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The Moral Problem
This widely anticipated volume offers a systematic introduction to and striking analysis of the central issues animating current debate in moral philosophy.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
242 pages, Paperback
First published December 5, 1994
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
October 27, 2007
i love reading ethical theory. i especially love meta-ethics. even when i disagree with it, i generally find it engaging, and this book is no exception. it is smartly written, and i was incredibly engaged. and by "engaged" by i mean "annoyed to the point of snarling and twitching". i don't mind a sincere and honest kantian, but i do resent a kantian in humean clothing-- a clever writer who rejects the essence of the humean moral theory under the guise of fixing a problem with it.
smiths argument is so careful and clean that i feel a little crumby giving the book only one star, but, then, i didn't like it. i can never tell if michael smith's writings in ethics are a sincere reflection of his intuitions or prudent intellectual exercises. if they are truly the former, then his intuitions are dead antithetical to my own.
smiths argument is so careful and clean that i feel a little crumby giving the book only one star, but, then, i didn't like it. i can never tell if michael smith's writings in ethics are a sincere reflection of his intuitions or prudent intellectual exercises. if they are truly the former, then his intuitions are dead antithetical to my own.
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September 4, 2019تا نیمهاش پیش رفتم ولی واقعاً به چرتگویی افتاده بود دیگه. قروقاطی و تکراری حرف میزد. ولش کردم.
September 7, 2020
As an amateur reader of philosophy, I found this book challenging to say the least. Judging by the glowing reviews on the jacket, I suspect the problem is me. I do however strongly disagree with Gilbert Harman of Princeton University who writes on the jacket that Smith's The Moral Problem is an exciting introduction to meta-ethics. I can't believe I am the only lay reader puzzled by sentences like 'These platitudes about colour play a certain crucial role in our coming to master colour vocabulary, for we come to master colour vocabulary by coming to treat remarks like these as platitudinous.' Much of the book is Smith criticising the views of other philosophers, which is difficult for a reader like me who does not have deep background knowledge of those views.
What I could puzzle out from the first and last two chapters, is that Smith is trying to solve a problem which he feels is at the heart of meta-ethics. This problem starts with the Humean observation that knowledge and desire are separate domains of thought. To know something is to represent the way the world is. To desire something is to represent the way the world might be. Knowing the way the world is never alone reason for us to take an action. To Hume, we can critique someones knowledge as true or false, but reasons for action are not themselves open to critique. De gustibus non est disputandum. On this view, knowledge and desire must always be separable, because if any sort of knowledge constituted a reason for action, then the reason for action would be open to critique.
The problem is that when we morally judge that an action is right, the judgement seems to provide a reason for action. For example, imagine someone said that giving to beggars was the right thing to do, but that we have no reason to give to beggars. This sounds like a contradiction, but if the Humean view above is correct, then it is absolutely possible to believe that an action is right, and also believe that we have no reason to do the action. This does not fit with either the way we usually talk about morality, or with our moral intuitions.
This is the moral problem that gives the book its title. Smith sees that many meta-ethical debates are fundamentally different ways of solving this problem. For example, non-cognitivists reject that there is any knowledge involved with moral judgement at all (Chp 2). Moral judgements are simply desires. Other philosophers have bitten the bullet and denied that knowing an action is right does not give someone a reason to take the action (Chp 3). Others have rejected the Humean theory of motivation outlined above (Chp 4).
Smith argues that all of these views are mistaken, and proposes and defends his own solution (Chp 5 and Chp 6). He differentiates normative reasons from a motivational reasons. Motivational reasons emphasize explanations of behavior, while normative reasons emphasize justification of behavior. A normative reason is what a person acting completely rationally would desire. The difference is clarified by an example -- a drug addict might recognize that taking drugs is worse for her, and she might regret that she has the compulsion to get the next fix. We can understand that she has a motivational reason for getting a fix -- she is addicted and has a strong psychological compulsion. But she does not have a normative reason for taking drugs.
This definition begs the question of what it means to be completely rational. Smith offers a sketch of what it means to be rational. A rational agent must have no false beliefs and all the relevant true beliefs, and the agent must deliberate correctly. There is a lot to unpack in the phrase 'deliberate correctly', though, and Smith doesn't give a full account of what it means.
Hume was correct, Smith argues, that motivational reasons cannot be rationally criticized. Normative reasons for action, however, can be rationally debated. What would a person acting fully rationally desire? The moral problem does not apply to this sort of reason, and this is the sort of reason involved with moral argument. When we ask whether it is right to lie to save a life, we are asking about what a person acting totally rationally has reason to do. Knowing that a fully rational person would desire something implies that it is a reason to act. This is the key step in Smith's argument. If he is right, then we can avoid the moral problem, because the Humean separation between knowledge and desire does not apply. We have moved from 'is' to 'ought'. This is Smith's solution to the moral problem.
Suppose that we accept the argument. Does this mean that moral facts exist? Not necessarily. It could be that what a fully rational person would desire might ultimately depend on cultural context. The fact that there is so much disagreement about what is right and wrong seems to suggest that rational debate does not lead to convergence of moral views. On the other hand, there is much less moral disagreement between cultures today than there was in the past. This may have something to do with the decline of religion and the rise of a reasoned basis for morality. Even authoritarian states preach superficial democracy today, and there are few places in the world where people believe aristocrats have natural rights to political power. Few societies practice slavery. Human rights are widely accepted as legitimate. Smith writes that we cannot know for sure, but we have some reason to be optimistic that we are continuing to make moral progress.
The Moral Problem taught me that there was a meta-ethical problem which I did not know was a problem until I read the book. The solution Smith develops is plausible, and his argument against the other solutions is thorough. Along the way I got a deeper understanding of the Hume's is-ought gap and how it might be bridged. As an amateur, however, the main meta-ethical question I am interested in is whether moral facts exist, whether they can be discovered, and whether common modern moral views are closer to moral truths than old-fashioned views. Smith could not ultimately answer this question, although to be fair, that was not his aim.
What I could puzzle out from the first and last two chapters, is that Smith is trying to solve a problem which he feels is at the heart of meta-ethics. This problem starts with the Humean observation that knowledge and desire are separate domains of thought. To know something is to represent the way the world is. To desire something is to represent the way the world might be. Knowing the way the world is never alone reason for us to take an action. To Hume, we can critique someones knowledge as true or false, but reasons for action are not themselves open to critique. De gustibus non est disputandum. On this view, knowledge and desire must always be separable, because if any sort of knowledge constituted a reason for action, then the reason for action would be open to critique.
The problem is that when we morally judge that an action is right, the judgement seems to provide a reason for action. For example, imagine someone said that giving to beggars was the right thing to do, but that we have no reason to give to beggars. This sounds like a contradiction, but if the Humean view above is correct, then it is absolutely possible to believe that an action is right, and also believe that we have no reason to do the action. This does not fit with either the way we usually talk about morality, or with our moral intuitions.
This is the moral problem that gives the book its title. Smith sees that many meta-ethical debates are fundamentally different ways of solving this problem. For example, non-cognitivists reject that there is any knowledge involved with moral judgement at all (Chp 2). Moral judgements are simply desires. Other philosophers have bitten the bullet and denied that knowing an action is right does not give someone a reason to take the action (Chp 3). Others have rejected the Humean theory of motivation outlined above (Chp 4).
Smith argues that all of these views are mistaken, and proposes and defends his own solution (Chp 5 and Chp 6). He differentiates normative reasons from a motivational reasons. Motivational reasons emphasize explanations of behavior, while normative reasons emphasize justification of behavior. A normative reason is what a person acting completely rationally would desire. The difference is clarified by an example -- a drug addict might recognize that taking drugs is worse for her, and she might regret that she has the compulsion to get the next fix. We can understand that she has a motivational reason for getting a fix -- she is addicted and has a strong psychological compulsion. But she does not have a normative reason for taking drugs.
This definition begs the question of what it means to be completely rational. Smith offers a sketch of what it means to be rational. A rational agent must have no false beliefs and all the relevant true beliefs, and the agent must deliberate correctly. There is a lot to unpack in the phrase 'deliberate correctly', though, and Smith doesn't give a full account of what it means.
Hume was correct, Smith argues, that motivational reasons cannot be rationally criticized. Normative reasons for action, however, can be rationally debated. What would a person acting fully rationally desire? The moral problem does not apply to this sort of reason, and this is the sort of reason involved with moral argument. When we ask whether it is right to lie to save a life, we are asking about what a person acting totally rationally has reason to do. Knowing that a fully rational person would desire something implies that it is a reason to act. This is the key step in Smith's argument. If he is right, then we can avoid the moral problem, because the Humean separation between knowledge and desire does not apply. We have moved from 'is' to 'ought'. This is Smith's solution to the moral problem.
Suppose that we accept the argument. Does this mean that moral facts exist? Not necessarily. It could be that what a fully rational person would desire might ultimately depend on cultural context. The fact that there is so much disagreement about what is right and wrong seems to suggest that rational debate does not lead to convergence of moral views. On the other hand, there is much less moral disagreement between cultures today than there was in the past. This may have something to do with the decline of religion and the rise of a reasoned basis for morality. Even authoritarian states preach superficial democracy today, and there are few places in the world where people believe aristocrats have natural rights to political power. Few societies practice slavery. Human rights are widely accepted as legitimate. Smith writes that we cannot know for sure, but we have some reason to be optimistic that we are continuing to make moral progress.
The Moral Problem taught me that there was a meta-ethical problem which I did not know was a problem until I read the book. The solution Smith develops is plausible, and his argument against the other solutions is thorough. Along the way I got a deeper understanding of the Hume's is-ought gap and how it might be bridged. As an amateur, however, the main meta-ethical question I am interested in is whether moral facts exist, whether they can be discovered, and whether common modern moral views are closer to moral truths than old-fashioned views. Smith could not ultimately answer this question, although to be fair, that was not his aim.
December 15, 2021
So glad I've finished this maddening book. Some parts of it are really impressive, but so much of it embodies the kind of wishful thinking that moral philosophy is rife with.
I don't think that immoral people are irrational, and I don't think values are beliefs, and I don't think that we gain new values through disputation, I think we just modify our surface level values through appeal to deeper ones, and I don't think if we were fully rational we would all agree, and I don't think someone that doesn't know certain things is irrational. If you agree with me on one of these points, Smith's theory falls apart completely.
I don't think that immoral people are irrational, and I don't think values are beliefs, and I don't think that we gain new values through disputation, I think we just modify our surface level values through appeal to deeper ones, and I don't think if we were fully rational we would all agree, and I don't think someone that doesn't know certain things is irrational. If you agree with me on one of these points, Smith's theory falls apart completely.
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October 8, 2022A useful, systematic introduction to meta-ethics. The organising theme of the book is to resolve the moral problem, the incompatibility between the following three theses:
1. Moral judgements express subject’s belief about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for one to do
2. If someone judges that it is right for them to do x, they are, under appropriate conditions, motivated to do x
3. One is motivated to do what one desires to do and when one has the appropriate means-end belief.
Beliefs and desires are distinct. Beliefs are truth apt whereas desires are not. Smith proposes theses about rationality and morality (that morality is rational) that connects beliefs and desires about moral facts in the form of reasons for action, facts about what it is right for one to do. This is his solution.
I found it to be a useful starting point for meta-ethics. One can clearly discern where they disagree with Smith and over what, and in doing so, survey the spectrum of meta-ethical positions.
1. Moral judgements express subject’s belief about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for one to do
2. If someone judges that it is right for them to do x, they are, under appropriate conditions, motivated to do x
3. One is motivated to do what one desires to do and when one has the appropriate means-end belief.
Beliefs and desires are distinct. Beliefs are truth apt whereas desires are not. Smith proposes theses about rationality and morality (that morality is rational) that connects beliefs and desires about moral facts in the form of reasons for action, facts about what it is right for one to do. This is his solution.
I found it to be a useful starting point for meta-ethics. One can clearly discern where they disagree with Smith and over what, and in doing so, survey the spectrum of meta-ethical positions.
April 10, 2025
A minor argument from the book: motivation by rightness de re is "commonsense intuition" while motivation by rightness de dicto is not. ***semi-shocked****
I, too, don't mind a genuine Kantian, but I do take exception to one masquerading as a Humean—a skillful writer who discards the foundational principles of Humean moral theory while claiming merely to refine it.
I, too, don't mind a genuine Kantian, but I do take exception to one masquerading as a Humean—a skillful writer who discards the foundational principles of Humean moral theory while claiming merely to refine it.
December 8, 2013
This is a very clear and carefully argued book on meta ethics. If you're studying and writing meta ethics papers you'll find the first one or two chapters a very helpful survey of the literature and its contours. Smith somewhat has his cake and eats it with his own proposal regarding externalism and internalism though. He seems to want to appease both Humean and Kantian intuitions by offering up a position that's somewhere in between. As other reviewers have said, Smith argues for his case so carefully, and qualifies it so thoroughly, that it's not easy to refute, though it's all also not terribly satisfying (in this reviewer's opinion).
January 20, 2016
Good and clear structure of the argument - admirable. Very useful and handy in order to create a neat picture (or 'roadmap') to the main arguments and positions in meta-ethics. As such I would recommend. The formulation of 'the moral problem' is also remarkably neat. However I don't like the proposed solution which I find rather pedestrian.
March 16, 2007
Try finding a flaw in Smith's arguments, I dare you. That said, the final view, while eminently defensible, is rather boring.
March 14, 2009
Just maybe the final word in metaethics.
April 14, 2010
I just got around to finishing this, I'm embarrassed to admit. It's amazingly well-argued. I'm in awe.
August 24, 2012
Smith broader naturalism idea.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews