκρατήσω εντελώς.. ιδού:

Το γέλιο Ι (οι σύντροφοι μπροστά στο σώμα του Στάλιν, καθώς ψυχορραγεί):

Σύμφωνα με τον Χρουστσόφ, μόνον ο Μπέρια φερόταν με τρόπο προσβλητικό  και απαράδεκτο. "Δεν είχε προφτάσει ο Στάλιν ν’ αρρωστήσει, κι ο Μπέρια άρχισε να ξερνάει το μίσος του για αυτόν και να τον χλευάζει",  έγραψε ο Χρουστσόφ. "Το ενδιαφέρον όμως ήταν πως μόλις ο Στάλιν έδειξε σημάδια στο πρόσωπό του ότι ανακτούσε τις αισθήσεις του και μας έκανε να πιστέψουμε ότι συνερχόταν, ο Μπέρια έπεσε στα γόνατα, του άρπαξε το χέρι και άρχισε να το φιλά. Όταν ο Στάλιν έχασε ξανά τις αισθήσεις του και έκλεισε τα μάτια, ο Μπέρια  σηκώθηκε κ έφτυσε".

Το γέλιο ΙΙ (για τις δίκες των γιατρών του 52):  Ένας μακρύς κατάλογος εβραίων γιατρών που συνδέονταν με την Κεντρική Κλινική Ιατροδικαστικής Ψυχιατρικής (Τατάαα – δικό μου) κατηγορήθηκαν ότι αρνούνταν να εφαρμόσουν τις μεθόδους της " Πατριωτικής Ρωσικής Ψυχιατρικής" και διέδιδαν τις "ψευδείς και επιβλαβείς θεωρίες" των Freud και Bergson..

Το δάκρυ Ι: Ο συνθέτης Σεργκέι Προκόφιεφ  πέθανε την ίδια μέρα με τον Στάλιν. αναγνωρισμένος ως ένας από τους κορυφαίους συνθέτες του αιώνα, ο Προκόφιεφ είχε ζήσει τα τελευταία του χρόνια κάτω από ένα μαύρο σύννεφο. Δύο φορές είχε αποδοκιμαστεί από τους κομμουνιστές αξιωματούχους για τις αποκαλούμενες "φορμαλιστικές" τάσεις στη μουσική του. Στην νεκρώσιμη ακολουθία ήταν παρόντες μία φούχτα συγγενείς, φίλοι και συνάδελφοι. Για πολλές μέρες δεν έγιναν δημόσιες αναγγελίες για το θάνατο του Προκόφιεφ, ούτε υπήρχαν διαθέσιμα άνθη για το στολισμό του φέρετρου.. είχαν χρησιμοποιηθεί ΟΛΑ για έναν και μοναδικό σκοπό: να τιμήσουν τον Στάλιν. Για τον Προκόφιεφ, ένα μοναχικό στεφάνι ήταν γερμένο πάνω σε ένα πιάνο κι ένας γείτονας έφερε μερικά φυτά σε γλάστρες για το στολισμό του φέρετρου.. σελ. 135.

Ποιος είπε ότι ο άνθρωπος στο ψηλό κάστρο (και η αυλή του) δεν μπορούν - και δεν πρέπει - να χλευαστούν; Προσωπικά το χρειαζόμουν, είχα φορτώσει πολύ τελευταία, και το κωμειδύλλιο του Κρεμλίνου ήταν ότι έπρεπε..

 

[Antonio Nunez · Rating 5 out of 5]

Rubinstein’s book on the death of Stalin is short but perfectly formed. It begins with the stroke(s) that fell him and then killed him in early March 1953, and it then moves backwards and forwards.

Backwards to his final years, with a focus on his final acts of maddened spite: the doctors’ plot, that was supposed to usher into a full-throated persecution of Soviet jews, possibly their physical annihilation; a substantial increase in the size of the ruling body, the Politburo, which would make it easier to purge top henchmen like Beria, Litvinov, Malenkov and Khruschev, just like had been done to Molotov some time earlier; and a tightening of collective farm policies, to allow the government to extract even more surplus from farmers: the very practice that had led to dreadful famines all over the countryside, particularly in the Ukraine (the Holodomor, very well shown in a recent film: Mr Jones, well worth seeing).

Forwards to initial attempts by heir apparent Malenkov to reduce tensions with the US. Eisenhower, who had been inaugurated a few months earlier wanted to meet with Malenkov, but he was stopped by his Secretary of State arch-anti communist John Foster Dulles: this destroyed an opportunity to unify Germany years before the Berlin Wall would be built, and to avoid the arms race and possibly the Cuban missile crisis. Republicans, eager to show they could be tougher than Democrats on the Reds wasted a golden opportunity to make the world safer. This opportunity vanished with worker uprisings against communist governments in satellites Eastern European states between April and June 1953, which helped Kruschev bring down Beria with the help of the army brass but also terrified the Soviets, and with the successful test of an H-bomb in August 1953, which terrified the Americans and their allies.

The book carries no baggage. It makes its case that, in spite of attempts by Khruschev and other leaders to purge the system of the worst Stalinist abuses, it couldn’t survive without using the Vozhd’s bag of tricks. Soviet communism was incapable of evolution and renewal. When Gorbachev removed its police powers, it imploded, they’re still picking up all the pieces.

[Fraser Kinnear · Rating 3 out of 5]

Loads of great history here. About half of the book actually is about the fallout from Stalin's death: the scapegoating of Malenkov, the ending of the doctor's plot, and Eisenhower's lackluster response and failure to seize the strategic opportunity provided. And of course, the fear and disorder that fell upon the country immediately following his death, which Rubenstein described as an appropriate microcosm of Stalin's reign as a whole: disorganized, dangerous, incompetent. Some of the results were positive, such as the dramatic shrinking of the gulag slave populations, ending the doctor's plot, and the long thaw that I suppose started with Kruschev's secret speech casting Stalin and the party he controlled in a more honest light.

Stalin's legacy speaks for itself, but Rubenstein also takes to task Stalin's abilities as a military strategist and a stalwart leader, describing some major military blunders and nervous breakdowns Stalin fell victim to during WWII.

Interesting to learn that Picasso (as a member of the French Communist party) was a supporter of Stalin. I remember reading that many European intellectuals were enamored of Communism up until the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in '68 , including Sartre. I guess I never thought about Picasso's politics.

I suppose this isn't a great first book to read about the USSR, or probably even Stalin, but it's interesting all the same.