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Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945
By the time of the dropping of the atom bomb in August 1945, the United States military situation in the Pacific was in disarray. As an Army staff officer stated simply, "The capitulation of Hirohito saved our necks."
In 1944, a year earlier, success seemed near, but squabbling in the military command and the logistical challenges of launching a full-scale invasion of the Japanese mainland soon took their toll, and by the time of V.E. Day it was questionable whether the United States was up to the task of ending the war in the Pacific. An exhausted American public was calling for troops to come home and for the country to return to manufacturing consumer items instead of arms. Republican politicians called for the Allies to back away from the demand for unconditional surrender. The politically powerful constituency of GIs won legislative victories, allowing soldiers more easily to leave the military and depleting units just as they most needed experienced soldiers. Weaving together analysis of grand strategy with a vivid narrative depicting the brutal, debilitating, and often terrifying experience of combat, Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio bring to life the final year in the Pacific. They explore the lives of the soldiers, sailors, and Marines who faced illness, drenching rain, and tenacious Japanese opponents. They also evoke the grand, clashing personalities of Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall, who warned of "the agony of enduring battle," and shed light on the views of President Roosevelt, who doubted Americans' understanding of the conflict and worried about a public mood that oscillated between overconfidence and despair. After the bloodletting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the war against Japan seemed more repugnant and less meaningful than the struggle against Germany. It is in this context, of military emergency and patience wearing thin, that a new president, Harry S. Truman, made the decision to deploy the atomic bomb.
This remarkable, gripping narrative challenges assumptions about the inevitability of the war's outcome, the consequences of the "Europe first" strategy, and the wisdom of America's leaders.
In 1944, a year earlier, success seemed near, but squabbling in the military command and the logistical challenges of launching a full-scale invasion of the Japanese mainland soon took their toll, and by the time of V.E. Day it was questionable whether the United States was up to the task of ending the war in the Pacific. An exhausted American public was calling for troops to come home and for the country to return to manufacturing consumer items instead of arms. Republican politicians called for the Allies to back away from the demand for unconditional surrender. The politically powerful constituency of GIs won legislative victories, allowing soldiers more easily to leave the military and depleting units just as they most needed experienced soldiers. Weaving together analysis of grand strategy with a vivid narrative depicting the brutal, debilitating, and often terrifying experience of combat, Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio bring to life the final year in the Pacific. They explore the lives of the soldiers, sailors, and Marines who faced illness, drenching rain, and tenacious Japanese opponents. They also evoke the grand, clashing personalities of Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall, who warned of "the agony of enduring battle," and shed light on the views of President Roosevelt, who doubted Americans' understanding of the conflict and worried about a public mood that oscillated between overconfidence and despair. After the bloodletting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the war against Japan seemed more repugnant and less meaningful than the struggle against Germany. It is in this context, of military emergency and patience wearing thin, that a new president, Harry S. Truman, made the decision to deploy the atomic bomb.
This remarkable, gripping narrative challenges assumptions about the inevitability of the war's outcome, the consequences of the "Europe first" strategy, and the wisdom of America's leaders.
711 pages, Hardcover
First published June 2, 2017
82 people are currently reading
417 people want to read
About the author
Waldo Heinrichs
7 books3 followersA scholar of U.S. foreign relations in the twentieth century, Waldo H. Heinrichs is Dwight E. Stanford Professor Emeritus at San Diego State University. He earned both a bachelor’s degree (1949) and doctorate (1960) in history from Harvard University.
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
October 8, 2018
The authors of this book aim to tell the story of how the U.S. was planning on invading Japan to end the war in the Pacific, all the while presenting facts and information about how such an invasion might not have worked out in the Americans' favor. Some of the information is presented over and over...and over, but I guess the authors were really just trying to nail down a point.
Starting with MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea, the book focuses almost solely on the U.S. Army's various battles with the Japanese in 1944 and 1945. Major naval battles such as those fought at the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf are discussed in small detail, along with the campaigns of the U.S. Marines. Other aspects of the latter stages of the Pacific War, such as the strategic bombing campaign by the B-29s based in the Marianas and the strangulation of the Japanese Empire's shipping by U.S. submarines are barely mentioned. Now, having not read as much on the U.S. Army's campaigns in New Guinea and the Philippines, this book was really informative and I came away agreeing with the authors that an invasion of Japan would have been a truly bloody and costly undertaking.
The authors main points for debating the plausibility of an invasion are such (in no particular order):
1. The campaigns of attrition fought by the Japanese in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa severely weakened U.S. Army and Marine divisions to the point that they would not be fully ready when the invasion was scheduled to begin.
2. Japan had seriously reinforced the island of Kyushu (the first target of the planned invasion), much more than U.S. Intelligence estimates predicted.
3. The transfer of troops from Europe to the Pacific, along with the release of soldiers who had accumulated enough points to go home, was taking much longer than expected and most wouldn't be available until early 1946.
4. Considerable pressure was put on the U.S. Army on the home front to release certain troops for various civilian jobs, especially in the railroad and mining industries.
5. After years of bloody fighting, the U.S. public was growing tired of the fighting and growing casualty lists and might not have the determination to see things through to the end.
While I was disappointed this book was almost entirely about the U.S. Army's campaign against Japan and included more of the social and political issues going on at the time, it really was pretty good at presenting the argument that an invasion of Japan would have been a tough go and might have even needed to be postponed.
Starting with MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea, the book focuses almost solely on the U.S. Army's various battles with the Japanese in 1944 and 1945. Major naval battles such as those fought at the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf are discussed in small detail, along with the campaigns of the U.S. Marines. Other aspects of the latter stages of the Pacific War, such as the strategic bombing campaign by the B-29s based in the Marianas and the strangulation of the Japanese Empire's shipping by U.S. submarines are barely mentioned. Now, having not read as much on the U.S. Army's campaigns in New Guinea and the Philippines, this book was really informative and I came away agreeing with the authors that an invasion of Japan would have been a truly bloody and costly undertaking.
The authors main points for debating the plausibility of an invasion are such (in no particular order):
1. The campaigns of attrition fought by the Japanese in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa severely weakened U.S. Army and Marine divisions to the point that they would not be fully ready when the invasion was scheduled to begin.
2. Japan had seriously reinforced the island of Kyushu (the first target of the planned invasion), much more than U.S. Intelligence estimates predicted.
3. The transfer of troops from Europe to the Pacific, along with the release of soldiers who had accumulated enough points to go home, was taking much longer than expected and most wouldn't be available until early 1946.
4. Considerable pressure was put on the U.S. Army on the home front to release certain troops for various civilian jobs, especially in the railroad and mining industries.
5. After years of bloody fighting, the U.S. public was growing tired of the fighting and growing casualty lists and might not have the determination to see things through to the end.
While I was disappointed this book was almost entirely about the U.S. Army's campaign against Japan and included more of the social and political issues going on at the time, it really was pretty good at presenting the argument that an invasion of Japan would have been a tough go and might have even needed to be postponed.
March 5, 2019
Deeply embedded in American mythology is the legacy of the ‘greatest generation’ and the last ‘good war’ – how a unified United States in an altruistic manner, marshaled incredible resources to fight and secure ‘unconditional surrender’ of its foes in World War II. Implacable Foes does much to diminish the vision of ‘unity’ on the home front as the United States confronted Japan over the last two years of the war and came up against the hard realities of a bloody invasion of the home islands.
The strongest portion of this book is the recounting of changing attitudes about the war in its final months. The authors provide context by reviewing the economic downturn after World War I, the Depression (jobs), domestic politics and the perceptions of military control of economic and civilian prerogatives – all key considerations as the US approached the end of a global conflict. This is contrasted with the generally broad support for the wartime Army which was being tempered by specific issues that weakened support for existing policies. The authors outline this intense civilian pressure on the Army with the domestic politics of the time -- Republicans or “dollar a year men” versus New Dealers and ‘idealists’. They chart the impact of key events -- FDR’s death, VE Day and Marshall’s resignation attempt and introduce key figures (Vinson, Grew, Stimson, Patterson, etc…) who balanced wartime aims (‘unconditional surrender’) with commitments to long service troops (the discharge program), efficient use of resources and fear of a post-war economic catastrophe.
One of the authors was a member of the 86th Infantry Division, originally slated for action in the Pacific. It was diverted to Europe as part of the American Army’s manpower shortage and stalemate in the winter of 1944. Arriving late in the campaign, it was one of the first slated and moved in the re-positioning of the US Army from Europe to the Pacific amid struggles to discharge some 2 million of the 8 million men on active duty through the ‘points’ system. As the authors demonstrate, the Army was trying to simultaneously downsize forces overall but ‘rightsize’ forces for the invasion of Japan. These units were in transit from Oklahoma to West Coasts ports when the atomic bombs were dropped. The planned continued movement sparked protest at their ports of embarkation as they anticipated the impending Japanese surrender.
Unfortunately, over 2/3 of the text, which describes the increasing difficulty faced by the Army as it encountered matured defenses on Japan’s inner defense lines, is poorly written and inadequately supported by maps. While the type of prose employed makes the policy debates immensely readable, the same cannot be said of it’s military accounts. Poorly written paragraphs are devoted to descriptions of challenging terrain which could have been obviated by the employment of topographical maps. The maps presented are completely inadequate to support the authors points – that both the scope and scale of the Pacific War presented difficulties not adequately addressed by service planners and that the difficulty of terrain, in particular, was less than optimal for the type of conflict the Army had been manned, trained and equipped. This is one of their other major points – that the manpower resources available to the Army in 1945 were completely inadequate to the problems of an invasion. Additionally, the infrastructure which allowed the Army to overcome a similar inadequacy in Europe the previous winter were not mature enough to support redress in time for the scheduled invasion. I would recommend consulting the official Army histories of these campaigns, as I did, to gain a better understanding of these challenges, if for no other reason, than to use those maps.
There are several other accounts which address many of these issues to include Wilmot’s, The War in the Pacific and the Army’s own “The 90 Division Gamble” in Command Missions. Richard Frank’s Downfall, probably the best single book on war termination in the Pacific makes similar points but largely within the context of the Battle of Okinawa and the decision to drop the atomic weapons. Like Frank, these authors delve into both inter-service rivalry and inter-Army politics
One of the authors most interesting assertions is that, unaware of the impeding atomic weapons, the Japanese may have had the best strategy. As Wilmott has described, 2/3 of the US casualties in the Pacific were suffered in the last year of the war in three campaigns – the Philippines, Iwo Jim and Okinawa. Disease and other non-battle casualties increased proportionally as well, as US formations were exposed to lengthy fights in terrain much more inhospitable than their counterparts faced in Europe. And, as Richard Frank pointed out in Downfall, casualties in the Okinawa fight had chilling effect on US policy makers and planners because of it’s ferocity, it’s timing (ending after VE day) and the similarities US planners were forced to face with Operation Olympic on the horizon. The Japanese strategy of attrition and suicide attacks in both the Philippines and Okinawa caused tremendous casualties in both the ground and naval formations employed in these attacks, in spite of increasing effectiveness of US infantry tactics and superiority of air formations. As these campaigns closed, forces earmarked for the invasion of Kyushu were under-strength and at the end of a long and debilitated replacement pipeline. Coupled with the simultaneous discharge of combat veterans with invaluable experience, unit cohesion was being diluted at perhaps the moment US forces would need it most. Disturbingly, victory in Europe changed the public’s perspective on the war and the Army’s conduct of the final campaign was being questioned on multiple fronts.
The author’s larger point is that military capacity was fundamentally related to political will and domestic political will war eroding. Like many authors, they believe the atomic weapons saved the United States from larger issues – a huge fight over competing strategies of invasion or blockade/strangulation conducted in an environment of diminishing domestic political support. Truman gritted his teeth in his rejection of Japanese Peace overtures in the wake of the employment of the Atomic weapons; but tellingly, he allowed the retention of the Emperor.
Overall, this is a book I recommend if you are interested in the dilemmas faced by policy makers in the closing year of World War II. As a military history, there are better sources.
The strongest portion of this book is the recounting of changing attitudes about the war in its final months. The authors provide context by reviewing the economic downturn after World War I, the Depression (jobs), domestic politics and the perceptions of military control of economic and civilian prerogatives – all key considerations as the US approached the end of a global conflict. This is contrasted with the generally broad support for the wartime Army which was being tempered by specific issues that weakened support for existing policies. The authors outline this intense civilian pressure on the Army with the domestic politics of the time -- Republicans or “dollar a year men” versus New Dealers and ‘idealists’. They chart the impact of key events -- FDR’s death, VE Day and Marshall’s resignation attempt and introduce key figures (Vinson, Grew, Stimson, Patterson, etc…) who balanced wartime aims (‘unconditional surrender’) with commitments to long service troops (the discharge program), efficient use of resources and fear of a post-war economic catastrophe.
One of the authors was a member of the 86th Infantry Division, originally slated for action in the Pacific. It was diverted to Europe as part of the American Army’s manpower shortage and stalemate in the winter of 1944. Arriving late in the campaign, it was one of the first slated and moved in the re-positioning of the US Army from Europe to the Pacific amid struggles to discharge some 2 million of the 8 million men on active duty through the ‘points’ system. As the authors demonstrate, the Army was trying to simultaneously downsize forces overall but ‘rightsize’ forces for the invasion of Japan. These units were in transit from Oklahoma to West Coasts ports when the atomic bombs were dropped. The planned continued movement sparked protest at their ports of embarkation as they anticipated the impending Japanese surrender.
Unfortunately, over 2/3 of the text, which describes the increasing difficulty faced by the Army as it encountered matured defenses on Japan’s inner defense lines, is poorly written and inadequately supported by maps. While the type of prose employed makes the policy debates immensely readable, the same cannot be said of it’s military accounts. Poorly written paragraphs are devoted to descriptions of challenging terrain which could have been obviated by the employment of topographical maps. The maps presented are completely inadequate to support the authors points – that both the scope and scale of the Pacific War presented difficulties not adequately addressed by service planners and that the difficulty of terrain, in particular, was less than optimal for the type of conflict the Army had been manned, trained and equipped. This is one of their other major points – that the manpower resources available to the Army in 1945 were completely inadequate to the problems of an invasion. Additionally, the infrastructure which allowed the Army to overcome a similar inadequacy in Europe the previous winter were not mature enough to support redress in time for the scheduled invasion. I would recommend consulting the official Army histories of these campaigns, as I did, to gain a better understanding of these challenges, if for no other reason, than to use those maps.
There are several other accounts which address many of these issues to include Wilmot’s, The War in the Pacific and the Army’s own “The 90 Division Gamble” in Command Missions. Richard Frank’s Downfall, probably the best single book on war termination in the Pacific makes similar points but largely within the context of the Battle of Okinawa and the decision to drop the atomic weapons. Like Frank, these authors delve into both inter-service rivalry and inter-Army politics
One of the authors most interesting assertions is that, unaware of the impeding atomic weapons, the Japanese may have had the best strategy. As Wilmott has described, 2/3 of the US casualties in the Pacific were suffered in the last year of the war in three campaigns – the Philippines, Iwo Jim and Okinawa. Disease and other non-battle casualties increased proportionally as well, as US formations were exposed to lengthy fights in terrain much more inhospitable than their counterparts faced in Europe. And, as Richard Frank pointed out in Downfall, casualties in the Okinawa fight had chilling effect on US policy makers and planners because of it’s ferocity, it’s timing (ending after VE day) and the similarities US planners were forced to face with Operation Olympic on the horizon. The Japanese strategy of attrition and suicide attacks in both the Philippines and Okinawa caused tremendous casualties in both the ground and naval formations employed in these attacks, in spite of increasing effectiveness of US infantry tactics and superiority of air formations. As these campaigns closed, forces earmarked for the invasion of Kyushu were under-strength and at the end of a long and debilitated replacement pipeline. Coupled with the simultaneous discharge of combat veterans with invaluable experience, unit cohesion was being diluted at perhaps the moment US forces would need it most. Disturbingly, victory in Europe changed the public’s perspective on the war and the Army’s conduct of the final campaign was being questioned on multiple fronts.
The author’s larger point is that military capacity was fundamentally related to political will and domestic political will war eroding. Like many authors, they believe the atomic weapons saved the United States from larger issues – a huge fight over competing strategies of invasion or blockade/strangulation conducted in an environment of diminishing domestic political support. Truman gritted his teeth in his rejection of Japanese Peace overtures in the wake of the employment of the Atomic weapons; but tellingly, he allowed the retention of the Emperor.
Overall, this is a book I recommend if you are interested in the dilemmas faced by policy makers in the closing year of World War II. As a military history, there are better sources.
July 27, 2017
An epic, masterful history of the final two years of America's war with Japan. Comprehensive, original, and accessible, this narrative offers an insightful understanding of the political, military, and social pressures on U.S. leaders as they simultaneously fought a determined enemy, demobilized American armed forces, and prepared for the transition to a postwar domestic economy.
August 24, 2017
Thorough analysis of S. Pacific naval operations at the end of WWII. How the author managed to get plane by plane descriptions of air battles completely mystifies me.
May 21, 2018
The first roughly two-thirds of the book is a battle history of the last year of the war in the Pacific, but utilizing a macro-overview primarily of the land war across the various islands. The battle accounts seldom descend below battalion level descriptions of actions. The greatest value of the narrative in this part of the book is the comprehensive treatment of the logistics requirements and the efforts expended (with increasingly less success) to maintain and operate the logistics train in the manner demanded to prosecute the war as planned and executed. It is an eye opening lesson. Of equal interest and value for an understanding of the war is the excellent discussion throughout of the leadership - the interplay between various military leaders, the political and administrative interactions back in the US and the effects of individual strengths and weaknesses on the war effort - particularly Marshall and MacArthur. MacArthur's ego, personal goals independent of the greater war and aggrandizing public affairs efforts even when deleterious to the greater war effort are amply substantiated. One wonders what the course of the war might have otherwise been, at times.
The final third of the book deals with the enormous consequences of VE Day in Europe, the increasingly intolerable casualty figures as the island campaign closed on Japan (Iwo Jima and especially Okinawa became stark evidence of the efficacy of the Japanese strategy to maximize casualties in order to play upon American war weariness), the Army's commitment to demobilize in part, to redeploy forces from Europe to the Pacific, and to oppose economic reconversion from war industry to civilian economics all contributed to massive discontent and growing opposition to the planned invasion of Kyushu. this in turn fed a growing movement to alter the insistence upon unconditional surrender in the lone hope it would shorten the increasingly intolerably costly war. It is interesting - but also very dry - reading. The authors have complied a narrative of meetings, memos, policy considerations, political developments and economical effects that is a comprehensive, meticulous and deeply educative historical lesson in the chaos following German surrender largely ignored elsewhere. Truman's use of the atomic bombs was ultimately a blessing - it cut what was rapidly becoming an insoluble Gordian knot of compressed preparation, insufficient or unavailable resources and inadequate expectations. The Japanese accurately assessed the American public's flagging commitment to war, and their extensive plans and preparations to maximize casualties was working. Combined with the endemic problems arising from the chaotic conditions incurred by the problematic issues of demobilization, redeployment and domestic economic reconversion, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands was becoming ever more
controversial and grim in its outlook.
But the content is dry and less than engaging - as interesting as I found it to be, I also found it difficult to wade through. Much the same can be said of the entire book. Moments of great interest and moments of interesting but laborious descriptions. Still, a valuable and largely necessary history for those interested in World War II and particularly the war in the Pacific.
The final third of the book deals with the enormous consequences of VE Day in Europe, the increasingly intolerable casualty figures as the island campaign closed on Japan (Iwo Jima and especially Okinawa became stark evidence of the efficacy of the Japanese strategy to maximize casualties in order to play upon American war weariness), the Army's commitment to demobilize in part, to redeploy forces from Europe to the Pacific, and to oppose economic reconversion from war industry to civilian economics all contributed to massive discontent and growing opposition to the planned invasion of Kyushu. this in turn fed a growing movement to alter the insistence upon unconditional surrender in the lone hope it would shorten the increasingly intolerably costly war. It is interesting - but also very dry - reading. The authors have complied a narrative of meetings, memos, policy considerations, political developments and economical effects that is a comprehensive, meticulous and deeply educative historical lesson in the chaos following German surrender largely ignored elsewhere. Truman's use of the atomic bombs was ultimately a blessing - it cut what was rapidly becoming an insoluble Gordian knot of compressed preparation, insufficient or unavailable resources and inadequate expectations. The Japanese accurately assessed the American public's flagging commitment to war, and their extensive plans and preparations to maximize casualties was working. Combined with the endemic problems arising from the chaotic conditions incurred by the problematic issues of demobilization, redeployment and domestic economic reconversion, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands was becoming ever more
controversial and grim in its outlook.
But the content is dry and less than engaging - as interesting as I found it to be, I also found it difficult to wade through. Much the same can be said of the entire book. Moments of great interest and moments of interesting but laborious descriptions. Still, a valuable and largely necessary history for those interested in World War II and particularly the war in the Pacific.
September 9, 2020
A huge detailed history of the last two years of the War in the Pacific, from the U.S. point of view. Excruciatingly detailed lists of battles and mountain ranges and troop movements in the Pacific islands, supporting the authors' main point: that an actual invasion of Japan's home islands would have been impossible because of the worn condition of the U.S. forces; further, any such plans likely would have been scuttled by the navy's preference for blockade. Frankly, I skimmed over the agonizing descriptions of the various island battles; I paid attention to the discussion of the political and logistical debates on the home front with the interaction of the congress, businessmen, bureaucrats, and military planners. The book drives home the generally accepted point that the U.S. won the war primarily due to its overwhelming productivity. It seems however that the books' details are meant to lead us to the self-gratifying conclusion that dropping the atomic bombs were inevitable and necessary, given the fears of a ground invasion. But they neglect to examine the effect of Soviet intervention on the Japanese government. I am disappointed that the authors elide this line of argument -- they use ULTRA intercepts to justify concerns about the ground invasion, but then are silent about any ULTRA intercepts after the atomic bomb, or after the Soviet declaration of war. According to my recent reading, the single most consequential element in the Japanese decision to surrender was the Soviet declaration of war, which eliminated their faint hope of using Stalin to broker a negotiated settlement. The authors here also describe how inscrutable Truman's opinions were about the ground war, the definition of unconditional surrender, and the need for dropping the atomic bombs. However, they do paint a memorable picture of the likely chaos and rapid sequence of events in the fog of war (even more so, dealing with the European and the home fronts), thus excusing some possible miscalculations along the way. The Greatest Generation, indeed!
This book is too unnecessarily big for all but the most diehard WW2 readers.
This book is too unnecessarily big for all but the most diehard WW2 readers.
October 5, 2017
Implacable Foes is clearly an impression book in its scope and detail. The authors present an almost encyclopedic description of the last 18 months of the US involvement in the Pacific Theater in WWII.
That said, the book absolutely shines in some respects, but in others it is ponderous and seems like it will never end. Perhaps that's how many of the soldiers felt in the terrible tragedies that formed so much of this time for so many people.
In my view, the best parts of the book involve the strategic considerations faced by the military and political leadership, and particularly the last few months of the war when the country, satisfied with the victory in Europe, was having some apparent difficultly balancing between bringing soldiers home, re-establishing the civilian economy, and winning the war against Japan. The authors present the case that the invasion of Japan, at last not needed because of the development and use of atomic weapons, may either not have occurred (blockade being the alternative strategy) or, had it occurred, may not have met with success.
Even though very detailed, the description of the island-by-island battles was much more difficult to wade through. The authors give what seems to be a brief account of the combat experience of every division, brigade, regiment, and often company or platoon in each of the battles. To be sure, the soldiers and sailors and marines in each of these conflicts deserves to be honored and remembered. But the writing is difficult, sometimes repetitive, and requires much focus to complete. There are several maps - but most are barely adequate with limited information, and many, many more maps with far more detail would have allowed the reader to follow the action and improved the presentation significantly.
In closing, although by no means an expert on WWII, I have read extensively in this arena, and despite some of its shortcomings, I must say that this text has added quite a bit to my understanding of the war.
That said, the book absolutely shines in some respects, but in others it is ponderous and seems like it will never end. Perhaps that's how many of the soldiers felt in the terrible tragedies that formed so much of this time for so many people.
In my view, the best parts of the book involve the strategic considerations faced by the military and political leadership, and particularly the last few months of the war when the country, satisfied with the victory in Europe, was having some apparent difficultly balancing between bringing soldiers home, re-establishing the civilian economy, and winning the war against Japan. The authors present the case that the invasion of Japan, at last not needed because of the development and use of atomic weapons, may either not have occurred (blockade being the alternative strategy) or, had it occurred, may not have met with success.
Even though very detailed, the description of the island-by-island battles was much more difficult to wade through. The authors give what seems to be a brief account of the combat experience of every division, brigade, regiment, and often company or platoon in each of the battles. To be sure, the soldiers and sailors and marines in each of these conflicts deserves to be honored and remembered. But the writing is difficult, sometimes repetitive, and requires much focus to complete. There are several maps - but most are barely adequate with limited information, and many, many more maps with far more detail would have allowed the reader to follow the action and improved the presentation significantly.
In closing, although by no means an expert on WWII, I have read extensively in this arena, and despite some of its shortcomings, I must say that this text has added quite a bit to my understanding of the war.
November 25, 2020
World War II in the Pacific is receiving renewed interest from popular historians. Now that the generation that fought World War II is rapidly disappearing, individual recollections of the conflict by those who saw and lived it first hand are rare. Authors like Heinrichs and Gallicchio and Ian Toll have stepped into this vacuum with excellent narratives.
Implacable Foes captures the intensity of the fighting during the final months of the war. The intensity stands in stark contrast to the war in Europe. Both theaters were brutal killing fields for those fighting as well as the civilian populations. Yet in terms of pure, hateful killing, these authors demonstrate how awful the fighting in the Pacific was, with the Japanese refusing to surrender and fighting to the death, and the Americans taking increasingly large numbers of casualties while wiping the enemy out.
The taking of Manila is a demonstration of why the word ‘implacable’ in the book’s title is so fitting. In gaining the city, the Americans destroyed it while the Japanese ruthlessly murdered civilians and fought to the death. The authors’ descriptions of the fighting show the down right futility and inhumanity of all out war. Yet, the American firebombing of Japanese cities was equally heinous.
An excellent account of the Japanese use of Kamikazes is presented. What sticks with me was how effective the Japanese attacks were, and their conventional attacks on American shipping as well. If the Japanese homeland would have been invaded, Kamikaze attacks would have exacted a heavy toll on the allies.
Implacable Foes captures the intensity of the fighting during the final months of the war. The intensity stands in stark contrast to the war in Europe. Both theaters were brutal killing fields for those fighting as well as the civilian populations. Yet in terms of pure, hateful killing, these authors demonstrate how awful the fighting in the Pacific was, with the Japanese refusing to surrender and fighting to the death, and the Americans taking increasingly large numbers of casualties while wiping the enemy out.
The taking of Manila is a demonstration of why the word ‘implacable’ in the book’s title is so fitting. In gaining the city, the Americans destroyed it while the Japanese ruthlessly murdered civilians and fought to the death. The authors’ descriptions of the fighting show the down right futility and inhumanity of all out war. Yet, the American firebombing of Japanese cities was equally heinous.
An excellent account of the Japanese use of Kamikazes is presented. What sticks with me was how effective the Japanese attacks were, and their conventional attacks on American shipping as well. If the Japanese homeland would have been invaded, Kamikaze attacks would have exacted a heavy toll on the allies.
August 3, 2021
Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific. 1944-1945 by Waldo Heinrich's and Marc Gallicchio was an outstanding book on the final years on the war in the Pacific.
Without the notes it comes in at under 600 pages and it covers the gambit of the war, including the different campaigns led by the Army and the Navy, the impact of wants and need of the home front ranging from politics, the economy and the transition from wartime to peace and the feelings of the civilian sector.
The book goes into detail in the impact of releasing high point men from service primarily in Europe but also in the Pacific and rotating them home while also gearing up for the final stages of the Pacific Campaign and the difficulties in doing both simultaneously. The book goes deeply in the position of unconditional surrender and the division on modifying it especially in relation to the Emperor and the impact of the Atomic bomb on the decision.
The personalities of Nimitz, MacArthur, Marshall, King, Leahy, Truman and others both in and out of the administration and congress are clarified and dwelled into.
A wonderful addition to the field and a must read.
Without the notes it comes in at under 600 pages and it covers the gambit of the war, including the different campaigns led by the Army and the Navy, the impact of wants and need of the home front ranging from politics, the economy and the transition from wartime to peace and the feelings of the civilian sector.
The book goes into detail in the impact of releasing high point men from service primarily in Europe but also in the Pacific and rotating them home while also gearing up for the final stages of the Pacific Campaign and the difficulties in doing both simultaneously. The book goes deeply in the position of unconditional surrender and the division on modifying it especially in relation to the Emperor and the impact of the Atomic bomb on the decision.
The personalities of Nimitz, MacArthur, Marshall, King, Leahy, Truman and others both in and out of the administration and congress are clarified and dwelled into.
A wonderful addition to the field and a must read.
April 27, 2019
Nicely researched but too much filler
This book could’ve been written with half the pages if the details of every island battle had been omitted. This is not just a big picture narrative but also goes into extreme detail not very relevant to the outcome of the war. There are also not enough stories of the different actors that were instrumental in winning this war. Most annoying was the play-by-play description of how each major island was conquered. Way too much detail! Overall however, it does give a very thorough analysis of the 1944 to 1945 period of the war in the Pacific. If you are the kind of reader that has read a lot about this subject, you will find too much repetition. On the other hand, if this is your first book about the Pacific war, you might enjoy it provided that you can keep reading through the detail of the different island battles.
This book could’ve been written with half the pages if the details of every island battle had been omitted. This is not just a big picture narrative but also goes into extreme detail not very relevant to the outcome of the war. There are also not enough stories of the different actors that were instrumental in winning this war. Most annoying was the play-by-play description of how each major island was conquered. Way too much detail! Overall however, it does give a very thorough analysis of the 1944 to 1945 period of the war in the Pacific. If you are the kind of reader that has read a lot about this subject, you will find too much repetition. On the other hand, if this is your first book about the Pacific war, you might enjoy it provided that you can keep reading through the detail of the different island battles.
January 3, 2024
Finally finished this! Implacable Foes is a thorough and richly detailed account of the US role in the final years of World War II’s Pacific Theater. I never thought I’d say this—but I think it’s actually too detailed. The book is plainly very deeply researched and makes its points well, but it sometimes gets bogged down in overly granular or repetitive discussions, especially when going in-depth on exactly which units were fighting where and when, and when discussing economic and military planning between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. There’s a lot of compelling detail here, and it was interesting to see so much of the high-level war strategy, but I found the book tougher to get through than other books that have a ground-level view of the Pacific War.
February 2, 2023
I read this book in fits and starts--the opening is great, as is the conclusion, but the middle parts can be a slog, like the Pacific war itself during the period covered. This is perhaps the only WWII book I've read that covers events all the way from the White House and the Pentagon down to platoons fighting on Pacific islands and sailors putting out fires from kamikaze attacks. Where the going got toughest for me was in the precise descriptions of terrain on islands that I really wanted to see in the form of topographic maps, but perhaps that is an exercise left to the reader. There just weren't enough maps in the book, nor enough detail in the maps, to truly satisfy me.
November 10, 2018
Amazon new facts
The depth and the details are outstanding.
Gives new appreciation to the complexity of the war in the Pacific, and how to end that war. Some if not all of this should be taught in high school and college. While the decision to drop the Bomb is not without controversy, this book gives new insight and depth to that decision.
I need more books like this !
The depth and the details are outstanding.
Gives new appreciation to the complexity of the war in the Pacific, and how to end that war. Some if not all of this should be taught in high school and college. While the decision to drop the Bomb is not without controversy, this book gives new insight and depth to that decision.
I need more books like this !
January 24, 2018
Incredibly detailed account of the Pacific theater. Somewhat overwhelming in detail, and could have used more reference points, such as maps.
February 7, 2022
A definitive account, albeit an exhaustive one, of the final years of battle in the Pacific in WWII.
April 26, 2025
Very interesting. A lot of the uncertainty and squabbles of 1945 have been elided from the popular historical record.
March 25, 2021
Exhaustively researched.
Exceptionally written.
Extraordinarly tragic and true.
As a note to anyone who may be considering assigning this book, I would not recommend it for undergraduates. It is exhaustive in its scope, despite focusing on one theater and one year. Rather, this is for the most focused WWII scholars. I would recommend the book for historical context to anyone studying the campaigns that were a part of the Pacific Theater of WWII, but not for a general readings course on military history or US history.
Exceptionally written.
Extraordinarly tragic and true.
As a note to anyone who may be considering assigning this book, I would not recommend it for undergraduates. It is exhaustive in its scope, despite focusing on one theater and one year. Rather, this is for the most focused WWII scholars. I would recommend the book for historical context to anyone studying the campaigns that were a part of the Pacific Theater of WWII, but not for a general readings course on military history or US history.
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May 28, 2022Great summary of the Pacific War
This is an excellent synopsis of th last two years of the war in the Pacific. It looks at the situation on a strategic/operational basis while paying close attention to the war weary public. In particular the horror that many felt after the Okinawa and Iwo Jima's battles is reflected in the author's analysis of the home front particularly the desire to get the troops back home after VE day and get back to a peace time economy. I would have given it 5 stars but I felt they needed a few more maps. But overall an outstanding book.
This is an excellent synopsis of th last two years of the war in the Pacific. It looks at the situation on a strategic/operational basis while paying close attention to the war weary public. In particular the horror that many felt after the Okinawa and Iwo Jima's battles is reflected in the author's analysis of the home front particularly the desire to get the troops back home after VE day and get back to a peace time economy. I would have given it 5 stars but I felt they needed a few more maps. But overall an outstanding book.
Want to read
July 19, 2017from dad
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