Conhecimento e crença cristã

by Alvin Plantinga

Uma investigação filosoficamente séria, mas acessível da racionalidade da crença cristã.

“O livro de Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief é um marco para a discussão da racionalidade da crença cristã… Esta esplêndida versão reduzida das propostas desse livro torna-o acessível para os leitores e estudantes fora do campo da filosofia. É um imenso prazer dar as boas-vindas a esta versão dessa obra seminal. As marcas da humildade e do brilhantismo de Plantinga estão aqui presentes; ninguém pode ler este livro sem ser espiritualmente estimulado e intelectualmente desafiado.”
— WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM
Perkins School of Theology

“Um livro notável. Ao longo dos anos, Alvin Plantinga minou preconceitos disseminados e defendeu as crenças teístas. Este livro contém as principais ideias da sua filosofia da religião a respeito de Deus, da fé, da crítica histórica, do pluralismo e de outros tópicos centrais. O que distingue este livro é a clareza com a qual Plantinga apresenta e desenvolve os seus argumentos... Um excelente compêndio do seu pensamento.”
— FRANCIS SCHÜSSLER FIORENZA
Harvard Divinity School

“Escrito por um dos maiores filósofos de hoje, este livro deve se tornar de imediato um clássico. Ele oferece uma apresentação concisa e acessível de uma das suas ideias mais marcantes — que ele desenvolveu com extremo cuidado e rigor ao longo dos últimos cinquenta anos — especificamente, que a crença teísta e cristã atinge o conhecimento sem ser baseada em argumentos.”

— MICHAEL BERGMANN
Purdue University

“Esta bem-vinda simplificação de Warranted Christian Belief, a obra-prima de Plantinga de epistemologia da religião, é fácil de ler, mesmo sendo tão erudita e filosoficamente atrativa quanto o original — ela merece ser lida e relida tanto por sua profundidade intelectual quanto por sua profundidade espiritual.”
— THOMAS M. CRISP
Biola University

Genres: Philosophy, Theology, Christianity, Religion, Nonfiction, Christian, Faith

224 pages, Paperback

First published March 15, 2015

About the author

He is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.

Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.

He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"

Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.

Reviews

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a simplified version of Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief. It attempts to make his argument in that book accessible to a general audience. It does an excellent job.

Plantinga addresses the question of whether Christian belief can be warranted (basically, whether Christian belief can qualify as knowledge). Plantinga argues that it can, but not that it does. In other words, this book is not an argument that Christian belief is *true*, only that there is a model of knowledge such that, if Christian belief is true, it counts as knowledge.

That seems like a modest enterprise, perhaps too modest to warrant (pardon the pun) a book on the subject. But, in fact, Plantinga's project is of immense value.

Plantinga distinguishes between de jure objections and de facto objections to Christian belief. De facto objections seek to show that Christian beliefs are false. De jure objections seek to show that Christian belief is in some way inappropriate, whether or not Christian beliefs are false. Since the de jure claims are more modest they are also the stronger philosophically: they aren't supposed to be burdened with having to demonstrate that Christian belief is false.

But Plantinga demonstrates that all the best de jure objections (Marx/Freud) *presuppose* a de facto objection. And since no one has offered a good de facto objection to Christian belief, the de jure objections fail as well.

Next Plantinga provides a model of warrant wherein theism can be warranted (he calls this the Aquinas/Calvin model or A/C model). The basic idea is that if God has designed our cognitive faculties to produce God-belief when we are in the right environment and if God has been successful in this intention, then theistic belief is warranted.

Next Plantinga provides a model of warrant wherein Christian belief can be warranted (he calls this the extended A/C model). This model takes into account the fall of man into sin, which damages the sensus divinitatis (the cognitive faculty that is designed to produce God-belief), the divine plan of salvation, the giving of the Holy Spirit, and the gift of faith (what he calls "the great truths of the gospel", following Edwards). The idea here is that Christian belief is warranted when a person receive the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS) and the gift of faith: since these are designed by God to produce true belief (and knowledge).

Next Plantinga addresses several objections. While Christian belief might be warranted, there may still be defeaters such that Christian belief never or rarely achieves (or maintains) a state of warrant. The defeaters addressed are historical biblical criticism (HBC), religious pluralism, and the problem of evil.

In regard to HBC Plantinga distinguishes between two kinds and notes that one kind adopts assumptions that Christians have no reason to adopt and the second kind ignores a line of evidence that Christians have no reason to ignore.

In regards to pluralism Plantinga distinguishes between an epistemological challenge and a moral challenge. The epistemological challenge is that the Christian has no reason to accept their own beliefs and reject other religious beliefs since both sorts of beliefs have the same merit. Plantinga points out that it is not the case that contrary religious claims have the same merit as the Christian beliefs, according to Christians. The moral challenge is that it is arrogant to cling to Christian belief when intelligent people disagree with those beliefs and there is no argument that would compel all of them to adopt Christian belief. In response to this Plantinga points out that so long as the Christian attends to their belief in an intellectually responsible manner and finds those beliefs compelling they aren't being arrogant to maintain Christian belief.

In regards to the problem of evil (POE) Plantinga notes that most scholars no longer think the logical problem of evil is viable. In regards to the evidential POE, Plantinga points out that any serious presentation of the problem must weigh it against Christian evidences to show that the POE outweighs any consideration in favor of the existence of God. Since no one has done this, there is no serious POE to address. Even if there were such an argument and all of our other lines of evidence also weighed against the existence of God this would not necessarily present a defeater for Christian belief if the IIHS is overwhelming. Plantinga uses the analogy of someone playing poker. All the independent lines of evidence would weigh against Jones' belief that he has a straight flush in his hand (e.g., the behavior of his poker opponents, the probability of him having drawn such from the deck, etc)... and yet if Jones looks at his hand and sees a straight flush then this properly basic perceptual belief outweighs all the other evidence.

A third option for the POE, and what Plantinga takes to be the strongest, would be to cast it in terms of proper basicallity. Maybe the POE isn't an *argument* at all, but is rather like an "inverse sensus divinitatis" but this would most likely be false on the extended A/C model. God wouldn't design a cognitive faculty to produce atheistic belief under those conditions and it's entirely plausible that a Christian upon experiencing or reflecting on some intense evil could still be compelled to believe in God.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Plantinga, Alvin. Knowledge and Christian Belief. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015.

This is a summary of Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief. While there are a few updates, is the lay version of WCB. In fact, some paragraphs are identical (e.g., his legendary definition of “fundamentalist”). As such, this serves as a nice introduction to Plantinga’s project. It is accessible to the educated lay reader. It doesn’t have the intimidating Bayesian formulae, for example. On the other hand, if you have read WCB or his other warrant books, there is nothing in this volume that you haven’t seen.

Plantinga makes a distinction between two different types of objection to religious belief: de jure and de facto. De jure objections mean the adherent is irrational in holding to religious belief. De facto objections suggest that the belief is erroneous.

On the contrary, by exploring these objections, Plantinga argues that the Christian is justified or warranted in holding to theism. A few words on epistemic justification. I am justified in believing something (on the old Lockean view) if I have fulfilled my epistemic duty: in other words, I am believing something on the basis of good evidence.

Plantinga suggests that the old classical view of justification isn’t necessary and the theist is within his epistemic rights if he holds to a position when a) the belief is produced by his mind in a b) proper functioning environment. Minor premise (which all Protestants must accept though no theologian will): the Holy Spirit produces the belief in me via the internal witness of the Holy Spirit. Conclusion: therefore, I am warranted.

Does this mean that announcing the Christian position makes it so? No, and this is where many critics of Plantinga miss the argument. The Christian position is open to undercutting and rebutting defeaters. Plantinga explores three types: biblical criticism, pluralism, and the problem of evil. The important thing about defeaters is that if someone faces a defeater, he has to face that defeater within the larger context of his hierarchy of beliefs.

Conclusion:

This is a good summary of Plantinga’s epistemology and a good intro to his work.

[Felipe Sabino · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantástico. Que orgulho publicar este livro!

[josie march · Rating 4 out of 5]

here's my heart, Lord, take and seal it for they courts above

[Braley Chambers · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not exactly a page turner, but definitely a great introduction to Plantinga’s religious epistemology. Also, Plantinga’s definition and mockery of the word “fundamentalist” on page 55 is is hysterical and true.

[Christopher Combs · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pretty solid book, his writing style is p good and a great book for someone looking for a philosophical approach to the Christian worldview. I found it far more compelling than typical evangelical books, however there were definitely some parts where it felt hand wavy. Ofc I'd expect Warranted Christian Belief to be far more rigorous but I don't have the brains for that right now haha.

[Anderson Paz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nesse livro, Plantinga discute vários argumentos contrários à racionalidade e razoabilidade da crença cristã. No primeiro capítulo, Plantinga rebate o argumento kantiano de que Deus é tão sublime que nossa mente não pode pensar ou aprender sobre Ele. E afirma que Deus pode ter criado pessoas capazes de conhecer verdades importantes sobre Ele.
No capítulo dois, Plantinga investiga a objeção de direito que diz que a fé cristã é irracional, injustificada ou imoral. Analisando o fundacionalismo clássico de Locke e as críticas de Marx e Freud à crença cristã, Plantinga afirma que não nenhuma objeção "grave" que se sustente contra a fé cristã, posto que a fé cristã tem "garantia" (crença produzida mediante faculdades cognitivas em pleno funcionamento em meio a ambiente cognitivo adequado, conforme projeto de design que visa com sucesso à verdade, cf. p. 77).
No capítulo três, Plantinga desenvolve um modelo a partir de Tomás e Calvino sobre como a crença teísta dispõe de garantia. O homem tem um conhecimento natural de Deus que produz a crença a respeito de Deus. Circunstâncias externas despertam o senso do divino. Essa é uma crença básica que produz conhecimento sobre Deus.
No capítulo seguinte, Plantinga aplica seu modelo à plenitude da fé cristã e sustenta que as crenças cristãs são justificadas, racionais e garantidas. No capítulo cinco, Plantinga diz que a fé é o elemento central do modelo Tomás-Calvino. Ela é uma atividade epistêmica que possibilita a crença em proposições que se aplicam a nós. A fé é imediata e formada de modo básico (por meio de evidência intuitiva). A crença é validada pela própria fé cristã e o objeto da crença satisfaz as condições de racionalidade e garantia.
No capítulo seis, Plantinga afirma que a fé é conhecimento de Deus revelado à mente e selado no coração. O coração é selado quando os afetos são corretos. Anseio, desejo e eros são sinais do amor de Deus.
No capítulo subsequente, Plantinga investiga objeções à experiência religiosa e sugere que "Deus provê os seres humanos com faculdades ou processos de formação de crença geradores dessas crenças que objetivam a verdade com sucesso; quando funcionam como foram projetados, no tipo de ambiente para o qual foram projetados, o resultado é o conhecimento ou a crença garantida" (p. 165).
Os três últimos capítulos tratam de anuladores. O primeiro investigado é a alta crítica. Plantinga diz que a alta crítica não anula a fé cristã. Ela assume premissas epistêmicas diferentes daquelas adotadas pelos cristãos. O segundo é o pluralismo religioso. Para Plantinga, o pluralismo não invalida a exclusividade da fé cristã. Ter uma episteme cristã não significa ser arrogante, mas sim acreditar na veracidade de suas crenças. Por fim, o problema do mal não anula ou contradita a existência de Deus.

[Josh S · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mercifully short book addressing the question of whether Christian belief is warranted if no assumption is made about whether Christianity is true or not. In other words, can someone justifiably argue "I don't know whether or not God exists, but regardless, it is irrational to be a Christian based on the available evidence"?

Basically, Plantinga argues that it's only possible to argue that Christianity is irrational if you make the initial assumption that God does not exist. If God does exist, then it's possible if not likely that there’s an innate sense of God’s presence, another sense like seeing or tasting, that is not reducible to nor dependent on reasoned argument.

It was a bit technical and dry, and I wouldn't recommend the book to anyone who isn't a diehard fan of philosophy. That said, in laying out his philosophical model of Christian belief, Plantinga gives some incredibly lucid descriptions of sin, faith, and the Gospel.

Faith is not to be contrasted with knowledge: faith (at least in paradigmatic instances) is knowledge, knowledge of a certain special kind. It is special in at least two ways. First, in its object: what is allegedly known is (if true) of stunning significance, certainly the most important thing a person could possibly know. But it is also unusual in the way in which that content is known; it is known by way of an extraordinary cognitive process or belief-producing mechanism. The belief-producing process involved is dual, involving both the divinely inspired Scripture (perhaps directly, or perhaps at the head of a testimonial chain), and also the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit. Both involve the special activity of God.

[Carlos Oliver · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was may first sort of 'formal' theology book. It was interesting to read a formal/analytical approach to big theological questions. The logic can be somewhat hard to follow at times, and the conclusions reached are somewhat underwhelming in my opinion. But the logical framework that is established is a very useful tool for thinking about these problems.

[Scott · Rating 4 out of 5]

A shorter version of Plantinga’s *Warranted Christian Belief*. Quite good.

[Don · Rating 5 out of 5]

What Alvin Plantinga has accomplished in his lifetime has been remarkable, arguing that religious belief is intellectually justified. Many people are not overwhelmingly convinced by the many arguments for God’s existence. I, for instance, often find myself somewhat persuaded by the writings of William Lane Craig, but then, if I’m being honest, also find myself at least somewhat persuaded by the counter-arguments. Although Plantinga has elsewhere made his own arguments for theism, he understands that these arguments are not foolproof (and to many, not even persuasive).

And so his argument in this book is, first, to point out that the arguments employed by skeptics are often undercut by their own epistemologies. For instance, evidentialism suffers from the infinite regress problem, and classical foundationalism cannot be established as true according to its own criteria. He proceeds to show that Christian belief for many can be warranted (that is, rational) by proposing four commonsensical criteria for warranted belief and then introducing a version of Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, or divine sense. In the end, he doesn’t show that Christian belief is true (again, that’s not his intention) but that it is rational.

Knowledge and Christian Belief is written for a popular audience, shorter and less jargony than Warranted Christian Belief. Nonetheless, most people would not find this an easy read. Although Plantinga writes very clearly, these ideas are heady ones, and, for me at least, some passages need to be read several times. That said, this is an extraordinary read, one that would benefit those who have a sense that the supernatural exists but don’t know how to reconcile this sense with the belief (pushed by the New Atheists, among others) that it’s irresponsible to have faith without more convincing evidence.

[Christopher Hughes · Rating 3 out of 5]

Alvin Plantinga’s Knowledge and Christian Belief was written as a synopsis of his much larger work: Warranted Christian Belief but is by no means a quick and easy read. While it is only 126 pages (not including index), Plantinga wrote about subjects that should cause the reader to slow down in order to think through much of what has been written. In addition, Plantinga’s writes with sophistication. At times, it seems as if he sought out the most obscure wording or phrasing possible and put them into the book. “What sort of phenomenology is involved in this epistemic process: what does it seem like from the inside?” (P. 97) is one such example. It took this reviewer a while to remember that some people do, in fact, speak in such a manner.
The goal of the book is to show that Christian belief is not without warrant. There is reasoning behind faith in general and the Christian faith in particular. To show this, the author lays out his argument in ten short chapters, going from the basic belief in God to Christian beliefs such as the Trinity, resurrection, and such, ultimately to answer defeater arguments against Christian belief (or belief in God in general). As he began the book, Alvin Plantinga quickly explained the philosophies of the detractors of faith, such as: Hume, Freud, and Marx. In doing so, arguments were made as to why these men were wrong and demonstrating that faith is not irrational, but highly rational when and if the mind is working as it ought.
For most of the rest of the book, Dr. Plantinga utilizes much of philosophy and theology of Aquinas and Calvin, putting their similar thoughts together in what he deems: The Aquinas/Calvin model of philosophy. This model basically states that there is an innate knowledge within humanity that knows there is a higher being. One does not have to philosophize or conjure up some notion; it naturally comes from within. Dr. Plantinga extended the model to other areas of Christian belief. Humanity knows there is a God, it seems then that man is made in his image yet fallen, and in need of a savior. The reader is walked through how this can all come about simply by extending the Aquinas/Calvin model.
It was in chapter four that the book began to come together a little better, but in an odd way. To this reviewer, it seemed as if faith was being deconstructed. This is the chapter from which the quote above was taken. To answer his question on the sort of phenomenology in the epistemic process, Plantinga asserts that “In the model, the beliefs constituting faith are typically basic; that is, they are not accepted by way of argument from other propositions or on the evidential basis of other propositions.” (P. 97). In other words, no one has to argue the point. Scripture is read and because one believes Scripture as authoritative or someone over them who is authoritative, he believes what he read or was read to him.
The sixth chapter is all about the Holy Spirit turning one’s affections toward God. This was by far, the most understandable and thought-provoking chapter in this book. This would be a chapter for every believer to read. Plantinga explained that eros is not simply a sexual love, but a love that has longings. That means that sex is a strand of eros, but not eros in its entirety. This eros is the love that a Christian has for God and God has for the believer as well. The explanation within this chapter can be life-changing for many believers in this world.
The objections begin in chapter seven; systematically and methodically, Plantinga dismantles the atheologian’s arguments. Beginning with higher criticism or as the author calls it, “Historical Biblical Criticism” it is shown that conservative Christians discount this way of reading the Bible because there is no warrant in their eyes to accept it. “It offers her no reason at all for rejecting or modifying her beliefs; it also offers little promise of enabling her to achieve better or deeper insight into what actually happened.” (P. 106). From there, one reads a short chapter on pluralism—the multiple and conflicting religions of the world. The author explained that a Christian believing himself to be right and all others to be wrong does not have to be egoism or elitism. It certainly can be but does not have to be.
Finally, Plantinga takes on the problem of evil. The philosopher is sure to make the reader understand that he is not writing on theonomy but is writing on how evil excludes there even being the possibility of God’s existence. This chapter was written well until he wrote these words: “The list of atrocities human beings commit against others is horrifying and hideous; it is also so long, so repetitious, that it is finally wearying. Occasionally, though new depths are reached.” (P 120). If the author had stopped there, all would be in agreement and continue on. However, Plantinga quoted from a book about such a depth of atrocity. The illustration was absolutely beyond the pale. There was no need, no warrant (to use Plantinga’s word) to put such an illustration into the book. Was not the holocaust, the rape of Nanking, or some other well-known atrocity not enough? What person needs to read such an illustration to know that mankind is capable of such horrors? How or why this got passed the editors at Eerdmans Publishing is uncertain.
For that reason, this reviewer would not recommend this book to be read by anyone. Perhaps that is a bit harsh, “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” as it were, but it is not only a pastor’s job to put good defenses into the hands of his members, but also to protect them from harm. This pastor existentially believes that the illustration could be an assault on the mind and heart. It is possible to use the material within the book to teach a class on this branch of apologetics and leave out the illustration. It is possible to white-out the illustration in its entirety and share the book to one well-acquainted with philosophy. Given its complex language and thought process, along with the illustrations, it is believed that there are easier, clearer books on apologetics for a layperson to read if he desires to learn more.


[Justin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reading Alvin Plantinga is a cookie for the brain. Even if you're not concerned or even familiar with the concept of warrant when it comes to religious belief, he draws you in and gets you to follow his arguments, which are clear and interesting. I even found the book to be motivating in piety at various parts, such as when he describes the internal work of the Holy Spirit upon the Christian believer.

[Nick]

Warranted Christian Belief for Dummies

[Caleb Chan]

Plantinga begins by addressing the Kantian objection of the very knowledge of God: that is, God is ultimate, and non-ultimate humans can't grasp ultimate things (2). He responds by arguing that if God exists, then God could create people with apriori knowledge of ultimate reality (6). Also, stating that you can't know God is a statement about God (6).

Now that knowledge of God is possible, he distinguishes between two objections against Christian belief (CB): de facto objections object to CB's truth, while de jure objections object to CB's rationality/justification (7). He then tackles some common de jure objections: CB isn't arrogant (10), CB isn't unjustified (17). However, a third objection—that CB is irrational—is more fertile. Both Marx and Freud spew vitriol using the irrationality objection: Marx says that CB is a result of cognitive defect; Freud says that CB is a result of wishful, non-truth-tracking processes (21–5). In other words, they argue that CB is unwarranted.

The Marx and Freud pairing leads to Plantinga's definition of warrant (deep breath in): "a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced by S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth" (whew!) (28).

So if you have CB, you're warranted only if all the above conditions for warrant are met. Plantinga thus needs to somehow fashion a model that accounts for his definition of warrant... and he turns to Aquinas and Calvin. He appeals to their agreement on the universal awareness of God through natural revelation, and specifically picks out Calvin's sensus divinitatis as a starting point for a model. That is, all humans have a cognitive faculty—the sensus divinitatis—which produces CB that arise instantaneously (i.e. as basic beliefs) (33).

But it seems that a sensus divinitatis for any religion could be argued for. What makes CB distinctly Christian? Plantinga responds by offering the "extended A/C [Aquinas/Calvin] model," beginning by recounting the Bible's origin account: all humans were made in God's image, giving all a sensus divinitatis (47). However, sin corrupted the sensus divinitatis (50). God thus revealed his salvation plan through the Holy Spirit, the Bible, and faith. The Holy Spirit works in a person to believe what the Bible says and produces faith (58–63), and this faith is a cognitive process that satisfies all the conditions for warrant because Holy Spirit-produced faith is proper cognitive function, occurs in a sin-infested environment where faith is mean to occur, and successfully produces true beliefs about God (63–4).

After briefly touching on how the Holy Spirit renews a believer's affections, Plantinga then moves on to objections and defeaters. He quickly dismantles objections that claim that religious experience can't support a supernatural explanation (falsely assumes that if a belief is warranted, then experience supports the belief; and that CB is a scientific hypothesis instead of a basic belief) (81–2); and that religious experience can't reveal specific information about God (falsely assumes that possibility of belief's falsehood implies belief's falsehood) (87).

He then tackles three defeaters to warranted CB: historical biblical criticism, pluralism, and evil. First, historical biblical criticism assumes things that traditional Christians have no good reason to accept and that consequently produces a truncated understanding of the Bible (103–6). Second, defeaters on pluralistic grounds (e.g. CB as exclusivist is arrogant) oddly imply that it's still arrogant to believe what you believe after much reflection, and that the person with CB has special access to warrant because of the extended A/C/ model (111–2). Thirdly, existence-of-evil type defeaters have no effect on the person's warrant for CB, because the warrant depends on the basic-belief-producing, constantly-renewing sensus divinitatis, not other beliefs or evidence regarding evil (118).

As I understand Plantinga's "extended A/C model," it just seems that he's taking orthodox/Reformational beliefs—on natural revelation; on the regenerating, preserving role of the Holy Spirit—and formalizing them with his epistemological toolkit. It's not something I expected an epistemological, analytical titan to do (unless you're raised Dutch Reformed... oh wait...). I suspect his overtly Protestant (and evangelical?) language will be exasperating for many of his readers. And because the gospel is so comprehensive, so intimate, so good, the extended A/C model just seems too easy; because it's God who shines light in my once-darkened eyes, of course my belief is warranted—God gave it to me! But again, Plantinga needed three books to directly produce his answer for why Christian belief is warranted. I think I'll need to read those.

[Zach Brandt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Summary of the book in the form of a dialogue between a Christian (Chad) and an atheist (Archie).

Archie: You know what the problem with Christianity is? The lack of evidence. There is not sufficient reason to justify believing all of the things a Christian believes. It’s just irrational to believe in something like God if you don’t have good evidence for that belief. The search for evidence is what distinguishes true knowledge from irrational opinions. How can you claim to be certain God exists, to give your money and your time to him, if you don’t have evidence for it? If I claimed to believe in some super-powerful alien race without any evidence, you would think I was crazy to let that belief change my whole life.

Chad: So, you’re saying that Christianity is irrational, just because it doesn’t have any evidence to support it?

A: Exactly.

C: So we have to have evidence to believe something, otherwise we are being irrational?

A: Of course. Otherwise you could just claim anything, and still be thought rational.

C: I’m not sure I agree with that. For example, what did you have for breakfast this morning?

A: Cereal.

C: What evidence do you have to support the belief that you had cereal for breakfast?

A: I just remember having cereal. I saw it, I made it, I ate it. I remember it!

C: Sure, but what evidence do you have to believe that your memory is true?

A: Because I always use my memory, and it is reliable.

C: Always reliable? You never misremember things?

A: Of course I do. It isn’t always reliable.

C: So it could be wrong now?

A: Sure. It could be wrong. But it isn’t. I had cereal.

C: I believe you did. But I don’t think you trust your memory because of evidence. It seems to me you trust your memory because it is some sort of faculty you have that reliably delivers truth to you. Not infallibly, but you would be silly to distrust your memory unless you had evidence. That would mean you doubt a ton of things you have no good reason to doubt!

A: Okay, I see your point when it comes to the cereal. We humans ordinarily have a reliable faculty called memory that gives us access to truth. Makes sense. But what does that have to do with believing in God?

C: I think our knowledge of God comes the same way. We could call things like memory a “common notion,” something that all people in common have that provides reliable access to knowledge. I think we have a bunch of these common notions, not just memory. Our five senses would be another example. I think we also have a faculty to know God, and that this is one of those common notions. And because it isn’t irrational to trust those common notions, it isn’t irrational to believe in God.

A: I follow you, but my problem is that the notion to believe in God isn’t common to all people. Not everyone believes in God. We all use memory and our senses, but God is not obvious to many of us!

C: Exactly. But Christianity actually has an explanation for that. See, Christianity claims that all people are made in the image of God and have a sense for God’s existence and divinity. That’s the common notion. But the problem is that we are sinners and the image is broken. So our sense for God is broken also. In fact, Christianity claims that because of our sin, it is impossible for any of us to come to a true knowledge of God.

A: …But, don’t you believe you know God?

C: I absolutely do! But I think something had to happen to me to fix my sense for God and help me know him. Christians claim that when we hear the gospel message, God the Holy Spirit can move into our hearts through that message, grant us faith to believe it, and thus restore our sense for God. The faculty we had for knowing God is fixed, and we can know God exists by faith. We don’t believe it because of evidence; we believe it because of the witness of the Holy Spirit with the Word of God. And because it is rational to trust common notions, it is rational to trust the common notion that helps us know God.

A: Okay, that’s clever. But it still doesn’t prove that God is real.

C: No, it doesn’t. But it does prove that if God is real, it is rational to believe in him. If God is not real, I agree that I am irrational for believing he exists.

A: So then it all depends on if God is real or not. But you don’t have any evidence to demonstrate he does exist!

C: Hold on! I never said there was no evidence. I actually believe there are plenty of good reasons to believe that the God of the Bible is real. For example…

[Noah McMillen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a distillation of Plantinga’s classic Warranted Christian Belief, and it is great for getting straight to the point in a very understandable manner. Plantinga argues that if Christianity is true, Christian belief is likely properly basic. A basic belief is one that is arrived at immediately, not by arguments; perception is something that leads to basic beliefs. A basic belief is properly basic if it has warrant, viz. that thing enough of which grants knowledge to a true belief. Plantinga writes, “a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth” (28). A person naturally comes to believe in God through an implanted sensus divinitatis, and comes to believe in the gospel and fundamental Christian truths through the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit coupled with the reading of Scripture. If Christianity is true, these beliefs are properly basic because they arise immediately and have warrant, as they are working according to their design. Plantinga also deals with three potential defeaters for Christian belief: historical Biblical criticism, religious pluralism, and the problem of evil, and finds them all lacking.

Simply, Plantinga is arguing that if Christianity is true, the Christian has rational knowledge with respect to his religious beliefs absent any arguments, something which I would have thought was obvious but apparently, many have denied. Nevertheless, Plantinga rigorously defends his thesis, and it was well worth the read.

[Stephen Drew]

Recommended by Kolby Atchison

[Daniel Stepke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reformed Epistemology may not double down as it should, but its at least convincing theoretically.

[Mason Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of my school required favorites of the year. Has helped me rethink what the foundation of my belief in God is.

[Marlon · Rating 5 out of 5]

En su ampliamente elogiado Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford, 2000) Alvin Plantinga trató con gran profundidad y extensión la cuestión de la racionalidad, o sensibilidad, de la creencia cristiana. En este libro Plantinga presenta las mismas ideas de forma más breve y accesible. Reconocido en todo el mundo como uno de los principales filósofos cristianos, Plantinga indaga en lo que significa exactamente la afirmación de que la creencia religiosa -y específicamente la cristiana- es irracional y no puede sostenerse con sentido. Sostiene que las críticas de ateos tan conocidos como Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris y Christopher Hitchens son completamente erróneas. Por último, Plantinga aborda varios de los posibles detractores de la creencia cristiana -el pluralismo, la ciencia, el mal y el sufrimiento- y muestra cómo no logran vencer la creencia cristiana racional.

PD: No es mi reseña.

[Chris McMillan · Rating 5 out of 5]

“I believe a thousand things, and many of them are things others – others of great acuity and seriousness – do not believe. Indeed, many of the beliefs that mean the most to me are of that sort. I realize I can be seriously, dreadfully, fatally wrong, and wrong about what it is enormously important to be right. That is simply the human condition: my response must be finally,
‘Here I stand; this is the way the world looks to me.’”

[Jason Henline · Rating 2 out of 5]

The overall idea of the book is that if Christianity is true, then Christians can have good reason for holding their beliefs. I imagine that most people would agree with this idea without having read this book, so this is probably aimed at hard-core atheists and Christians who want to counter the attacks of those atheists. In the introduction the author says that this book is meant to be a more accessible version of his previous book Warranted Christian Belief, which I assume uses the same arguments as this book but in more detail.

Perhaps a weakness of the arguments put forward in this book is that they probably apply just as well to many religions other than Christianity. The book does have a chapter on pluralism that argues that even though there are many religions in the world, that is not a definitive argument that Christianity is not true. I think the author is probably correct as far as that argument goes, but the argument also seems to apply equally to many other religions, so the reader is left with the idea that belief in any of these religions has as much warrant as belief in Christianity. Furthermore, at least some of these other religions are probably incompatible with Christianity, so at least one of them must be false.

It's not a fundamental problem that there can be two beliefs with equal warrant where one is true and the other is false. After all, the usual definition of knowledge includes that the belief be both true and warranted, so it is accepted that a belief can be warranted without being true. However, there does seem to be a problem that the amount of warrant a belief has does not seem to be necessarily correlated with its truth. It seems that we want some other method of helping us to determine truth besides the method that gives Christian belief its warrant. From this perspective, can we really say that these kinds of beliefs are warranted?

In any case, based on the author's argument, the author seems to be in no position to criticize any religious belief that includes a belief in God and some kind of Holy Spirit. So, in the author's worldview we probably can't criticize suicide bombers, burqas, etc. Perhaps not a very comfortable place for us to be practically, but a common moral relativist position nonetheless, so probably not far from the mainstream.

The author's argument that Christian belief can be warranted seems to lean heavily on the idea that warrant can arise from an internal sense of the divine. The author notes that a common objection is that warrant cannot follow from religious experience. The author attempts to defeat this objection by claiming that religious experience is as valid as memory and traditional sensory perception when it comes to establishing warrant. He says that it would be absurd to think that your belief that you had pancakes for breakfast was not warranted because you cannot be sure that your memory is reliable, and similarly that it would be absurd to say that your religious beliefs was not warranted because you cannot be sure that your sense of the divine is reliable.

This argument seems to me to fail because there is no such equivalence between memory and sense of the divine. If you cannot trust your memory to some extent, then you have no hope of constructing a useful worldview (if someone ever comes up with a way to do it, then I retract this, but I don't think that will ever happen). So some reliance on memory is warranted because you have no other option. In contrast, constructing a world view without reliance on sense of the divine seems to be no problem, so the argument in parallel fails.

Chapter 5 on faith and chapter 6 entitled "Sealed Upon our Hearts" were interesting inclusions in this book. Neither of them seemed to support the main argument being made by the book. I think they were included because the author thought there were some interesting points to be made with the reasoning he was using for the main line of the argument. I think the book would have been fine (better?) without them. It was a struggle for me not to skip these chapters entirely.

To sum up my view on this book, if you are looking for an argument in favor of moral relativism, this book may fit the bill, but I think the case for that view can be made much more concisely than it is done in this book.

[Aaron · Rating 5 out of 5]

Many years ago I picked up a copy of Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) and read through it in a matter of days. I don't say that to brag or to pretend that I am somehow more accomplished than anyone (I just happen to be a pretty good speed reader) but I mention this because I want to express how incredibly impactful the book was. I simply could not put it down. It captivated my mind and utterly demolished my previously held fideism. I have heard some claim that Plantinga himself is a fideist. This is most popularly held by Panelhum. Nothing could be further from the truth! For more on this I recommend reading On Fideism and Alvin Plantinga.Warranted Christian Belief was a book that set forth the rationality of theism.

Fifteen years later I was pleasantly surprised to learn that Plantinga re-released his book in a more accessible (and 392 pages shorter) book called Knowledge and Christian Belief published last April. In his introduction, he sets out his reasoning for writing this shorter version,

"My book Warranted Christian Belief came out more than a dozen years ago, I still endorse nearly everything I wrote there; but some have told me the book is too long and in places too technical. I'm afraid I have to agree, and I would like to put things right. . ."

If that was Plantinga's purpose in writing Knowledge and Christian Belief than he has absolutely achieved his goal.`The book retains the general line of argumentation and logical flow without getting too deep into peripheral issues which (though I believe add more weight to his arguments) are not necessary in order to have a basic understanding of Plantinga's thought. In fact, one could gain just as much from this book as WCB if the purpose is simply to understand how and why belief in God is a warranted belief.

Some may ask why such a book is necessary. Plantinga answers this by rightfully pointing out that one of the most damaging (and yet least thought through) arguments against theism is the false notion put forth by Freud and Marx that such belief is unwarranted- that it lacks justification. Pantings spends a brief amount of time defining the language and thought those who hold this view and then spends the bulk of the book demonstrating that belief in God is not only rational, but also warranted.

I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to have a good understanding of the warrant we have to believe in God and yet doesn't have the background knowledge required to read WCB. This book would be invaluable to anyone who is struggling with the belief in God or for anyone who regularly (or even occasionally) encounters those who believe that such belief is unwarranted. This book would be perfect for the homeschooled junior or senior in high school but may be difficult to follow for most who are younger. The book is also ideal for anyone about to enter college. The beauty of Knowledge and Christian Belief is that it takes Plantinga's arguements from WCB and makes them accessible to anyone who is able to follow the logical flow of a conversation. This book should be on everyone's bookshelf. It is that good..

Disclosure of Material Connection: I received this book free from WM.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company in exchange for an online review. I was not required to write a positive review. The opinions I have expressed are my own. I am disclosing this in accordance with the Federal Trade Commission’s 16 CFR, Part 255: “Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising.”

[Fabrício Tavares De Moraes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alvin Plantinga, neste livro sucinto e de agradável leitura, não somente estabelece uma epistemologia reformacional na tradição de Bavinck, Kuyper e Warfield, mas também responde a alguns questionamentos e potenciais 'anuladores' da fé cristã que são característicos dos períodos moderno e pós-moderno. Neste sentido, além de responder às críticas epistemológicas de Marx e Freud, em especial, também demonstra indiretamente a fraqueza argumentativa do neoateísmo, em especial seus quatro nomes represenativos: Dawkins, Dennett, Harris e Hitchens. Retomando e revitalizando os conceitos de Calvino e Aquino, o filósofo norte-americano nos ensina que a tradição cristã como um todo permanece sendo um copioso repertório do qual seus filósofos podem extrair pontos para a garantia -- o elemento que faz com que a simples crença se torne conhecimento -- da fé cristã.

[عدنان العبار · Rating 5 out of 5]

Is Christianity passe? Are religious people irrational in their beliefs? Can we know things about God? Plantinga, one of the greatest contemporary philosophers alive, attempts to answer these questions in this book. Starting from the idea of warrant, what makes true belief knowledge, surpassing the Gettier problem, to the extended A/C model, where he demonstrates that Christian Belief is not as its Critics claim -- irrational, and ultimately without basis.

I can imagine some faults with the book. As much as it tries to be bold, such things are really tough and beyond our human capabilities. But the author brilliantly explains that the very same problems are encountered by a physicist, who, only after making the appropriate (and unprovable) assumptions, is able to continue. I enjoyed this book immensely, and think that it can be very useful for future papers to write on the foundations of theoretical physics based on the idea of warranted belief.

An endnote: This book is a simplification and a summary of his book, Warranted Christian Belief which I will surely check out in the future, and his other extremely influential book, The Nature of Necessity where he aims at rescuing and reviving The Ontological Proof from its detractors.

[David Shane · Rating 3 out of 5]

Don't pick this up if you're expecting a traditional Christian apologetic - it is very much a book of philosophy, but it is good to read philosophy from time to time. Plantinga essentially argues, especially pulling from Aquinas and Calvin, that Christian belief could have warrant - not that Christianity is true, note, but rather something more along the lines of "if something like Christianity is true, then rational well-thinking people could have warrant for believing in it". So... back one step, if you will. (Of course, he also thinks it is true, but that is not his thrust here.)

The biggest complaint you might raise to such a book is simply that very few of the objections people raise to Christianity these days take place on such a philosophical level - I think "I don't need Christianity" or "Christians/Christianity is immoral/bad" are a lot more common these days. All the same... it is good to think about what it *means* to *know* something, and I think Christians in particular will be better for having thought through the book.

[Aid · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book, I'm not sure if I buy into Reformed Epistemology but it was fun to read about nonetheless. I don't see how the extended A/C model couldn't be extended to any religious belief system, be it Christian or otherwise, and so I'm not sure if it's sound.

[Eric C 1965 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book. Belief is basic. Aquinas and Calvin have provided a model; Plantinga extends it. Higher Criticism, pluralism, and evil cannot undercut or defeat belief; de jure arguments end up being de facto. Chapter 6 was less understandable.

[Daniel]

A good summary of reformed epistemology, much quicker than reading 'Warranted Christian Belief'.