Usually, academic philosophers and democratic majorities in Western liberal democracies are miles apart in matters of immigration. Whereas philosophers like to pontificate free movement, human rights, global equality of opportunity and the open borders necessary to achieve all these things, most ordinary people do not feel the least bound by a moral obligation to let in large amounts of strangers from unfamiliar cultures who seek to improve, and understandably so, their economic prospects.
Strangers in Our Midst is a deviation from this pattern, and one that is long-overdue. It proves that what these majorities feel and think but often struggle to articulate, especially compared to the high-minded and glib rhetoric of their well-educated globalist/progressivist opponents, also withstands more sustained, philosophical scrutiny. So, this book can be seen—though I am not implying it was intended as such—partly as a philosophical vindication of the current, quite restrictive status quo on immigration, which approaches immigration as roughly the prerogative of the nation-state.
To illustrate what this prerogative amounts to, consider the following. If, hypothetically, the Netherlands are distributing immigration quota between a group of Christian Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and a group of Muslim Somalians, then it is free to give more of these to the former if it reasons that it will be easier for this group—after all, they already speak the language and ascribe to a Western religion—to integrate in Dutch society and adopt those aspects of Dutch culture that it deems important. You might suspect that this is about race, which Miller rightly argues is not a permissible selection ground because it is a morally arbitrary fact of someone's identity, but that is false; for, there are as many if not more Black South Africans who speak Afrikaans as their mother tongue as there are white people. (Of course, this does presuppose that the Somalians only have a relatively weak, economic interest in moving to the Netherlands, and not a far stronger interest, e.g., to seek refuge because natural disasters have made their country unliveable or because they are being persecuted by a hateful regime. I will try to return to the question of what to do with refugees at a later date.)
In contrast to other works in the philosophy of immigration like Joseph Carens' The Ethics of Immigration, Strangers in Our Midst adopts a real-world or realist approach. That is, it does not evade the challenges posed by immigration by fleeing into ideal-theory, that is, by presupposing an ideal world in which as a result of very little economic inequality and the absence of oppressive regimes there would not be any large flows of immigrants to begin with. Obviously, in such a world immigration would not give rise to any problems and philosophers of immigration would soon be out of business. In reality, however, as Miller notes in the introduction, polls suggests that 38% of people living in Sub-Saharan Africa and 21% of people living in the Middle-East would migrate if given the chance. These are truly staggering, disconcerting numbers. Clearly, mass immigration, or the possibility of its occurrence, has to be taken seriously.
I won't give a summary of all the ground that is covered in this book. However, here were some points I found particularly convincing:
— The argument that border controls do not amount to coercion but are merely a form of prevention, on the grounds that, conceptually, coercion means forcing someone to specifically do one particular thing intended by you (e.g., a gunman threatening to kill a bank clerk if she does not hand over the money) whereas prevention means taking away one possible course of action, leaving the agent with an ample amount of other options.
— The distinction between weak (partiality towards compatriots is permitted if reasons can be given) and strong (partiality towards compatriots is never permitted) cosmopolitanism and the dismissal of the latter. According to Miller, weak cosmopolitanism boils down to a broad humanitarianism, which though not entirely toothless (immigrants cannot be turned away without a good explanation, that is, without explaining what sort of costs their entry would involve) does not come close to securing the case for open borders and free movement.
— The rejection of the various arguments for immigration as a human right.
— The defense of a 'thick' account of public culture as well as some degree of cultural (in addition to civic) integration.
— The argument that refugees are to be much more narrowly—and perhaps literally—understood as those people who can only be helped by providing 'refuge', that is, by moving them from their location and not by any other means. That this is far from obvious is shown by the fact that many so-called 'refugees' could be helped, at least in principle, by providing ample protection and shelter in situ and by improving and expanding already existing camps.
In sum, this book shows that immigration is not just a happily-ever-after but that it can generate considerable costs for the receiving country (and sometimes to the country of origin as well, when there is a risk of brain-drain). Consequently, countries can reasonably refuse to shoulder these costs if they have good reasons, one such good reason is if they wish to protect their rich cultural traditions and national identity. To be clear, the reverse is also true: if countries do not care much for their cultural traditions and are happy to see their culture and language be displaced by other, foreign ones, then they are free to pursue corresponding immigration and integration policies.