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Studies in Dogmatics
Man: The Image of God
In this series rooted in the normative significance of Scripture, noted Dutch theologian G. C. Berkouwer examines great doctrines of the Reformed faith, developing and defending Reformed theology through interaction with a wide range of theologies and theologians
380 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1962
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101 people want to read
About the author
G.C. Berkouwer
35 books20 followersGerrit Cornelis Berkouwer was for years the leading theologian of the Gereformeerde Kerken in the Netherlands (GKN). He occupied the Chair in systematic theology of the Faculty of Theology, Free University (VU) in Amsterdam.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
September 28, 2014
This is the best book on Christian anthropology, hands down. Berkouwer's thesis is simple and he doggedly sticks to it: man is a pscyho-somatic unity who operates from a "Heart-mindset." Any attempt to abstract an essence of man leads to antinomies or even worse, falsely pagan ideas.
Berkouwer begins with the standard Reformed division of man. On the broader/narrower distinction: man, despite his fall, was not beastialized (38). By narrower man lost his communion with God. the broader sense reminds us of what was not lost in the fall. Perhaps better to speak of a duality between Old and New.
Historical survey:
Schilder sees man’s creation as the pre-condition for the image, but not the image itself (Berkouwer 54). The actual image lies in the officium created man receives (I don’t think this is the full picture, but there is some truth to this, especially if we connect the imago dei with man’s dominion, as the Westminster Shorter Catechism hints at).
Thus, the image is dynamic and is rooted in the Covenantal God’s Relation with man. the word “image” implies “making visible.”
Schilder resists any abstracting the image. The glory of the image shines forth in service to God (56).
The danger with Schilder’s approach is that it makes the image too “dynamic” with an emphasis on conformitas. It is not a hard push from here to Arminianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and Eastern Orthodoxy.
What is the relationship between man’s humanness and God’s Image? Berkouwer wants to deny that fallen man images God (57). He says he can do this without rejecting what it means for man to be man.
Passages like Genesis 9:6 are not proof-texts for some abstract view of the image analogia entis. They deal with a humanness in the context of God’s plan of salvation. The truth of the matter is Scripture doesn’t focus that much on the distinction between wider and narrow, important though it is. traditional discussions have always focused on image as defined by person, will, reason, and freedom. Scripture, on the other hand, is concerned with man-in-relation-to-God. A synthesis between the ontic and active aspects of the image is impossible when using concepts like “nature” and “essence” (61).
Biblical usage: The NT speaks of humanity as whether it is the “New man in Christ” or not. To the degree it speaks of conformitas, it speaks of the new conformitas in Christ.
While the analogia entis is certainly wrong, we need to be careful of speaking of an analogia relationis, pace Barth and Dooyeweerd. Berkouwer wisely notes that Scripture doesn’t speak of a “relation” in the abstract, but of a “relation as it becomes visible in the salvation of Christ” (101).
Even if one were to speak of an analogia entis, the biblical presentation of “being like God” has nothing to do with the natural state of affairs but rather shows forth the wonder of the new birth (1 John 3:9). The “imitation of God” forms the pendant of our witness to the world, in which word and deed are joined in an unbreakable unity (102).
The Whole Man
Scripture doesn’t talk about man in the abstract, but man in his relation to God (195).
Biblical use of the word “soul.”
Sometimes it is “nefesh,” meaning life and can refer to man himself. Berkouwer rejects that “soul” is a “localized religious part of man” (201). The Bible’s interchangeable usage between soul and life should draw attention to the fact that the “heart” is of primary importance: “The heart shows forth the deeper aspect of the whole humanness of man, not some functional localization in a part of man which would be the most important part” (202-203).
Concerning anthropological dualisms
Such a view sees the soul as the “higher” part, closer to God. Leads to ascetism. However, evil in the bible is never localized in a part of man.
Bavinck attacks trichotomy because Scripture knows of no original dualism between spirit and matter (209). The trichotomist sees the soul as mediating between body and spirit (find Damascene’s comment that the soul is higher point, cf Bruce McCormack, Engaging the Doctrine of God).
Dualism and duality are not identical (211). We can speak of a duality in God’s creation man and woman, without positing an ontological dualism between them (this is where Maximus and Jakob Boehme err). “Duality within created reality does not exclude harmony and unity, but is exactly oriented towards it” (211).
Does soul and body involve a tension, and if so that would make it a dualism? If it does involve a tension, we must reject not only trichotomy, but dichotomy.
Per the confessions and creeds, “there is a great difference between non-scientific references to a dual aspect of human nature and a thesis that man is composed of two substances, body and soul” (213-214).
The Dooyeweerdians
It opposes the idea that all the rich variation of humanness can be forced into two substantial categories.
Stoker defines substance as the “systatic core of man, that which functions in all spheres” (H.G. Stoker, Die nuwere Wijsbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, 1933, 40ff.).
For the Dooyeweerdian critique, matter can never be an independent counter-pole to form.
Genuine and real life in Scripture is life in communion with God. The philosophical notion of “immortality of the soul” calls death a lie and misunderstands the judgment of God (250).
The main contention of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd whether there was a natural immortality based on an essence abstracted from its relation to God, from which we can draw further conclusions, such as the soul’s “indestructibility” (249).
Per Van der Leuw, there is no continued existence of the soul as such after death, “but a continuation of the contact point by God even though death” (Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding, 25 quoted in Berkouwer 252).
The problem of what happens when we die does not involve a purely spiritual salvation but can only be answered in the context of death and the Day of Judgment (Althaus).
Is immortality of the soul correlative with the substantial dualism of mind-body? This dichotomy raises substantial (pun?) problems and questions (255):
When the “soul” is separated from the body, what activities is it still able to carry out?
If the body is the organ of the soul (as in Aquinas), and the soul needs the body to carry out its functions, how can the soul know or do anything after death?
Dooyeweerd notes that the psychic functions are indissolubly connected with the total temporal-cosmic relationship of all modal functions and cannot be abstracted from this relationship.
Thus, we have a “living soul” which does not live.
Rather, with Dooyeweerd we should speak of a duality which is supra-temporal in the religious center of man (heart) and the whole temporal-functional complex.
Dooyeweerd does say that the soul continues as a form of existence with an individuality structure (Berkouwer 257n. 33).
Does Dooyeweerd’s school give us a “psychology without a soul?”
No, for Dooyeweerd says we cannot view man’s essence “in itself” and then tack it onto a relation with God.
The Reformed confessions’ use of soul and body is not to give a systematic anthropology but to show that expectation of salvation surpasses death (271).
Criticisms:
He doesn’t give the best discussion of EO, either in what they believe or in how to critique it. Though he does hint that EO thinkers aren’t always able to clearly state the connection between inheriting Adam’s curse of death and why we always do sinful things, but yet refusing to call it Original Sin.
Berkouwer begins with the standard Reformed division of man. On the broader/narrower distinction: man, despite his fall, was not beastialized (38). By narrower man lost his communion with God. the broader sense reminds us of what was not lost in the fall. Perhaps better to speak of a duality between Old and New.
Historical survey:
Schilder sees man’s creation as the pre-condition for the image, but not the image itself (Berkouwer 54). The actual image lies in the officium created man receives (I don’t think this is the full picture, but there is some truth to this, especially if we connect the imago dei with man’s dominion, as the Westminster Shorter Catechism hints at).
Thus, the image is dynamic and is rooted in the Covenantal God’s Relation with man. the word “image” implies “making visible.”
Schilder resists any abstracting the image. The glory of the image shines forth in service to God (56).
The danger with Schilder’s approach is that it makes the image too “dynamic” with an emphasis on conformitas. It is not a hard push from here to Arminianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and Eastern Orthodoxy.
What is the relationship between man’s humanness and God’s Image? Berkouwer wants to deny that fallen man images God (57). He says he can do this without rejecting what it means for man to be man.
Passages like Genesis 9:6 are not proof-texts for some abstract view of the image analogia entis. They deal with a humanness in the context of God’s plan of salvation. The truth of the matter is Scripture doesn’t focus that much on the distinction between wider and narrow, important though it is. traditional discussions have always focused on image as defined by person, will, reason, and freedom. Scripture, on the other hand, is concerned with man-in-relation-to-God. A synthesis between the ontic and active aspects of the image is impossible when using concepts like “nature” and “essence” (61).
Biblical usage: The NT speaks of humanity as whether it is the “New man in Christ” or not. To the degree it speaks of conformitas, it speaks of the new conformitas in Christ.
While the analogia entis is certainly wrong, we need to be careful of speaking of an analogia relationis, pace Barth and Dooyeweerd. Berkouwer wisely notes that Scripture doesn’t speak of a “relation” in the abstract, but of a “relation as it becomes visible in the salvation of Christ” (101).
Even if one were to speak of an analogia entis, the biblical presentation of “being like God” has nothing to do with the natural state of affairs but rather shows forth the wonder of the new birth (1 John 3:9). The “imitation of God” forms the pendant of our witness to the world, in which word and deed are joined in an unbreakable unity (102).
The Whole Man
Scripture doesn’t talk about man in the abstract, but man in his relation to God (195).
Biblical use of the word “soul.”
Sometimes it is “nefesh,” meaning life and can refer to man himself. Berkouwer rejects that “soul” is a “localized religious part of man” (201). The Bible’s interchangeable usage between soul and life should draw attention to the fact that the “heart” is of primary importance: “The heart shows forth the deeper aspect of the whole humanness of man, not some functional localization in a part of man which would be the most important part” (202-203).
Concerning anthropological dualisms
Such a view sees the soul as the “higher” part, closer to God. Leads to ascetism. However, evil in the bible is never localized in a part of man.
Bavinck attacks trichotomy because Scripture knows of no original dualism between spirit and matter (209). The trichotomist sees the soul as mediating between body and spirit (find Damascene’s comment that the soul is higher point, cf Bruce McCormack, Engaging the Doctrine of God).
Dualism and duality are not identical (211). We can speak of a duality in God’s creation man and woman, without positing an ontological dualism between them (this is where Maximus and Jakob Boehme err). “Duality within created reality does not exclude harmony and unity, but is exactly oriented towards it” (211).
Does soul and body involve a tension, and if so that would make it a dualism? If it does involve a tension, we must reject not only trichotomy, but dichotomy.
Per the confessions and creeds, “there is a great difference between non-scientific references to a dual aspect of human nature and a thesis that man is composed of two substances, body and soul” (213-214).
The Dooyeweerdians
It opposes the idea that all the rich variation of humanness can be forced into two substantial categories.
Stoker defines substance as the “systatic core of man, that which functions in all spheres” (H.G. Stoker, Die nuwere Wijsbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, 1933, 40ff.).
For the Dooyeweerdian critique, matter can never be an independent counter-pole to form.
Genuine and real life in Scripture is life in communion with God. The philosophical notion of “immortality of the soul” calls death a lie and misunderstands the judgment of God (250).
The main contention of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd whether there was a natural immortality based on an essence abstracted from its relation to God, from which we can draw further conclusions, such as the soul’s “indestructibility” (249).
Per Van der Leuw, there is no continued existence of the soul as such after death, “but a continuation of the contact point by God even though death” (Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding, 25 quoted in Berkouwer 252).
The problem of what happens when we die does not involve a purely spiritual salvation but can only be answered in the context of death and the Day of Judgment (Althaus).
Is immortality of the soul correlative with the substantial dualism of mind-body? This dichotomy raises substantial (pun?) problems and questions (255):
When the “soul” is separated from the body, what activities is it still able to carry out?
If the body is the organ of the soul (as in Aquinas), and the soul needs the body to carry out its functions, how can the soul know or do anything after death?
Dooyeweerd notes that the psychic functions are indissolubly connected with the total temporal-cosmic relationship of all modal functions and cannot be abstracted from this relationship.
Thus, we have a “living soul” which does not live.
Rather, with Dooyeweerd we should speak of a duality which is supra-temporal in the religious center of man (heart) and the whole temporal-functional complex.
Dooyeweerd does say that the soul continues as a form of existence with an individuality structure (Berkouwer 257n. 33).
Does Dooyeweerd’s school give us a “psychology without a soul?”
No, for Dooyeweerd says we cannot view man’s essence “in itself” and then tack it onto a relation with God.
The Reformed confessions’ use of soul and body is not to give a systematic anthropology but to show that expectation of salvation surpasses death (271).
Criticisms:
He doesn’t give the best discussion of EO, either in what they believe or in how to critique it. Though he does hint that EO thinkers aren’t always able to clearly state the connection between inheriting Adam’s curse of death and why we always do sinful things, but yet refusing to call it Original Sin.
June 29, 2024
THE EIGHTH VOLUME IN BERKOUWER’S 14-VOLUME “STUDIES IN DOGMATICS”
Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer (1903-1996) taught systematic theology at the Free University in Amsterdam. The other volumes in this series are: The Providence of God,Faith and Sanctification,Faith and Justification,The Person of Christ,General Revelation,Faith and Perseverance,Divine Election,The Work of Christ,The Sacraments,Sin,The Return of Christ,Holy Scriptures,The Church. He also wrote books such as The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism,Modern Uncertainty and Christian Faith,Recent Developments in Roman Catholic Thought,A Half Century of Theology: Movements and Motives, etc.
He wrote in the first chapter of this 1957 book, “Today, more than at any time, the question “What is man?’ is at the center of theological and philosophical concern… Why should this be a PROBLEM? It would seem that there is nothing so widely and generally ‘known’ in everyday experience as is man… Is not this ‘nature’ experienced by all of us, in ourselves and in others, in countless relationships, in the heights of human happiness and the depths of grief? Who does not ‘know’ man, whom we daily encounter, and the man that we ourselves are? There can only be one answer to such questions; namely, that this almost irresistible problem appears to many a mind NOT to have found a clear and obviously irrefutable answer, and that this apparently general ‘knowledge’ of the nature of man is not so obvious after all… Hence it does not appear, on second thought, to be at all clear and obvious WHO and WHAT man really is, and there is thus every reason to pose the problem.” (Pg. 9)
He explains, “we may conclude that theological concern with the image of God has concentrated on the so-called dual character of the image, and especially on the question of whether we can correctly speak of the image when man’s conformity to God’s will has vanished. Some would say that man’s humanness, his humanity… as such is part of the image… The point at issue is thus the relationship between … man’s humanness, and the image of God.” (Pg. 57)
He states, “Thus we can hardly see anthropomorphism as something which clouds our view of God, which should be conquered and surpassed, in order to gain a more ‘spiritual’ view of God. We should rather see it as a manner of speaking which gives full perspective to our view of the living and active God, though we must never forget that this manner of speaking is and must always be inadequate. And hence it is not the danger that God will be anthropomorphically compared to some part of man (e.g., his body)… but rather the danger that unlimited use of it might be wrongly understood in the context of the religious ideas of the heathen world surrounding Israel.” (Pg. 80)
He argues, “Thus we can evaluate contemporary personalism which applied to the image as a reaction against the dangers of an abstract ontology. As such, it is a constant reminder of these dangers; but it should at the same time be stated that this personalism itself operated with the concept of relation which does not sufficiently recognize that a being in relation should not underemphasize reality, but rather becomes evidenced in reality… in this relation we do confront the actuality and reality of man’s nature, which even in its corruption has not escaped from God’s hand, but rather stands guilty in every corner of his being, while in this relation.” (Pg. 140)
He explains, “‘common grace’ limits the powers of evil. This common grace may be brought into relation with the grace of Christ in this sense, that this protection of man’s humanness provides OPPORTUNITY for man to have salvation through Christ; but it is as such nevertheless not Christologically defined or limited. It is a holding back of sin which can lead to a relative but nevertheless striking conformity, which surely is not without meaning in the light of God’s intentions, but which can never in the least degree excuse man in the total alienation of his life from God.” (Pg. 155)
He suggests, “Conscience is thus not a limit on that corruption which alienates man from God in the very depths of his being. The reaction against evil, in the sense of protest even to the extent of self-accusation, may show that man is not withdrawn from the holiness and goodness of the ever-present commandments of God, but it does not break through man’s alienation from God, and presents no solution which can restore life’s harmony. Conscience is thus not in the least an unassailable ‘light of nature,’ but an indication of a disharmony; of a denigration, in which the unity of life appears to be lost, and in which man---in spite of himself---accuses himself.” (Pg. 176)
He points out, “Common humanity: the words can be lightly used and be made into a theory which today is hardly taken seriously in actual life; but this fact does not invalidate their richness and deepest meaning. Man is---even when alienated from God---not alone. In considering the estate of fallen man, there is indeed more reason for us to reflect on this social component than on the preservation of his understanding and will. For surely this breaking through the bonds of isolation, full of continuing enrichment and responsibility, can hardly be due merely to a remnant of individual endowments. Such a ‘remnant’ might explain a certain legality and outward conformity to the law, but not the development in the course of the life of fallen man of these truly surprising relationships.” (Pg. 183)
He states, “We have already remarked… that Scripture, to use the terms of dichotomy, takes not only the soul but also the body, very seriously. This affirmation of the body’s worth has always been a [scandal] to every dualistic theory of gradation between higher and lower elements in man. One of the most valuable possessions of the early Church was its confession of the resurrection of the body, against all tendencies to devalue the body… This eschatological affirmation is indissolubly related to the whole New Testament witness regarding the salvation of man.” (Pg. 230)
He comments, “it is also clear why Scripture does not take up this continued existence and the ‘immortality of the soul’ as an independent theme, a fact which impresses those who approach Scripture from a belief in general immortality as being ‘strange.’ The basic reason for this fact… is, that this continued existence as such is never preached as a comfort, an immortality which man might deduce from the structure of his being, a comfort which he could seek and find against approaching death. Scripture shows us no way through which death loses its serious character… Such a comfort is ruled out, since true comfort can lie only in the overcoming of death, in an overpowering annihilation of death in all perspectives… This is something radically different from the sort of escape from death which is implied in the idea of the immortality of the soul.” (Pg. 268)
He says, “The New Testament revelation regarding freedom this articulates a deeply religious verdict. Every concept of freedom which would describe man’s essence ontologically, apart from his relation to God, must end with the ‘freedom’ of autonomy and self-determination. Such an abstract ontology of essences can give no true perspective on freedom; it must always designate as the earmark of freedom, being ‘free from’… This freedom… is then seen as the ‘essence’ of man, a self-sufficient inwardness which protests all threats to it or limits on it, all conquest and compulsion. Freedom is then defined by man’s dignity and by his inner nature. This freedom leaves man to himself, and he chooses so to be, as over against the world of the other, which limits him and threatens him… Freedom is thus formally qualified, and from this point of view any limit or responsibility will be seen as a relativizing of absolute freedom.” (Pg. 327) He adds, “Here… there is a consciousness of impregnability, of legitimacy, of the true nature of man which is revealed in its freedom as a ‘being free for’ and therein also as a ‘being free from.’ This concept of freedom can no longer be called formal, for it is completely concretized in actual life.” (Pg. 330)
He summarizes, “if we … seek a synthesis between the freedom given by God and a formal freedom, the freedom to choose evil, we shall inevitably fail in this dualistic concept of freedom, for the choice of sin perverts and does not reveal a free will. And our unsuccessful striving for such a synthesis can be based only on a concept of neutral ‘freedom’ as part of the essence of man. If we do not abstract man’s essence, and thus also his creaturely freedom, from God, if we do not see freedom as a release for arbitrary choice, then we shall not wish nor be able to combine true freedom and … the enslaved will… We can never see freedom as a gift of God if we begin with such an arbitrary ‘free’ will.” … And man is so completely under the delusion of this arbitrary free will that it takes a lifetime to become accustomed to the light of genuine freedom… For the law and the gospel take man away from the illusion of the crossroads at which he supposes he can choose either way arbitrarily. They break through the darkness of the ‘indifferent will,’ and the delusion which continually obsesses man on the path of sin.” (Pg. 347-348)
For anyone interested in conservative Reformed theology, this entire series will be of great interest. The diversity of the theologians and sources with whom Berkouwer interacts make this series a very stimulating reading project.
Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer (1903-1996) taught systematic theology at the Free University in Amsterdam. The other volumes in this series are: The Providence of God,Faith and Sanctification,Faith and Justification,The Person of Christ,General Revelation,Faith and Perseverance,Divine Election,The Work of Christ,The Sacraments,Sin,The Return of Christ,Holy Scriptures,The Church. He also wrote books such as The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism,Modern Uncertainty and Christian Faith,Recent Developments in Roman Catholic Thought,A Half Century of Theology: Movements and Motives, etc.
He wrote in the first chapter of this 1957 book, “Today, more than at any time, the question “What is man?’ is at the center of theological and philosophical concern… Why should this be a PROBLEM? It would seem that there is nothing so widely and generally ‘known’ in everyday experience as is man… Is not this ‘nature’ experienced by all of us, in ourselves and in others, in countless relationships, in the heights of human happiness and the depths of grief? Who does not ‘know’ man, whom we daily encounter, and the man that we ourselves are? There can only be one answer to such questions; namely, that this almost irresistible problem appears to many a mind NOT to have found a clear and obviously irrefutable answer, and that this apparently general ‘knowledge’ of the nature of man is not so obvious after all… Hence it does not appear, on second thought, to be at all clear and obvious WHO and WHAT man really is, and there is thus every reason to pose the problem.” (Pg. 9)
He explains, “we may conclude that theological concern with the image of God has concentrated on the so-called dual character of the image, and especially on the question of whether we can correctly speak of the image when man’s conformity to God’s will has vanished. Some would say that man’s humanness, his humanity… as such is part of the image… The point at issue is thus the relationship between … man’s humanness, and the image of God.” (Pg. 57)
He states, “Thus we can hardly see anthropomorphism as something which clouds our view of God, which should be conquered and surpassed, in order to gain a more ‘spiritual’ view of God. We should rather see it as a manner of speaking which gives full perspective to our view of the living and active God, though we must never forget that this manner of speaking is and must always be inadequate. And hence it is not the danger that God will be anthropomorphically compared to some part of man (e.g., his body)… but rather the danger that unlimited use of it might be wrongly understood in the context of the religious ideas of the heathen world surrounding Israel.” (Pg. 80)
He argues, “Thus we can evaluate contemporary personalism which applied to the image as a reaction against the dangers of an abstract ontology. As such, it is a constant reminder of these dangers; but it should at the same time be stated that this personalism itself operated with the concept of relation which does not sufficiently recognize that a being in relation should not underemphasize reality, but rather becomes evidenced in reality… in this relation we do confront the actuality and reality of man’s nature, which even in its corruption has not escaped from God’s hand, but rather stands guilty in every corner of his being, while in this relation.” (Pg. 140)
He explains, “‘common grace’ limits the powers of evil. This common grace may be brought into relation with the grace of Christ in this sense, that this protection of man’s humanness provides OPPORTUNITY for man to have salvation through Christ; but it is as such nevertheless not Christologically defined or limited. It is a holding back of sin which can lead to a relative but nevertheless striking conformity, which surely is not without meaning in the light of God’s intentions, but which can never in the least degree excuse man in the total alienation of his life from God.” (Pg. 155)
He suggests, “Conscience is thus not a limit on that corruption which alienates man from God in the very depths of his being. The reaction against evil, in the sense of protest even to the extent of self-accusation, may show that man is not withdrawn from the holiness and goodness of the ever-present commandments of God, but it does not break through man’s alienation from God, and presents no solution which can restore life’s harmony. Conscience is thus not in the least an unassailable ‘light of nature,’ but an indication of a disharmony; of a denigration, in which the unity of life appears to be lost, and in which man---in spite of himself---accuses himself.” (Pg. 176)
He points out, “Common humanity: the words can be lightly used and be made into a theory which today is hardly taken seriously in actual life; but this fact does not invalidate their richness and deepest meaning. Man is---even when alienated from God---not alone. In considering the estate of fallen man, there is indeed more reason for us to reflect on this social component than on the preservation of his understanding and will. For surely this breaking through the bonds of isolation, full of continuing enrichment and responsibility, can hardly be due merely to a remnant of individual endowments. Such a ‘remnant’ might explain a certain legality and outward conformity to the law, but not the development in the course of the life of fallen man of these truly surprising relationships.” (Pg. 183)
He states, “We have already remarked… that Scripture, to use the terms of dichotomy, takes not only the soul but also the body, very seriously. This affirmation of the body’s worth has always been a [scandal] to every dualistic theory of gradation between higher and lower elements in man. One of the most valuable possessions of the early Church was its confession of the resurrection of the body, against all tendencies to devalue the body… This eschatological affirmation is indissolubly related to the whole New Testament witness regarding the salvation of man.” (Pg. 230)
He comments, “it is also clear why Scripture does not take up this continued existence and the ‘immortality of the soul’ as an independent theme, a fact which impresses those who approach Scripture from a belief in general immortality as being ‘strange.’ The basic reason for this fact… is, that this continued existence as such is never preached as a comfort, an immortality which man might deduce from the structure of his being, a comfort which he could seek and find against approaching death. Scripture shows us no way through which death loses its serious character… Such a comfort is ruled out, since true comfort can lie only in the overcoming of death, in an overpowering annihilation of death in all perspectives… This is something radically different from the sort of escape from death which is implied in the idea of the immortality of the soul.” (Pg. 268)
He says, “The New Testament revelation regarding freedom this articulates a deeply religious verdict. Every concept of freedom which would describe man’s essence ontologically, apart from his relation to God, must end with the ‘freedom’ of autonomy and self-determination. Such an abstract ontology of essences can give no true perspective on freedom; it must always designate as the earmark of freedom, being ‘free from’… This freedom… is then seen as the ‘essence’ of man, a self-sufficient inwardness which protests all threats to it or limits on it, all conquest and compulsion. Freedom is then defined by man’s dignity and by his inner nature. This freedom leaves man to himself, and he chooses so to be, as over against the world of the other, which limits him and threatens him… Freedom is thus formally qualified, and from this point of view any limit or responsibility will be seen as a relativizing of absolute freedom.” (Pg. 327) He adds, “Here… there is a consciousness of impregnability, of legitimacy, of the true nature of man which is revealed in its freedom as a ‘being free for’ and therein also as a ‘being free from.’ This concept of freedom can no longer be called formal, for it is completely concretized in actual life.” (Pg. 330)
He summarizes, “if we … seek a synthesis between the freedom given by God and a formal freedom, the freedom to choose evil, we shall inevitably fail in this dualistic concept of freedom, for the choice of sin perverts and does not reveal a free will. And our unsuccessful striving for such a synthesis can be based only on a concept of neutral ‘freedom’ as part of the essence of man. If we do not abstract man’s essence, and thus also his creaturely freedom, from God, if we do not see freedom as a release for arbitrary choice, then we shall not wish nor be able to combine true freedom and … the enslaved will… We can never see freedom as a gift of God if we begin with such an arbitrary ‘free’ will.” … And man is so completely under the delusion of this arbitrary free will that it takes a lifetime to become accustomed to the light of genuine freedom… For the law and the gospel take man away from the illusion of the crossroads at which he supposes he can choose either way arbitrarily. They break through the darkness of the ‘indifferent will,’ and the delusion which continually obsesses man on the path of sin.” (Pg. 347-348)
For anyone interested in conservative Reformed theology, this entire series will be of great interest. The diversity of the theologians and sources with whom Berkouwer interacts make this series a very stimulating reading project.
March 12, 2015
Berkouwer opens his book with two theological-anthropological strikes. 1) He mentions sin within the first 5 pages. 2) He doesn't mention the Incarnate Christ for 87 pages.
Despite the rough start, Berkouwer does not strike out. His anthropology does not assume an essential sinfulness of man even though man's essence is totally affected by sin. And while I would have liked to see the Incarnation introduced earlier and therefore given more priority, his anthropology is Christologically informed.
I also would have liked to see more interaction with Patristic sources, but his limitation to his immediate context and tradition is understandable.
Despite the rough start, Berkouwer does not strike out. His anthropology does not assume an essential sinfulness of man even though man's essence is totally affected by sin. And while I would have liked to see the Incarnation introduced earlier and therefore given more priority, his anthropology is Christologically informed.
I also would have liked to see more interaction with Patristic sources, but his limitation to his immediate context and tradition is understandable.
December 20, 2023
I've read at least a few Berkouwer books at this point, and I have to say that this is one of his best. With each chapter, he tackles a contended idea that attends the doctrine of man such as the immortality of the soul, traducianism vs. creationism, and human freedom. In the first chapter, he defines the concept 'image of God.' Here, he argues, controversially, that the image of God was lost (not marred or disfigured) with the fall. However, he does clarify that humanness and image are not equivalent, though they are closely connected. Even if one disagrees with Berkouwer on this point, given the sophistication of his case, it is worth reading and interacting with.
Overall, this book anticipates and developed themes in theological anthropology that are largely assumed and advocated for today such as the whole man, body included, rather than a dualistic conception of man as soul and/versus body as the primary focus of man and the notion that God's providential activity is not competitive with human freedom (such that more of God's activity equals less of man's freedom). Though not as up to date with the ancient Near Eastern background for the concept of image and work of biblical scholars such as G. K. Beale on the first human as priest/kings, this is a very helpful older work on theological anthropology.
Overall, this book anticipates and developed themes in theological anthropology that are largely assumed and advocated for today such as the whole man, body included, rather than a dualistic conception of man as soul and/versus body as the primary focus of man and the notion that God's providential activity is not competitive with human freedom (such that more of God's activity equals less of man's freedom). Though not as up to date with the ancient Near Eastern background for the concept of image and work of biblical scholars such as G. K. Beale on the first human as priest/kings, this is a very helpful older work on theological anthropology.
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April 4, 2015Read for my essay, was useful but I struggled to engage with it. Not a reflection on the book itself but rather one on my preferred writing style to engage with.
February 29, 2016
Read some forty years ago. Very instructive and interactive with theological thinking on what it means to bear the image of God.
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