Optimistic perspective on Chinese financial reform from a Western-born board member of two separate Chinese banks.
During the Mao era, the People's Bank of China wasn't a bank in the modern sense - it just performed accounting functions for the central government. That began to change after Deng's reforms in the late 1970s, but China's banking system was only really transformed in the 1990s, with Zhu Rongji's tenure in the PBOC. He pushed forward a set of sweeping reforms - clearing out the sclerotic levels of upper management, cleaning up loans to non-performing SOEs, bond issuances, and then listing the banks on international stock exchanges.
This set of reforms continued even during the 1990s Asia economic crisis. Though the relative isolation from FDI insulated China from the worst effects of that regional crisis, Two big banks went bust in 1998 - GITIC and the Hainan Investment Trust. Though now, the thrust of reform is more gradual, and not the drastic change that was needed in the 1990s. The end result, Stent argues, is that the Chinese banking system is fully modernized, complete with modern IT implementation, risk management and auditing capabilities, corporate governance with strict accountability, and retail standards. While there are some structural quirks compared to different bankers, Stent claims that the hybrid 'market socialist' system is at least as functional as market capitalism.
Frankly, I wish I could share his optimism. Though maybe I am just skittish about finance after the past nine years of crisis, but also the recent phenomenon of 'hiding' non-performing loans, railway debt, or the extensive 'shadow banking' system give me pause. In any case, I learned much from this perspective, and anyone interested in the Chinese economy or international development would think so, too.