Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
A bit too much for an even semi-casual read unless you are already an expert in the field. So only of any real value to specialists. Having said that even a browse through gives a bit of a feel for this fascinating subject. Games, strategies, and algorithms for finding strategies - including learning algorithms. A pervading theme is the tractability ( or suspected intractability) of the various problems. The last two lectures provide some fascinating results on new complexity classes related to the classic P and NP classes. So all in all pretty fascinating. I’m going to have to do some preparatory study and come back to it in order to go through it thoroughly. It looks like it’s well worth it.
A nice, readable tour through some of the more important parts of algorithmic game theory. The core ideas are around basic mechanism design, characterizing efficiency/complexity of equilibria, and learning/equilibrium dynamics; all are presented in Tim's easygoing and pleasant style.
This makes a good companion to the larger and more reference-appropriate Algorithmic Game Theory (2007) edited by Nisan et al.
Excelent introductory book on the subject, especially together with the respective lectures on youtube on which it is based (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list...).
Is is structured in three parts: * lecture 2-10 introduces mechanism design as the science of rule making, mainly focusing on auctions. * lecture 11-15 outlines the "price of anarchy" approximation guarantees for equilibria of games. * lecture 16-20 presents positive and negative results for the computation of an interesting hierarchy of equilibria (pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated eq.).
I tried to get an introduction to this subject with the AGT-book of Nisan et al. (2007) a couple of years ago, but it was somehow too difficult for my "self-study" beside my regular work in the software business. Now, I worked all the way through the lectures together with the book, and it worked! It is really surprising to me how well Tim's spoken and written medias complement each other. Listening to Tim in the videos provided a very good intuition about "what is really important" and "what is the central idea" and the book helped with the details, the systematics, and sometimes with Tim's handwriting.