Révolution dans la révolution

by Régis Debray

Régis Debray studied at the École Normale Supérieure under Louis Althusser, becaming "agrégé de philosophie" in 1965. In the late 1960s he was a professor of philosophy at the University of Havana in Cuba, and became an associate of Che Guevara in Bolivia. He wrote the book Revolution in the Revolution?, which analysed the tactical & strategic doctrines then prevailing among militant socialist movements in Latin America, & acted as a handbook for guerrilla warfare that supplemented Guevara's own manual on the subject. It was published by Maspero in Paris in 1967 & in the same year in New York (Monthly Review Press & Grove), Montevideo (Sandino), Milan (Feltrinelli) & Munich (Trikont). Guevara was captured in Bolivia early in 10/67; on 4/20/67, Debray had been arrested in the small town of Muyupampa, also in Bolivia. Convicted of having been part of Guevara's guerrilla group Debray on 11/17 was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He was released in 1970 after an international campaign for his release which included Jean-Paul Sartre, André Malraux, Général De Gaulle & Pope Paul VI.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, France, Latin American History, Philosophy, Theory

Paperback

First published January 1, 1967

About the author

Intellectual, journalist, government official and professor. He is known for his theorization of mediology, a critical theory of the long-term transmission of cultural meaning in human society; and for having fought in 1967 with Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia.

Reviews

[Devin · Rating 3 out of 5]

I went back and forth while reading this, struggling to figure out if I liked it or couldn't stand to read another page. I hopped on here and read reviews that seemed to agree with me; most of the readers are confused as to how to feel about this book.

Regis Debray got an incredible opportunity: a firsthand experience with Cuban revolutionaries, mainly Che Guevara. His association with Guevara cost him quite a bit of freedom, as he was imprisoned after this book was published. For how long, I am not certain, but I wonder if he revisited this book after his release and sought out any editing or revisions.

Debray consistently slams Marxist-Leninists (of which he is presumably? thought he never officially states) for sticking too close to the line of Communist history up to then; he says that too many Communists are focused on bourgeois parliamentarianism that existed in the days preceding the Bolshevik Revolution, or of the extremely intricate, peasant-based Communism of the Chinese Revolution. He speaks as if Marxist-Leninists are not at least somewhat acquainted with historical materialism; we as Communists (and I myself am a Marxist-Leninist, so I'm speaking to that as well) know that material conditions change as history and therefore, the class struggle, advances. What worked for Marx in 1848, was different than what worked for the Paris Commune in 1871, which was different than what worked for the Bolsheviks in 1917, which was different than what worked for China in 1949, etc etc. Hell, even what worked for the Bolsheviks in 1905 wasn't the same as what worked for them in 1917 -- and we KNOW this (or we should, anyway), because we know that in dialectics, everything is constantly in motion. On one hand, Debray seems to comprehend this, and if his writing style took on more of a warning tone, I would understand, but at times, he seems almost smug, condescending, and patronizing, even going so far as to insulting and criticizing the Bolsheviks and the Red Army-China for their methods of revolutionary work, which, at those specific times, worked for them.

It is roughly in the last 20 or so pages that Debray finally reaches what I consider to be the thesis of this book: conditions in Latin america are different than they have been anywhere else, and thus, the rise of Communism in Latin america, has been different, namely that what worked in the Cuban Revolution was Guerilla Warfare, and that is what Debray believes must be built on, that Guerilla Warfare is the nucleus of the rising socialist movement, and should be the focal point by which a socialist revolution is built around. Certainly a departure from previous lines of thinking, but again, that is what worked for Cuba, and at the time, it was seen as a proper line. However, Debray goes so far to one end of the spectrum to defend this, that at times, he outright favors abandoning any sort of non-military camaraderie -- he advocates canceling all conferences, meetings, or rallies in favor of building up an armed struggle and Guerilla Warfare groups. Essentially, whereas Marxism-Leninism calls for a balance of theory and practice, Debray concerns himself much more with advocating mainly for practice, with little room for theory.

In one annoyingly patronizing passage of the book, he claims that the peasants (presumably of Cuba) are "frightened" by big words and therefore, big words and theory discussions are useless to them, and that they should instead just be persuaded to join combat. This, coming from a white man from France strikes me as incredibly racist and patronizing towards Cubans, Afro-Cubans, etc. who are rural, but that of course, does not make them some sort of horribly uneducated persons like Debray implies here.

Finally, Debray has praises of Fidel Castro constantly and YES, Fidel Castro was an amazing, revolutionary figure who changed the course of history, and a lot of what Debray says is true -- Fidel truly did build a revolutionary movement, not with bourgeois scholars or intellectualist college students, but with rural peasants in combat, in Guerilla Warfare (in one passage I did enjoy, Debray, in so many words, says that the Cuban revolution wasn't made, it was born in 1953 in the Moncanda Barracks, and that the leaders were elected by history on that day), and Fidel did say that the people of Latin america would be revolutionaries and there would be a revolution with or without a Party, but that does not mean Fidel Castro was anarchic in his thinking and accepted that as a solution; he was a Marxist-Leninist at his core, and advocated for that until the day he died. Party work as we know it was not a top priority for Castro like it would be for us, but as Debray says at the end of this book, seemingly contradicting himself, there may be a thousand ways to speak of revolution, but there must be an agreement between all those resolve to make it. Fidel Castro, in leading this revolution, advocated for a Communist Cuba and world, and was a Marxist-Leninist, and saw only Marxism-Leninism, as the solution, with or without a Party. Debray seems to ignore or disregard this.

Overall, a pretty impressive read. This is definitely an early look at Third Worldism and the socialist revolution in the Global South, and I can appreciate that, despite the glaring errors. Also, there is a random but humorous nonetheless, criticism of reactionary trotskyism in the first part of the book, and of course, I love a good takedown of trotskyism.

I'd recommend reading this with a very critical lens.

[Daniel · Rating 3 out of 5]

A clearly historically important book, this is more useful to read as an intervention than as a fully-fleshed-out work of philosophy or political strategy. Given our vastly differing historical and geographic contexts, it isn't always obvious what can be learned from this book - but it's more than the "profession of faith" dismissed by Debray today, whose opinion I'm not particularly interested in, and whose assessment of the failure strategy it outlines feels exaggerated. Some of his arguments against theory and in favour of practice are too bald, risking the opposite problems, but they remind us of the importance of attention to the concrete conditions. The emphasis on tenacity, the struggles that must be endured, and the sense that "failure is a springboard" - these are striking by comparison to some of the attitudes today, although clearly Debray is given to romanticising suffering (and, of course, there is no reason not to find responsibilities for those who can't - for whatever reason - command one of his 'machine-gun nests'!).

It doesn't make sense to go through all of Debray's cautions and so on - the book is short enough that you can read them for yourself with little trouble - but I would like to quote the following:
"Trotskyism attributes great importance to the socialist character of the revolution, to its future programme, and would like to be judged by this purely phraseological question, as if declaring a thousand times that the revolution should be socialist would help call it into existence. But the nub of the question is not theoretical, it lies in the forms of organization through which the 'Socialist Revolution' will be realized. It is here that we discover not only that the revolution which they speak of is utopian, but that the means employed lead not to the revolution but to the scarcely utopian liquidation of existing popular movements."

[Erik Graff · Rating 3 out of 5]

I sat on this one several years before finally getting down to read it. Written when the author was in a Bolivian prison, Debray had spent some months with Ernesto "Che" Guevara's ill-fated little band prior to their capture by CIA-led local forces. Some of the book is about shared experience, but much of it, too much of it, is about the theory of organizing foci of armed guerillas throughout countries of the third world, primarily in Latin America--precisely the volunteeristic enterprise Che had failed to accomplish in Bolivia.

I read this book while on breaks from working at the Mission of Our Lady of Mercy on Racine and Jackson in Chicago.

[Alfie Hancox · Rating 3 out of 5]

"It takes courage to state the facts out loud when these facts contradict a tradition. There is, then, no metaphysical equation in which vanguard = Marxist-Leninist party; there are merely dialectical conjunctions between a given function - that of the vanguard in history - and a given form of organisation - that of the Marxist-Leninist party. These conjunctions arise out of prior history and depend on it. Parties exist here on earth and are subject to the rigours of terrestrial dialectics. If they have been born, they can die and be reborn in other forms."

[Karlo Mikhail · Rating 3 out of 5]

Taking the Cuban guerrilla war led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevarra as model, Regis Debray in Revolution in the Revolution? concludes that certain revolutonary practices have become obsolete in contemporary Latin American. He calls for a revolution in revolutionary practice.

Debray rightfully attacks legalist "Marxist-Leninist" parties who cling to the illusions of empowering the masses exclusively through the parliamentary struggle, an arena dominated by the landed and monied elites.

He rails against the strategy of armed self-defense, or the occupation and defense of a clearly defined territory by the revolutionary forces. A guerrilla force's strength of stealth and mobility becomes dissipated without a distinction between the armed revolutionaries and the rest of the population. The same reasons are deployed in Debray's argument against the establishment of fixed guerrilla bases, especially in the initial stages of the struggle.

At the same time, Debray takes lengths to denigrate armed propaganda, patient ground working and political agitation among the peasant masses one-sidedly in favor of immediate and aggressive armed offensives that supposedly inspires the people to rise up:

"The destruction of a troop transport truck or the public execution of a police torturer is a more effective propaganda for the local population than a hundred speeches. Such conduct convinces them of the essential: that the Revolution is on the march, that the enemy is no longer invulnerable."

But while Debray's injunction for oppressed people to take up arms, basing the revolutionary leadership at the heart of the struggle in the countryside, and developing their forces from small to big, and criticisms against the dogmatic establishment of fixed bases or one-sided reliance on armed self-defense is laudable, these insights are weighed down on the other hand by an ultra-militarist stance.

The people's army, for instance, should not be under the revolutionary party's control because it is for him in itself already the political, organizational, and ideological director and locus of the struggle. It would seem that Debray has a point when he argues that an urban political party's control over the guerrilla army is fraught with dangers ranging from risky meetings to lack of decisiveness. But the better alternative liquidating the party altogether is the basing of the political party's center of operations in the countryside itself, alongside the army.

Painstaking mass work and building of organs of political power among the people is meanwhile relegated to the sides in favor of dashing armed exploits. Military operations, political organizing, and the waging of agrarian reform in controlled areas go together. Of course, guerrillas cannot win or even survive without a consolidated and organized people's movement behind it.

Far from offering any revolution in revolutionary practice, it would come as no surprise that no armed struggle that took Debray's words to the letter only led to, as he himself put it, "a profusion of admirable sacrifices, of wasted heroism leading nowhere – that is, leading anywhere except to the conquest of political power."

[El · Rating 5 out of 5]

يقدم دوبريه تأصيلاً نظرياً لحرب العصابات باعتبارها الطريق الوحيد لانعتاق الشعوب اللاتينية، في ضوء تعميمات الثورة الكوبية، وتطور أشكال النضالات المختلفة، والصفعات التي كالتها الرجعية للأحزاب الشيوعية اللاتينية والهزائم التي منيت بها ..

كانت القارة تموج بمختلف أشكال النضال بدءاً من حرب الغوار وانتهاءاً بالجبهات الانتخابية، وهو يمد الخط الجيفاري ويوجه نقداً لاذعاً للتروتسكية التي لازالت تهاجم وتشوه الثورة الكوبية ومسارها حتى اللحظة ..

لم يقرأ جيفارا الكتاب سوى في أبريل من عام استشهاده، و الكتاب أحد مراجع نظرية حرب العصابات مع كتابات جيفارا التي صدرت في مطلع الستينيات عن القواعد المؤسسة لخرب الغوار ..

الكتاب ثري ومهم لكل ماركسي، لأنه يناقش القضية من مواقع ماركسية لينينية ويفدم أطروحات تستأهل نقاشا جدياً.

[David Ross · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very informative but equally as dry. This analysis primarily focuses on the specifics of the Cuban revolution but contrasts it to many of the biggest "communist" movements of the last few hundred years. It benefits from the access allowed to the author by Fidel and his party, presumably after they had taken power and were in a place to analyse their victory. You can see why the Weather Underground and many other 60s radicals took it as a guide to their struggle. It's pretty unashamedly a text to guide an insurrection through the many pitfalls and divisions that can derail a national movement for liberation.

[Rjurik Davidson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pretty hard to rate this book. Am I rating its political argument, or it as a piece of historical literature? As a political argument it’s a good picture of what the guerilla-movements of the 1960s and 1970s believed, purportedly based on the Cuban Revolution, though in this aspect it’s rather innacurate, since even the Cubans tended to underestimate (though certainly less than some admit) the centrality of their urban struggle committees. Still, this is definitely worth checking out as a historical document of a particular moment.

[Will · Rating 3 out of 5]

An analysis of guerrilla warfare in Latin America in the 1970s, and the ways in which the author believes Marxist-Leninism should achieve their goals. He argues for the centrality of political leadership (not military), and the need for guerrillas to focus on cities and not only mountains/rural areas.

[Griffin · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book discusses guerrilla warfare in 20th century Latin America, explaining theory on how tactics may be most effective for successful revolution. I found out about this book from an Isaacs/Kitroeff class. I know we're all pacifists, but it's an interesting critique of guerrilla warfare.

[Nate Huston · Rating 3 out of 5]

Want a run-down of the South American flavor of revolution ala Castro and Gueverra? Look no further.

[pjr8888 · Rating 5 out of 5]

The task of every revolutionary is to create the revolution.

[Ernest Hogan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Provides an interesting contrast to the current world situation.

[Alex T · Rating 4 out of 5]

good stuff

[Debopriyo Moulik · Rating 4 out of 5]

The analysis of how to bring about a revolution, is forceful and precise. A must read for all the revolutionaries worldwide.

[Eurethius Péllitièr · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brilliant perspective on the need for struggle

[Julio The Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

"I regret that I am not guilty".---Regis Debray, at the end of his trial for sedition in Bolivia.
I have a friend and distinguished colleague who back in 1967, still a kid in his twenties, flew down to Bolivia to get Regis Debray released from prison. Once upon a time in the late Sixties this was the most influential and divisive book in the world. Both West and East suppressed REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? Washington hated and feared it as much as Moscow. Fidel Castro had it instantly translated from French into Spanish. Some books that preach revolution, say THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, foreshadow the event. In the case of Debray's magnum opus the opposite is true. He published REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? just as guerrilla movements in Latin America started to peak, then decline and vanish (Except Colombia). Debray's fiery thesis is quite simple: 1. The Communist Parties of Latin America are bureaucratic, gerontocratic, ossified tools of the USSR, about as subversive as the Christian Democrats. 2. There is no peaceful road to socialism in Latin America, not after the experiences of Arbenz of Guatemala, Goulart of Brazil and a half dozen other overthrown do-gooders. 3. The conventional armies of Latin America, trained by the United States, cannot be defeated by conventional means. Only the rural guerilla can do that. (Not the urban, for as Che' Guevara had warned, "to the guerrilla the city is a tomb".) Agree or disagree, this slim volume is still worth reading for understanding how and why Che' called for "2, 3 many Viet Nams" and what other road the Third World might have taken after his death. Incidentally, Debray later published a repudiation of his own thesis in the two-volume work A CRITIQUE OF ARMS. I've read it in Spanish; good luck finding an English translation.

[Mia · Rating 4 out of 5]

Part 1 is electric, as are the prefaces, introduction, and forwards (in the verso publications edition). Part 2 drags a little as it's less relevant to us today (the present for Debray is our past, and the lessons he outlines were not learned).
Part 3 is an interesting look into the future of our past.
Rating is more along 4.5

[Benjamín Beroíza · Rating 2 out of 5]

La teoría del foco conduce a las masas a la masacre, al suplantamiento de la voluntad obrera, y en algunos casos a la conciliación con el Narco.