Fabulous book with many solid lessons for those interested in the field of Emergency and Crisis and disaster Management Process (CDMP)
While I started this book a while ago, I had to abandon it due to professional teaching obligations (a lack of available time and energy)
This is nevertheless an easy in in-depth read and should take even the uninitiated reader no more than three weeks max if they apply themselves.
The authors have very skillfully aligned some keen insights and a wealth of knowledge in this slim volume. This is, without a doubt one of the most insightful and well-written titles relating to CDMP that I have yet to encounter. This does not mean that it is blemish-free or without warts. By an large one of the strong points is it's unique approach and not merely regurgitating what others have already written previously. They utilize external and secondary sources with parsimony, and make certain that such observations are well-aligned to the points being illustrated.
Okay, enough with the accolades now for the analysis.: This analysis is positive and fairly consistent throughout, but there a re a few points where I diverge with the authors'' viewpoints.
I will present my analysis in chronological form.
P3. there is a personal value judgment relating to the climate change debate which has no place here. A positive reflection was that crisis do not automatically entail victims or damage to infrastructure. Worth bearing in mind.
P.5 Has what is ,in my opinion, one of the most pertinent and important observations in the entire treatise, which is repeated on p.7 para 3. to wit: to paraphrase - crises are self-perpetuating events and cannot be avoided, merely dealt with as effectively as possible. While that origins are varied the cause of the crisis itself is the systems inability to cope or respond to these events. Furthermore, if it were possible to accurately predict a crisis there would most likely be no crisis, or it would fail to manifest itself and overwhelm the response.
P.12 discusses the interesting phenomenon of the "battle of Samaritans." I will leave it to the reader to investigate this
P. 19 The authors raise a most vital point [MVP hereafter] relating to rational design. Crisis detection relies upon both operators and system design if either is lacking or flawed a crisis can emerge.
Pp. 30-32 covers the aspects relating to the human cognitive experience when faced with crisis, to include cognitive bias.
Pp. 35-36 A MVP on the important distinction between the balance of heuristic judgment and experiential knowledge is established.
P.37 The 3 characteristics of resilient organizations are summarized as: Self-awareness, decentralization, and training.
P.45 (section 3.2) speaks of stress- induced failures of leadership and while this is certainly important the authors provide no clarification or insight. Thus they present the problem but no alternative solutions. This being said there is some hint of this in later chapters.
P.46 Examine 2 forms of collective group behavior identified as conflict and conformity. In other words groups tend to wither coalesce or fragment.
Pp 46-49 Examines and analyzes leadership in the context of small group dynamics - useful.
P.50 Multiple advocacy is limited by both time and political constraints.
P.51 the four forms of "non-decision-making" a very useful analysis that indicates not making a decision is also a decision in its own right.
P. 54 Centralization of authority versus decentralization of responsibility.
P.58 the importance of "up-scaling."
P. 62 Mistaken analysis and less funding, training and education.
P. 70 the Authors claim that "In viable democracies there are, of course, legal and ethical as well as practical limits to governmental "news management" in a crisis. Few would argue that this remains the case today following lessons learned with the covid-19 pandemic. governments have become power drunk, control the narrative completely in complicity with Main stream media. There actually remain very few of what may be termed "viable democracies."
P. the role of media in shaping the official narrative
P/ 92 The authors cogently underscore the vital relationship between successful crisis termination and post-crisis accountability
P. 98 a comparative analysis between operational and political closure. The examination of time deficits and over-extensions in crisis management
P.100 Why, What now, What next? The tough questions of post-crisis evaluation.
P.101 The expectations of government response and responsibility.
P.103 Tends to conflate the concepts of sense-making and meaning -making. I found this to be one of the most unclear portions presented. Sources that produce blame generation. Various levels of accountability.
P. 107 Secondary stakeholders during crisis events.
P108. Crises as a source of opportunity. (The authors emphasize the fact is that crisis events present unique opportunities for organizational, operation and structural changes which might, otherwise, never materialize due to political in-fighting and the resultant failure to institute meaningful change)/
P.116 compares puzzling and powering...these concepts are pretty much a matter of common sense.
P.118 MVP Obstacles to lesson-learning both during response and recovery phases.
P.126 Reformist and conservative perspectives of reform.
P.131 Crisis management and reform leadership are entirely incompatible and subscribe to opposing goals.
P.138 Initial definitions of the crisis tend to be persistent. great observation. "What is said cannot be unsaid."
P.142 the spread of bad news tends to be more supported and fostered .
P.146 An astonishing yet true statement by the authors: "A crisis plan may exert some influence in the establishment of a crisis center, but the existence and use of a formal plan do not by any means determine the effectiveness of the crisis response."
P. 147 the importance of plans based upon goals. In other words, a Utilitarian approach where the ends justify the means.
P.148 The importance of building social capital where shared values = shared objectives.
P.150 The importance of documenting all events and decisions in accordance with post-crisis accountability.
P. 152. Accountability versus deflection and denial. Experiential knowledge when combined with historical analysis present the best possible mix or preparedness.
P.153 Combating complacency by fostering leadership commitment results in enhanced motivation.
P.154. The dangers of sweeping reform