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The Concept of Identity
The book as a whole tackles a cluster of central metaphysical issues in a consistently clear and careful manner. Moreover, Hirsch is pleasantly undogmatic and endeavors to give fair treatment to those views he eventually rejects. His arguments for his own conclusions are frequently all-the-more forceful for that. The standard of argument is high and Hirsch has something interesting to say on every topic he discusses.
- GenresPhilosophy
328 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1982
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August 20, 2018
I Spy With My Little I
A worthwhile excursion in philosophy, accessible with good and imaginative examples and only a small degree of formalism that might put off some readers. Hirsh's topic lies at the root of ontological discourse - what is it about an object that makes it unique, identifiable and discernible from other objects.
According to Hirsh, identity relies on the persistence of objects over time, contiguity over space and articulation, that is distinctiveness from the background. The identifying characteristics of an object are known as sortals, a term originating with John Locke. A sortal is a noun-like property such as "giraffeness" as opposed to adjectival (tall) or adverbial (speedy) which gives an object a category. We then employ persistance , co-location, contiguity and connectedness to discern an object from similar objects of the same kind. In maintaining that an object's identity remains the same over time we allow for discrete changes of non-sortal properties.
The rationals discussed for our assigning an unique identity are conventionalism, empiricism and innate human nature.
Conventionalism simply means that the identification of an object is based on common agreement. To illustrate this possiblity he suggest a language which would describe an "incar", meaning a car that is inside the garage, and an "outcar" - one that is outside the garage. Such a language would describe a car entering a garage as the transformation of an outcar to an incar. One identity to be replaced by another. He then brings up the notion of a villager. Inside the village he would have one identity - outside he would have another. I think Hirsch dismisses this too easily. At home I have one identity - at work I have another. Though I am the same person, it is likely that I am thought of fairly differently in both. Similarly individuals do report a sense of loss of a sense of identity when they retire permanently, or temporarily after child birth or when losing a job.
The discussion of empiricism is rather short. Hirsh talks about Quine's and Eckehart Kohler's notion that the identification we apply to objects is due to sensory exploration of the envirionment. and by agreement of the senses. It is our reaction to objects that is key. Hirsh points out William James's remark "But what are things? Nothing... but special groups of sensible qualities, which happen practically or esthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names." (pp251)
The last notion, innateness, is represented in modern times by W. V Quine who wrote of "body unifying considerations ... are rooted in instinct" pp112 . Here the argument is that we categorize and discern uniqueness not because the universe is what it is, but because we ourselves are designed by nature to view the universe in a particular fashion. Even if there were different conventions that can be applied, it is in our nature to apply only certain conventions.
IMV this beggars the question and subordinates it to verification by experiments in cognitive science rather than a discourse in meaning. It is conventionalism reborn, but the convention is based on our own evolved inner structure.
It's only in the final chapter that Hirsh gets to the notion of the identity of a person or a relationship, and I'd have liked to have seen him take the next step which would be to reflect on the identity of abstractions such as relations, ethnicities and nationalities.
Some of the distinctions that Hirsch makes are perhaps too fine grained to fully appreciate in one reading and take time to assimilate. Interestingly enough, a one of my nephew's friends was involved in a project to identify people and objects as they moved from the range of one surveillance camera to another, so the ability to speak meaningfully about identity does have practical applications.
It's a good book for those interested in, or at least (if you're a student) studying philosophy as Hirsch explains things well and gives good coverage to both classical and modern approaches. Through this book I really enjoyed having Hirsch as a teacher. He's clear, precise and every now and then he has a bit of whimsy - it would have been a pleasure to have learned from him in person.
A worthwhile excursion in philosophy, accessible with good and imaginative examples and only a small degree of formalism that might put off some readers. Hirsh's topic lies at the root of ontological discourse - what is it about an object that makes it unique, identifiable and discernible from other objects.
According to Hirsh, identity relies on the persistence of objects over time, contiguity over space and articulation, that is distinctiveness from the background. The identifying characteristics of an object are known as sortals, a term originating with John Locke. A sortal is a noun-like property such as "giraffeness" as opposed to adjectival (tall) or adverbial (speedy) which gives an object a category. We then employ persistance , co-location, contiguity and connectedness to discern an object from similar objects of the same kind. In maintaining that an object's identity remains the same over time we allow for discrete changes of non-sortal properties.
The rationals discussed for our assigning an unique identity are conventionalism, empiricism and innate human nature.
Conventionalism simply means that the identification of an object is based on common agreement. To illustrate this possiblity he suggest a language which would describe an "incar", meaning a car that is inside the garage, and an "outcar" - one that is outside the garage. Such a language would describe a car entering a garage as the transformation of an outcar to an incar. One identity to be replaced by another. He then brings up the notion of a villager. Inside the village he would have one identity - outside he would have another. I think Hirsch dismisses this too easily. At home I have one identity - at work I have another. Though I am the same person, it is likely that I am thought of fairly differently in both. Similarly individuals do report a sense of loss of a sense of identity when they retire permanently, or temporarily after child birth or when losing a job.
The discussion of empiricism is rather short. Hirsh talks about Quine's and Eckehart Kohler's notion that the identification we apply to objects is due to sensory exploration of the envirionment. and by agreement of the senses. It is our reaction to objects that is key. Hirsh points out William James's remark "But what are things? Nothing... but special groups of sensible qualities, which happen practically or esthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names." (pp251)
The last notion, innateness, is represented in modern times by W. V Quine who wrote of "body unifying considerations ... are rooted in instinct" pp112 . Here the argument is that we categorize and discern uniqueness not because the universe is what it is, but because we ourselves are designed by nature to view the universe in a particular fashion. Even if there were different conventions that can be applied, it is in our nature to apply only certain conventions.
IMV this beggars the question and subordinates it to verification by experiments in cognitive science rather than a discourse in meaning. It is conventionalism reborn, but the convention is based on our own evolved inner structure.
It's only in the final chapter that Hirsh gets to the notion of the identity of a person or a relationship, and I'd have liked to have seen him take the next step which would be to reflect on the identity of abstractions such as relations, ethnicities and nationalities.
Some of the distinctions that Hirsch makes are perhaps too fine grained to fully appreciate in one reading and take time to assimilate. Interestingly enough, a one of my nephew's friends was involved in a project to identify people and objects as they moved from the range of one surveillance camera to another, so the ability to speak meaningfully about identity does have practical applications.
It's a good book for those interested in, or at least (if you're a student) studying philosophy as Hirsch explains things well and gives good coverage to both classical and modern approaches. Through this book I really enjoyed having Hirsch as a teacher. He's clear, precise and every now and then he has a bit of whimsy - it would have been a pleasure to have learned from him in person.
Displaying 1 of 1 review