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Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army during the Vietnam Era
Vietnam was a failure of the American military mind. Our commanders were provided with overwhelming firepower, vast supplies, superior troops, massive and nearly unopposed air and sea forces, and the pick of commanders. Yet they were defeated.
Of all the major powers the United States had the most experience in guerrilla warfare. Dating back to our own Revolution, the Civil War, the Indian wars, the Philippines, and even World War II, we learned the guerrilla lessons. However, our army units went to Vietnam organized as though to fight against Russia in Europe.
From the time of the American advisors at Dien Bien Phu through Tet and at last the American withdrawal, our military efforts were vitiated by a continued lack of under standing of the nature of the war. Without that understanding defeat was inevitable.
Vietnam was used as a swiftly rotating opportunity to command in battle and to harvest often meaningless medals useful to officer promotion. Reports of tactical failures were ignored. Facts contrary to command opinion were suppressed. Statistics like body counts and weapons captured became a self-deceiving and, in the end, a disastrous game.
Cincinnatus is the pen name of a military man who entered service as a private in Korea and rose through the ranks to become a senior field-grade officer. A graduate of Command and General Staff College, he is the author of one book on military history as well as papers and monographs. He holds A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. He is currently assigned to the Pentagon.
Of all the major powers the United States had the most experience in guerrilla warfare. Dating back to our own Revolution, the Civil War, the Indian wars, the Philippines, and even World War II, we learned the guerrilla lessons. However, our army units went to Vietnam organized as though to fight against Russia in Europe.
From the time of the American advisors at Dien Bien Phu through Tet and at last the American withdrawal, our military efforts were vitiated by a continued lack of under standing of the nature of the war. Without that understanding defeat was inevitable.
Vietnam was used as a swiftly rotating opportunity to command in battle and to harvest often meaningless medals useful to officer promotion. Reports of tactical failures were ignored. Facts contrary to command opinion were suppressed. Statistics like body counts and weapons captured became a self-deceiving and, in the end, a disastrous game.
Cincinnatus is the pen name of a military man who entered service as a private in Korea and rose through the ranks to become a senior field-grade officer. A graduate of Command and General Staff College, he is the author of one book on military history as well as papers and monographs. He holds A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. He is currently assigned to the Pentagon.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1981
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
March 2, 2020
Damning indictment of army close-mindedness in Vietnam. Illuminating to read after Afghanistan/Iraq books where you see the exact problems happened before with the same results.
January 4, 2019
A must for any Army officer. The critical look at the failings of the United States Army during Vietnam was completed in 1981. Was struct by how many of the same leadership shortcomings, and career protection actions still ring true today and in today's Army.
For those who want to buck the system - take this book as a warning and blueprint of what to do and what to avoid.
For those who want to buck the system - take this book as a warning and blueprint of what to do and what to avoid.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews