“Free speech is more important than hurt feelings. It is a sorry sign of the times that such a statement might seem outlandish to some.”
Trigger warning: common-sense-based views, anti-priggishness, the necessity to judge for yourself and not take everything the author says at face-value, anti-holier-than-thou-conformism, freedom-does-not-include-the-right-to-unchallenged-narcissism
Supposing you feel inclined to disagree with the above quotation from Mick Hume’s book Trigger Warning: Is the Fear of Being Offensive Killing Free Speech? and would want to counter that whenever you use your right to speaking your mind freely, you should take into consideration how your words will be received and if they might not do more harm than good, you might already be on the slippery slope of self-censorship at best and demanding further-going state-regulations for free speech at worst. In that case, reading this book might do you a world of good.
Mind, although Hume has a very wide definition of what he regards as falling under the scope of free speech – wider, in fact, than I personally deem appropriate –, he still says that libel, insults and threats do not, of course, qualify as examples of people using this basic right. And, what is more, he says that having the right of using free speech, even though it may offend others, does not exempt you from judging for yourself the appropriateness in any given situation of doing so – according to William Hazlitt’s dictum, “An honest man speaks the truth, though it may give offence; a vain man, in order that it may.” In that context, we might also add that a vain man, or woman, is especially quick at taking offense.
Hume is not only concerned with growing state regulations against free speech but also with the increasing influence of the PC language police that do their best to limit the scope of what can be said in public, and even in private, and here his cogent conclusion is:
”The attempt to de-normalise any speech which somebody finds offensive is having a stultifying effect on public debate, encouraging an atmosphere of tame conformism and mute self-censorship.” (Chapter 8)
The problem here is that what I, you, he, she, it regard as an offense is perfectly subjective, and while some people might feel offended and hurt in their feelings by what they see when they look into the mirror, yet what the mirror shows them is the truth. In public debates, this narcissistic approach of terming anything one might feel offended by as “hate speech” will eventually lead to the stifling of discussion and the end of people expressing their thoughts for fear of being branded as White Old Men and maybe even of having their social and professional lives ruined in a modern witch-hunt. Hume’s conclusion is:
”[…] anyone is entitled to take offence at anything said by anybody else. But taking offence does not give them any right to take away somebody else’s freedom of speech.” (ibid.)
Hume sees the reason for this increase in touchiness and the instrumentalization of being offended – something that, according to Frank Furedi, will lead to “the criminalization of criticism” – in the fact that in pluralistic societies traditional sources of identity, like nation, church, family, are losing influence and that people strive to establish new identities, and he states that
”[i]dentity politics is the sphere of competitive victimhood. Identity groups draw their moral authority from the claim for redress for grievances and offences against them, past and present. The insistence that you are constantly vulnerable and victimized reinforces the tendency to take offence at any opinion outside your identity’s narrow worldview. Since identity is defined subjectively, it matters not what the intention of the offending speaker or writer might have been. If the identity group says it is offensive, then it automatically must be so, and demands for a withdrawal, apology and possibly compensation will follow.” (ibid.)
You may want to laugh out loud at the idea of making another person’s arbitrary or self-alleged level of sensibility the litmus test of what you are allowed to say, but the laughter will surely die in your throat when you learn that UK legislation’s definition of “hate speech” is based on exactly what the person spoken or referred to, or any other person, might deem offensive. I could not help thinking that at the bottom of all this madness, which is not void of method, there is people’s increasing tendency to rely on the Nanny State, a tendency which is encouraged by self-appointed social justice warriors. People have more and more got used to relying on the state and the government to redress social wrongs and to fight the ills of social inequality, but their material well-being is just one thing. Another is their urge to feel cozy in their assumptions about themselves, and so their next demand will be for the state to make sure that they might not have to face their own orthodoxies challenged by dissenting views. The flipside of it all is that the state, and a self-righteous and jaded Internet mob, will become the arbiter in the question of what can and what cannot be said in public, and eventually thought in private. Thoughtcrime will no longer be just a dystopian bogeyman and the idea of the government actually educating citizens, as though they were foul-mouthed and naughty children, will become acceptable. After all, a nanny not only feeds, clothes and pampers her fosterlings but also has to tell them what they must and must not say and think. And governments just ever-thankfully grasp at any excuse to enlarge their power over civil life.
Hume also deals with other strategies of what he calls the “reverse-Voltaires”, for example their favourite weapons of labelling opposing views as based on phobias or denial strategies in order to make them seem spawned by psychological disorders or downright dishonesty and put them beyond the pale of what is worth discussing. In old rhetoric schools this was called the argumentum ad hominem or the appeal to motive, both strategies of poisoning the well. In societies based on free speech, individualism and scientific progress, strategies like these should be beneath any responsible and enlightened person’s dignity. For example, will findings and data casting some doubt on anthropogenic climate change be adequately dealt with by calling scientists who come up with them “climate change deniers”? Probably only so if you are very, very religious about that sort of thing. When you read some of the raving rants of climate change orthodoxics on scientists who either do not believe in anthropogenic climate change or do not assign the topic top priority, in Chapter 10, you may well gain the impression that the Middle Ages and the Holy Inquisition have been reintroduced through the back door.
I cannot deny … ahem … that Mick Hume’s thoughts on the silent war on free speech were on the whole very convincing to me, and I sincerely hope that the western world will not adopt the new religion of stupidity and self-censoring because in the long run, every single one of us would suffer from its consequences. Nevertheless, the book is not flawless. For once, it is too long and repetitive. Second, I find it hard to agree with Hume’s loose definition of free speech. When dumb and sexually frustrated Internet junkies post their raping fantasies with regard to a certain person online, I would not, unlike Hume, regard this as a despicable though meaningless insult, but I would argue that this is a substantial threat and should be prosecuted accordingly. Hamstringing crude remarks like these or racial slurs is not the same as shutting down a debate by labelling your opponent a climate change denier or by telling him to check his privileges – as though men could not hold views on abortion – or as bowdlerizing Mark Twain or Joseph Conrad in a pathetic attempt to rewrite history, thereby proving one’s pathetic ignorance of literature. I would also not agree with Hume’s attempts at whitewashing the often rather mud-slinging and manipulative popular press, but here Hume is obviously writing pro domo.
Last not least, there remains the question of how powerful words are when it comes to changing reality and to manipulating people. While I cannot help laughing at Judith Butler’s performativity model, which reminds me of Frodo’s fear of speaking the name of Sauron out aloud or of the stoning scene in The Life of Brian, I do not share Hume’s smugness about people’s general immunity against propaganda and manipulation, either. The truth is probably that people can be seduced by words – but not by those alone – and that leaving them to judge for themselves might also have them end up with wrong and even harmful conclusions. Nevertheless the danger of people making the wrong choices is no justification for governments and identity pressure groups to decide what may and what may not be said and thought because that what would be the source of their ultimate authority to do so? Are they less passionate, more impartial, better educated – or even the better people? And after all, people need not necessarily end up with the wrong ideas if they have the chance to see both sides of a question and if they are used to using their loaves. Living in a democracy and enjoying personal freedoms – also from government control – and having the right to send up self-righteous, po-faced prigs, by the way, are such highs good that even the possibility of sometimes making the “wrong” choices is a price we should be willing to pay.
With all due apologies from a white, middle-aged male.