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The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991
The Soviet Tragedy is an essential coda to the literature of Soviet studies...Insofar as [he] returns the power of ideology to its central place in Soviet history, Malia has made an enormous contribution. He has written the history of a utopian illusion and the tragic consequences it had for the people of the Soviet Union and the world.
-- David Remnick, The New York Review of Books
"In Martin Malia, the Soviet Union had one of its most acute observers. With this book, it may well have found the cornerstone of its history."
-- Francois Furet, author of Interpreting the French Revolution
" The Soviet Tragedy offers the most thorough scholarly analysis of the Communist phenomenon that we are likely to get for a long while to come...Malia states that his narrative is intended 'to substantiate the basic argument,' and this is certainly an argumentative book, which drives its thesis home with hammer blows. On this breathtaking journey, Malia is a witty and often brilliantly penetrating guide. He has much wisdom to impart."
-- The Times Literary Supplement
"This is history at the high level, well deployed factually, but particularly worthwhile in the philosophical and political context -- at once a view and an overview."
-- The Washington Post
-- David Remnick, The New York Review of Books
"In Martin Malia, the Soviet Union had one of its most acute observers. With this book, it may well have found the cornerstone of its history."
-- Francois Furet, author of Interpreting the French Revolution
" The Soviet Tragedy offers the most thorough scholarly analysis of the Communist phenomenon that we are likely to get for a long while to come...Malia states that his narrative is intended 'to substantiate the basic argument,' and this is certainly an argumentative book, which drives its thesis home with hammer blows. On this breathtaking journey, Malia is a witty and often brilliantly penetrating guide. He has much wisdom to impart."
-- The Times Literary Supplement
"This is history at the high level, well deployed factually, but particularly worthwhile in the philosophical and political context -- at once a view and an overview."
-- The Washington Post
592 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1994
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621 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
June 28, 2021
I normally am cautious with negative reviews, even more when I see that they are a minority. But in this case I do think that most readers overlook major shortcomings of this book. Someone else, and no one less than Ianni Kotsonis, summarized them best.
(Re)consider what you think about this book by first reading his review essay: Ianni Kotsonis, “The Ideology of Martin Malia,” The Russian Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 124–130. Shorter version of similar thoughts: Review by Robert Legvold, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1994), p. 166. Feel free to message me in case you don’t have access to them.
Lastly: You’re likely to yse this in a class, so be open about your sources and don’t be too lazy to make your own argument :-)
(Re)consider what you think about this book by first reading his review essay: Ianni Kotsonis, “The Ideology of Martin Malia,” The Russian Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 124–130. Shorter version of similar thoughts: Review by Robert Legvold, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1994), p. 166. Feel free to message me in case you don’t have access to them.
Lastly: You’re likely to yse this in a class, so be open about your sources and don’t be too lazy to make your own argument :-)
March 8, 2021
A fantastic analysis of Soviet ideology through the context of history. Martin Malia does an excellent job of tracing the "logic" of Soviet history, from the roots of socialism, through the development of revolution, the roads taken and untaken, and finally the inevitable collapse of the system. He examines the political, economic, ideological, and societal facets of Soviet society with attention and care. Soviet history is a difficult thing to try and recreate with any sort of accuracy, but Malia is very clear as to where and how he draws his deductions from, staying close to fact and firm logic, but also allowing for relevant speculation. Moreover, his own arguments concerning socialism and the Soviet fate are extremely well constructed. The book is well structured, relevant, and engaging. It would be a worthwhile read even for those uninterested in history, as a worthwhile examination of one of the most controversial philosophies of the modern age.
July 11, 2024
“In sum, socialism doesn’t exist, and the Soviet Union built it.”
Martin Malia belongs to a group of historians on the USSR that tend to be highly critical of the Soviet Union and believe the whole enterprise was doomed from the start. This group of Sovietologists emphasize the inherent problems in socialism and attribute many failures of the Soviet Union to these underlying ideological faults. This conservative critique of the Soviet Union and its history has reached its apogee under Martin Malia. Other conservative historians on the USSR (I’m specifically thinking of Richard Pipes), while they approach Soviet history from the same angle, tend to be twice as combative while being half as nuanced or brilliant as Malia.
It is worth mentioning that, being published in 1994, this book is certainly outdated as far as Soviet historiography goes. Plenty of other brilliant historians have contributed to the field since then and added to our knowledge and understanding of the USSR such as Alex Rabinowitch, Ron Suny, and Moshe Lewin. Most of which have moved away from the emphasis on ideology that grips the work of Malia and other Cold War era Sovietologists. It’s easy to see why. While not wholly deterministic (Malia repeatedly asserts that he is not a determinist), ideological explanations for the failure of the Soviet Union tends to be like performing surgery with a scythe rather than a scalpel. Surely, one would think, motives can be more complex than a single-minded pursuit of building socialism.
Despite these faults, this book is still simply brilliant. Malia’s intuitive and unparalleled understanding of the socialist tradition alone makes The Soviet Tragedy a necessary read to properly understand the Soviet Union. His re-centering of the Communist ideology at the core of Soviet history is not wholly without merit. Even if there were also underlying implicit goals of Soviet leaders and Soviet people, Communism was very clearly the explicit goal of the Communist Party. Therefore, the extent to which socialist ideals drove the actions of those in power is deserving of study. Many times throughout the book I found a point disagreeable only for Malia to wear me down and lead me to a more nuanced understanding of Soviet ebbs and flows.
I am a big fan of Malia’s style and deep thinking on socialist history in Russia. The author’s brilliance truly shines in the epilogue, in which he discusses both Russia and the socialist movements after 1991. Although his conclusions are more optimistic than they probably should have been (at least in regard to post-Soviet Russia), his analysis seems to have done much better to predict the present than others could have done 30 years ago.
No single historiography can provide an all-encompassing narrative, and The Soviet Tragedy as a monologue is no exception. Yet even if this book is a bit outdated in certain regards and rather polemical, it contributes greatly to the historical dialogue on the Soviet Union. In this context, I highly recommend The Soviet Tragedy as a book that engages with the ideological underpinnings of a global superpower.
Martin Malia belongs to a group of historians on the USSR that tend to be highly critical of the Soviet Union and believe the whole enterprise was doomed from the start. This group of Sovietologists emphasize the inherent problems in socialism and attribute many failures of the Soviet Union to these underlying ideological faults. This conservative critique of the Soviet Union and its history has reached its apogee under Martin Malia. Other conservative historians on the USSR (I’m specifically thinking of Richard Pipes), while they approach Soviet history from the same angle, tend to be twice as combative while being half as nuanced or brilliant as Malia.
It is worth mentioning that, being published in 1994, this book is certainly outdated as far as Soviet historiography goes. Plenty of other brilliant historians have contributed to the field since then and added to our knowledge and understanding of the USSR such as Alex Rabinowitch, Ron Suny, and Moshe Lewin. Most of which have moved away from the emphasis on ideology that grips the work of Malia and other Cold War era Sovietologists. It’s easy to see why. While not wholly deterministic (Malia repeatedly asserts that he is not a determinist), ideological explanations for the failure of the Soviet Union tends to be like performing surgery with a scythe rather than a scalpel. Surely, one would think, motives can be more complex than a single-minded pursuit of building socialism.
Despite these faults, this book is still simply brilliant. Malia’s intuitive and unparalleled understanding of the socialist tradition alone makes The Soviet Tragedy a necessary read to properly understand the Soviet Union. His re-centering of the Communist ideology at the core of Soviet history is not wholly without merit. Even if there were also underlying implicit goals of Soviet leaders and Soviet people, Communism was very clearly the explicit goal of the Communist Party. Therefore, the extent to which socialist ideals drove the actions of those in power is deserving of study. Many times throughout the book I found a point disagreeable only for Malia to wear me down and lead me to a more nuanced understanding of Soviet ebbs and flows.
I am a big fan of Malia’s style and deep thinking on socialist history in Russia. The author’s brilliance truly shines in the epilogue, in which he discusses both Russia and the socialist movements after 1991. Although his conclusions are more optimistic than they probably should have been (at least in regard to post-Soviet Russia), his analysis seems to have done much better to predict the present than others could have done 30 years ago.
No single historiography can provide an all-encompassing narrative, and The Soviet Tragedy as a monologue is no exception. Yet even if this book is a bit outdated in certain regards and rather polemical, it contributes greatly to the historical dialogue on the Soviet Union. In this context, I highly recommend The Soviet Tragedy as a book that engages with the ideological underpinnings of a global superpower.
March 17, 2019
This generally excellent interpretive survey of the history of the Soviet Union is not without its flaws. As other reviewers have noted, Malia's bias towards utter disdain of socialism and the Soviet Union is noticeable; combined with the general tendency of historical narratives to require certain facts to be shoe-horned in, there are several places where the astute reader may take exception with Malia's characterization of events. Additionally, though his prose is generally highly readable, his diction is regularly pretentious.
Ordinarily, these flaws would be enough to cause me to drop my star rating a bit. I am declining to do so, however, because Malia's thesis is argued so forcefully. For a dense, 520 page work of history, I could not put it down. Malia argues that the basic rottenness of the Soviet system was not due to any particular circumstances of the experiment but to the failures of socialism itself. He does not see Stalin as an aberration, but rather as a logical consequence of a system that requires power to be concentrated in a single set of hands for it to function. Even then, as Malia demonstrates in his examination of the regimes of Kruschev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev, it functions poorly.
I read this book hoping to fill in the gaps of my knowledge of Soviet history as part of a general study of the twentieth century, not because I hoped to find ammunition to dispute the arguments of the self-proclaimed socialists now ascending in Western society. On the contrary: Malia takes great pains to point out that mere support of a welfare state hardly qualifies one as a socialist. However, having read this, I would suggest that it would make an excellent addition to the reading list of those who are inclined to socialist sympathies. Though I noted his bias, Malia is hardly a "socialized medicine" type. He was a leading expert on the Soviet Union, and this book reflects a deep understanding of that defunct empire's political and economic systems. The book's epilogue on the future of socialism is notable both fornits prescience and its charitability towards a political Left with which Malia has profound disagreement. "The Soviet Tragedy" is a great book, and - beyond its merits as a work of history - deserves to be more widely read as a reality check on what many are actually advocating.
5/5 stars
Ordinarily, these flaws would be enough to cause me to drop my star rating a bit. I am declining to do so, however, because Malia's thesis is argued so forcefully. For a dense, 520 page work of history, I could not put it down. Malia argues that the basic rottenness of the Soviet system was not due to any particular circumstances of the experiment but to the failures of socialism itself. He does not see Stalin as an aberration, but rather as a logical consequence of a system that requires power to be concentrated in a single set of hands for it to function. Even then, as Malia demonstrates in his examination of the regimes of Kruschev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev, it functions poorly.
I read this book hoping to fill in the gaps of my knowledge of Soviet history as part of a general study of the twentieth century, not because I hoped to find ammunition to dispute the arguments of the self-proclaimed socialists now ascending in Western society. On the contrary: Malia takes great pains to point out that mere support of a welfare state hardly qualifies one as a socialist. However, having read this, I would suggest that it would make an excellent addition to the reading list of those who are inclined to socialist sympathies. Though I noted his bias, Malia is hardly a "socialized medicine" type. He was a leading expert on the Soviet Union, and this book reflects a deep understanding of that defunct empire's political and economic systems. The book's epilogue on the future of socialism is notable both fornits prescience and its charitability towards a political Left with which Malia has profound disagreement. "The Soviet Tragedy" is a great book, and - beyond its merits as a work of history - deserves to be more widely read as a reality check on what many are actually advocating.
5/5 stars
June 7, 2016
A very fixed anti-Soviet buyist. Well explained, but I doubt it's the whole truth. Especially interesting from Stalin's death onwards, because until that point I feel I learnt no new information. The description of the times posterior to that, as well as the moments leading up to the collapse of the URSS were far more informative and interesting.
December 2, 2025
Œuvre magistrale qui explique de manière très précise que la chute de l'URSS était déterminée et non contingente ! À lire
August 2, 2018
Read it over a year ago, on the heels of Pipes’ “Russian Revolution”. Considered to be Malia’s magnum opus it fully lives up to its reputation. I was taking copious notes at the time, and today they aptly demonstrate that unless you systematize the notes shortly after, they morph into a fine gallery of memory lapses. Still, some neural circuits were vaguely triggered and the illusion of time not wasted was kept afloat.
To that effect a few takeaways are worth penning down:
- The only practical Marxism is Leninism, and Lenin’s socialist objective can only be realized by Stalin’s methods.
- Soviet regime turned to totalitarianism because it was socialist, not despite it.
- Theme: historical development of Socialism in Russia as hard/soft oscillation
- Theme: absolutely monstrous crimes against individual in pursuit of “common good”
Per Malia communism’s legacy is a broad acceptance of the idea that market is required for econ growth, and that injection of broad state-supported safety net into capitalism is required for immunity. Written in 1994 (Malia dies in 2004), he also predicts that socialist “equality” tendencies will inevitably resurge after the next global economic crisis. More disturbingly he vividly describes a “future” transmigration of Marxist paradigm into identity politics with a heavy dose of oppressor-oppressed rhetoric.
--- Rest are notes to self on Stalin only ---
(Lenin, Khrushchev, Breznnev, [Andropov, Chernenko], Gorbachev/Yeltsin are covered in my other reviews)
’29-’35: collectivization, 5Y plans, industrialization
5Y plan – concrete manifestation of Condorcet/Comte/Saint-Simon ideas.
Stalin’s problem - proletariat required for Socialism didn’t exist in Russia. Solution – eliminate “kulak as a class” and create proletariat.
Stalin kicks Lenin’s embryonic kulak elimination program into high-gear (Gulag).
Holodomor (’32-’33) – 6-11M
Collectivization is a total disaster for agriculture, nightmare of lives lost, and leaves a permanent scar on the psyche of the country
Per Malia collectivization, horrific as it is, does lead to Stalin’s only historical achievement – Industrialization.
(In his very recent work Stephen Kotkin argues that collectivization retarded the rate of industrialization)
By ’34-’35 Soviet Union and US are the only two completely self-sufficient powers (?)
Industrialization found its purpose in military complex to fight perceived, and then real, enemies.
’35-’39 Purges, Great Terror, party consolidation.
Stalin’s rationale for the purges: erase memories of collectivization and consolidate control.
His position and party itself is shaky (“Rightists”, “Leftists”). Needs to clean up the ranks, erase the memories of mistakes/insubordination, and stabilize.
Additional outside pressures - international situation, rise of fascism, militarization.
Alliance of left w/ commies in opposition to fascism dangerous for Stalin.
Stalin abandons any hope of “world revolution”, but goes for full consolidation of power at home.
’36 show trials and public purges of Stalin’s rivals.
’37-39 private in-depth purges of loyalists Party men: managerial cadres, officer corps, NKVD, professionals.
This Stalin’s “Second Revolution” creates “social mobility” to fill the empty ranks with fresh men unburdened by historical memories of Party’s mistakes.
Seeds of Stalin-built Brezhev’s generation (Brezhnev, Gromyko, Andropov, Kchruchev, Chernenko)
Gulag. Essential for the system, required for 5Y year plan & industrialization
4 major waves: early 30s collectivization, mid-late 30s purges, ’39-40 western territory annexation, WW2 (‘traitors’, minorities, post-war ‘collaborators’)
Price:
- Overall demographic shortfall: 15M for ’26-’39, plus 55M ’39-50 (half deaths, half shortfall in birth)
- Actual deaths in camps: 20M deaths from political causes, even per official today’s numbers.
Many regimes relied on terror, Stalin’s had some unique features:
- Public show trials plus totally private confessions that were never made public!
- Lack of resistance within the Party in any of its branches.
’45-’53 post-war rebuilding, cold war, stability of the party.
Restoration what was lost during the war: politics, economy, culture. Slightly softer style.
Growth of party, professionals nomenklatura
New directions: missiles, nuclear, space.
Fundamental incompatibility with the West - Cold war and Iron Curtain
’49-‘53 emphasis on stability of the Party, signs of dementia, preparation for another purge, death.
To that effect a few takeaways are worth penning down:
- The only practical Marxism is Leninism, and Lenin’s socialist objective can only be realized by Stalin’s methods.
- Soviet regime turned to totalitarianism because it was socialist, not despite it.
- Theme: historical development of Socialism in Russia as hard/soft oscillation
- Theme: absolutely monstrous crimes against individual in pursuit of “common good”
Per Malia communism’s legacy is a broad acceptance of the idea that market is required for econ growth, and that injection of broad state-supported safety net into capitalism is required for immunity. Written in 1994 (Malia dies in 2004), he also predicts that socialist “equality” tendencies will inevitably resurge after the next global economic crisis. More disturbingly he vividly describes a “future” transmigration of Marxist paradigm into identity politics with a heavy dose of oppressor-oppressed rhetoric.
--- Rest are notes to self on Stalin only ---
(Lenin, Khrushchev, Breznnev, [Andropov, Chernenko], Gorbachev/Yeltsin are covered in my other reviews)
’29-’35: collectivization, 5Y plans, industrialization
5Y plan – concrete manifestation of Condorcet/Comte/Saint-Simon ideas.
Stalin’s problem - proletariat required for Socialism didn’t exist in Russia. Solution – eliminate “kulak as a class” and create proletariat.
Stalin kicks Lenin’s embryonic kulak elimination program into high-gear (Gulag).
Holodomor (’32-’33) – 6-11M
Collectivization is a total disaster for agriculture, nightmare of lives lost, and leaves a permanent scar on the psyche of the country
Per Malia collectivization, horrific as it is, does lead to Stalin’s only historical achievement – Industrialization.
(In his very recent work Stephen Kotkin argues that collectivization retarded the rate of industrialization)
By ’34-’35 Soviet Union and US are the only two completely self-sufficient powers (?)
Industrialization found its purpose in military complex to fight perceived, and then real, enemies.
’35-’39 Purges, Great Terror, party consolidation.
Stalin’s rationale for the purges: erase memories of collectivization and consolidate control.
His position and party itself is shaky (“Rightists”, “Leftists”). Needs to clean up the ranks, erase the memories of mistakes/insubordination, and stabilize.
Additional outside pressures - international situation, rise of fascism, militarization.
Alliance of left w/ commies in opposition to fascism dangerous for Stalin.
Stalin abandons any hope of “world revolution”, but goes for full consolidation of power at home.
’36 show trials and public purges of Stalin’s rivals.
’37-39 private in-depth purges of loyalists Party men: managerial cadres, officer corps, NKVD, professionals.
This Stalin’s “Second Revolution” creates “social mobility” to fill the empty ranks with fresh men unburdened by historical memories of Party’s mistakes.
Seeds of Stalin-built Brezhev’s generation (Brezhnev, Gromyko, Andropov, Kchruchev, Chernenko)
Gulag. Essential for the system, required for 5Y year plan & industrialization
4 major waves: early 30s collectivization, mid-late 30s purges, ’39-40 western territory annexation, WW2 (‘traitors’, minorities, post-war ‘collaborators’)
Price:
- Overall demographic shortfall: 15M for ’26-’39, plus 55M ’39-50 (half deaths, half shortfall in birth)
- Actual deaths in camps: 20M deaths from political causes, even per official today’s numbers.
Many regimes relied on terror, Stalin’s had some unique features:
- Public show trials plus totally private confessions that were never made public!
- Lack of resistance within the Party in any of its branches.
’45-’53 post-war rebuilding, cold war, stability of the party.
Restoration what was lost during the war: politics, economy, culture. Slightly softer style.
Growth of party, professionals nomenklatura
New directions: missiles, nuclear, space.
Fundamental incompatibility with the West - Cold war and Iron Curtain
’49-‘53 emphasis on stability of the Party, signs of dementia, preparation for another purge, death.
June 4, 2013
An insightful analysis of the logic of Soviet history. Malia not only examines both internal Russian and external international circumstances that led first to the creation of Soviet state and its further development and fall, he also traces how the Communist ideology determined the actions of Soviet leaders in said circumstances. His view is that the trajectory of Soviet development was defined primarily by this ideology.
February 26, 2014
Rather decent (albeit brief) summary of the life of the USSR. Only criticism I have is that it didn't adequately discuss the USSR losing money by propping up their European puppet governments (E Germany, Poland, etc).
April 23, 2018
This was a lot more than I wanted . Plus I did not always agree with the authors opinions but it was well organized. Refreshed my memory about the pre WWI period. I think I am well read up on Russia now to keep me for a few years . This was a long read.
September 30, 2019
Těžko říci, zda existuje ucelenější analýza a syntéza o socialismu. Osobně mohu říci snad jen to, že jsem nic ucelenějšího na toto téma nečetl. Kniha je rozhodně studijním a vědeckým materiálem, nikoliv nějakým účelově zabarveným politickým testamentem, závěr, ke kterému lze lacině sklouznout při četbě jakékoliv knihy z oboru společenských věd.
Ukázka zajímavého analytického postřehu je neúprosná logika periodického střídání období maximalistického socialismu, to, co je nazýváno nazýváno válečným komunismem či, a uvolněnější pragmatickou politikou, to co komunisté nazývali NEP (Nová Ekonomická Politika), perestrojka či obecněji reformní komunismus. Jestliže se v kapitalistické ekonomice střídají období recese a konjunktury, tak komunisté ve svém centrálně řízeném systému vlastně dospěli k témuž. Od Marxe se tak můžeme “zhoupnout” až k Hayekovi, který periodické střídání recese a konjunktury v tržní ekonomice teoreticky vysvětlil; a ačkoliv nemají brutální metody komunistického socialismu v tržní ekonomice obdobu, víra v technokratické řízení společnosti vede vlastně k témuž.
Zajímavý je popis Chruščovovy, Brežněvovy a Gorbačovovy éry, která není v tomto kontextu zdokumentována tak, jako “klasická” diktátorská éra Lenina a Stalina. Popis mechanismu kolektivizace za Stalina už dnes tolik nepřekvapí, ale třeba to, že se Chruščov snažil demokratizovat vzdělávací systém zrušením školného na univerzitách, zavedené právě Stalinem, či vyhlásit povinnou desetiletou docházku, nebo že až v roce 1956 byly zavedeny starobní důchody - a to pouze pro dělníky, pro rolníky až o 10 let později, může na “výdobytky socialismu”, mýtu ideálu rovnosti, a role socialismu jako systému, který popoháněl kapitalistické ekonomiky v zavádění sociálních jistot, vnášet poněkud jiné světlo. Kniha je takovýmito informacemi protkána, což zpestřuje jinak ne vždy snadné čtení.
Zajímavý je přesah závěrečné kapitoly do dnešních dní, jakési úvahy na téma “k čemu to celé bylo a kam nás to třeba jednou dovede”:
“Znamená to, že je maximalistické pokušení jednou pro vždy zažehnáno? Téměř s jistotou nikoliv. (...) Zrovna tak lze očekávat pokušení znovu vzkřísit ideu superstátu: pokud by se objevil silný zájem o údajné společné blaho.
Mocným kandidátem na roli katalyzátoru je rovněž ušlechtilé ekologické hnutí, které podle svých slov hájí společné, přímo planetární zájmy lidstva proti sobecké touze po zisku a růstu ze strany boháčů. Až příliš známým výrazivem odsuzuje “anarchii” trhu, práva jedince podřizuje snaze o společné blaho, a navíc má v záloze “ekoplánování”. Praktické otázky ekologie jsou zásadně prezentovány jako morální a ve svých extrémnějších podobách přechází ekologie v hnutí za záchranu lidského rodu. (...)
Znovu však musíme upozornit, že zmíněné problémy se zapřahují do služeb staré známé spasitelské metafyziky, která je daleko přesahuje. V nedokonalém světě má zkrátka utopie své pevné místo a bylo by pošetilé předpokládat, že ztroskotání největší utopie našeho věku povede k zániku utopické politiky.”
A to bylo napsáno v roce 1994, kdy vyšla tato kniha v originále.
Učit se, učit se, učit se.
V. I. Lenin
Ukázka zajímavého analytického postřehu je neúprosná logika periodického střídání období maximalistického socialismu, to, co je nazýváno nazýváno válečným komunismem či, a uvolněnější pragmatickou politikou, to co komunisté nazývali NEP (Nová Ekonomická Politika), perestrojka či obecněji reformní komunismus. Jestliže se v kapitalistické ekonomice střídají období recese a konjunktury, tak komunisté ve svém centrálně řízeném systému vlastně dospěli k témuž. Od Marxe se tak můžeme “zhoupnout” až k Hayekovi, který periodické střídání recese a konjunktury v tržní ekonomice teoreticky vysvětlil; a ačkoliv nemají brutální metody komunistického socialismu v tržní ekonomice obdobu, víra v technokratické řízení společnosti vede vlastně k témuž.
Zajímavý je popis Chruščovovy, Brežněvovy a Gorbačovovy éry, která není v tomto kontextu zdokumentována tak, jako “klasická” diktátorská éra Lenina a Stalina. Popis mechanismu kolektivizace za Stalina už dnes tolik nepřekvapí, ale třeba to, že se Chruščov snažil demokratizovat vzdělávací systém zrušením školného na univerzitách, zavedené právě Stalinem, či vyhlásit povinnou desetiletou docházku, nebo že až v roce 1956 byly zavedeny starobní důchody - a to pouze pro dělníky, pro rolníky až o 10 let později, může na “výdobytky socialismu”, mýtu ideálu rovnosti, a role socialismu jako systému, který popoháněl kapitalistické ekonomiky v zavádění sociálních jistot, vnášet poněkud jiné světlo. Kniha je takovýmito informacemi protkána, což zpestřuje jinak ne vždy snadné čtení.
Zajímavý je přesah závěrečné kapitoly do dnešních dní, jakési úvahy na téma “k čemu to celé bylo a kam nás to třeba jednou dovede”:
“Znamená to, že je maximalistické pokušení jednou pro vždy zažehnáno? Téměř s jistotou nikoliv. (...) Zrovna tak lze očekávat pokušení znovu vzkřísit ideu superstátu: pokud by se objevil silný zájem o údajné společné blaho.
Mocným kandidátem na roli katalyzátoru je rovněž ušlechtilé ekologické hnutí, které podle svých slov hájí společné, přímo planetární zájmy lidstva proti sobecké touze po zisku a růstu ze strany boháčů. Až příliš známým výrazivem odsuzuje “anarchii” trhu, práva jedince podřizuje snaze o společné blaho, a navíc má v záloze “ekoplánování”. Praktické otázky ekologie jsou zásadně prezentovány jako morální a ve svých extrémnějších podobách přechází ekologie v hnutí za záchranu lidského rodu. (...)
Znovu však musíme upozornit, že zmíněné problémy se zapřahují do služeb staré známé spasitelské metafyziky, která je daleko přesahuje. V nedokonalém světě má zkrátka utopie své pevné místo a bylo by pošetilé předpokládat, že ztroskotání největší utopie našeho věku povede k zániku utopické politiky.”
A to bylo napsáno v roce 1994, kdy vyšla tato kniha v originále.
Učit se, učit se, učit se.
V. I. Lenin
September 14, 2024
First up, Malia's work is very comprehensive, the title is actually misleading, it goes almost a century back from 1917, explaining all the culminating events up to the actual revolution. That said, this book is nowhere near "a primer" to learn about USSR. The author talks about events and personalities in such a manner that he already expects you to be knowledgeable about them. In short, this book is not about "what happened and when" and more about "how it happened and why". If you already know about USSR history, then this book will amplify your knowledge, if you don't, this is going to be tough read for you, (as it was for me.)
Another point about Malia is that he's openly hostile to the idea of socialism and he's not even trying to seem neutral or impartial. He's brutal about the shortcomings of the system (as he should be) but he certainly glosses over its few, albeit important achievements. Bear in mind, this book was written in 1994, just after utter collapse of the union, so it's basically a "told-you-so" to all the other sovietolog historians who were more sympathetic to the system when the union was still standing. His tone can be somewhat condescending, but his data is true and his insights are usually spot on. His predictions at the conclusion of the book about where the Left will go are quite eerily accurate, after seeing what unfolded in the 30 years since then.
I didn't like the way he called democratic socialist countries like Sweden as "welfare states" though. I guess that was easy to say in 90s where the West was riding high, after 30 years of rabid neo-liberal policies, I bet all those citizens of the free world would like themselves a bit of that sweet welfare state now.
Another point about Malia is that he's openly hostile to the idea of socialism and he's not even trying to seem neutral or impartial. He's brutal about the shortcomings of the system (as he should be) but he certainly glosses over its few, albeit important achievements. Bear in mind, this book was written in 1994, just after utter collapse of the union, so it's basically a "told-you-so" to all the other sovietolog historians who were more sympathetic to the system when the union was still standing. His tone can be somewhat condescending, but his data is true and his insights are usually spot on. His predictions at the conclusion of the book about where the Left will go are quite eerily accurate, after seeing what unfolded in the 30 years since then.
I didn't like the way he called democratic socialist countries like Sweden as "welfare states" though. I guess that was easy to say in 90s where the West was riding high, after 30 years of rabid neo-liberal policies, I bet all those citizens of the free world would like themselves a bit of that sweet welfare state now.
February 11, 2022
I'll start with the positive portion of this review: Malia is obviously very knowledgeable about Soviet history.
Okay, now that that's out of the way...
This book is in desperate need of a more recent edition. It was written in 1994 and published in 1996, a mere 3-5 years after the disbanding of the Soviet Union. The version of the book I read was printed in 2022, and as best as I could tell, it was the original work of Malia. This is problematic, especially since it seems to be assigned to students of Russian history. This book is *wildly* outdated, and some of the terminology that Malia uses is offensive. He seizes on every opportunity to refer to Russia and the Soviet empire as "backways," which is more telling of Malia's own prejudice than of the Soviet Union. This book is very much the product of of an immediate-post-USSR-collapse perspective, tinged with some "the Cold War wasn't that long ago" attitudes. I can only imagine what being a student of Malia's at University of California at Berkeley from 1958 to 1991 would have been like. I am only speculating, but I don't believe his teachings about the Soviet Union would have been unbiased.
This book, at least the edition/printing that I read, is not fit for any classroom in 2022.
Okay, now that that's out of the way...
This book is in desperate need of a more recent edition. It was written in 1994 and published in 1996, a mere 3-5 years after the disbanding of the Soviet Union. The version of the book I read was printed in 2022, and as best as I could tell, it was the original work of Malia. This is problematic, especially since it seems to be assigned to students of Russian history. This book is *wildly* outdated, and some of the terminology that Malia uses is offensive. He seizes on every opportunity to refer to Russia and the Soviet empire as "backways," which is more telling of Malia's own prejudice than of the Soviet Union. This book is very much the product of of an immediate-post-USSR-collapse perspective, tinged with some "the Cold War wasn't that long ago" attitudes. I can only imagine what being a student of Malia's at University of California at Berkeley from 1958 to 1991 would have been like. I am only speculating, but I don't believe his teachings about the Soviet Union would have been unbiased.
This book, at least the edition/printing that I read, is not fit for any classroom in 2022.
April 28, 2025
My personal favorite book on Soviet history I have ever read.
What sets this book apart is that Malia does a fantastic job examining the philosophy of Soviet Communism: the regime cannot be understood without understanding the theory and logic of Marxism-Leninism. As he aptly notes in an entire chapter dedicated to the history of Socialism, "Socialism" is not a real thing: terms like "Capitalism" and "feudalism" were coined by socialists to describe things that already existed, but "Socialism" was a future thing that didn't exist yet and thus was not grounded in any concrete reality. As a result, Socialism is in the eye of the beholder, and it is functionally a messianic religion rather than a political program, and the results become evident in the "Soviet Experiment."
This kind of analysis is a feature of Malia's book. While he does tell the regular history as well, it is Malia's analysis of how the Soviet Union worked (or, more often, didn't) that really sets this apart from other Soviet histories. Many can tell you how the Soviet Union collapsed and failed, but Malia provides a very compelling answer as to why.
What sets this book apart is that Malia does a fantastic job examining the philosophy of Soviet Communism: the regime cannot be understood without understanding the theory and logic of Marxism-Leninism. As he aptly notes in an entire chapter dedicated to the history of Socialism, "Socialism" is not a real thing: terms like "Capitalism" and "feudalism" were coined by socialists to describe things that already existed, but "Socialism" was a future thing that didn't exist yet and thus was not grounded in any concrete reality. As a result, Socialism is in the eye of the beholder, and it is functionally a messianic religion rather than a political program, and the results become evident in the "Soviet Experiment."
This kind of analysis is a feature of Malia's book. While he does tell the regular history as well, it is Malia's analysis of how the Soviet Union worked (or, more often, didn't) that really sets this apart from other Soviet histories. Many can tell you how the Soviet Union collapsed and failed, but Malia provides a very compelling answer as to why.
March 22, 2024
So I got this because I wanted a basic overview of the USSR. And lol, there are parts that are just like "Everyone knows what what happened! Let's analyze it!" and I'm like NOOOOOO, I DO NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED.
It also gets kinda close to the Hayek-ian idea that any government regulation leads to fascism but pulls back at the last second.
It also gets kinda close to the Hayek-ian idea that any government regulation leads to fascism but pulls back at the last second.
August 23, 2024
While I found the book's pace to be at times dense and slow paced, I did gain considerable insight into the history and workings of the former Soviet Union. It clarified some preconceptions and thoughts I've had for years and presented them in a way I hadn't considered before. This is a conceptual book, which is something I struggle with at times. Nonetheless, I am glad to have read it.
January 21, 2022
The greatest and most comprehensive history book regarding the growth and development of Marxist ideology and political power within Russia and later the soviet union. Anyone seeking to expand their knowledge of communism must read this book>
May 20, 2019
A well thought out critique of Soviet Socialism from the early beginnings and origins to the, some say inevitable, downfall.
March 22, 2008
An undertaking, to be sure, but if you can get through this mountain of the political life of the Soviet Union, you may find yourself with a new outlook, thanks to Malia's convincing attempt to undermine the idea that popular revolution lead to the establishment of Communism in Russia. He contends that the coup to establish democratic Socialism lost out to oligarchy and that Stalin's successors spent their careers scrambling to reform, yet also preserve the legacy of Stalin and his era of charisma.
May 19, 2007
Dry, but authoritative in chronicling the failure of state sponsored socialism in Russia.
January 22, 2015
Pisana trochę w formie przeintelektualizowanej rozprawki, minimalne błędy rzeczowe. Dosyć słabo opisane lata ,,panowania" Nikity Siergiejowicza i Leonida Ilicza, szkoda.
May 8, 2015
Worth the read for the last chapter and epilogue. Balanced summary.
April 2, 2017
Epopeja - tento výraz mi neustále prechádzal mysľou ako som ja prechádzal textom Martina Malia. Jej veľkosť i hĺbka sú krásnym symbolom ako odpovedať na otázku, čo je to sovietsky komunizmus. Ak si niekto myslí, že sa na to dá jednoducho odpovedať a pochopiť do pár vetami, či minútami, kolosálne sa mýli.
Autor prezentuje do detailov príchod, fungovanie a kolaps komunizmu v Rusku. Mňa zaujal názor, že to bol monumentálny sociologický pokus, ktorý chceli komunisti zrealizovať stoj, čo stoj. Bola to realizácia surreálneho systému - utópie. Autor analyzuje kľúčové i čiastkové kroky vodcov Sovietskeho Ruska; nesnaží sa vniesť do interpretácie emotívnosť, je chladnokrvne pedantný a kriticky. Celý koncept Sovietskeho Ruska - kedy si možno človek myslí, aké to bolo celé nelogické, absurdné, primitívne a smiešne, zobrazuje v brutálnej historickej logike - všetko tam malo svoje miesto, príčinu, význam, filozofiu a ideu! A toto je na knihe pre mňa najprínosnejšie.
Malia delí dejiny sovietskeho Ruska na: Leninovské obdobie vojenského komunizmu (komunizmus, jeho predpoklady sa museli nanovo vybudovať v spoločnosti, ktorá mala k nemu najďalej), príchod Stalina a skoky vpred (profilovanie systému, tvorba nového homo sovieticus, budovanie, čistky - ako katarzia systému (aby nové mohlo nastať)), Stalin a impérium - vrchol systému, Chruščov - začiatok poklesu vs medzinárodný rešpekt, Brežnev - neostalinizmus anabáza pokračujúceho spádu systému, Černenko-Antropov snaha brzdiť pád spojením sa s technokratmi, Gorbačov-Jelcin: Prestrojka ako reformovaný komunizmus a glasnosť ako demokratizácia, Pád - Malia podčiarkol hlavné príčiny: hospodárstvo, slabosť ideológie, vymretie stalinovej generácie (držala systém); a k tomu dodáva, čo je raritný fenomén v dejinách: strana padla sama do seba, sama bola príčinou kolapsu... (opäť! ja tu píšem o veľkých veciach pár slovami - tieto slová sú len nositeľmi ohromných dejov, ktoré treba chápať v ich komplexnosti, v mojom prípade slová len lákajú študovať a skúmať, nechcú vysvetľovať - na to treba oveľa väčší priestor)
Plusom, či mínusom knihy je možno jej zohľadnenie medzinárodného aspektu, ktorý tam je podľa môjho názoru len čiastkovo zahrnutý (tým nehovorím, že nie je!). Na druhej strane chápem autorovu vôľu analyzovať a koncentrovať sa skutočne na Ruské dejiny a sledovať ich čisto bez tiku vidieť za tým "iné sily" (čo by mnohí tam chceli vidieť, tak alebo tak). Ja som to koniec koncov ocenil, keďže autor pracoval s vonkajšími aspektmi, len keď to tam malo svoje miesto a príčinu.
Kniha mnou poriadne otriasala, prebudovala rôzne pohľady a chápania, opäť mi dejiny ukázali, že nie sú jednoduchou a účelovou vedou (pre niekoho!), ktorá hľadá ospravedlnenia, potvrdenia a iné masáže národných eg.
Prečítať je bol masívny zážitok, niečo ako dovolenka v minulosti, každú stranu som skúmal, užíval si, tešil sa ako malé dieťa.
Ohromné dielo!
Autor prezentuje do detailov príchod, fungovanie a kolaps komunizmu v Rusku. Mňa zaujal názor, že to bol monumentálny sociologický pokus, ktorý chceli komunisti zrealizovať stoj, čo stoj. Bola to realizácia surreálneho systému - utópie. Autor analyzuje kľúčové i čiastkové kroky vodcov Sovietskeho Ruska; nesnaží sa vniesť do interpretácie emotívnosť, je chladnokrvne pedantný a kriticky. Celý koncept Sovietskeho Ruska - kedy si možno človek myslí, aké to bolo celé nelogické, absurdné, primitívne a smiešne, zobrazuje v brutálnej historickej logike - všetko tam malo svoje miesto, príčinu, význam, filozofiu a ideu! A toto je na knihe pre mňa najprínosnejšie.
Malia delí dejiny sovietskeho Ruska na: Leninovské obdobie vojenského komunizmu (komunizmus, jeho predpoklady sa museli nanovo vybudovať v spoločnosti, ktorá mala k nemu najďalej), príchod Stalina a skoky vpred (profilovanie systému, tvorba nového homo sovieticus, budovanie, čistky - ako katarzia systému (aby nové mohlo nastať)), Stalin a impérium - vrchol systému, Chruščov - začiatok poklesu vs medzinárodný rešpekt, Brežnev - neostalinizmus anabáza pokračujúceho spádu systému, Černenko-Antropov snaha brzdiť pád spojením sa s technokratmi, Gorbačov-Jelcin: Prestrojka ako reformovaný komunizmus a glasnosť ako demokratizácia, Pád - Malia podčiarkol hlavné príčiny: hospodárstvo, slabosť ideológie, vymretie stalinovej generácie (držala systém); a k tomu dodáva, čo je raritný fenomén v dejinách: strana padla sama do seba, sama bola príčinou kolapsu... (opäť! ja tu píšem o veľkých veciach pár slovami - tieto slová sú len nositeľmi ohromných dejov, ktoré treba chápať v ich komplexnosti, v mojom prípade slová len lákajú študovať a skúmať, nechcú vysvetľovať - na to treba oveľa väčší priestor)
Plusom, či mínusom knihy je možno jej zohľadnenie medzinárodného aspektu, ktorý tam je podľa môjho názoru len čiastkovo zahrnutý (tým nehovorím, že nie je!). Na druhej strane chápem autorovu vôľu analyzovať a koncentrovať sa skutočne na Ruské dejiny a sledovať ich čisto bez tiku vidieť za tým "iné sily" (čo by mnohí tam chceli vidieť, tak alebo tak). Ja som to koniec koncov ocenil, keďže autor pracoval s vonkajšími aspektmi, len keď to tam malo svoje miesto a príčinu.
Kniha mnou poriadne otriasala, prebudovala rôzne pohľady a chápania, opäť mi dejiny ukázali, že nie sú jednoduchou a účelovou vedou (pre niekoho!), ktorá hľadá ospravedlnenia, potvrdenia a iné masáže národných eg.
Prečítať je bol masívny zážitok, niečo ako dovolenka v minulosti, každú stranu som skúmal, užíval si, tešil sa ako malé dieťa.
Ohromné dielo!
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