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Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium
This book evaluates the life and empire of the pivotal yet controversial Byzantine emperor Heraclius (ad. 610-641), a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. His stormy war-torn reign is critical for understanding the background to fundamental changes in the Balkans and the Middle East, including the emergence of Islam. Heraclius' skills enabled him to capture and recapture important territory, including Jerusalem, Syria and Egypt. Yet, they proved to be of little value when he confronted early Islamic conquests.
372 pages, Hardcover
First published April 21, 2003
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About the author
Walter Emil Kaegi Jr.
10 books7 followersWalter Emil Kaegi is a historian and scholar of Byzantine History, professor of history at the University of Chicago, and a Voting Member of The Oriental Institute. He received his PhD from Harvard University in 1965. He is known for his researches on the period from the fourth through eleventh centuries with a special interest in the advance of Islam, interactions with religion and thought, and military subjects. Kaegi is also distinguished for analyzing the Late Roman period in European and Mediterranean context, and has written extensively on Roman, Vandal, Byzantine and Muslim occupation of North Africa. He is known also as the co-founder of the Byzantine Studies Conference and the editor of the journal Byzantinische Forschungen.
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September 26, 2013
This is the first biography of Heraclius in over a century, and the first ever in English. That a biography was worth writing should be clear from the book’s cover note:
“This book evaluates the life and times of the pivotal yet controversial and poorly understood Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (AD 610-641), a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. Heraclius’ reign is critical for understanding the background to fundamental changes in the Balkans and the Middle East, including the emergence of Islam, at the end of Antiquity.”
Though few in England know of him, Heraclius is one of the most astonishing figures in history. Except they are true, the facts of his life read like something out of legend. He seized power in 610 just as the Persians were turning their war with the Empire from a set of opportunistic raids into an attempt at its destruction. During the next ten years, every Imperial frontier crumbled. After a thousand years of control by Greeks, or by Greeks and Romans, Persia and Egypt fell to the Persians.. The Slavs and Avars took most of Greece. The Lombards and Visigoths nibbled away at the remaining European provinces in the West. Africa aside, the Empire was reduced to a core that covered roughly the same area as modern Turkey.
Suddenly, after a decade of seeming inactivity, Heraclius went on the offensive and struck deep inside the Persian Empire. In a series of brilliant campaigns, he shattered the Persians and won everything back. In 629, he went in triumph to Jerusalem and restored the fragment of the True Cross that had been taken by the Persians. It seemed to be the start of a new age of Roman greatness, in which its absolutely triumphant Emperor – the new Alexander – could remake the world as he pleased.
Five years later, and without warning, the Moslems streamed out of the desert and took Syria. Another few years, and they took Egypt. By the time he died, Heraclius had lost nearly every one of the regained territories. And these were now permanently lost. From the ashes of the Eastern Roman Empire would emerge the Byzantine state and society in much the same form as they preserved down to 1204.
You can hardly go wrong in telling the story. Gibbon did it well. So did Finlay. So did Oman. So did many in the 20th century. I have now written six novels set in seventh century Byzantium, and you really have to work hard not to convey something of how remarkable the age was. Yet, for all his undoubted mastery of the sources in at least four languages, Walter E. Kaegi makes an embarrassingly good effort at draining all sense of wonder from the story.
First, there is the writing of the book. It begins well enough – even if the discussion of possible Armenian origins soon outstays its welcome. After a few dozen pages, though, the narrative breaks down into a mass of repetitions. Look at this:
“Both antagonists remained on the battlefield after the combat. Byzantine cavalrymen watered their horses to arrow-shots’ distance from the Persian horsemen, who watched over their dead until the seventh hour of the night. (p.162)
“At the end of the battle of Nineveh, after the stripping of the dead, and while the Zoroastrian Persians watched over their dead for a minimal observance of respect, the Byzantines, at a distance of two arrow-shots (approximately 266 or 600 meters), watered and fed their horses.” (p.163)
“After defeat, the Persians, in what was a kind of standoff, having lost 6,000 men, kept a watch over the corpses of their dead…, following Zoroastrian strictures, but for a more limited duration, for one-fifth or so of a day (probably an abbreviated watch for military exingencies). (p.169)
These repetitions are carried to the point where I suspect that Professor Kaegi, over many years, jotted his thoughts onto postcards, and wrote his book by arranging the cards into loose order and not revising anything at all. Apart from looking incompetent, he manages to ruin any sense of narrative.
Then we have continual assertions of what might have been, but for which we have little or no evidence. For example:
“Heraclius probably used the threat of abandoning Constantinople for Africa to help persuade the Patriarch Sergios and the clergy and the Constantinopolitan public to accept, or be resigned to, the forced loan of ecclesiastical plate and to accept other extraordinary governmental measures.” (p.111)
This might have happened. There is nothing wrong with asking what might have been in history. I do this all the time in my novels. I see no reason why historians should refuse to speculate. For Professor Kaegi, however, it seems to have crowded out many things that should have gone into his book.
He does not give a clear overview of the Orthodox and Monophysite dispute about the nature of Christ. Nor does he show how the Monothelite compromise was an attempt at shutting down almost two centuries of rancorous debate. The omission is a grave fault, as there was no boundary in this age between religion and politics. Possibly one reason why Syria and Egypt fell so easily once the Persians broke through the frontiers was that the Semites largely believed in a single nature for Christ and the Greeks did not. Each side saw the other as heretical. This may also have allowed a shared outlook with the Arabs when they invaded. Why Greek hegemony collapsed so easily in Syria and Egypt cannot be explained by any single cause. But religion was one of the important causes.
Again, there is no systematic or ultimately meaningful discussion of how the Empire twice managed to survive the loss of Syria and Egypt. These had always been rich territories, contributing much in taxes and manpower. And Egypt, for over 600 years, had been sending around seven million bushels of corn every year, first to Rome, then to Constantinople. The corn was sold or given to the people. It fed armies on campaign. It was handed out as bribes to allies or enemies. How did the Empire get over this loss? What effect might it have had on the population of Constantinople? How far might the numbers have declined? To what extent might the Imperial capital have become less parasitic?
Above all perhaps, there is the brief mention of an anomaly that I have long wondered about, but no discussion of how this might transform our understanding of Byzantium during and after the reign of Heraclius. Back in the third century, the undivided Empire had faced increased pressure on two fronts – the arrival of the Goths on the Rhine and Danube, and the Persian revival in the East. By and large, the frontiers were held. But there was a fiscal crisis that led to debasement of the silver coinage. Though the frontiers simply collapsed after 602, the gold coinage was not debased. Indeed, in 615 – between the loss of Syria and of Egypt – the silver coinage was stabilised for the first time, and the new standard lasted for centuries. What was going on? The established narrative is one of catastrophic decline, only briefly arrested, and only finally overcome by internal recovery and the decay of Islamic power. But hard money has no place in this narrative. Professor Kaegi writes much about forced loans of plate from the Church, and secular confiscations. But I do not see how these could account for a bimetallic stability that lasted though all the interlocking crises of the seventh century and beyond.
Now, my credentials for announcing new theories are slight. I am a novelist. I have not spent a lifetime studying Byzantium. On the other hand, I am reasonably competent in the two classical languages, and have read all the Greek and Latin literary sources, either in the original or in translation. I have read my way through most of the Dumbarton Oaks conference papers, and dozens of other journal articles. I have read many of the relevant archaeological reports, and the main overviews of the numismatic and epigraphic sources. In saying what I think, I have some right to a hearing.
I suspect is that the seventh century was far less disastrous than the subsequent historians have claimed. The real collapse happened in the middle of the sixth century, when bubonic plague killed over a third of the Mediterranean population. It was now that Syria and Egypt lost their Greek elites, and ceased to contribute anything meaningful to the Empire. They remained attached only so long as no other power was able to detach them. The Empire itself retreated into its “Turkish” core. Within this, a largely Greek and mostly Orthodox population slowly recovered. It was barely touched by the Persian and Arab wars, and was always able to provide sufficient armies and taxes to defend the core. Syria and Egypt could be recovered from the Persians because they were overstretched, and Heraclius was clever enough in the end to defeat them inside Persia with minimal forces. Recovering territory from the Arabs was another matter – but the Arabs never broke for long into the core.
If we assume that the mediaeval Byzantine Empire had already come into being by the time Justinian died in 565, the reverses of the next century were less a disaster than somewhere between an embarrassment and a blessing. Perhaps the currency was never debased because no one in government was that concerned about the lost territories.
But let me return to the book in question. It would have been useful had it contained a discussion of the decay of Latin in the Empire, and its replacement by Greek as the official language. Professor Kaegi does mention the change in the Imperial titles from something long and pompous and very Roman to the simple Pisteuos en Christo Basileus. But there is no sense here of how one civilisation is giving way to another. George of Pisidia is used as a source. But we are not told that he wrote his epic in iambic trimeter rather than the traditional hexameters. That would have led us into the interesting matter of how Greek was spoken in the seventh century, and the relationship between the living and the increasingly distant exemplars on whom they tried to base themselves. I suppose you can find all this in Warren Treadgold. You can certainly find it in the Dumbarton Oaks papers. But a biography of Heraclius without any of the cultural background is of doubtful value.
To be fair, the book does have its good points. There are excellent notes and a comprehensive bibliography. Also, Professor Kaegi tells me things about the campaigns in Persia that I did not know. He locates and describes the battlefields. No one else has done this. Also, I had supposed that Heraclius won annihilating victories. In fact, he won a series of what amount to skirmishes, relying on diplomacy and the terror of his name to bring an already exhausted Persia crumbling into dust. And, better than anyone else has, this explains why he failed to stop the Arabs. Unlike the Persians, they needed annihilating defeats that were not possible given the resources available. Or their generals needed to be bribed or tricked into treason against the Caliph in ways that the fellowship of early Islamic civilisation made impossible. If you persist with this book, you will not come away empty handed.
On the whole, however, the book is disappointing. It could have been so much better. Perhaps it will be – if only it can be rewritten for a second edition.
“This book evaluates the life and times of the pivotal yet controversial and poorly understood Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (AD 610-641), a contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. Heraclius’ reign is critical for understanding the background to fundamental changes in the Balkans and the Middle East, including the emergence of Islam, at the end of Antiquity.”
Though few in England know of him, Heraclius is one of the most astonishing figures in history. Except they are true, the facts of his life read like something out of legend. He seized power in 610 just as the Persians were turning their war with the Empire from a set of opportunistic raids into an attempt at its destruction. During the next ten years, every Imperial frontier crumbled. After a thousand years of control by Greeks, or by Greeks and Romans, Persia and Egypt fell to the Persians.. The Slavs and Avars took most of Greece. The Lombards and Visigoths nibbled away at the remaining European provinces in the West. Africa aside, the Empire was reduced to a core that covered roughly the same area as modern Turkey.
Suddenly, after a decade of seeming inactivity, Heraclius went on the offensive and struck deep inside the Persian Empire. In a series of brilliant campaigns, he shattered the Persians and won everything back. In 629, he went in triumph to Jerusalem and restored the fragment of the True Cross that had been taken by the Persians. It seemed to be the start of a new age of Roman greatness, in which its absolutely triumphant Emperor – the new Alexander – could remake the world as he pleased.
Five years later, and without warning, the Moslems streamed out of the desert and took Syria. Another few years, and they took Egypt. By the time he died, Heraclius had lost nearly every one of the regained territories. And these were now permanently lost. From the ashes of the Eastern Roman Empire would emerge the Byzantine state and society in much the same form as they preserved down to 1204.
You can hardly go wrong in telling the story. Gibbon did it well. So did Finlay. So did Oman. So did many in the 20th century. I have now written six novels set in seventh century Byzantium, and you really have to work hard not to convey something of how remarkable the age was. Yet, for all his undoubted mastery of the sources in at least four languages, Walter E. Kaegi makes an embarrassingly good effort at draining all sense of wonder from the story.
First, there is the writing of the book. It begins well enough – even if the discussion of possible Armenian origins soon outstays its welcome. After a few dozen pages, though, the narrative breaks down into a mass of repetitions. Look at this:
“Both antagonists remained on the battlefield after the combat. Byzantine cavalrymen watered their horses to arrow-shots’ distance from the Persian horsemen, who watched over their dead until the seventh hour of the night. (p.162)
“At the end of the battle of Nineveh, after the stripping of the dead, and while the Zoroastrian Persians watched over their dead for a minimal observance of respect, the Byzantines, at a distance of two arrow-shots (approximately 266 or 600 meters), watered and fed their horses.” (p.163)
“After defeat, the Persians, in what was a kind of standoff, having lost 6,000 men, kept a watch over the corpses of their dead…, following Zoroastrian strictures, but for a more limited duration, for one-fifth or so of a day (probably an abbreviated watch for military exingencies). (p.169)
These repetitions are carried to the point where I suspect that Professor Kaegi, over many years, jotted his thoughts onto postcards, and wrote his book by arranging the cards into loose order and not revising anything at all. Apart from looking incompetent, he manages to ruin any sense of narrative.
Then we have continual assertions of what might have been, but for which we have little or no evidence. For example:
“Heraclius probably used the threat of abandoning Constantinople for Africa to help persuade the Patriarch Sergios and the clergy and the Constantinopolitan public to accept, or be resigned to, the forced loan of ecclesiastical plate and to accept other extraordinary governmental measures.” (p.111)
This might have happened. There is nothing wrong with asking what might have been in history. I do this all the time in my novels. I see no reason why historians should refuse to speculate. For Professor Kaegi, however, it seems to have crowded out many things that should have gone into his book.
He does not give a clear overview of the Orthodox and Monophysite dispute about the nature of Christ. Nor does he show how the Monothelite compromise was an attempt at shutting down almost two centuries of rancorous debate. The omission is a grave fault, as there was no boundary in this age between religion and politics. Possibly one reason why Syria and Egypt fell so easily once the Persians broke through the frontiers was that the Semites largely believed in a single nature for Christ and the Greeks did not. Each side saw the other as heretical. This may also have allowed a shared outlook with the Arabs when they invaded. Why Greek hegemony collapsed so easily in Syria and Egypt cannot be explained by any single cause. But religion was one of the important causes.
Again, there is no systematic or ultimately meaningful discussion of how the Empire twice managed to survive the loss of Syria and Egypt. These had always been rich territories, contributing much in taxes and manpower. And Egypt, for over 600 years, had been sending around seven million bushels of corn every year, first to Rome, then to Constantinople. The corn was sold or given to the people. It fed armies on campaign. It was handed out as bribes to allies or enemies. How did the Empire get over this loss? What effect might it have had on the population of Constantinople? How far might the numbers have declined? To what extent might the Imperial capital have become less parasitic?
Above all perhaps, there is the brief mention of an anomaly that I have long wondered about, but no discussion of how this might transform our understanding of Byzantium during and after the reign of Heraclius. Back in the third century, the undivided Empire had faced increased pressure on two fronts – the arrival of the Goths on the Rhine and Danube, and the Persian revival in the East. By and large, the frontiers were held. But there was a fiscal crisis that led to debasement of the silver coinage. Though the frontiers simply collapsed after 602, the gold coinage was not debased. Indeed, in 615 – between the loss of Syria and of Egypt – the silver coinage was stabilised for the first time, and the new standard lasted for centuries. What was going on? The established narrative is one of catastrophic decline, only briefly arrested, and only finally overcome by internal recovery and the decay of Islamic power. But hard money has no place in this narrative. Professor Kaegi writes much about forced loans of plate from the Church, and secular confiscations. But I do not see how these could account for a bimetallic stability that lasted though all the interlocking crises of the seventh century and beyond.
Now, my credentials for announcing new theories are slight. I am a novelist. I have not spent a lifetime studying Byzantium. On the other hand, I am reasonably competent in the two classical languages, and have read all the Greek and Latin literary sources, either in the original or in translation. I have read my way through most of the Dumbarton Oaks conference papers, and dozens of other journal articles. I have read many of the relevant archaeological reports, and the main overviews of the numismatic and epigraphic sources. In saying what I think, I have some right to a hearing.
I suspect is that the seventh century was far less disastrous than the subsequent historians have claimed. The real collapse happened in the middle of the sixth century, when bubonic plague killed over a third of the Mediterranean population. It was now that Syria and Egypt lost their Greek elites, and ceased to contribute anything meaningful to the Empire. They remained attached only so long as no other power was able to detach them. The Empire itself retreated into its “Turkish” core. Within this, a largely Greek and mostly Orthodox population slowly recovered. It was barely touched by the Persian and Arab wars, and was always able to provide sufficient armies and taxes to defend the core. Syria and Egypt could be recovered from the Persians because they were overstretched, and Heraclius was clever enough in the end to defeat them inside Persia with minimal forces. Recovering territory from the Arabs was another matter – but the Arabs never broke for long into the core.
If we assume that the mediaeval Byzantine Empire had already come into being by the time Justinian died in 565, the reverses of the next century were less a disaster than somewhere between an embarrassment and a blessing. Perhaps the currency was never debased because no one in government was that concerned about the lost territories.
But let me return to the book in question. It would have been useful had it contained a discussion of the decay of Latin in the Empire, and its replacement by Greek as the official language. Professor Kaegi does mention the change in the Imperial titles from something long and pompous and very Roman to the simple Pisteuos en Christo Basileus. But there is no sense here of how one civilisation is giving way to another. George of Pisidia is used as a source. But we are not told that he wrote his epic in iambic trimeter rather than the traditional hexameters. That would have led us into the interesting matter of how Greek was spoken in the seventh century, and the relationship between the living and the increasingly distant exemplars on whom they tried to base themselves. I suppose you can find all this in Warren Treadgold. You can certainly find it in the Dumbarton Oaks papers. But a biography of Heraclius without any of the cultural background is of doubtful value.
To be fair, the book does have its good points. There are excellent notes and a comprehensive bibliography. Also, Professor Kaegi tells me things about the campaigns in Persia that I did not know. He locates and describes the battlefields. No one else has done this. Also, I had supposed that Heraclius won annihilating victories. In fact, he won a series of what amount to skirmishes, relying on diplomacy and the terror of his name to bring an already exhausted Persia crumbling into dust. And, better than anyone else has, this explains why he failed to stop the Arabs. Unlike the Persians, they needed annihilating defeats that were not possible given the resources available. Or their generals needed to be bribed or tricked into treason against the Caliph in ways that the fellowship of early Islamic civilisation made impossible. If you persist with this book, you will not come away empty handed.
On the whole, however, the book is disappointing. It could have been so much better. Perhaps it will be – if only it can be rewritten for a second edition.
January 24, 2017
In some ways, this can be considered a prequel to Kaegi's Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests as it is an extensively detailed history and biography of the dominant figure in Byzantium during the early part of the seventh century, focusing primarily on Herakleios and the war against the Persians. As usual, Kaegi starts off with a solid discussion of the sources and the problems that they pose. The next chapter goes on to discuss Herakleios' early life in Armenia and Africa, as well as the rebellion against Phokas and the difficulty in knowing much about the early years of Herakleios' reign. The combination of the success of the Persians during that time and the extensive taint of the later sources by Herakleian propaganda tend to make that time quite obscure. Kaegi makes some interesting points about Herakleios' involvement in religious affairs and his attempt to make his mark on the city. The next chapter turns more directly to Herakleios' role in the war against the Persians and begins in 622, demonstrating how Herakleios now had a solid enough base to personally move out against the Persians, the first emperor to directly head for war with the intention of fighting in it since the time of Theodosius I at the end of the fourth century. The next chapter deals with Herakleios' dealings in Armenia with the Kok Turks and Armenians and his preparation to deal with the Persians, as well as the Persian siege of Constantinople. The political wranglings that took place in Armenia are particularly interesting and I have not seen them covered so well before. The following chapters deals with the actual invasion of Mesopotamia and the peace settlements made with the Persian commanders after Herakleios' victory and the fall of Khusrau II. Here Kaegi does an excellent job of piecing together events that are rather confusing in the sources. The next chapter deals with a variety of things - the change in Herakleios' title, things that he built, the persecution of the Jews, and the triumph motif that appears in the sources. The last two chapters deal with Herakleios and the early Arab conquests. They are a good companion to Kaegi's other book on the subject, which I mentioned above. There is a great deal of important content in this book, and by no means is it just a rote history of the reign. Kaegi's analysis is excellent, even if major questions are sometime left unanswered. There is no doubt that this will be the standard work on Herakleios for some time to come.
The focus on the military narrative, however, means that if we consider this to be a biopgraphy, it is not well-balanced. Major questions are only dealt with superficially or left unanswered. Kaegi seems to have little interest in Herakleios' marriage to his niece Martina, despite the sources' frequent condemnation of this act. Did Herakleios have some political motive, or was it really done out of affection? Kaegi provides no insight. He also fails to fully address the question of Herakleios' threat to the people of Constantinople that he would move the capital west. Kaegi calls it a ploy, but Constans II moved the capital to Syracuse briefly later in the century, so it was clearly a realistic possibility. As many other reviewers have mentioned, Kaegi's writing is quite bad. He repeats himself, changes themes frequently, and often gives important topics too little discussion. While it is extremely important and useful, this book is a tedious read and is not for the casual reader looking for a general biography of one of Byzantium's most recognizable names.
The focus on the military narrative, however, means that if we consider this to be a biopgraphy, it is not well-balanced. Major questions are only dealt with superficially or left unanswered. Kaegi seems to have little interest in Herakleios' marriage to his niece Martina, despite the sources' frequent condemnation of this act. Did Herakleios have some political motive, or was it really done out of affection? Kaegi provides no insight. He also fails to fully address the question of Herakleios' threat to the people of Constantinople that he would move the capital west. Kaegi calls it a ploy, but Constans II moved the capital to Syracuse briefly later in the century, so it was clearly a realistic possibility. As many other reviewers have mentioned, Kaegi's writing is quite bad. He repeats himself, changes themes frequently, and often gives important topics too little discussion. While it is extremely important and useful, this book is a tedious read and is not for the casual reader looking for a general biography of one of Byzantium's most recognizable names.
October 23, 2013
Dr. Kaegi states in his introduction that a biography of Heraclius has never been written in English. This book fills that void admirably. Dr. Kaegi begins by surveying the existing scholarship on the reign of Heraclius, and the varying interpretations of his legacy, and in so doing, leaves behind the Ostrogorsky paradigm, which was, and still is, an article of faith in most Byzantine survey courses (p. 10). In this brief survey, Dr. Kaegi illustrates the contradictions in the life of this important emperor, and the disagreement among scholars as to his contributions to and influence on seventh century Byzantium (pp. 16-18).
Heraclius's origins are surveyed, and the events closely following the murder of Phocas are detailed. Dr. Kaegi also explains the methods that Heraclius used to legitimize his reign, such as participation in the city and church rituals, which were so important to daily life in Constantinople, as well as possibly encouraging new ceremonies. "Heraclius for his part may have encouraged the development of new rituals and ceremonies because he understood the need to communicate with his subjects" (p. 62). Heraclius also used his children in these ceremonies to encourage the legitimization of his dynasty (p. 63). Dr. Kaegi then goes on to describe the military campaigns against the Persians, culminating in the eventual victory of the Byzantine armies. The author's description and analysis of Heraclius as military commander is the heart of the book. Beginning with chapter 6, the book describes the closing years of Heraclius's reign, and the rise of the Muslim threat. Dr. Kaegi states that the years 628 to 633 "are pivotal for understanding him [Heraclius] and the history of his empire" (p. 193). Heraclius triumphed over the Persians, and gained a religious victory by obtaining possession of the True Cross. He began the monumental task of rebuilding infrastructure and securing Byzantine territory, as the recent conflict had ravaged much of the eastern territories, and resulted in a huge loss of human life. Another challenge was the reinstitution of Byzantine authority in areas such as Syria and Egypt, which had been out of Byzantine control for more than a decade (p. 195), and would prove difficult at best because of demographic disruption (p. 219). The final two chapters of the book describe the actions Heraclius took to fight off the Muslim advance, as well as his attempt to deal with crises close to home. The emperor attempted to summon troops from Numidia to assist in the defense of Egypt because of the absence of any large garrison of Byzantine troops there, but General Peter refused, which shows some of the limits of Heraclius's authority (p. 233). In Heraclius's final years, the Byzantines suffered a string of military reverses at the hands of the Muslims, culminating in the loss of the Holy Land, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and the beginning of the conquest of Egypt. There were also theological divisions over the nature of Christ, a renewed financial crisis, and a succession dispute between the children from his first and second wives. In evaluating the life of Heraclius, Dr. Kaegi list thirteen major crises that the emperor faced throughout his life, as well as evaluating his performance as both a military commander and politician, and ties it all together in a solid conclusion.
Dr. Kaegi marshals an impressive list of primary sources in Greek, Latin, and Arabic, and provides an extensive bibliography, as well as several maps showing military movements. Overall, this is a good, solid work on a much studied, and much misunderstood, period in Byzantine history.
Heraclius's origins are surveyed, and the events closely following the murder of Phocas are detailed. Dr. Kaegi also explains the methods that Heraclius used to legitimize his reign, such as participation in the city and church rituals, which were so important to daily life in Constantinople, as well as possibly encouraging new ceremonies. "Heraclius for his part may have encouraged the development of new rituals and ceremonies because he understood the need to communicate with his subjects" (p. 62). Heraclius also used his children in these ceremonies to encourage the legitimization of his dynasty (p. 63). Dr. Kaegi then goes on to describe the military campaigns against the Persians, culminating in the eventual victory of the Byzantine armies. The author's description and analysis of Heraclius as military commander is the heart of the book. Beginning with chapter 6, the book describes the closing years of Heraclius's reign, and the rise of the Muslim threat. Dr. Kaegi states that the years 628 to 633 "are pivotal for understanding him [Heraclius] and the history of his empire" (p. 193). Heraclius triumphed over the Persians, and gained a religious victory by obtaining possession of the True Cross. He began the monumental task of rebuilding infrastructure and securing Byzantine territory, as the recent conflict had ravaged much of the eastern territories, and resulted in a huge loss of human life. Another challenge was the reinstitution of Byzantine authority in areas such as Syria and Egypt, which had been out of Byzantine control for more than a decade (p. 195), and would prove difficult at best because of demographic disruption (p. 219). The final two chapters of the book describe the actions Heraclius took to fight off the Muslim advance, as well as his attempt to deal with crises close to home. The emperor attempted to summon troops from Numidia to assist in the defense of Egypt because of the absence of any large garrison of Byzantine troops there, but General Peter refused, which shows some of the limits of Heraclius's authority (p. 233). In Heraclius's final years, the Byzantines suffered a string of military reverses at the hands of the Muslims, culminating in the loss of the Holy Land, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and the beginning of the conquest of Egypt. There were also theological divisions over the nature of Christ, a renewed financial crisis, and a succession dispute between the children from his first and second wives. In evaluating the life of Heraclius, Dr. Kaegi list thirteen major crises that the emperor faced throughout his life, as well as evaluating his performance as both a military commander and politician, and ties it all together in a solid conclusion.
Dr. Kaegi marshals an impressive list of primary sources in Greek, Latin, and Arabic, and provides an extensive bibliography, as well as several maps showing military movements. Overall, this is a good, solid work on a much studied, and much misunderstood, period in Byzantine history.
April 20, 2021
What a lost opportunity this book is. Dealing with one of the most fascinating and influential but poorly known figures of Late Antiquity, here is the first fully dedicated biography in English but Kaegi has made a serious hash of it. The narrative is all over the place and I seriously doubt anyone read it properly before it was published. Often he will mention an event then repeat it almost with the same wording a page or so later. It's a garbled stream of consciousness vaguely stitched together which makes a confusing period even more confusing. The subject matter is enthralling but he leaves the reader frustrated and bewildered. I can only wish someone like Tom Holland can seize this material and make it into the glittering tale of heroism and despair it deserves to be.
October 23, 2013
This may be the first biography in English on Heraclius and pretty much the only one currently easily available, but it is remarkable how such an interesting life can be made so boring.
The book is clearly written by somebody that lives and breathed the Byzantine Empire and the literature on it, but the book assumes that so is the reader and that makes it a hard read at times, as one is forever running to the library and following the rest of the argument through some academic journal or other. Add to that sections that repeat themselves, but come to contradictory outcomes and the enjoyment of the book is much diminished. What a pity.
The book is clearly written by somebody that lives and breathed the Byzantine Empire and the literature on it, but the book assumes that so is the reader and that makes it a hard read at times, as one is forever running to the library and following the rest of the argument through some academic journal or other. Add to that sections that repeat themselves, but come to contradictory outcomes and the enjoyment of the book is much diminished. What a pity.
January 6, 2023
This is a scholarly book written by a historian. The most recent biography written about Heraclius, it is informative and thorough. It is not, unfortunately, a page turner. If Dr Kaegi, whom the world lost this year, would have combined his unparalleled depth of Byzantine history with a person with a talent for story telling, this could have been masterful. I don't mind reading dry books for information and really wanted to learn about Heraclius, so I enjoyed it. . . but be warned.
May 1, 2008
Heroic story of this emperor's humble beginnings in Africa, spectacular defeat and destruction of the Persian Empire and religion and his eventual fall from power. This should be a movie!
February 13, 2023
While the author's content is generally ok (he is an expert in the field), his presentation is horrible. The book reads as if he wrote each paragraph independently and then just slapped them together to be a book--so much repetition; so much inconsistency (especially in names).
Anyone writing about Heraclius is going to face the source problem--our sources are not great (although better than for some other topics of Byzantine history) and are often late. And the author never really provides his own analysis/evaluation of the major sources for Heraclius. The real problem, though, is that Kaegi asks a variety of speculative questions that just can't be answered by the sources, but instead of passing over them in silence (i.e. leaving them out of the book), he asks them and then says something like, 'we don't/cannot know...' or 'there is no record about how Heraclius felt about...' Or he offers rampant speculation on the issue. It makes for a frustrating reading experience.
If you have to know about Heraclius (because you're a scholar of this period), then I suppose you will have to read this book (there's nothing else out there like it), but if you're not, I cannot recommend this book to you. If you're an aspiring popular history writer, there is definitely an opening for a better-told biography of this important and potentially fascinating Byzantine emperor.
Anyone writing about Heraclius is going to face the source problem--our sources are not great (although better than for some other topics of Byzantine history) and are often late. And the author never really provides his own analysis/evaluation of the major sources for Heraclius. The real problem, though, is that Kaegi asks a variety of speculative questions that just can't be answered by the sources, but instead of passing over them in silence (i.e. leaving them out of the book), he asks them and then says something like, 'we don't/cannot know...' or 'there is no record about how Heraclius felt about...' Or he offers rampant speculation on the issue. It makes for a frustrating reading experience.
If you have to know about Heraclius (because you're a scholar of this period), then I suppose you will have to read this book (there's nothing else out there like it), but if you're not, I cannot recommend this book to you. If you're an aspiring popular history writer, there is definitely an opening for a better-told biography of this important and potentially fascinating Byzantine emperor.
January 13, 2022
Felt like there was too much speculation in Heraclius' early life. The invasion of Mesopotamia and the aftermath of the Persian war up to the the Arab conquests was the strongest part of the book.
December 12, 2015
I found this book while browsing through the Byzantine section in my local university's main library. I've been acquainted with Dr. Kaegi's scholarship for a long time and I've always respected his erudition and historical judgement. So, when I saw this book on a rather neglected subject- this is one of the only English studies on Heraclius-, I couldn't resist picking it up.
This neglect of Heraclius, which this volume tries to address, is a, on one level, a bit surprising. Given the importance of this emperor's reign as a turning point in Byzantine and, indeed, world history as well as its dramatic oscilation between near-collapse and delirious victory back to near-collapse, one wonders why it is so neglected. The fault, of course, is in the sources which are both scanty and heavily biased. Heraclius is one of those polarizing historical figures about whom it is really almost impossible to have a lukewarm reaction. On one level, his is the savior of Byzantium against the blood-thirsty tyranny of Phocas and against the mighty Persions, he is also responsible for the near-collapse of Byzantine defences against the Muslims. His reputation with the Church is even more problematic, both as the promoter of Monotheltism as a method to reconcile Chalcedonians and Monophysites and as contracting the 'incestuous' with his first cousin and the succession crises which resulted from that union. Even our scanty sources retain this bifurcated perspective on Heraclius and that makes it difficult to assess his reign, especially in light of the shortage of sources.
Kaegi's main argument about Heraclius is that his successes were not the result of overwelming military force or ability, but rather in his diplomatic and strategic skills in exploiting the factions and divisions in th enemy's camp. His victories in civil wars and, most particularly, in the war against Persian were the result of creating significant defections in the ranks of his enemies which, in turn, caused his enemy's ability to fight to collapse. In the latter war, it was Heraclius neutralization of the main Persian army under Sharbaraz through exploiting that general's differences with the Persian king, that led to his tactical victory at the Battle of Ninevah, the assasination of Krosroes II and the attendant dynastic chaos which followed. However, Heraclius met his match with the early Muslims because he neither had the forces to defeat them and the spectacular unity of the Muslim community in the first generation after Mohammed made it impossible to sow the chaos he needed to sow to slow down the Muslim advance. It is an interesting argument, but one that is difficult to confirm, given the evidence. It does, very elegantly, explain the helplessness of the Byzantines after the Battle of Yarmouk.
Kaegi's book demonstrates an excellent grasp on the sources and a good historical reconstruction of this very important Byzantine emperor.
This neglect of Heraclius, which this volume tries to address, is a, on one level, a bit surprising. Given the importance of this emperor's reign as a turning point in Byzantine and, indeed, world history as well as its dramatic oscilation between near-collapse and delirious victory back to near-collapse, one wonders why it is so neglected. The fault, of course, is in the sources which are both scanty and heavily biased. Heraclius is one of those polarizing historical figures about whom it is really almost impossible to have a lukewarm reaction. On one level, his is the savior of Byzantium against the blood-thirsty tyranny of Phocas and against the mighty Persions, he is also responsible for the near-collapse of Byzantine defences against the Muslims. His reputation with the Church is even more problematic, both as the promoter of Monotheltism as a method to reconcile Chalcedonians and Monophysites and as contracting the 'incestuous' with his first cousin and the succession crises which resulted from that union. Even our scanty sources retain this bifurcated perspective on Heraclius and that makes it difficult to assess his reign, especially in light of the shortage of sources.
Kaegi's main argument about Heraclius is that his successes were not the result of overwelming military force or ability, but rather in his diplomatic and strategic skills in exploiting the factions and divisions in th enemy's camp. His victories in civil wars and, most particularly, in the war against Persian were the result of creating significant defections in the ranks of his enemies which, in turn, caused his enemy's ability to fight to collapse. In the latter war, it was Heraclius neutralization of the main Persian army under Sharbaraz through exploiting that general's differences with the Persian king, that led to his tactical victory at the Battle of Ninevah, the assasination of Krosroes II and the attendant dynastic chaos which followed. However, Heraclius met his match with the early Muslims because he neither had the forces to defeat them and the spectacular unity of the Muslim community in the first generation after Mohammed made it impossible to sow the chaos he needed to sow to slow down the Muslim advance. It is an interesting argument, but one that is difficult to confirm, given the evidence. It does, very elegantly, explain the helplessness of the Byzantines after the Battle of Yarmouk.
Kaegi's book demonstrates an excellent grasp on the sources and a good historical reconstruction of this very important Byzantine emperor.
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