Leading economists consider the shape of future economic will it resume the pre-crisis consensus, or contend with the post-crisis “new normal”?
What will economic policy look like once the global financial crisis is finally over? Will it resume the pre-crisis consensus, or will it be forced to contend with a post-crisis “new normal”? Have we made progress in addressing these issues, or does confusion remain? In April of 2015, the International Monetary Fund gathered leading economists, both academics and policymakers, to address the shape of future macroeconomic policy. This book is the result, with prominent figures—including Ben Bernanke, John Taylor, and Paul Volcker—offering essays that address topics that range from the measurement of systemic risk to foreign exchange intervention.
The chapters address whether we have entered a “new normal” of low growth, negative real rates, and deflationary pressures, with contributors taking opposing views; whether new financial regulation has stemmed systemic risk; the effectiveness of macro prudential tools; monetary policy, the choice of inflation targets, and the responsibilities of central banks; fiscal policy, stimulus, and debt stabilization; the volatility of capital flows; and the international monetary and financial system, including the role of international policy coordination.
In light of these discussions, is there progress or confusion regarding the future of macroeconomic policy? In the final chapter, volume editor Olivier Blanchard both. Many lessons have been learned; but, as the chapters of the book reveal, there is no clear agreement on several key issues.
ContributorsViral V. Acharya, Anat R. Admati, Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Ben Bernanke, Olivier Blanchard, Marco Buti, Ricardo J. Caballero, Agustín Carstens, Jaime Caruana, J. Bradford DeLong, Martin Feldstein, Vitor Gaspar, John Geanakoplos, Philipp Hildebrand, Gill Marcus, Maurice Obstfeld, Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, Rafael Portillo, Raghuram Rajan, Kenneth Rogoff, Robert E. Rubin, Lawrence H. Summers, Hyun Song Shin, Lars E. O. Svensson, John B. Taylor, Paul Tucker, José Viñals, Paul A. Volcker
Olivier Jean Blanchard is currently the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, a post he has held since September 1, 2008. He is also the Class of 1941 Professor of Economics at MIT, though he is currently on leave. Blanchard is one of the most cited economists in the world, according to IDEAS/RePEc.
Blanchard earned his Ph.D. in Economics in 1977 at MIT. He taught at Harvard University between 1977 and 1983, after which he returned to MIT as a professor. Between 1998 and 2003 Blanchard served as the Chairman of the Economics Department at MIT. He is also an advisor for the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston (since 1995) and New York (since 2004).
Blanchard has published numerous research papers in the field of macroeconomics, as well as undergraduate and graduate macroeconomics textbooks (including his extremely popular Macroeconomics).
This tremendous collection of bite-sized essays by the world’s economic pundit establishment was pretty much made for my morning commute.
So, at the risk of sounding like Lou Bega, it’s Rogoff vs Summers on Monday, Bernanke vs Taylor on Tuesday and Feldstein vs DeLong on Friday. Really good stuff. Because they are restricted to five pages, they get down to their point immediately.
The Emerging Markets bit was not as good, with loads of locals using this as a platform to say they did a good job, even the Brazil fellow. Oh, and the Bank Negara guy things he’s Martin Feldstein and does not end his piece with any references. Skip most of the EM bit and go straight to the inimitable Raghuram Rajan’s contribution. It’s as good a summary of where we find ourselves and how we got here as Olivier Blanchard’s.
Read this very accessible compilation and you will be 100% caught up with the status quo of the debate: secular stagnation versus debt supercycle, monetary policy vs macroprudential measures, usefulness of increased central bank balance sheets versus lack of safe assets, this is the big guys slugging it out.
Great book with well thought of positions and arguments presented by academics and central bankers.
Without going into detail, I found a few of the themes presented quite enlightening and thought provoking; Larry Summers's Secular Stagnation Theory might be the most topical and current one after Trump's win in the US Elections, his reflationary fiscal policies fit Larry's prognosis for a return to growth.
Another interesting theory presented was the Credit Surface Theory and the negative externalities of subjecting banks to minimum capital adequacy ratios as they deincentivise banks from catering to the whole credit suface including SME's and high risk-weighted borrowers, who might be a key to growth.
DeLong makes an interesting argument in favor of big government and pushing for big fiscal debt balances. The big government part is based on his argument that technological developments and their effect on societal and wealth distribution, have potentially disabled Adam Smith's Invisible Hand; a big government that promotes fairer distribution and social welfare will be needed in the twenty first century.
Macroprudential policies, International policy coordination, rule vs target based monetary policies, among others were also topics that were well presented.
We thought we had it figured out: sustained global economic growth was a function of careful monetary policy, disciplined fiscal behavior, free-floating exchange rates, and international cooperation that enabled the flow of goods and capital. But then the 2009 global financial crisis hit, and a decade of sputtering growth, intermittent European debt crises, a wildly depressed yield curve, and drastic changes to regulatory regimes have sent economists back to the drawing board.
Good.
This book compiles succinct and well-articulated perspectives on the state of macroeconomic policy in a world that does not behave according to traditional paradigms. Brought together as part of an IMF conference, these economists are the preeminent experts within the field and provide a robust debate challenging existing assumptions and pointing out possible future scenarios. This book is definitely directed to other specialists in the field and some of the conversations are belabored with too much technical jargon and inside baseball references. Yet the discussion is surprisingly comprehensive and approachable, providing an excellent sense of the confusing and uncertain state of play of the international economy.