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How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War
Book by Bonekemper III, Edward H.
248 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1998
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July 10, 2014
Bonekemper has written a book that many Civil War history buffs will find outrageously controversial. His thesis, that Gen. Lee lost a winnable war through incompetent leadership, is broken down into the following claims:
1) By taking the war into the North, Lee followed an ill-conceived strategy that had no chance of ultimate success. He could not maintain himself in supply at that distance from his base. He would eventually have to retreat, making it seem like he had been defeated, whether he had been or not. Further, he was making poor use of the two strategic advantages that the South had: a) they did not have to conquer the North in order to win the war, they only had to outlast them; and b) with their internal lines of communication, they could shift men and resources to the places where they most needed them.
2) Lee's strategical viewpoint was influenced by his focus on the war in the East, and particularly the war in Virginia. He demanded and received the best of everything the South had to offer, and used it to fight for Virginia rather than for the South as a whole. He ignored important developments in the West, and denied that theater resources that might have prevented its collapse. This myopia eventually allowed his own forces to be cut off and surrounded.
3) Lee's strategy was made even worse by his preference for being on the offensive tactically. He failed to grasp that technological changes in weaponry had made massed charges on well-prepared defensive fortifications tantamount to suicide. He sent his soldiers into numerous assaults on Northern positions, that, even when they succeeded in driving back the enemy, were using up his manpower resources at an unsustainable rate.
4) Compounding the above errors, Lee was not good at managing his army. He failed to provide himself with an adequate staff that could oversee the carrying out of his orders. His orders themselves were often vague, discretionary, and delivered verbally so that they were subject to misinterpretation and distortion.
Anyone who is not wed to the image of Lee as a brilliant military commander will probably find himself being swayed by Bonekemper's arguments. Although born and raised in the South, my opinions on the Civil War make me an honorary Yankee. Therefore, I was entirely open to reading criticism of Lee, in spite of his iconic status. I found that at some point, though, I began to lose confidence in Bonekemper's objectivity. No possible objections to his viewpoint are presented or answered. He sets up the facts he wants the reader to focus on, and ignores everything else. Nowhere does he mention that the idea of an invasion of the North was promoted by Johnston before Lee ever took command, or that it was also floated by Jackson at the end of his Valley campaign. Nowhere does he mention that the weight of public opinion in the South was completely opposed to a defensive war, and would probably have forced the resignation of any general who attempted to fight in that manner. (Lee could hardly have argued in favor of a defensive war using the prestige that he only enjoyed due to his willingness to go on the offensive.) Nor does Bonekemper mention the material advantages in resources and advanced weaponry enjoyed by the North that would have made a defensive war unlikely to succeed. Although weaponry made great technological advances during the war, the South did not possess the advanced weaponry as soon or in the same quantity as the North. For example, the South's retreat in the face of McClellan's advance during the Peninsula campaign was necessitated by their lack of long range guns that could respond to an artillery bombardment by Northern batteries.
That said, I think there is some truth in Bonekemper's book, even if he does overstate his case. The South did not lose solely because of the decisions of one man, but Lee does bear some of the responsibility for the loss (not that I would have wanted the outcome to be different). Had Bonekemper tempered his arguments and taken into account some of the possible objections, this would be a much stronger book. Even so, I think it is worth reading for those who already have some knowledge of the issues. It is not a good book to start with in learning about the Civil War, though, and it is definitely not the last word on its subject.
1) By taking the war into the North, Lee followed an ill-conceived strategy that had no chance of ultimate success. He could not maintain himself in supply at that distance from his base. He would eventually have to retreat, making it seem like he had been defeated, whether he had been or not. Further, he was making poor use of the two strategic advantages that the South had: a) they did not have to conquer the North in order to win the war, they only had to outlast them; and b) with their internal lines of communication, they could shift men and resources to the places where they most needed them.
2) Lee's strategical viewpoint was influenced by his focus on the war in the East, and particularly the war in Virginia. He demanded and received the best of everything the South had to offer, and used it to fight for Virginia rather than for the South as a whole. He ignored important developments in the West, and denied that theater resources that might have prevented its collapse. This myopia eventually allowed his own forces to be cut off and surrounded.
3) Lee's strategy was made even worse by his preference for being on the offensive tactically. He failed to grasp that technological changes in weaponry had made massed charges on well-prepared defensive fortifications tantamount to suicide. He sent his soldiers into numerous assaults on Northern positions, that, even when they succeeded in driving back the enemy, were using up his manpower resources at an unsustainable rate.
4) Compounding the above errors, Lee was not good at managing his army. He failed to provide himself with an adequate staff that could oversee the carrying out of his orders. His orders themselves were often vague, discretionary, and delivered verbally so that they were subject to misinterpretation and distortion.
Anyone who is not wed to the image of Lee as a brilliant military commander will probably find himself being swayed by Bonekemper's arguments. Although born and raised in the South, my opinions on the Civil War make me an honorary Yankee. Therefore, I was entirely open to reading criticism of Lee, in spite of his iconic status. I found that at some point, though, I began to lose confidence in Bonekemper's objectivity. No possible objections to his viewpoint are presented or answered. He sets up the facts he wants the reader to focus on, and ignores everything else. Nowhere does he mention that the idea of an invasion of the North was promoted by Johnston before Lee ever took command, or that it was also floated by Jackson at the end of his Valley campaign. Nowhere does he mention that the weight of public opinion in the South was completely opposed to a defensive war, and would probably have forced the resignation of any general who attempted to fight in that manner. (Lee could hardly have argued in favor of a defensive war using the prestige that he only enjoyed due to his willingness to go on the offensive.) Nor does Bonekemper mention the material advantages in resources and advanced weaponry enjoyed by the North that would have made a defensive war unlikely to succeed. Although weaponry made great technological advances during the war, the South did not possess the advanced weaponry as soon or in the same quantity as the North. For example, the South's retreat in the face of McClellan's advance during the Peninsula campaign was necessitated by their lack of long range guns that could respond to an artillery bombardment by Northern batteries.
That said, I think there is some truth in Bonekemper's book, even if he does overstate his case. The South did not lose solely because of the decisions of one man, but Lee does bear some of the responsibility for the loss (not that I would have wanted the outcome to be different). Had Bonekemper tempered his arguments and taken into account some of the possible objections, this would be a much stronger book. Even so, I think it is worth reading for those who already have some knowledge of the issues. It is not a good book to start with in learning about the Civil War, though, and it is definitely not the last word on its subject.
April 7, 2021
Published in 1998 by Sergeant Kirkland's Museum and Historical Society, Inc.
Bonekemper lived the dream of most students of the Civil War - once he retired as an attorney, he created a second career as a Civil War author, college lecturer and a frequent guest on C-SPAN to talk about leadership in the Civil War. He also gave 10 lectures at the Smithsonian!
Bonekemper is an unabashed fan of the Union side in the war, especially General Grant. As Bonekemper loves to point out, only 4 armies were captured during the Civil War and Grant captured 3 of them Grant's subordinate Sherman captured the fourth after Lee had already surrendered his army to Grant. The only general on the Confederate side that can compare to Grant is, of Course, Robert E. Lee. Lee is generally celebrated as the best general in the war and Bonekemper dedicates this book to proving that wrong.
Bonekemper ignores the easiest place to go after the iconic image Lee - his betrayal of his oath as an officer of the U.S. Army to go fight for the Confederacy. Literally, no human being is responsible for more deaths of American soldiers than Robert E. Lee. Instead, he goes after Lee's record as a general on the battlefield - the part that is supposed to be unassailable.
Bonekemper doesn't argue that Lee's tactical skills on the battlefield weren't formidable and sometimes even brilliant.
Instead, Bonekemper argues that Lee was a failure when it came to national military strategy for the Confederacy. Lee spent most of the war as CSA President Jefferson Davis's main military advisor - oftentimes the only one Davis took seriously. At the end of the war he commanded every soldier in the entire Confederacy.
Yet, he never left the Army of Northern Virginia to see what else was happening. He never demonstrated that he understood the value of any army other than his own except that they might send him extra troops (which they did on a regular basis. The exception was when he loaned out a chunk of his army with Longstreet for a few months to Braxton Bragg in Tennessee and Georgia. Within a few weeks Lee was lobbying to have them returned)
All Lee had to do was not lose. This sounds obvious, but it is much easier than the North's goal. The North had to actually conquer the South - defeat all of its armies, stop it from operating as a government and take away its ability to keep on fighting. Lee's model should have been George Washington in the Revolutionary War. Washington hung around long enough that the British home front got sick of the war and agreed to terms.
But, instead of fighting for time and playing defense, Lee acted like he was trying to conquer the North. Twice he invaded the North (Antietam and Gettysburg) and twice he was defeated and came back to Virginia with nothing to show for it except the worst losses he suffered in the war. After Gettysburg he never was able to gather enough troops to go on the offense in any meaningful way again.
The Battle of Chanecellorsville is symptomatic of the problem with Lee. Lee was outnumbered by more than 2 to 1 and still won the battle with a combination of speed, daring and confidence. It is an impressive victory by any standard. But it came at a massive cost. The Union had 17,000 casualties out of 130,000 (13%) that were replaced within weeks. Lee had 12,000 casualties out of 60,000 (20%) that were only replaced by pulling troops away from other fronts and causing them to lose.
If it costs you a greater percentage of your force to win battles and you have the smaller army you cannot win. Almost every battle Lee fought in could be described in that way.
Bonekemper argues that Lee ground his army to dust, refused to consider the needs of other theaters and kept fighting for months after it had become obvious that he had not hope of winning the war, costing the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides.
The research is impeccable and the facts become overwhelming as the pages go rolling along. It almost becomes tedious - another battle, another costly win (usually) that bled away irreplaceable men for a win that did little to further the war effort. Meanwhile, Generals Grant, Sherman and Thomas chewed up every army in the West, conquered or cut off every state except for Virginia and North Carolina until Lee finally surrendered.
Ironically, if Lee had stayed with the Union, the rumor was that he would have been offered the command of Union forces. He would have been the general that that army desperately needed - not afraid to attack, not afraid to strike the enemy to win the war and he would have had the extra men and resources that his fighting style required. It might have been a short war.
5 stars out of 5 because it proves a long-needed point.
See all of the books I have reviewed by this author: https://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/sear...
Bonekemper lived the dream of most students of the Civil War - once he retired as an attorney, he created a second career as a Civil War author, college lecturer and a frequent guest on C-SPAN to talk about leadership in the Civil War. He also gave 10 lectures at the Smithsonian!
Bonekemper is an unabashed fan of the Union side in the war, especially General Grant. As Bonekemper loves to point out, only 4 armies were captured during the Civil War and Grant captured 3 of them Grant's subordinate Sherman captured the fourth after Lee had already surrendered his army to Grant. The only general on the Confederate side that can compare to Grant is, of Course, Robert E. Lee. Lee is generally celebrated as the best general in the war and Bonekemper dedicates this book to proving that wrong.
Bonekemper ignores the easiest place to go after the iconic image Lee - his betrayal of his oath as an officer of the U.S. Army to go fight for the Confederacy. Literally, no human being is responsible for more deaths of American soldiers than Robert E. Lee. Instead, he goes after Lee's record as a general on the battlefield - the part that is supposed to be unassailable.
Bonekemper doesn't argue that Lee's tactical skills on the battlefield weren't formidable and sometimes even brilliant.
Instead, Bonekemper argues that Lee was a failure when it came to national military strategy for the Confederacy. Lee spent most of the war as CSA President Jefferson Davis's main military advisor - oftentimes the only one Davis took seriously. At the end of the war he commanded every soldier in the entire Confederacy.
Yet, he never left the Army of Northern Virginia to see what else was happening. He never demonstrated that he understood the value of any army other than his own except that they might send him extra troops (which they did on a regular basis. The exception was when he loaned out a chunk of his army with Longstreet for a few months to Braxton Bragg in Tennessee and Georgia. Within a few weeks Lee was lobbying to have them returned)
All Lee had to do was not lose. This sounds obvious, but it is much easier than the North's goal. The North had to actually conquer the South - defeat all of its armies, stop it from operating as a government and take away its ability to keep on fighting. Lee's model should have been George Washington in the Revolutionary War. Washington hung around long enough that the British home front got sick of the war and agreed to terms.
But, instead of fighting for time and playing defense, Lee acted like he was trying to conquer the North. Twice he invaded the North (Antietam and Gettysburg) and twice he was defeated and came back to Virginia with nothing to show for it except the worst losses he suffered in the war. After Gettysburg he never was able to gather enough troops to go on the offense in any meaningful way again.
The Battle of Chanecellorsville is symptomatic of the problem with Lee. Lee was outnumbered by more than 2 to 1 and still won the battle with a combination of speed, daring and confidence. It is an impressive victory by any standard. But it came at a massive cost. The Union had 17,000 casualties out of 130,000 (13%) that were replaced within weeks. Lee had 12,000 casualties out of 60,000 (20%) that were only replaced by pulling troops away from other fronts and causing them to lose.
If it costs you a greater percentage of your force to win battles and you have the smaller army you cannot win. Almost every battle Lee fought in could be described in that way.
Bonekemper argues that Lee ground his army to dust, refused to consider the needs of other theaters and kept fighting for months after it had become obvious that he had not hope of winning the war, costing the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides.
The research is impeccable and the facts become overwhelming as the pages go rolling along. It almost becomes tedious - another battle, another costly win (usually) that bled away irreplaceable men for a win that did little to further the war effort. Meanwhile, Generals Grant, Sherman and Thomas chewed up every army in the West, conquered or cut off every state except for Virginia and North Carolina until Lee finally surrendered.
Ironically, if Lee had stayed with the Union, the rumor was that he would have been offered the command of Union forces. He would have been the general that that army desperately needed - not afraid to attack, not afraid to strike the enemy to win the war and he would have had the extra men and resources that his fighting style required. It might have been a short war.
5 stars out of 5 because it proves a long-needed point.
See all of the books I have reviewed by this author: https://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/sear...
June 6, 2021
First of all, I should clarify the 2 star review is not due to the content of the book itself (which I have my issues with) but the utterly abyssal formatting for the Kindle version of the book. The book is almost impossible to read and full of errors including the annotations being spread throughout the main text. It's just unprofessional and frankly should be redone for whoever wants to read this book electronically.
As for the actual content of the book, Bonekemper does a decent job of summarizing the faults of those who attempt to lionize Robert E. Lee's strategy for carrying out the Civil War. Specifically, that Robert E. Lee attempted a strategy of constant aggressiveness, attacks, and direct confrontation with the Union Army that wracked up massively casualties that the South was completely unable to sustain.
Correctly, Bonekemper points out that the South didn't have to win the war but only not lose and the direct confrontation of the Union only benefited the side with the heavier industrial as well as population base. Bonekemper also points out, correctly, that the South only hardened the North's resolve by inflicting as many casualties as they did. People who otherwise didn't care about the Confederacy's secession wanted them punished for the massive amounts of blood they did spill by the end of things.
Honestly, I'm not entirely sure I agree with his conclusions. Lee's strategies were bloody and direct when they should have defensive but the advantages the North possessed meant that they would have only grown stronger the longer the war pressed on. In simple terms, my view is that victory for the South was always impossible and to quote Wargames, "The only winning move was not to play."
Still, that isn't a defense of Lee who engaged in a brutal and bloody strategy that was all for naught no matter what. The attempts to paint him as a tactical genius have always been motivated by attempts to whitewash the Confederacy's flaws and bear no real resemblance to reality. So I give credit to the author for exposing that "maximizing casualties for no real long term benefit" is certainly the makings of a bad strategist.
I just believe the CSA was always doomed and good for that.
As for the actual content of the book, Bonekemper does a decent job of summarizing the faults of those who attempt to lionize Robert E. Lee's strategy for carrying out the Civil War. Specifically, that Robert E. Lee attempted a strategy of constant aggressiveness, attacks, and direct confrontation with the Union Army that wracked up massively casualties that the South was completely unable to sustain.
Correctly, Bonekemper points out that the South didn't have to win the war but only not lose and the direct confrontation of the Union only benefited the side with the heavier industrial as well as population base. Bonekemper also points out, correctly, that the South only hardened the North's resolve by inflicting as many casualties as they did. People who otherwise didn't care about the Confederacy's secession wanted them punished for the massive amounts of blood they did spill by the end of things.
Honestly, I'm not entirely sure I agree with his conclusions. Lee's strategies were bloody and direct when they should have defensive but the advantages the North possessed meant that they would have only grown stronger the longer the war pressed on. In simple terms, my view is that victory for the South was always impossible and to quote Wargames, "The only winning move was not to play."
Still, that isn't a defense of Lee who engaged in a brutal and bloody strategy that was all for naught no matter what. The attempts to paint him as a tactical genius have always been motivated by attempts to whitewash the Confederacy's flaws and bear no real resemblance to reality. So I give credit to the author for exposing that "maximizing casualties for no real long term benefit" is certainly the makings of a bad strategist.
I just believe the CSA was always doomed and good for that.
January 30, 2024
Confirmed my belief that Lee is overrated. Author agrees with historian McPherson’s statement in Battle Cry of Freedom “The South could win the war by not losing; the North could only win by winning.” Further believes the South’s primary opportunity for success was to outlast Lincoln.
Bonekemper observations:
(a) Lee often conceived complicated battle plans, but then employed a “hands off” approach once the battle had started. (“As soon as I order my troops forward into battle, I leave my army in the hands of God.”) However, many of his staff needed more oversight (and prodding to stay on course!) and only Jackson seemed to thrive under this removed leadership.
(b) However, (like Petruzzi also says in his Jeb Stuart defense,) despite his complicated plans, Lee often gives vague, discretionary orders, often verbally, that could be misconstrued or misremembered. (Lists many battle orders that required timed attacks by multiple brigades after long marches, or where some attention on the field by Lee would have turned the tide, but biggest example is Gettysburg <>i>“Even though Stonewall Jackson was dead, Lee persisted in issuing ambiguous orders that only Jackson could have turned into victories.” )
(c) His commitment to offence (needlessly) killed a lot of men. “In Lee’s first seven months of command, his army had inflicted 50,000 casualties on the enemy, but it had done so at a cost if could not afford: about 45,000 casualties of it’s own. Given the Union’s 4:1 manpower advantage, this was a pace that could not be sustained” Lee may have won battles, but his cost in human lives was not sustainable for the south. The author further gives an example of pre-Lee and Post-Lee hit ratios. Ex, at Mechanicsville the hit ratio was 91:16, compared to a fairly balanced hit ratios of 49:59 and 137:105 in pre-Lee battles at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks.
(d) He was a Virginian committed to defending Virginia, thus he lost sight of the bigger picture, allowing the West (and those resources) to fall – pulling troops needed in the West to defend his beloved Virginia. (Example, the triumph of Sherman in Atlanta giving Lincoln a boost right before the election.) “Immediately after signing his resignation, Lee penned a letter… in which he telling said, ‘Save in defense of my native State, I have no desire ever again to draw my sword.’ ” Interestingly, Lee only had enough troops to invade PA (Gettysburg) because he refused to send any part of the army to rescue Vicksburg from Grant.
** Not a reason Lee was the wrong military commander for the South, but that Lee’s glowing reputation is mainly the result of incompetent leaders (like Jubal Early / William N. Pendleton) who promoted Lee’s generalship and discounted Longstreet to make themselves look better.
** Also continued to fight, cause needless deaths (especially for the south, who had so many few men to start with: “Lee’s final wartime mistake had been his failure to halt the fighting when it no longer served any sane purpose. This failure accounts for the final tens of thousands of meaningless deaths. After the fall of Atlanta, or certainly after Lincolns reelection, Lee should have realized that … Valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss must have attended the continuance of the contest.”
The conclusion, chapter 12, is outstanding and sums up all the points. FWIW I completely disagree with Author’s take on Stuart at Gettysburg and truly blame Lee for bad directions and not using the cavalry he actually had on hand.
BUT, there are some caveats: First author Bonekemper wants the reader to believe that, despite the North’s overwhelming population and resources, the South could have won the war with the correct defensive general by, similar to the American Revolutionary war, hunkering down and outlasting the ‘northern aggression’. [Ex. He states the North had 4,070,000 men fighting age, while the south had only 1,140,000. While mentioning, he kind of glosses over the large weapons advantage the north had.] Second, we have to believe that the South – with their near obsession with honor – would allow a defensive general to keep his job. I’m not sure either of those were true?
I learned a lot (some of it was preaching to the choir.) However Bonekemper undercuts his own case a bit by how clearly doesn’t like Lee. The first chapter starts out with facts about Lee’s unhappy marriage, which had nothing to do with the case for his military skills! Thus from the start he doesn’t come across as an objective observer. He ignores all the resources that gave the North such a large advantage, he ignores how even with all Lee’s problems he outsmarted several US generals, and ignores that the Confederate government was pushing him to invade the north.
Another great quote:
“Having lost over half of his 10,500 men in the July 3 charge, General Pickett submitted a battle report highly critical of that assault – and probably of Lee. Lee declined to accept the report and ordered it rewritten.
Pickett refused to do so.”
Bonekemper observations:
(a) Lee often conceived complicated battle plans, but then employed a “hands off” approach once the battle had started. (“As soon as I order my troops forward into battle, I leave my army in the hands of God.”) However, many of his staff needed more oversight (and prodding to stay on course!) and only Jackson seemed to thrive under this removed leadership.
(b) However, (like Petruzzi also says in his Jeb Stuart defense,) despite his complicated plans, Lee often gives vague, discretionary orders, often verbally, that could be misconstrued or misremembered. (Lists many battle orders that required timed attacks by multiple brigades after long marches, or where some attention on the field by Lee would have turned the tide, but biggest example is Gettysburg <>i>“Even though Stonewall Jackson was dead, Lee persisted in issuing ambiguous orders that only Jackson could have turned into victories.” )
(c) His commitment to offence (needlessly) killed a lot of men. “In Lee’s first seven months of command, his army had inflicted 50,000 casualties on the enemy, but it had done so at a cost if could not afford: about 45,000 casualties of it’s own. Given the Union’s 4:1 manpower advantage, this was a pace that could not be sustained” Lee may have won battles, but his cost in human lives was not sustainable for the south. The author further gives an example of pre-Lee and Post-Lee hit ratios. Ex, at Mechanicsville the hit ratio was 91:16, compared to a fairly balanced hit ratios of 49:59 and 137:105 in pre-Lee battles at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks.
(d) He was a Virginian committed to defending Virginia, thus he lost sight of the bigger picture, allowing the West (and those resources) to fall – pulling troops needed in the West to defend his beloved Virginia. (Example, the triumph of Sherman in Atlanta giving Lincoln a boost right before the election.) “Immediately after signing his resignation, Lee penned a letter… in which he telling said, ‘Save in defense of my native State, I have no desire ever again to draw my sword.’ ” Interestingly, Lee only had enough troops to invade PA (Gettysburg) because he refused to send any part of the army to rescue Vicksburg from Grant.
** Not a reason Lee was the wrong military commander for the South, but that Lee’s glowing reputation is mainly the result of incompetent leaders (like Jubal Early / William N. Pendleton) who promoted Lee’s generalship and discounted Longstreet to make themselves look better.
** Also continued to fight, cause needless deaths (especially for the south, who had so many few men to start with: “Lee’s final wartime mistake had been his failure to halt the fighting when it no longer served any sane purpose. This failure accounts for the final tens of thousands of meaningless deaths. After the fall of Atlanta, or certainly after Lincolns reelection, Lee should have realized that … Valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss must have attended the continuance of the contest.”
The conclusion, chapter 12, is outstanding and sums up all the points. FWIW I completely disagree with Author’s take on Stuart at Gettysburg and truly blame Lee for bad directions and not using the cavalry he actually had on hand.
BUT, there are some caveats: First author Bonekemper wants the reader to believe that, despite the North’s overwhelming population and resources, the South could have won the war with the correct defensive general by, similar to the American Revolutionary war, hunkering down and outlasting the ‘northern aggression’. [Ex. He states the North had 4,070,000 men fighting age, while the south had only 1,140,000. While mentioning, he kind of glosses over the large weapons advantage the north had.] Second, we have to believe that the South – with their near obsession with honor – would allow a defensive general to keep his job. I’m not sure either of those were true?
I learned a lot (some of it was preaching to the choir.) However Bonekemper undercuts his own case a bit by how clearly doesn’t like Lee. The first chapter starts out with facts about Lee’s unhappy marriage, which had nothing to do with the case for his military skills! Thus from the start he doesn’t come across as an objective observer. He ignores all the resources that gave the North such a large advantage, he ignores how even with all Lee’s problems he outsmarted several US generals, and ignores that the Confederate government was pushing him to invade the north.
Another great quote:
“Having lost over half of his 10,500 men in the July 3 charge, General Pickett submitted a battle report highly critical of that assault – and probably of Lee. Lee declined to accept the report and ordered it rewritten.
Pickett refused to do so.”
October 6, 2017
Recently Robert E. Lee has been in the news a lot lately. At least his statues have been. My first knowledge of Robert E. Lee came from his name affixed upon an orange Dodge Charger on a popular TV show when I was a kid. At some point I connected the name to the historical figure which brought me to another question: Why is a General Lee so popular despite losing a war that defended slavery? That and other stuff birthed a lifetime of curiosity about the Civil War and American History in general.
Since the war ended there had been an ongoing effort to prop up and glorify Robert E. Lee and the southern cause. Lee has enjoyed at times almost God like status among many in the former Confederate states. He represented the Southern states as a master General, a southern gentleman and a benevolent leader of what became known as the "lost cause" movement.
What the author looks at here is to dispel the myth that it was a possibility despite being outnumbered, poorly equipped and malnourished Lee was in partly to blame for the southern loss. The book claims that had Lee fought less aggressively and perhaps conserved his manpower and material he may have outlasted Lincoln and North's desire to continue the war. Prime example of this would be General George Washington who despite also being outnumbered, poorly equipped and starving most of the time had outlasted England's will to fight in the American Revolution.
If you believe Robert E. Lee is a God you're probably going to hate this book although given the title I doubt you'd pick it the first place. For other's it may be just a different way to look at Lee besides what may have been presented in popular culture and legend.
Since the war ended there had been an ongoing effort to prop up and glorify Robert E. Lee and the southern cause. Lee has enjoyed at times almost God like status among many in the former Confederate states. He represented the Southern states as a master General, a southern gentleman and a benevolent leader of what became known as the "lost cause" movement.
What the author looks at here is to dispel the myth that it was a possibility despite being outnumbered, poorly equipped and malnourished Lee was in partly to blame for the southern loss. The book claims that had Lee fought less aggressively and perhaps conserved his manpower and material he may have outlasted Lincoln and North's desire to continue the war. Prime example of this would be General George Washington who despite also being outnumbered, poorly equipped and starving most of the time had outlasted England's will to fight in the American Revolution.
If you believe Robert E. Lee is a God you're probably going to hate this book although given the title I doubt you'd pick it the first place. For other's it may be just a different way to look at Lee besides what may have been presented in popular culture and legend.
January 13, 2021
While Bonekemper argues many legitimate reasons why Robert E Lee’s aggressive strategy in the face a much larger northern war machine and manpower ultimately led to the destruction of his army and eventual defeat of the south in the Civil War, it gets a be a bit much at times.
Bonekemper blames Lee for all the failing of southern armies (not just the Army of Northern Virginia) and negative outcomes in which Lee couldn’t really be held to account for. While anything positive that happened was certainly due to someone else. (ie Stonewall Jackson)
I think the best attribute of the book is that it provides are fairly good timeline of events and battles throughout the CW. There is a lot of (necessary) simplification of major battles into only a few pages, but for CW novices, it’s a decent overview.
I found the use of hit ratios to be interesting and a new way to analyze battle outcomes.
Overall, it’s well written and a quick read and brings up a lot of good points about R. E. Lee’s generalship and strategy. But it certainly lays it on pretty thick at times.
Bonekemper blames Lee for all the failing of southern armies (not just the Army of Northern Virginia) and negative outcomes in which Lee couldn’t really be held to account for. While anything positive that happened was certainly due to someone else. (ie Stonewall Jackson)
I think the best attribute of the book is that it provides are fairly good timeline of events and battles throughout the CW. There is a lot of (necessary) simplification of major battles into only a few pages, but for CW novices, it’s a decent overview.
I found the use of hit ratios to be interesting and a new way to analyze battle outcomes.
Overall, it’s well written and a quick read and brings up a lot of good points about R. E. Lee’s generalship and strategy. But it certainly lays it on pretty thick at times.
April 16, 2024
Robert E. Lee is not the greatest general in US history. Through statistics, military analysis, and overall strategy. Edward Bonekemper dismantles the Lost Cause lies that lay behind the deification of Lee. Lee was not only a bad general, but he needlessly butchered his army from the Seven Days Battles to Appomattox at an astonishing rate, as well as being too entirely focused on Virginia while Confederate armies in the West were losing battle after battle because troops were sent east instead of to the western theatre, the western theatre is where the confederacy lost the Civil War, and Lee with his generalship is also the reason the confederates lost because of Lee's underestimation of modern weaponry against Napoleonic tactics is what caused the confederates to lose many soldiers they could not replace. I strongly suggest this to anyone looking for the truth behind the Lost Causes and it's deification of Lee.
April 15, 2018
An ok book but it gives ammunition to those of us who believe that Robert E. Lee is highly overrated. The Confederacy lost due to some of his strategic military decisions. As for his aggressiveness I think this could have been done differently than Lee did. Southerners demanded aggressiveness but frontal assaults, while proving one's bravery, can not be justified in terms of casualties. Lee never seemed to learn the lessons of the early battles or other battles. Bonekemper keeps the focus right on Lee's actions as the military commander and it raises tremendous questions as to why he is held by so many Americans in high regard.
January 24, 2020
I've read several books that question the cult of Robert E. Lee, and each and every one repeatedly hearkens back to this one. I now see why.
Bonekemper pulls absolutely no punches on Lee. His analysis of Lee's personal, tactical, and political failures is ruthless, detailed, and always well sourced. There are a few points I didn't agree with, but overall I came away both impressed and educated. I have an inkling that as future generations smother and destroy the myth of the Glorious Lost Cause, more and more of us will look back to appreciate early works like this that placed factual analysis over sentimentalism. At least, that's the hope.
Bonekemper pulls absolutely no punches on Lee. His analysis of Lee's personal, tactical, and political failures is ruthless, detailed, and always well sourced. There are a few points I didn't agree with, but overall I came away both impressed and educated. I have an inkling that as future generations smother and destroy the myth of the Glorious Lost Cause, more and more of us will look back to appreciate early works like this that placed factual analysis over sentimentalism. At least, that's the hope.
June 6, 2017
Leans perhaps a bit too far the other way in its effort to puncture the myth of Lee's military genius, but this book does support its arguments with plenty of analysis. The stats are pretty clear; Lee lost more men than the "butcher" U. S. Grant, due largely to his penchant for over-aggressive frontal assaults. In addition, his myopic focus on his home state starved the western armies of the support they needed to stop Sherman.
July 6, 2018
The author makes an excellent case that Robert E. Lee does not deserve the reputation as one of the best generals in American history. This book is a damning indictment of Lee's performance as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. In addition the author provides an explanation of how the Cult of Lee arose in the years after the war.
The current debates on how to interpret the Civil War makes this book a must read.
The current debates on how to interpret the Civil War makes this book a must read.
May 2, 2022
After years of reading and viewing so much about the Civil War I began to silently theorize that the revered Lee may not have been the great general we give credit to today. For so long I simply kept my opinion to myself thinking that I must be misreading history or not properly connecting events.
Bonekemper rescued me! His analysis is not of the myth or the legend, it is of the history and the actions and the facts which he supports with solid evidence to prove his case. Even if you are a worshipper in the cult of Robert E. Lee, you should peel back the curtain and see him with objective eyes. Legends are often based on fantasy. Bonekemper's thesis is hard to deny.
Bonekemper rescued me! His analysis is not of the myth or the legend, it is of the history and the actions and the facts which he supports with solid evidence to prove his case. Even if you are a worshipper in the cult of Robert E. Lee, you should peel back the curtain and see him with objective eyes. Legends are often based on fantasy. Bonekemper's thesis is hard to deny.
December 3, 2024
It turns out to be very entertaining to read about how somebody was tragically, historically wrong — but Bonekemper provides more than a dadcore history read here. This is a thorough deconstruction of the “Lost Cause” myth and tries to scrub away at that pernicious stain on historiography. Make no mistake: the only thing heroic about Lee is that he fatally doomed the Confederacy.
October 28, 2013
Robert E. Lee has been lionized since the end of the 19th century as a military genius; a man who would have achieved victory for the Confederacy if only his armies had not been so outnumbered.
Southerners, needing something to ennoble their defeat in the cause of retaining slavery, chose Lee as the shining example of the South they wished to be seen as having fought for: brave, noble and honest.
In pursuit of that goal a concerted effort by former southern generals, heritage groups, and historians effectively insinuated that view of the war, and of Lee's supposed military genius, into mainstream consciousness. That view has largely prevailed in most biographies of Lee and in histories of the Civil War ever since.
This book provides a long-needed corrective.
The author argues persuasively that far from being the military genius that most believe him to be, Lee was largely a failure, both strategically and tactically. In fact he goes on to argue that Lee's actions are largely to blame for southern defeat.
Both arguments are persuasive, with some caveats.
Strategically the author argues, Lee was fighting the wrong war. Overly aggressive, constantly looking to take the offensive even in victorious battles, he unnecessarily squandered his army, wracking up casualty rates the south could not sustain. His forays into the North at Antietam and Gettysburg were disasters from the outset, guaranteeing at least the perception of defeat as he was forced to retreat back into Virginia, and in the case of Gettysburg an actual and devastating defeat.
He should have been playing defense as most of his subordinate generals advocated, preserving men and materiel until divisions in the north finally broke its will to carry on the war.
The author, slightly less persuasively, argues Lee was also deficient tactically; utilizing a hands off approach to battles that often left his army wondering what to do, and allowing subordinates to decide for themselves what path to take without consideration of the overall strategy. Lee often issued vague orders, and except in his collaboration with Stonewall Jackson, was unimaginative planning battles; preferring either doomed frontal assaults, or devising plans so complicated they had no chance of success.
I think here the author sometimes takes the least flattering view of Lee's action and asserts it as the truth when other equally plausible interpretations might put Lee in a better light.
The overall effect of his argument here is still quite persuasive though.
Lastly I think the author stretches a bit blaming Lee for the failures of others, particularly John Bell Hood.
Overall a devastating critique of Lee as a military leader that is at least as persuasive - more so in my opinion - as those histories that lionize his achievements.
Southerners, needing something to ennoble their defeat in the cause of retaining slavery, chose Lee as the shining example of the South they wished to be seen as having fought for: brave, noble and honest.
In pursuit of that goal a concerted effort by former southern generals, heritage groups, and historians effectively insinuated that view of the war, and of Lee's supposed military genius, into mainstream consciousness. That view has largely prevailed in most biographies of Lee and in histories of the Civil War ever since.
This book provides a long-needed corrective.
The author argues persuasively that far from being the military genius that most believe him to be, Lee was largely a failure, both strategically and tactically. In fact he goes on to argue that Lee's actions are largely to blame for southern defeat.
Both arguments are persuasive, with some caveats.
Strategically the author argues, Lee was fighting the wrong war. Overly aggressive, constantly looking to take the offensive even in victorious battles, he unnecessarily squandered his army, wracking up casualty rates the south could not sustain. His forays into the North at Antietam and Gettysburg were disasters from the outset, guaranteeing at least the perception of defeat as he was forced to retreat back into Virginia, and in the case of Gettysburg an actual and devastating defeat.
He should have been playing defense as most of his subordinate generals advocated, preserving men and materiel until divisions in the north finally broke its will to carry on the war.
The author, slightly less persuasively, argues Lee was also deficient tactically; utilizing a hands off approach to battles that often left his army wondering what to do, and allowing subordinates to decide for themselves what path to take without consideration of the overall strategy. Lee often issued vague orders, and except in his collaboration with Stonewall Jackson, was unimaginative planning battles; preferring either doomed frontal assaults, or devising plans so complicated they had no chance of success.
I think here the author sometimes takes the least flattering view of Lee's action and asserts it as the truth when other equally plausible interpretations might put Lee in a better light.
The overall effect of his argument here is still quite persuasive though.
Lastly I think the author stretches a bit blaming Lee for the failures of others, particularly John Bell Hood.
Overall a devastating critique of Lee as a military leader that is at least as persuasive - more so in my opinion - as those histories that lionize his achievements.
March 9, 2016
Let me begin by stating that there is nothing new to be found in this book; let me likewise say that I enjoyed it and found it worth reading. This seeming paradox is easily explained. Yes, Lee's shortcomings as a general have been well-explored elsewhere (Jones, Nolan, Hart, Fuller, etc.), as have the origins of the "Lee cult" that over-inflated his reputation as a commanding officer in connection with the rise of the "Lost Cause" romanticization of the Civil War. Bonekemper offers no new analysis of these issues, relying almost exclusively on secondary sources. However, as a synthesis of these sources, his book - the main text of which weighs in at a svelte two hundred pages, give or take a few - makes for a quick but thorough examination of the case that Lee was, in fact, quite bad at doing the job for which he is most famous. The argument is efficiently presented, well-grounded in the scholarly literature, and ultimately persuasive. Though many other authors (as noted above) have given the brief against Lee's undeserved reputation for brilliance, Bonekemper, by referencing all these arguments, gives a picture not just of one historian's quibble but rather of a scholarly consensus and the facts upon which it is based.
Bonekemper's style is exactly the sort you would expect from a career attorney: workmanlike but uninspiring. History can be written engagingly, even beautifully - the best writers of history are prose stylists to match any author of fiction. This is not excellent prose. It is not off-puttingly bad, but it is generally dry and sometimes dense, and Bonekemper's verbal tics will quickly become obvious (and tiresome) to any reader who is paying attention. The two hundred pages of this volume read slower than they ought. On the other hand, it is the brutal lack of style in Bonekemper's writing that allows him to present such a powerful and well-sourced argument in such a relatively brief space. This is a not a book for casual readers - it is not a "fun read," even if your particular bag is Civil War military history. It is, however, an excellent source for scholars of the subject, amateur or professional. Not an indispensable one, but a very useful one still yet.
Bonekemper's style is exactly the sort you would expect from a career attorney: workmanlike but uninspiring. History can be written engagingly, even beautifully - the best writers of history are prose stylists to match any author of fiction. This is not excellent prose. It is not off-puttingly bad, but it is generally dry and sometimes dense, and Bonekemper's verbal tics will quickly become obvious (and tiresome) to any reader who is paying attention. The two hundred pages of this volume read slower than they ought. On the other hand, it is the brutal lack of style in Bonekemper's writing that allows him to present such a powerful and well-sourced argument in such a relatively brief space. This is a not a book for casual readers - it is not a "fun read," even if your particular bag is Civil War military history. It is, however, an excellent source for scholars of the subject, amateur or professional. Not an indispensable one, but a very useful one still yet.
November 2, 2020
Unpopular with Southerners, this book nonetheless is a necessary examination of the notion that Lee simply was not as good a general as he has often been made out to be.
July 5, 2010
Fun 'what if' style of history.
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