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Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative
Alasdair MacIntyre explores some central philosophical, political and moral claims of modernity and argues that a proper understanding of human goods requires a rejection of these claims. In a wide-ranging discussion, he considers how normative and evaluative judgments are to be understood, how desire and practical reasoning are to be characterized, what it is to have adequate self-knowledge, and what part narrative plays in our understanding of human lives. He asks, further, what it would be to understand the modern condition from a neo-Aristotelian or Thomistic perspective, and argues that Thomistic Aristotelianism, informed by Marx's insights, provides us with resources for constructing a contemporary politics and ethics which both enable and require us to act against modernity from within modernity. This rich and important book builds on and advances MacIntyre's thinking in ethics and moral philosophy, and will be of great interest to readers in both fields.
332 pages, Hardcover
First published November 17, 2016
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About the author
Alasdair MacIntyre
81 books524 followersAlasdair Chalmers MacIntyre was a British-American philosopher who contributed to moral and political philosophy as well as history of philosophy and theology. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) is one of the most important works of Anglophone moral and political philosophy in the 20th century. He was senior research fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) at London Metropolitan University, emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and permanent senior distinguished research fellow at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture. During his lengthy academic career, he also taught at Brandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt University, and Boston University.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
February 13, 2020
8.5/10
Not as good as 'After Virtue' or 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry', 'Ethics' can be thought of as a contemporary continuation of 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?' from an Aristotelian perspective, and counted partially towards a fulfillment of the project MacIntyre set for himself in the closing chapter of 'Three Rival Versions'.
This work is very focused on practical Aristotelian and neo-Thomistic ethics, and lacks discussion of how a tradition is formed, how ethical beliefs are justified, how one tradition of ethical philosophy can claim one's allegiance in the face of unsolved problems, and other metaethical concerns that were the focus of 'After Virtue'. If viewed as a fourth book in the Trilogy, they go something like this:
1. After Virtue: epistemology of ethics, metaphysics
2. Whose Justice?: history of practical reason
3. Three Rival Versions: history of modern ethics and metaethical enquiry
4. Ethics in Conflict: contemporary applied ethics/practical reason.
Not as good as 'After Virtue' or 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry', 'Ethics' can be thought of as a contemporary continuation of 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?' from an Aristotelian perspective, and counted partially towards a fulfillment of the project MacIntyre set for himself in the closing chapter of 'Three Rival Versions'.
This work is very focused on practical Aristotelian and neo-Thomistic ethics, and lacks discussion of how a tradition is formed, how ethical beliefs are justified, how one tradition of ethical philosophy can claim one's allegiance in the face of unsolved problems, and other metaethical concerns that were the focus of 'After Virtue'. If viewed as a fourth book in the Trilogy, they go something like this:
1. After Virtue: epistemology of ethics, metaphysics
2. Whose Justice?: history of practical reason
3. Three Rival Versions: history of modern ethics and metaethical enquiry
4. Ethics in Conflict: contemporary applied ethics/practical reason.
August 12, 2020
Excellent and tremendously necessary
MacIntyre caps his long career with a magnificent work written, not for the academic, but the everyday person. Yes, it is theoretical but such theory as is easily accessible by anyone. It could and should be taught in high schools. Yes, it is markedly Catholic, but if the argument is true, it could not otherwise be, and it indicts everything that is not markedly of some tradition. The biographies at the end are intriguing and imperatives for us living in the 21st century. Read it; share it. Let me not hear the f After Virtue again, for the book trumps that in many ways.
MacIntyre caps his long career with a magnificent work written, not for the academic, but the everyday person. Yes, it is theoretical but such theory as is easily accessible by anyone. It could and should be taught in high schools. Yes, it is markedly Catholic, but if the argument is true, it could not otherwise be, and it indicts everything that is not markedly of some tradition. The biographies at the end are intriguing and imperatives for us living in the 21st century. Read it; share it. Let me not hear the f After Virtue again, for the book trumps that in many ways.
August 14, 2018
This book is proof of what my first philosophy professor said: “Philosophy is the search for the good life.” It’s not often treated that way, for various reasons; but MacIntyre’s whole purpose in this book is to try to answer the question(s), How do I pursue the good life for me; what might deter me from living that life; and how do I understand any of this in our complex moral and political landscape? One of the best works of moral philosophy I’ve read.
February 28, 2018
Another excellent book by Alasdair MacIntyre. Much of the content of Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity will be familiar to those that have read After Virtue or other of his previous works, though I think that this is his most accessible work to date. While I have in the past recommended After Virtue to friends interested in reading moral philosophy or MacIntyre specifically, I may start recommending this instead as I think it is written and organized in such a way as to be less intimidating to those not initiated in academic philosophy.
I'll give you the 30-second version of the book. In MacIntyre's words: "“A single, if complex, theoretical conclusion emerged from the first four chapters of this essay. It is that agents do well only if and when they act to satisfy only those desires whose objects they have good reason to desire, that only agents who are sound and effective practical reasoners so act, that such agents must be disposed to act as the virtues require, and that such agents will be directed in their actions toward the achievement of their final end.” The final ch. is a set of four mini-biographies intended to support that thesis.
I'll also give you my favorite passage from the book, one of the most rousing that MacIntyre has written and one that clearly indicates a practical import of his philosophy as he conceives it. He is speaking of virtuous moral and political discourse when he concludes:
"I laid stress earlier on the importance of, whenever possible, treating disagreements, practical or theoretical, as opportunities for learning from one's critics. It is their positions against which one argues, not them, and the adoption of an adversarial attitude toward those with whom one is in philosophical debate is a hindrance to enquiry. But there are types of disagreements, types of conflict, that has a peculiar importance in our own cultural, social, and economic order where what the virtues require is a very different attitude, where the opponents have defined themselves as enemies of any rationally defensible conception of civil and political order. During the last thirty years, poverty has been recurrently generated and regenerated within advanced capitalism, and welcome technologically based advances in productivity have been accompanied by stagnation or near stagnation in wages. Not only, as I noticed earlier, have the costs of those measures which enable capitalism to recover from its crises been widely inflicted on children, but at the same time those who dominate the economic order have, as I also noticed, appropriated an increasing proportion of the wealth produced, especially in the United States. In the United Kingdom, as I write, the average compensation for the Chief Executive Officer of a corporation is 84 times the average compensation of a worker, while in Sweden the number is 89, in France 109, in Germany 147, and in the United States 275. These numbers are an index of how far, without any sense of their own absurdity, those with the most power and money have been able to immunize themselves from risk, while by their decisions and actions exposing the weakest and most vulnerable to risk and making them pay the costs, when those decisions and actions go astray. They have identified themselves as having an interest that can only be served and a status that can only be preserved if the common goods of family, workplace, and school are not served. Disagreement with them and with those theorists dedicated to the preservation of the economic and political order in which they flourish is therefore of a very different kind from most other theoretical and philosophical disagreements. It is and should be pursued as a prologue to prolonged social conflict.” (219-20)
I'll give you the 30-second version of the book. In MacIntyre's words: "“A single, if complex, theoretical conclusion emerged from the first four chapters of this essay. It is that agents do well only if and when they act to satisfy only those desires whose objects they have good reason to desire, that only agents who are sound and effective practical reasoners so act, that such agents must be disposed to act as the virtues require, and that such agents will be directed in their actions toward the achievement of their final end.” The final ch. is a set of four mini-biographies intended to support that thesis.
I'll also give you my favorite passage from the book, one of the most rousing that MacIntyre has written and one that clearly indicates a practical import of his philosophy as he conceives it. He is speaking of virtuous moral and political discourse when he concludes:
"I laid stress earlier on the importance of, whenever possible, treating disagreements, practical or theoretical, as opportunities for learning from one's critics. It is their positions against which one argues, not them, and the adoption of an adversarial attitude toward those with whom one is in philosophical debate is a hindrance to enquiry. But there are types of disagreements, types of conflict, that has a peculiar importance in our own cultural, social, and economic order where what the virtues require is a very different attitude, where the opponents have defined themselves as enemies of any rationally defensible conception of civil and political order. During the last thirty years, poverty has been recurrently generated and regenerated within advanced capitalism, and welcome technologically based advances in productivity have been accompanied by stagnation or near stagnation in wages. Not only, as I noticed earlier, have the costs of those measures which enable capitalism to recover from its crises been widely inflicted on children, but at the same time those who dominate the economic order have, as I also noticed, appropriated an increasing proportion of the wealth produced, especially in the United States. In the United Kingdom, as I write, the average compensation for the Chief Executive Officer of a corporation is 84 times the average compensation of a worker, while in Sweden the number is 89, in France 109, in Germany 147, and in the United States 275. These numbers are an index of how far, without any sense of their own absurdity, those with the most power and money have been able to immunize themselves from risk, while by their decisions and actions exposing the weakest and most vulnerable to risk and making them pay the costs, when those decisions and actions go astray. They have identified themselves as having an interest that can only be served and a status that can only be preserved if the common goods of family, workplace, and school are not served. Disagreement with them and with those theorists dedicated to the preservation of the economic and political order in which they flourish is therefore of a very different kind from most other theoretical and philosophical disagreements. It is and should be pursued as a prologue to prolonged social conflict.” (219-20)
October 5, 2025
MacIntyre is my favorite recent philosopher, and I think it is his best work. Second time through and it only got better. I wish he’d spent a little more time directly addressing rival normative theories—he takes paragraph-long shots at utilitarianism several times, and even less often address Kantians or rights-theorists. He treats the two as warring aspects of a single institution called “Morality,” then joins DH Lawrence, Oscar Wilde, Bernard Williams, and others in attacking that institution. I guess given the strength of that central argument there’s no need to address the rest in detail, but it may have helped both philosophers and “plain nonphilosophical persons” see why those modes of practical reasoning are ultimately inadequate.
That is virtually the only thing I wish were different in the book. I hope to write an adapted paraphrase for freshman ethics and business ethics students someday, since it’s pretty dense argument.
But it’s probably MacIntyre’s tightest and most persuasive argument. So very good. This should be part of the canon of MacIntyre, ethics, philosophy, even nonfiction.
That is virtually the only thing I wish were different in the book. I hope to write an adapted paraphrase for freshman ethics and business ethics students someday, since it’s pretty dense argument.
But it’s probably MacIntyre’s tightest and most persuasive argument. So very good. This should be part of the canon of MacIntyre, ethics, philosophy, even nonfiction.
July 6, 2018
Really enjoyed this book. MacIntyre targets philosophers and plumbers alike, anyone wishing to simply live well qua human being. He cuts through a lot of philosophical status quo to argue a contemporary form of Thomistic Aristotelianism. I liked it.
I can’t often say this about works of philosophy, but I found this book remarkably helpful over the past few months, as I have made several pivotal “life decisions.” But MacIntyre also helps readers slow down and reflect on the desires and reasons that underpin our every-day decisions.
His sentences are rather awkward here and there, but the book was accessible on the whole. The sections on economics were most challenging for me, but also quite illuminating. The narrative section at the end was fascinating. Read this book.
I can’t often say this about works of philosophy, but I found this book remarkably helpful over the past few months, as I have made several pivotal “life decisions.” But MacIntyre also helps readers slow down and reflect on the desires and reasons that underpin our every-day decisions.
His sentences are rather awkward here and there, but the book was accessible on the whole. The sections on economics were most challenging for me, but also quite illuminating. The narrative section at the end was fascinating. Read this book.
December 8, 2016
Absolutely amazing. This book (imo) really dispels the myth that Macintyre was advocating for a form of political quietism (ala Dreher BenOp-ism.) But I really need to read this a second time before I can write an in-depth review.
February 8, 2020
MacIntyre is always interesting to read, as one of few Thomistic thinkers taken somewhat seriously in modern philosophy departments. Yet, I did not find this book as interesting as some of his other works, perhaps I have become too familiar with his positions. Nonetheless, this book has a given place in the MacIntyre canon. It presents a more mature version of those arguments that he has considered and reconsidered since first publishing After Virtue all those years ago. That book is still his book and the conclusions are also in large part his own, but throughout the years some things have changed. MacIntyre has turned towards a Thomistic account of virtue ethics, one that is based on a metaphysical biology. In one sense, these are attempts to ground the theory he presents in something less abstract. This is also what he does in this book.
Briefly, MacIntyre starts out by examining the nature of our desires. What does it mean to desire something and how can we make intelligible the notion that there are some desires that we have good reason for, whilst others are such that we have to question whether they are legitimate at all. Some lives plainly go wrong because the things desired are either improper or some unpropitious circumstance removes those desires from reach. These are questions that plain persons not in the least tainted by this or that philosophical fad find themselves asking, or so MacIntyre seems to claim (I am, like MacIntyre, far too tainted by theory to verify this myself). Upon reflecting on such questions, one hastily speeds along towards philosophy, and finds oneself asking what it means to be or do 'Good', about the different rank-orderings of various goods. MacIntyre presents two main viewpoints one can adopt in response to this: Expressivism or Aristotelianism. To the naïve Expressivist, to say that something is good is simply to record one's approval of it, so as to commend it to others. Ultimately, however, Expressivism is the attitude of acting rationally to maximize one's preferences (which are somehow given beforehand, and for which no justification can be made), and this is what shall recur again and again throughout the book. To the Aristotelian on the other hand, to say that something is good is to say that it contributes to the flourishing of those who engage in it or otherwise affirm it. The Aristotelian claims that we can distinguish those human groups, and those individuals in such groups, that act so as to contribute to their flourishing as humans from those which are such that they detract from their flourishing, i. e. are destructive to the ends of human life. The lines in the sand have been drawn, and the arguments are plentiful on both sides. MacIntyre considers many different arguments on both sides of the divide, but ultimately there is no way for either side to convince the other, their theories in a certain sense being set up as mirror images of one another. This is the impasse where MacIntyre started his work all those years ago and it is telling of the depth of the rift that neither position has moved an inch during the last forty years.
However, it is also where MacIntyre's arguments come alive, for he maintains that it is precisely those philosophical constraints of theory, hidden in some dark corner of the philosophy department-the furthest reaches of the university library and that one PhD-level seminar-that distort the reasoning of real humans in real situations, and by disguising those facts and relations in the world that give people the stuff from which they must craft their lives we have shifted the debate into one further specialist sub-discipline of little interest to non-specialists. Thus MacIntyre attempts to bridge the chasm of philosophical impasse by grounding his Aristotelianism in the nature and reality of everyday lives. This motivates MacIntyre to embark on a sociological study of the nature of our present age, how those particular moral institutions and conceptions that are all too present in our age have come to be understood. Emboldened by this endeavor, MacIntyre finally turns to giving a more substantial account of his Aristotelian Thomism inspired by Marx™. It is in large part a restatement of Thomism, although it lacks those particularities that make Thomism such a powerful position in philosophy, but also mean that it is given little attention in modern day discourse.
A particularly illustrative example of MacIntyre's position is presented in Chapter 4.2 on communities and common goods as conceived in his NeoAristotelianism and those public goods of advanced modernity. For MacIntyre, there is a difference between public and common goods insofar as those which are common can only, and this is crucial, be achieved as a member of a certain group, be it a family or a state, whilst those goods which are nowadays considered to be public are achieved by individuals qua individuals, and directed towards the ends of those individuals, albeit provided for by the commons. Furthermore, common goods are inevitably such that they are directed towards not the satisfaction of some individual end, but rather towards some common end. Thus, to fail to achieve that common good of the family which is so lacking in the present age is to fail as rational agents in ordering those ends towards which one is aimed. It is to place one’s own ends over those of one’s children, or to leave the family to join the Army in times of peace. To MacIntyre, it is through the virtues that we come to order our ends in such a way that they are conducive to the flourishing of the common goods by which we live well. There are other kinds of common goods, however, which are in our present situation interrelated in such a way that to enable a family to flourish is also to be engaged in such other common pursuits towards ends that are understandable only in relation to those characteristic modes of engagement of the workplace, school and state. In all of these areas, MacIntyre finds that there are two distinct modes of engagement that can be pursued, each of which relies on particular view of the relation of individual to common ends. In schools or workplaces, there are certain common ends which are striven for either (1) by enabling those who are engaged in the relevant activity to pursue the common good as teacher or worker or student or manager, thereby improving also the relevant skills qua those various roles or (2) by interacting in these environments as individuals pursuing their own end of riches or degrees or some other such good. MacIntyre, then, finds that those who pursue the common goods are able to achieve their own good as an individual only insofar as they pursue those common ends towards which they are directed, and in so doing, they inevitably have to rank order the various ends. They are rational agents only insofar as they are able to, and do, deliberate with others on the ranking of those common goods that they share. For such persons, those social relationships in which they exist are constitutive of their identity, and they cannot but understand themselves as such. On the other hand, there is the individual who conceives only of his own ends, and thus finds such common activities as schooling or work as either enabling or obstructing to the extent that they enable or obstruct the achievement of those ends which he prefers. Any ordering of the ends is ultimately based on those preferences. Such a person will then be a rational agent insofar as he is able to arrive at relevant preferences and later to implement these. He will understand himself as an individual first, and any social realities are simply contingent. Any modern person inhabits both these positions at different times of his or her life and in different social circumstances.
These, then are the two options available in advanced modernity, and MacIntyre urges us to take up the Aristotelian position and to see ourselves as Zoon Politikon aimed towards those ends which are our own and those of our family, school, town, state, and for a real Thomism God, although He is suspiciously lacking in this book. To MacIntyre, it is only by understanding ourselves and our lives in terms of the narrative proposed by Aristotelianism that we are able to understand and act in advanced modernity. He proposes that his theory of praxis-praxis of theory-gives an account of how to act against the present age from within.
This is perhaps the best statement of MacIntyre's position yet, and for this it is well worth five stars. There are some things that are questionable, however, and MacIntyre's style of writing has lost some of the fire he had when writing After Virtue. As mentioned above there are times where the position presented can be questioned from within the Thomist tradition. Firstly, MacIntyre's argument, like many others that attempt to position an inherently philosophico-theological weltanschauung in terms palatable to Modern Man, fails to ground itself in the particularities of the worldview it comes from. This is also the case of some modern theologians who in their desire to placate the masses abstract away all those things that were the very ground of their plain worldview. This is also the sense one gets when reading Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity sometimes, here, the virtues are discussed at some length, but not as they would be understood by a priest, or the victims of his all too long sermons. Secondly, God does not even appear in the index, and MacIntyre seems to be aware of this, for he ends the book with a suggestion that natural theology may have some value in explaining the good of consistently approaching the right particular goods. Habitual grace in not in the index either, which is a shame, since he might have found it useful in the conclusion.
Oh Well, if that is the price you have to pay to receive attention from the philosophical establishment and a big-name publisher.
Briefly, MacIntyre starts out by examining the nature of our desires. What does it mean to desire something and how can we make intelligible the notion that there are some desires that we have good reason for, whilst others are such that we have to question whether they are legitimate at all. Some lives plainly go wrong because the things desired are either improper or some unpropitious circumstance removes those desires from reach. These are questions that plain persons not in the least tainted by this or that philosophical fad find themselves asking, or so MacIntyre seems to claim (I am, like MacIntyre, far too tainted by theory to verify this myself). Upon reflecting on such questions, one hastily speeds along towards philosophy, and finds oneself asking what it means to be or do 'Good', about the different rank-orderings of various goods. MacIntyre presents two main viewpoints one can adopt in response to this: Expressivism or Aristotelianism. To the naïve Expressivist, to say that something is good is simply to record one's approval of it, so as to commend it to others. Ultimately, however, Expressivism is the attitude of acting rationally to maximize one's preferences (which are somehow given beforehand, and for which no justification can be made), and this is what shall recur again and again throughout the book. To the Aristotelian on the other hand, to say that something is good is to say that it contributes to the flourishing of those who engage in it or otherwise affirm it. The Aristotelian claims that we can distinguish those human groups, and those individuals in such groups, that act so as to contribute to their flourishing as humans from those which are such that they detract from their flourishing, i. e. are destructive to the ends of human life. The lines in the sand have been drawn, and the arguments are plentiful on both sides. MacIntyre considers many different arguments on both sides of the divide, but ultimately there is no way for either side to convince the other, their theories in a certain sense being set up as mirror images of one another. This is the impasse where MacIntyre started his work all those years ago and it is telling of the depth of the rift that neither position has moved an inch during the last forty years.
However, it is also where MacIntyre's arguments come alive, for he maintains that it is precisely those philosophical constraints of theory, hidden in some dark corner of the philosophy department-the furthest reaches of the university library and that one PhD-level seminar-that distort the reasoning of real humans in real situations, and by disguising those facts and relations in the world that give people the stuff from which they must craft their lives we have shifted the debate into one further specialist sub-discipline of little interest to non-specialists. Thus MacIntyre attempts to bridge the chasm of philosophical impasse by grounding his Aristotelianism in the nature and reality of everyday lives. This motivates MacIntyre to embark on a sociological study of the nature of our present age, how those particular moral institutions and conceptions that are all too present in our age have come to be understood. Emboldened by this endeavor, MacIntyre finally turns to giving a more substantial account of his Aristotelian Thomism inspired by Marx™. It is in large part a restatement of Thomism, although it lacks those particularities that make Thomism such a powerful position in philosophy, but also mean that it is given little attention in modern day discourse.
A particularly illustrative example of MacIntyre's position is presented in Chapter 4.2 on communities and common goods as conceived in his NeoAristotelianism and those public goods of advanced modernity. For MacIntyre, there is a difference between public and common goods insofar as those which are common can only, and this is crucial, be achieved as a member of a certain group, be it a family or a state, whilst those goods which are nowadays considered to be public are achieved by individuals qua individuals, and directed towards the ends of those individuals, albeit provided for by the commons. Furthermore, common goods are inevitably such that they are directed towards not the satisfaction of some individual end, but rather towards some common end. Thus, to fail to achieve that common good of the family which is so lacking in the present age is to fail as rational agents in ordering those ends towards which one is aimed. It is to place one’s own ends over those of one’s children, or to leave the family to join the Army in times of peace. To MacIntyre, it is through the virtues that we come to order our ends in such a way that they are conducive to the flourishing of the common goods by which we live well. There are other kinds of common goods, however, which are in our present situation interrelated in such a way that to enable a family to flourish is also to be engaged in such other common pursuits towards ends that are understandable only in relation to those characteristic modes of engagement of the workplace, school and state. In all of these areas, MacIntyre finds that there are two distinct modes of engagement that can be pursued, each of which relies on particular view of the relation of individual to common ends. In schools or workplaces, there are certain common ends which are striven for either (1) by enabling those who are engaged in the relevant activity to pursue the common good as teacher or worker or student or manager, thereby improving also the relevant skills qua those various roles or (2) by interacting in these environments as individuals pursuing their own end of riches or degrees or some other such good. MacIntyre, then, finds that those who pursue the common goods are able to achieve their own good as an individual only insofar as they pursue those common ends towards which they are directed, and in so doing, they inevitably have to rank order the various ends. They are rational agents only insofar as they are able to, and do, deliberate with others on the ranking of those common goods that they share. For such persons, those social relationships in which they exist are constitutive of their identity, and they cannot but understand themselves as such. On the other hand, there is the individual who conceives only of his own ends, and thus finds such common activities as schooling or work as either enabling or obstructing to the extent that they enable or obstruct the achievement of those ends which he prefers. Any ordering of the ends is ultimately based on those preferences. Such a person will then be a rational agent insofar as he is able to arrive at relevant preferences and later to implement these. He will understand himself as an individual first, and any social realities are simply contingent. Any modern person inhabits both these positions at different times of his or her life and in different social circumstances.
These, then are the two options available in advanced modernity, and MacIntyre urges us to take up the Aristotelian position and to see ourselves as Zoon Politikon aimed towards those ends which are our own and those of our family, school, town, state, and for a real Thomism God, although He is suspiciously lacking in this book. To MacIntyre, it is only by understanding ourselves and our lives in terms of the narrative proposed by Aristotelianism that we are able to understand and act in advanced modernity. He proposes that his theory of praxis-praxis of theory-gives an account of how to act against the present age from within.
This is perhaps the best statement of MacIntyre's position yet, and for this it is well worth five stars. There are some things that are questionable, however, and MacIntyre's style of writing has lost some of the fire he had when writing After Virtue. As mentioned above there are times where the position presented can be questioned from within the Thomist tradition. Firstly, MacIntyre's argument, like many others that attempt to position an inherently philosophico-theological weltanschauung in terms palatable to Modern Man, fails to ground itself in the particularities of the worldview it comes from. This is also the case of some modern theologians who in their desire to placate the masses abstract away all those things that were the very ground of their plain worldview. This is also the sense one gets when reading Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity sometimes, here, the virtues are discussed at some length, but not as they would be understood by a priest, or the victims of his all too long sermons. Secondly, God does not even appear in the index, and MacIntyre seems to be aware of this, for he ends the book with a suggestion that natural theology may have some value in explaining the good of consistently approaching the right particular goods. Habitual grace in not in the index either, which is a shame, since he might have found it useful in the conclusion.
Oh Well, if that is the price you have to pay to receive attention from the philosophical establishment and a big-name publisher.
Read
June 18, 2025It is too hard for me to judge the intellectual merits of the book but I will simply say it’s my least favorite. And yet despite that, it has a beautiful ending:
“Directedness of these two kinds is then a mark of lives lived well. But directedness toward what? Certainly toward some set of attainable goods, ordered as reason dictates, a set that characteristically changes as agents move from adolescence to middle age and beyond. Yet does this mean that someone who dies before attaining whatever were in her or his case the most notable of those goods must have somehow failed, must have fallen short of perfecting or completing her or his life, so that we may judge that, if only she or he had lived longer, then they might have perfected or completed that life? To think in this way is, as I argued earlier, to misunderstand. To live well is to act so as to move toward achieving the best goods of which one is capable and so as to become the kind of agent capable of achieving those goods. But there is no particular finite good the achievement of which perfects and completes one’s life. There is always something else and something more to be attained, whatever one’s attainments. The perfection and completion of a life consists in an agent’s having persisted in moving toward and beyond the best goods of which she or he knows. So there is presupposed some further good, an object of desire beyond all particular and finite goods, a good toward which desire tends insofar as it remains unsatisfied by even the most desirable of finite goods, as in good lives it does. But here the enquiries of politics and ethics end. Here natural theology begins.”
“Directedness of these two kinds is then a mark of lives lived well. But directedness toward what? Certainly toward some set of attainable goods, ordered as reason dictates, a set that characteristically changes as agents move from adolescence to middle age and beyond. Yet does this mean that someone who dies before attaining whatever were in her or his case the most notable of those goods must have somehow failed, must have fallen short of perfecting or completing her or his life, so that we may judge that, if only she or he had lived longer, then they might have perfected or completed that life? To think in this way is, as I argued earlier, to misunderstand. To live well is to act so as to move toward achieving the best goods of which one is capable and so as to become the kind of agent capable of achieving those goods. But there is no particular finite good the achievement of which perfects and completes one’s life. There is always something else and something more to be attained, whatever one’s attainments. The perfection and completion of a life consists in an agent’s having persisted in moving toward and beyond the best goods of which she or he knows. So there is presupposed some further good, an object of desire beyond all particular and finite goods, a good toward which desire tends insofar as it remains unsatisfied by even the most desirable of finite goods, as in good lives it does. But here the enquiries of politics and ethics end. Here natural theology begins.”
January 10, 2026
ความแตกต่างระหว่าง "ศีลธรรม m ตัวเล็ก" กับ "ศีลธรรม M ตัวใหญ่"
ศีลธรรม m ตัวเล็ก (morality in the anthropological sense): หมายถึงระบบศีลธรรมของวัฒนธรรมต่างๆ ทั่วโลก เช่น ศีลธรรมของชาวกรีกโบราณ, ไวกิ้งยุคกลาง, หรือชนเผ่าในโพลินีเซีย ศีลธรรมเหล่านี้ทำหน้าที่จัดระเบียบสังคมและวัฒนธรรมเฉพาะกลุ่มนั้นๆ
ศีลธรรม M ตัวใหญ่ (Morality with a capital M): คือศีลธรรมของโลกสมัยใหม่ที่มองตนเองว่าเป็น "จุดสูงสุด" ของความพยายามทางศีลธรรมของมนุษยชาติ มันไม่ได้มองว่าตนเองเป็นเพียง หนึ่งใน ทางเลือกทางวัฒนธรรม แต่มองว่าเป็นศีลธรรมที่ "ถูกต้อง" "ก้าวหน้า" และ "สากล" ที่มนุษย์ทุกคนที่มีเหตุมีผลควรยอมรับ
แมคอินไทร์จำแนกลักษณะเด่นของศีลธรรมสมัยใหม่ไว้ดังนี้
1. มีความเป็นทางโลก (Secular): เป็นมาตรฐานที่ไม่ยึดโยงกับศาสนา และใช้ตัดสินศาสนาได้ด้วย
2. มีผลผูกพันสากล (Universally binding): บังคับใช้กับผู้มีเหตุมีผลทุกคนโดยไม่สนใจบริบททางวัฒนธรรม
3. **ขั้วตรงข้ามระหว่างการทำเพื่อตนเองกับเพื่อผู้อื่น:** มองว่าการทำดีคือการเสียสละ (Altruism) ซึ่งตรงข้ามกับการทำเพื่อประโยชน์ส่วนตน (Egoism)
4. ตัวตนทางศีลธรรมที่เป็นนามธรรม (Abstract Agent): กฎศีลธรรมบังคับใช้กับทุกคนเหมือนกันหมด โดยไม่สนใจบทบาททางสังคมหรืออาชีพ (เช่น ห้ามโกหก ไม่ว่าคุณจะเป็นใคร) และถือว่าทุกคนมีแรงจูงใจพื้นฐานเหมือนกัน
5. ความรู้สึกเหนือกว่า (Superiority): มองว่าศีลธรรมสมัยใหม่มีเหตุผลและศิวิไลซ์กว่าศีลธรรมในอดีตหรือวัฒนธรรมอื่น
6. ความขัดแย้งที่หาข้อยุติไม่ได้ (Irresolvable Dilemmas): มีความขัดแย้งภายในระหว่างการยึดถือ "สิทธิ" (ห้ามละเมิดกฎบางอย่างเด็ดขาด) กับ "อรรถประโยชน์" (ทำเพื่อผลลัพธ์ที่ดีที่สุด) ซึ่งนำไปสู่การโต้เถียงที่ไม่จบสิ้นทั้งในทางทฤษฎีและชีวิตจริง
ศีลธรรม m ตัวเล็ก (morality in the anthropological sense): หมายถึงระบบศีลธรรมของวัฒนธรรมต่างๆ ทั่วโลก เช่น ศีลธรรมของชาวกรีกโบราณ, ไวกิ้งยุคกลาง, หรือชนเผ่าในโพลินีเซีย ศีลธรรมเหล่านี้ทำหน้าที่จัดระเบียบสังคมและวัฒนธรรมเฉพาะกลุ่มนั้นๆ
ศีลธรรม M ตัวใหญ่ (Morality with a capital M): คือศีลธรรมของโลกสมัยใหม่ที่มองตนเองว่าเป็น "จุดสูงสุด" ของความพยายามทางศีลธรรมของมนุษยชาติ มันไม่ได้มองว่าตนเองเป็นเพียง หนึ่งใน ทางเลือกทางวัฒนธรรม แต่มองว่าเป็นศีลธรรมที่ "ถูกต้อง" "ก้าวหน้า" และ "สากล" ที่มนุษย์ทุกคนที่มีเหตุมีผลควรยอมรับ
แมคอินไทร์จำแนกลักษณะเด่นของศีลธรรมสมัยใหม่ไว้ดังนี้
1. มีความเป็นทางโลก (Secular): เป็นมาตรฐานที่ไม่ยึดโยงกับศาสนา และใช้ตัดสินศาสนาได้ด้วย
2. มีผลผูกพันสากล (Universally binding): บังคับใช้กับผู้มีเหตุมีผลทุกคนโดยไม่สนใจบริบททางวัฒนธรรม
3. **ขั้วตรงข้ามระหว่างการทำเพื่อตนเองกับเพื่อผู้อื่น:** มองว่าการทำดีคือการเสียสละ (Altruism) ซึ่งตรงข้ามกับการทำเพื่อประโยชน์ส่วนตน (Egoism)
4. ตัวตนทางศีลธรรมที่เป็นนามธรรม (Abstract Agent): กฎศีลธรรมบังคับใช้กับทุกคนเหมือนกันหมด โดยไม่สนใจบทบาททางสังคมหรืออาชีพ (เช่น ห้ามโกหก ไม่ว่าคุณจะเป็นใคร) และถือว่าทุกคนมีแรงจูงใจพื้นฐานเหมือนกัน
5. ความรู้สึกเหนือกว่า (Superiority): มองว่าศีลธรรมสมัยใหม่มีเหตุผลและศิวิไลซ์กว่าศีลธรรมในอดีตหรือวัฒนธรรมอื่น
6. ความขัดแย้งที่หาข้อยุติไม่ได้ (Irresolvable Dilemmas): มีความขัดแย้งภายในระหว่างการยึดถือ "สิทธิ" (ห้ามละเมิดกฎบางอย่างเด็ดขาด) กับ "อรรถประโยชน์" (ทำเพื่อผลลัพธ์ที่ดีที่สุด) ซึ่งนำไปสู่การโต้เถียงที่ไม่จบสิ้นทั้งในทางทฤษฎีและชีวิตจริง
April 6, 2019
While there is little new in this work over and above what MacIntyre has written, it is an excellent holistic review of his project and one that would be of interest to anyone interested in moral and political philosophy. The idea that the book is written for the educated layman seems a bit inaccurate to me, but t is one of MacIntyre's more accessible works; a full appreciation of the work for me seems to require knowledge of modern approaches to ethics and politics that may be implicit in everyday practise, but are rarely made explicit outside of academic contexts.
I am not entirely convinced by MacIntyre's argument, but he does an excellent job of engaging with strong representatives of modern ethical perspectives, which can be quite rare among many who claim inspiration from MacIntyre (e.g Rod Dreher). Furthermore, he does raise some important questions for any expressivist account of morality, particular in terms of the relation between a radically first person perspective on ethics like the one Williams endorses, and the question of self-deception and self-knowledge.
I wish MacIntyre would have engaged more with the thought of Charles Taylor and Hans Georg Gadamer in this work, given that they share a certain Aristotleianism with him, but grounded in a hermeneutic-phenemological approach, but that may be idiosyncratic to me.
I am not entirely convinced by MacIntyre's argument, but he does an excellent job of engaging with strong representatives of modern ethical perspectives, which can be quite rare among many who claim inspiration from MacIntyre (e.g Rod Dreher). Furthermore, he does raise some important questions for any expressivist account of morality, particular in terms of the relation between a radically first person perspective on ethics like the one Williams endorses, and the question of self-deception and self-knowledge.
I wish MacIntyre would have engaged more with the thought of Charles Taylor and Hans Georg Gadamer in this work, given that they share a certain Aristotleianism with him, but grounded in a hermeneutic-phenemological approach, but that may be idiosyncratic to me.
August 7, 2018
One of the most helpful books that I've read. It helped me to organize and think through my life at a time when I needed it. While a theoretical work, MacIntyre's argument for how to reason practically spills over into real life. It has to do so.
Sadly, I read this book over a long span of time. So, I don't have a crisp way of detailing the argument except to say: we ought to rightly order priorities based on what is good and desire the good.
Here's MacIntyre's summary: "It is that agents do well only if and when they act to satisfy only those desires whose objects they have good reason to desire, that only agents who are sound and effective practical reasoners so act, that such agents must be disposed to act as the virtues require, and that such agents will be directed in their actions toward the achievement of their final end" (243).
Sadly, I read this book over a long span of time. So, I don't have a crisp way of detailing the argument except to say: we ought to rightly order priorities based on what is good and desire the good.
Here's MacIntyre's summary: "It is that agents do well only if and when they act to satisfy only those desires whose objects they have good reason to desire, that only agents who are sound and effective practical reasoners so act, that such agents must be disposed to act as the virtues require, and that such agents will be directed in their actions toward the achievement of their final end" (243).
May 21, 2018
Solid critiques of modern Morality (as expressivist prescriptive decision theory) and its problematic embedding in (and obscuring of the excesses of) individualistic capitalism. Calls for a return to a "Neo/Thomistic Aristotelian" conception of common goods: that questions of right action start from "we" not "I"; that development of reason is a process of learning from one's (and one's ancestors) mistakes and successes; that we recognize dissatisfaction, discontent, and grief as valuable states along the way and do not overemphasize maximizing happiness etc. Ok.
March 25, 2021
A powerful analyisis of the fundamental nature of the questions of ethics. MacIntyre's crisp prose lends his arguments conceptual transparency and wide-ranging implications. I particularly enjoyed the closing chapter in which MacIntyre parses out the practical implications of his theoretical framework through attentive close reading of the life of four remarkable twentieth-century characters. The soviet novelist Vasily Grossman and the trinidadian Marxist C.L. James were highpoints for me.
June 19, 2025
Densely argued, always fascinating. Even if you disagree with some of his conclusions, this is a major discussion of how to think about ethics and narrative.
It's best appreciated if you have some acquaintance with philosophical literature, especially Aristotle and some strands of contemporary ethical positions.
It's also a great source for what else to read on the subject.
It's best appreciated if you have some acquaintance with philosophical literature, especially Aristotle and some strands of contemporary ethical positions.
It's also a great source for what else to read on the subject.
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December 14, 2025MacIntyre’s conception of rationality is weird. Rationality depends upon conversations but I don’t think that’s the accurate social process that has organized the goods of a culture. Here, I wrote a little essay on it
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https://docs.google.com/document/d/1p...
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https://docs.google.com/document/d/1p...
July 1, 2017
This book is pure genius. Read it and be exposed to the sheer beauty of human existence according to the Virtues framework of Aristotle. By the end you'll be driven to read both St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.
January 25, 2021
Noticeably worse writing than MacIntyre’s already middling standard and not much new ground. But: more forcefully Marxist and revolutionary than he’s been in a while. Probably a good introduction for someone who doesn’t know what MacIntyre’s whole thing is.
January 29, 2018
So clear-sighted. Gives a lot of clues to understand our cultural malaises.
June 23, 2023
The best book on ethics I’ve read in many years. I won’t bother to outline or summarize, as other reviewers have done that. Basically, MacIntyre argues agains the most common ethical theories of our time: deontology and consequentialism. He suggests that Aristotelian virtue ethics is both a more productive theory and truer to how we actually reason much of the time. He also explains that we tend to, but should not, neglect common goods, because without common goods we cannot as individuals achieve good (eudaimonic) lives. Also, that instead of trying to fulfill our desires, we need to become able to question those desires and determine whether we have good reason to pursue them.
That’s enough summary—no summary could be convincing, but MacIntyre’s arguments are quite cogent.
So, my personal response? I think it would be a better world if everyone could read this book. And MacIntyre says he is writing for the “lay reader”, or, as he calls us more often, “plain people.” Unfortunately, I don’t think he has quite succeeded. I can’t imagine most of the people I know making it through this book—not because it is dull, but because the prose is often hard to follow (his syntax is sometimes cumbersome) and, more importantly, he often seems to be overly concerned with defending his position against the imagined counter-arguments of professional philosophers. At points, this defense would likely be obscure to most readers, and anyway they wouldn’t be likely to make the same kinds of counter-arguments. As Bertrand Russell somewhere says, there are arguments so obviously stupid that only someone trained for years as a philosopher could possibly believe them.
My own concern, as a “plain person” is not the same as what MacIntyre spends time defending against. For one thing, I think MacIntyre, like all philosophers, has an absurdly naive idea of the function of art. He seems to think that the goal of art is to tell profound truths. It isn’t. The goal of art is always and everywhere to strengthen our unexamined assumptions and provide support for the values that derive from those assumptions. That is, all art produces ideology (in the positive sense, but also in the negative).
Finally, the last chapter, in which MacIntyre offers biographies of four “successful” people, seems to me to somewhat contradict the arguments of much of the book. For instance, he explains how Sandra Day O’Connor was somewhat limited in her ability to become a practical reasoner because of her inability to question her basic beliefs and her rejections of theory. But it seems to me (agains, as a “plain person” who never took a philosophy class) that the problem MacIntyre finds with O’Connor is actually a problem with the discourse and practice of law generally, not a personal failing. I would expect that he should have concluded by examining how various discourses/practices/institutions in our world either produce good practically reasoning or fail to do so, since we are always doing our reasoning in some particular discourse, with others, socially.
Still, I’m giving this five stars because I think the argument for Aristotelian (MacIntyre says Thomistic Aristoltelianism) ethics and politics is powerful and convincing. I imagine it will likely make little impression on the unplain people who are sure we need to commit to deontology or consequentialism, but for the rest of us it is useful. I would, however, like to see somebody try to explain this argument in prose that more of us plain folk are likely to be able to read. Like most lifelong academics, MacIntyre has lost touch with ordinary language to some degree.
That’s enough summary—no summary could be convincing, but MacIntyre’s arguments are quite cogent.
So, my personal response? I think it would be a better world if everyone could read this book. And MacIntyre says he is writing for the “lay reader”, or, as he calls us more often, “plain people.” Unfortunately, I don’t think he has quite succeeded. I can’t imagine most of the people I know making it through this book—not because it is dull, but because the prose is often hard to follow (his syntax is sometimes cumbersome) and, more importantly, he often seems to be overly concerned with defending his position against the imagined counter-arguments of professional philosophers. At points, this defense would likely be obscure to most readers, and anyway they wouldn’t be likely to make the same kinds of counter-arguments. As Bertrand Russell somewhere says, there are arguments so obviously stupid that only someone trained for years as a philosopher could possibly believe them.
My own concern, as a “plain person” is not the same as what MacIntyre spends time defending against. For one thing, I think MacIntyre, like all philosophers, has an absurdly naive idea of the function of art. He seems to think that the goal of art is to tell profound truths. It isn’t. The goal of art is always and everywhere to strengthen our unexamined assumptions and provide support for the values that derive from those assumptions. That is, all art produces ideology (in the positive sense, but also in the negative).
Finally, the last chapter, in which MacIntyre offers biographies of four “successful” people, seems to me to somewhat contradict the arguments of much of the book. For instance, he explains how Sandra Day O’Connor was somewhat limited in her ability to become a practical reasoner because of her inability to question her basic beliefs and her rejections of theory. But it seems to me (agains, as a “plain person” who never took a philosophy class) that the problem MacIntyre finds with O’Connor is actually a problem with the discourse and practice of law generally, not a personal failing. I would expect that he should have concluded by examining how various discourses/practices/institutions in our world either produce good practically reasoning or fail to do so, since we are always doing our reasoning in some particular discourse, with others, socially.
Still, I’m giving this five stars because I think the argument for Aristotelian (MacIntyre says Thomistic Aristoltelianism) ethics and politics is powerful and convincing. I imagine it will likely make little impression on the unplain people who are sure we need to commit to deontology or consequentialism, but for the rest of us it is useful. I would, however, like to see somebody try to explain this argument in prose that more of us plain folk are likely to be able to read. Like most lifelong academics, MacIntyre has lost touch with ordinary language to some degree.
February 6, 2017
This is a succinct and clear statement of MacIntyre's position on how human beings ought to practically reason though life decisions. A good introduction to those unfamiliar with his critique of critique of the practice of moral philosophy in the academy, his sociological observations about life in modernity, and the wit and clarity with which he writes. Especially at a time where his analysis in After Virtue is being used by reactionaries towards their own partisan ends, this book is an important restatement of MacIntyre's views on the incoherence of both the ethics of the liberal nation state and the morality of modern capitalism.
January 21, 2025
FIVE STARS. A Classic.
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