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We March Against England: Operation Sea Lion, 1940–41
In May 1940 Nazi Germany was master of continental Europe, the only European power still standing was Great Britain – and the all-conquering German armed forces stood poised to cross the Channel. Following the destruction of the RAF fighter forces, the sweeping of the Channel of mines, and the wearing down of the Royal Naval defenders, two German army groups were set to storm the beaches of southern England. Despite near-constant British fears from August to October, the invasion never took place after first being postponed to spring 1941 before finally being abandoned entirely.
Robert Forcyzk, author of Where the Iron Crosses Grow, looks beyond the traditional British account of Operation Sea Lion, complete with plucky Home Guards and courageous Spitfire pilots, at the real scale of German ambition, plans and capabilities. He examines, in depth, how Operation Sea Lion fitted in with German air-sea actions around the British Isles as he shows exactly what stopped Hitler from invading Britain.
Robert Forcyzk, author of Where the Iron Crosses Grow, looks beyond the traditional British account of Operation Sea Lion, complete with plucky Home Guards and courageous Spitfire pilots, at the real scale of German ambition, plans and capabilities. He examines, in depth, how Operation Sea Lion fitted in with German air-sea actions around the British Isles as he shows exactly what stopped Hitler from invading Britain.
402 pages, Kindle Edition
Published October 20, 2016
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173 people want to read
About the author
Robert Forczyk
58 books73 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
January 17, 2019
To start with, the author is obviously very anti-Churchill as he takes every opportunity to criticize Churchill throughout the book. Even though the book has a wealth of information, some not even pertaining to the subject, yet is still interesting, the author uses it only to advance his arguments and has some double standards with the info he himself provides. He also says in the end that he does not want to make his own assessment, but then does so anyway and it chapter 7 he fully outlines what he thinks would have happened if Seelowe was launched and it turns into a bit of an alternate history novel for me. Even though this book is interesting, the author is too interested in just his own arguments and a bit self absorbed in my personal opinion.
April 7, 2017
Reasonable overview of Sealion
Robert Forczyk has delivered a reasonable overview of Sealion with some interesting strategic options I hadn't considered. However, in my view the book is let down by some implausible theories of German naval capabilities.
That being said it was not too dry and an entertaining read.
Robert Forczyk has delivered a reasonable overview of Sealion with some interesting strategic options I hadn't considered. However, in my view the book is let down by some implausible theories of German naval capabilities.
That being said it was not too dry and an entertaining read.
February 25, 2017
It's a pile of contrarian revisionist crap with the typical dearth of supporting evidence for overturning decades of well-supported historical interpretations.
December 10, 2018
I appreciate that the author has researched the subject extensively and includes many accurate records, but I was left with the feeling that he was dismissive of Britain and comes across in my opinion as an anglophobe. Yes Britain was struggling and made many mistakes and as he states correctly had significant failing during summer of 1940. But his perspective does not do justice to the bravery of the British people and her allies at what was a challenging period in history.
If Britain was as incompetent and incapable as he proclaims then surely Britain would have capitulated?
If Britain was as incompetent and incapable as he proclaims then surely Britain would have capitulated?
September 19, 2019
Disappointing. Some assertions are flat out wrong ("At Salerno, it took the Germans four days to get their Panzers into action ...." (p 228) No. Less than four hours - the 16th Panzer Division was defending the beaches.) Or when he says the absence of anti-aircraft defenses would allow Luftwaffe dive-bombers to be used. (p 255) The same Stukas that were withdrawn a month earlier after suffering debilitating losses? Nor are naval battles decided by raw number of hulls, nor scored by number of sailors killed.
Others are unsupported, as with his three-page lamentation of the British acquisition of US aircraft.
In his review of how the German Army would cross the Channel, the author omits a point he himself had made earlier, that much of the lift was barges, 1/2 unpowered, and limited to 2 or 3 knots, when the timetable required at least 5 knots. He also ignores the strong current through the Channel, and ultimately just accepts the German plan as feasible, even though it requires more troops to be moved to a wider range of beaches, and then supported without port capacity, than was achieved after two years planning by the Allies in Normandy.
To meet his goal of disqualifying the RAF from having "won" the Battle of Britain, he largely ignores the Battle, and Hitler seemingly just wanders away from committing to the invasion because no senior staff officer made the case for it.
Annoyingly, the author just simply doesn't care for Churchill as a strategist or military leader, and frequently wanders off point to cast aspersions on his decisions, such as reinforcing the Middle East before the threat of Sea Lion had ended. He advises, some 70 years after the fact, for Churchill and the UK to pursue an armistice in 1940, as if the wars of the 20th Century were some 18th C Kabinettskrieg (cabinet war), to be called off and on at the whim of princes.
The author says that the creation of amphibious capabilities for Sea Lion gave Germany more options late in the war in the Med and in Russia. Looking at the events cited (Kuban peninsula in early 1943, Crimea summer 1943, Tunisia Nov 1942 to May 1943, Aegean fall 1943, and Courland 1945) - it appears that the amphibious capability just gave Germany the power to get forces cut off and wasted.
Others are unsupported, as with his three-page lamentation of the British acquisition of US aircraft.
In his review of how the German Army would cross the Channel, the author omits a point he himself had made earlier, that much of the lift was barges, 1/2 unpowered, and limited to 2 or 3 knots, when the timetable required at least 5 knots. He also ignores the strong current through the Channel, and ultimately just accepts the German plan as feasible, even though it requires more troops to be moved to a wider range of beaches, and then supported without port capacity, than was achieved after two years planning by the Allies in Normandy.
To meet his goal of disqualifying the RAF from having "won" the Battle of Britain, he largely ignores the Battle, and Hitler seemingly just wanders away from committing to the invasion because no senior staff officer made the case for it.
Annoyingly, the author just simply doesn't care for Churchill as a strategist or military leader, and frequently wanders off point to cast aspersions on his decisions, such as reinforcing the Middle East before the threat of Sea Lion had ended. He advises, some 70 years after the fact, for Churchill and the UK to pursue an armistice in 1940, as if the wars of the 20th Century were some 18th C Kabinettskrieg (cabinet war), to be called off and on at the whim of princes.
The author says that the creation of amphibious capabilities for Sea Lion gave Germany more options late in the war in the Med and in Russia. Looking at the events cited (Kuban peninsula in early 1943, Crimea summer 1943, Tunisia Nov 1942 to May 1943, Aegean fall 1943, and Courland 1945) - it appears that the amphibious capability just gave Germany the power to get forces cut off and wasted.
April 18, 2017
While the author presents a well researched order of battle, his speculations about what could and couldn't be done are somewhere between doubtful and outlandish. Undeniable weaknesses in the British forces are explained in detail while similar or worse weaknesses on the German are handwaved away or ignored. For example, the author refers to the low visibility in the English Channel as an obstacle to Royal Navy interceptors (reasonable enough), but said visibility never comes into play when he argues that German boats could accurately inflict severe damage unto intercepting ships! The logistics of keeping an invasion force fed and armed across contested waters are similarly dismissed with barely a passing mention here and there. German infighting is mentioned but doesn't seem to factor into the what-if scenarios presented.
All in all, it's a not terrible book that lets some rather dubious assumptions drag it down.
All in all, it's a not terrible book that lets some rather dubious assumptions drag it down.
August 4, 2017
The Hitler Diaries were a peculiar farrago of fact and fabrication. One of the more inspired lies that the forgery contained was the claim that Hitler’s decision to halt his Panzers and allow the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force to evacuate at Dunkirk was because he did not want to inflict too devastating a blow because he still hoped that the British government might come to its senses and make its peace with Nazi Germany.
The reason why this seemed so plausible was because Hitler’s admiration for Britain was on the record and seemingly genuine. In ‘Mein Kampf’ Hitler not only expressed the high regard in which he held the British ‘Tommy’ and British wartime propaganda, he also expressed the view that the Kaiser had made a grievous error in going to war with Britain at all. According to Hitler there was no need for Britain and Germany to quarrel, as Britain was essentially a maritime power and as long as she gave Britain a free hand on the continent Germany would give her blessing to Britannia continuing to rule the waves and reaping the rewards of its vast colonial possessions.
In ‘Mein Kampf’ Hitler also expressed his desire for Germany to form alliances with Britain, Italy and Japan, which would have the effect of isolating and neutralising France and make it easier for him to implement his primary objective of securing Lebensraum or living room in the east at the expense of the Soviet Union, which he detested on racial and ideological grounds.
Hitler’s subsequent expansion of the German navy is bound to cast doubt on Hitler’s ultimate intentions but this has to be set aside evidence such as his taking fighter ace Adolf Galland to task for glorying in shooting down RAF planes during the Battle of Britain, telling him that this unnecessary bloodshed should give no cause for satisfaction as it represented a distraction from the real fight which was to be against Stalin’s Russia.
This is the context in which one should approach Robert Forczyk’s ‘We March Against England’ which examines Operation Sealion (the proposed German invasion of Britain), initiated by Fuhrer Directive No.16 of 16 July 1940, and why it was postponed on 17 September 1940. To what extent was the Fuhrer’s heart never really in the affair (because he yearned to launch what became Operation Barbarossa) and to what extent did he decide to cut his losses because of fierce British resistance, most notably in the Battle of Britain?
Forczyk is keen to dispel what he sees as the myth that by “standing firm … ‘the Few’ of RAF Fighter Command frustrated Hitler’s plans to invade England and thereby inflicted the first major defeat upon the Third Reich.” He is certainly right to claim that Operation Sealion was a very much more serious threat than some historians suppose and to draw attention to the fact that Britain’s “military position remained extremely perilous” long after September 1940; acknowledging the importance of the Battle of the Atlantic, Churchill himself said that “the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril”. However, whilst it is difficult to disagree with much of Forczyk’s analysis, particularly on operational matters, his account is still open to question.
Firstly, in stating that it was not “preordained” that Hitler would “eschew Seelöwe in favour of Barbarossa” Forczyk seems unwilling to concede that for the long-held ideological reasons referred to above, Hitler would always be predisposed to abandon Sealion for Barbarossa. Secondly, in staking out a claim for the originality of his argument Forczyk appears to have ignored those who have already de-mythologized the Battle of Britain, most notably R.J. Overy, whose name features nowhere in the book.
This, then, is a very enjoyable thought-provoking exercise in military history which is often genuinely illuminating (for example reminding us of the Luftwaffe’s early capacity for precision night time bombing) even though one suspects that Forczyk's full-blooded frontal assaults are sometimes mounted against an Aunt Sally.
The reason why this seemed so plausible was because Hitler’s admiration for Britain was on the record and seemingly genuine. In ‘Mein Kampf’ Hitler not only expressed the high regard in which he held the British ‘Tommy’ and British wartime propaganda, he also expressed the view that the Kaiser had made a grievous error in going to war with Britain at all. According to Hitler there was no need for Britain and Germany to quarrel, as Britain was essentially a maritime power and as long as she gave Britain a free hand on the continent Germany would give her blessing to Britannia continuing to rule the waves and reaping the rewards of its vast colonial possessions.
In ‘Mein Kampf’ Hitler also expressed his desire for Germany to form alliances with Britain, Italy and Japan, which would have the effect of isolating and neutralising France and make it easier for him to implement his primary objective of securing Lebensraum or living room in the east at the expense of the Soviet Union, which he detested on racial and ideological grounds.
Hitler’s subsequent expansion of the German navy is bound to cast doubt on Hitler’s ultimate intentions but this has to be set aside evidence such as his taking fighter ace Adolf Galland to task for glorying in shooting down RAF planes during the Battle of Britain, telling him that this unnecessary bloodshed should give no cause for satisfaction as it represented a distraction from the real fight which was to be against Stalin’s Russia.
This is the context in which one should approach Robert Forczyk’s ‘We March Against England’ which examines Operation Sealion (the proposed German invasion of Britain), initiated by Fuhrer Directive No.16 of 16 July 1940, and why it was postponed on 17 September 1940. To what extent was the Fuhrer’s heart never really in the affair (because he yearned to launch what became Operation Barbarossa) and to what extent did he decide to cut his losses because of fierce British resistance, most notably in the Battle of Britain?
Forczyk is keen to dispel what he sees as the myth that by “standing firm … ‘the Few’ of RAF Fighter Command frustrated Hitler’s plans to invade England and thereby inflicted the first major defeat upon the Third Reich.” He is certainly right to claim that Operation Sealion was a very much more serious threat than some historians suppose and to draw attention to the fact that Britain’s “military position remained extremely perilous” long after September 1940; acknowledging the importance of the Battle of the Atlantic, Churchill himself said that “the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril”. However, whilst it is difficult to disagree with much of Forczyk’s analysis, particularly on operational matters, his account is still open to question.
Firstly, in stating that it was not “preordained” that Hitler would “eschew Seelöwe in favour of Barbarossa” Forczyk seems unwilling to concede that for the long-held ideological reasons referred to above, Hitler would always be predisposed to abandon Sealion for Barbarossa. Secondly, in staking out a claim for the originality of his argument Forczyk appears to have ignored those who have already de-mythologized the Battle of Britain, most notably R.J. Overy, whose name features nowhere in the book.
This, then, is a very enjoyable thought-provoking exercise in military history which is often genuinely illuminating (for example reminding us of the Luftwaffe’s early capacity for precision night time bombing) even though one suspects that Forczyk's full-blooded frontal assaults are sometimes mounted against an Aunt Sally.
June 14, 2017
Forczyk makes the case that Germany could have mounted Operation Sea Lion and, at least, been successful in bringing the UK to the negotiating table and armistice. The book is fascinating in its detail of the British armed forces' weakness and preparations and the German armed forces' preparations and strengths and weaknesses. He lays these out in detail and in well organized fashion. He then has a short walk through of a middling successful Operation Sea Lion scenario and includes a couple of scenarios of smaller-scale amphibious raids that Germany could have carried out on the British Isles.
On the pro-side, Forczyk makes a good case of Britain's woeful weakness in its defenses of the south east coast that would have been most likely site of Axis landings. He also highlights the naval and air forces limitations in the face of a focused German cross-channel attack. He makes an, overly long, but convincing case of Churchill's unfocused strategy and dispersal of the Empire's limited armed resources in the post-Dunkirk period.
As convincing as he was on the UK side, the German side of the equation was unconvincing. It seems a lot of his case are a list of German "missed opportunities" and "if they'd did x and y" the German's could have made Sea Lion as success. But he doesn't convince that the feuding services and lack of enthusiasm in the Kriegsmarine could have been overcome if Hitler wasn't fully on board. Forczyk over estimates the Kriegsmarine's ability to concentrate enough ships and support to gain enough local naval superiority to make the initial landings and even more importantly, move follow up forces and keep them all supplied in the face of sustained Royal Naval and RAF attack on the limited escort and logistical resources.
He also, in light of the Allied experience in large amphibious assaults, waves a lot of problems away with a faith in the, undeniable, talent of lower and operational-level German leadership for ad hoc improvisation under tight circumstances. Amphibious assaults are a great deal more complex and notably requires a great deal more coordination across units and services than regular operations. The learning curve for the Allies was in the order of a dozen small to medium sized assaults (Commando raids and Dieppe raid) to larger operations such as Tarawa, till they were ready to make the Normandy landings. That Germany could have made such a large (6-8 division) landing work on the first attempt, is unlikely.
Still an interesting read into an operation that is one of the great 'what-ifs' in WWII.
On the pro-side, Forczyk makes a good case of Britain's woeful weakness in its defenses of the south east coast that would have been most likely site of Axis landings. He also highlights the naval and air forces limitations in the face of a focused German cross-channel attack. He makes an, overly long, but convincing case of Churchill's unfocused strategy and dispersal of the Empire's limited armed resources in the post-Dunkirk period.
As convincing as he was on the UK side, the German side of the equation was unconvincing. It seems a lot of his case are a list of German "missed opportunities" and "if they'd did x and y" the German's could have made Sea Lion as success. But he doesn't convince that the feuding services and lack of enthusiasm in the Kriegsmarine could have been overcome if Hitler wasn't fully on board. Forczyk over estimates the Kriegsmarine's ability to concentrate enough ships and support to gain enough local naval superiority to make the initial landings and even more importantly, move follow up forces and keep them all supplied in the face of sustained Royal Naval and RAF attack on the limited escort and logistical resources.
He also, in light of the Allied experience in large amphibious assaults, waves a lot of problems away with a faith in the, undeniable, talent of lower and operational-level German leadership for ad hoc improvisation under tight circumstances. Amphibious assaults are a great deal more complex and notably requires a great deal more coordination across units and services than regular operations. The learning curve for the Allies was in the order of a dozen small to medium sized assaults (Commando raids and Dieppe raid) to larger operations such as Tarawa, till they were ready to make the Normandy landings. That Germany could have made such a large (6-8 division) landing work on the first attempt, is unlikely.
Still an interesting read into an operation that is one of the great 'what-ifs' in WWII.
October 15, 2021
Forczyk's work is impressive because he created a book from not so many documents and testimonies.
He's made it in a bit tricky way, by describing both British and German capabilities in various branches and aspects. He put plenty of additional informations, such as Spanish attitude towards events of 1939—1940, Churchill's fancy trench-digging machines and many others. Some might found this irrelevant, some might consider as interesting addition. It's personal matter to judge.
The operation itself is only part of the book. Before reaching chapters about actual landing on British coast, we need to push through Raf/Luftwaffe/RN/Kriegsmarine descriptions. Don't worry, nobody wants us to read about every vessel's tonnage/plane's range - just basic informations, including armament, purpose and origin.
It's useful when we're making the whole picture of Sea Lion's problem.
After this section we're biting into Seelowe itself. Fleet tactics, idea of landing procedure, typical problems during first moments of Invasion. There is a lot of it.
Then we're observing author's idea of next few day's course of events such us British counterattack, capturing of Folkestone and Dover.
Some people complaint about it, as about something putting British Army in bad light. Forczyk did something different from typical narration about Sea Lion. He assessed that Wehrmacht has capabilities for successful landing on British shore. It's reasonable, especially if we paid attention on details provided and got overall picture of 1940's situation.
And yes, this book is ant-Churchill. It is, because former First Lord of Admiralty made plenty of wrong decisions and someone pointed it out. Britain stumbled heavily during first years of war, and that's the fact.
Maps are nice and neat. I found them very useful.
Appendices gave me a bit deeper insight in predicted ODB and participating unit strength.
I recommend this book. Forczyk made it again!
He's made it in a bit tricky way, by describing both British and German capabilities in various branches and aspects. He put plenty of additional informations, such as Spanish attitude towards events of 1939—1940, Churchill's fancy trench-digging machines and many others. Some might found this irrelevant, some might consider as interesting addition. It's personal matter to judge.
The operation itself is only part of the book. Before reaching chapters about actual landing on British coast, we need to push through Raf/Luftwaffe/RN/Kriegsmarine descriptions. Don't worry, nobody wants us to read about every vessel's tonnage/plane's range - just basic informations, including armament, purpose and origin.
It's useful when we're making the whole picture of Sea Lion's problem.
After this section we're biting into Seelowe itself. Fleet tactics, idea of landing procedure, typical problems during first moments of Invasion. There is a lot of it.
Then we're observing author's idea of next few day's course of events such us British counterattack, capturing of Folkestone and Dover.
Some people complaint about it, as about something putting British Army in bad light. Forczyk did something different from typical narration about Sea Lion. He assessed that Wehrmacht has capabilities for successful landing on British shore. It's reasonable, especially if we paid attention on details provided and got overall picture of 1940's situation.
And yes, this book is ant-Churchill. It is, because former First Lord of Admiralty made plenty of wrong decisions and someone pointed it out. Britain stumbled heavily during first years of war, and that's the fact.
Maps are nice and neat. I found them very useful.
Appendices gave me a bit deeper insight in predicted ODB and participating unit strength.
I recommend this book. Forczyk made it again!
November 17, 2017
A good book, providing an across the spectrum analysis of the British-German conflict in 1940 to 1941. Though mostly centered on Operation Sea Lion, the planned German invasion of Britain, this book dives into a wider view of the global aspects of WWII at the time: the slow buildup to the convoy battles in the Atlantic, the growing strategic bombing campaign underway by the RAF, and the many German alternatives to the invasion. Stopping just short of an alternate history escapade, the author smartly brings together a quantitative and qualitative analysis, from tactical to strategic, through both technical and human aspects. The end result is a well put together book that leaves very few stones uncovered and comes up with a viable, if admittedly somewhat controversial, conclusion to the whole affair. By stripping away the mythologies, the personalities, and the politics, the author provides a great example of how a pointed and detailed military history should be written. Great for those more interested in the nuts and bolts of warfare in the early years of WWII, and those wanting to better understand how the latter years of the war would play out.
February 2, 2020
I'll give the author a lot of credit, he gave me lots to think about. I would describe this as trying to show that Sea Lion was a lot more serious that most of us are willing to give it credit. He looks carefully at both sides of the event. First of all, yes the Germans were unprepared for amphibious warfare, but they developed a lot of capability quite rapidly, and if they had chosen to invade in 1941, they had much better equipment by then. Certainly too, British doctrine was terrible. Whether they could have successfully repelled the Germans is debatable. And, the invasion of the Soviet Union was not pre-ordained. Hitler was impulsive, so he could have done that, or taken Gibraltar, or punished the Swiss, or done all kinds of other things which crossed his mind at one time or another. And, if the Luftwaffe could still contest the English Channel while not having complete control, would the Royal Navy have risked all to try and take out the German invasion fleet? The book is well done and covers many errors on both sides, and tries to be complete and give a coherent account of this challenging topic. I was impressed.
June 29, 2017
"We March Against England" starts slowly, and then builds to an awesome conclusion. At the start, I was not thrilled to read accounts of the war as it started until May 1940 or so.
But then, the author throws matters into high gear in parsing all the factors that made Germany and Britain perhaps less mighty than current historiography argues. He pulls no punches lashing out at other historians as well as Churchill and Hitler. The parts about espionage and why Spain didn't join the axis are particularly gripping.
Then, BANG! He launches a long explanation of how Sea Lion would have led to a protracted stalemate on British soil, the effects of which would cripple the Empire's firepower elsewhere. Eventually, he comes to the conclusion that such action would delay, but certainly not stop, ultimate Axis defeat.
Finally, as an added bonus, Forczyk includes dozens of well-explained photos as the end of the book. I also commend the publisher on the excellent maps.
I look forward to reading more from this author. A+.
But then, the author throws matters into high gear in parsing all the factors that made Germany and Britain perhaps less mighty than current historiography argues. He pulls no punches lashing out at other historians as well as Churchill and Hitler. The parts about espionage and why Spain didn't join the axis are particularly gripping.
Then, BANG! He launches a long explanation of how Sea Lion would have led to a protracted stalemate on British soil, the effects of which would cripple the Empire's firepower elsewhere. Eventually, he comes to the conclusion that such action would delay, but certainly not stop, ultimate Axis defeat.
Finally, as an added bonus, Forczyk includes dozens of well-explained photos as the end of the book. I also commend the publisher on the excellent maps.
I look forward to reading more from this author. A+.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 12, 2018
The author suggests - no, proclaims is a better word - that England's wet-tissue-paper defenses stood no chance against the hardened steel spear of German might and that Germany could have, indeed, should have launched Sea Lion in 1940 or at least 1941. This would have at least forced Churchill - no love at all for Winston in this book - to the bargaining table and resulted in an armistice which would have altered the face of World War II. It's interesting, but heavily and unabashedly anti-British biased writing and glows with admiration for the German military machine. But, as a copy editor, I found most galling was Forczyk's insistence on repeatedly making fundamental errors such as writing 10-15,000 when he means a range of 10,000 to 15,000, not 10 to 15,000. And he misused the term pounder consistently, describing, for instance a "25-pounder gun." It's either a 25-pound gun or a 25 pounder. When you add the "er" you form another noun. I wish I could have had a crack at this book before it was published.
August 12, 2017
Found it in my library and found it a well researched book. It is a book that looks with a new eye on the conflict in England in 1940.The author offers an alternative view of the Battle of Britain and the proposed invasion of the UK (sea lion) arguing the Germans could have landed a first wave even with a strong RAF. The problem would have been to reinforce and resupply the army. The invasion would have stalled forcing Hitler to withdrawn his army.
It is a book that is well researched and full of new historical insights.
I am remain of the opinion that Hitler wanted to invade, but loyalty to Goring led him to to allow his Luftwaffe the task of defeating the RAF. This failure led to the cancellation of Sea Lion. Moreover Hitler (1940) was focusing on an invasion of Russia, believing that Stalin's red army would be easily beaten in 1941.This would mean Britain would have no choice to but to negotiate a peace treaty early in 1942 without the need of an invasion.
It is a book that is well researched and full of new historical insights.
I am remain of the opinion that Hitler wanted to invade, but loyalty to Goring led him to to allow his Luftwaffe the task of defeating the RAF. This failure led to the cancellation of Sea Lion. Moreover Hitler (1940) was focusing on an invasion of Russia, believing that Stalin's red army would be easily beaten in 1941.This would mean Britain would have no choice to but to negotiate a peace treaty early in 1942 without the need of an invasion.
March 20, 2022
Robert Forczyk brings his usual erudition and personal experience to bear in a meticulous examination of the most famous campaign that never happened, Operation Sea Lion. Although this is not a full-blown hypothetical campaign, Mr. Forczyk does provide a glimpse of the “what if” of the first days of a German invasion attempt: would they get across the Channel? What role would the RN and RAF play? How would the reconstituting British Army and Home Guard deal with the seasoned Wehrmacht forces, if any managed to reach the beaches? Based on in-depth analysis of the men and equipment, leaders and battle plans that the Germans and British had in September 1940, Mr. Forczyk brilliantly sets the scene for the cross-channel invasion as well as exploring alternative courses of action that each side could have taken, but didn’t. Great addition to his other full-length campaign books and worthy of joining any WW2 collection.
November 29, 2018
Well-written, wide-ranging narrative reviewing the conditions of the early war affecting the chances of success for Sea Lion for both the attacker and defender by looking at the materials, technologies, ideologies, command structures, tactics, and differing internal priorities.
Also serves as a counter-narrative to the tales of the Battle of Britain, Battle of the Atlantic, and Operation Sea Lion by merging them into one larger overlapping event instead of distinct conflicts where each piece impacted the next.
The author paints a picture of a more unsure Churchill in these early years, given to reckless, ill-conceived and -planned adventures like the naval battle at Mers-el-Kebir and Operation Menace in west Africa.
Order of battle details abound for not only ancillary planned and executed operations but for the hypothetical outcome of Sea Lion through every stage.
Also serves as a counter-narrative to the tales of the Battle of Britain, Battle of the Atlantic, and Operation Sea Lion by merging them into one larger overlapping event instead of distinct conflicts where each piece impacted the next.
The author paints a picture of a more unsure Churchill in these early years, given to reckless, ill-conceived and -planned adventures like the naval battle at Mers-el-Kebir and Operation Menace in west Africa.
Order of battle details abound for not only ancillary planned and executed operations but for the hypothetical outcome of Sea Lion through every stage.
November 18, 2017
This book is an onverall analysis of Germany war against England between the Fall of France and Barbarossa. The author gives a lot of detail of the capabilties of the germans in Spetember 1940 to mount operation sea lion. The authors alos talks about the anti-invasion capabilities of great-Britain. There even two counterfactuals chapters, one of Sea Lion in September 1940 and another on options of raiding with a commando the Isle of Wight. A must have for anybody interested in Sea Lion and the siege war between England and Nazi Germany in 1940-1941.
March 18, 2024
Operation Sealion and the plan to invade England was a event so near and so far for the Third Reich. This book offers an abundance of what could have happen and never did by so many variables and events of that time. I found the read to be fascinating and informative as the author goes into well researched information and well planned events on both sides of the channel. It is a history lover’s asset and well presented and written
October 9, 2020
very interesting and well-researched. There is a bit too much speculation / assumption to put it into the top tier, but still a nice read.
October 23, 2020
Like many have said there is a lot of negative Churchill stuff. It's a shame, because it DOES offer a fresh perspective on the events, giving much new detail and food for thought.
February 10, 2017
Probably the most interesting read that I have had in some time! I have read several of his books now, including the superb Where the Iron Crosses Grow. Unlike many historians, Robert has a gift for writing in a way that is detailed, yet interesting and well paced. He is a story teller rather than a figures/statistics regurgitator. Anyway, We March Against England goes into tremendous detail about the planned amphibious invasion of England by the Third Reich named Operation Sea Lion. Robert goes into great detail to dispel common misbeliefs, glossed over facts, and general sentiments about this tremendous undertaking. This book hits on every aspect of what was transpiring between England and Germany (and worldwide) during 1940-1941(and prior). I can say without any doubt that I learned volumes of new information for this book and have a completely new understanding of the subjects at hand. Highly recommend!
May 21, 2017
Book received from NetGalley
I had heard about Operation Sea Lion prior to reading this book but I had no clue what it was. World War II history is too "new" for me to really enjoy reading or studying about it. I learned quite a bit from this book and now I want to know more about this early part of World War II.
I had heard about Operation Sea Lion prior to reading this book but I had no clue what it was. World War II history is too "new" for me to really enjoy reading or studying about it. I learned quite a bit from this book and now I want to know more about this early part of World War II.
December 2, 2016
It had its good points and its let me tell you again points. Very good on technical details and many good points on things not usually considered.
April 2, 2017
Solid effort this, worth a read if a ww2 buff.
September 7, 2018
Forczyk's technical analysis is, as usual, painstaking and illuminating and he does a good job in dispelling the myth that Fighter Command single-handedly prevented Sea Lion from taking place by achieving sustained daytime air superiority over England. He correctly points out that this "victory" in the Battle of Britain was insufficient to prevent a German channel crossing, particularly given the difficulties the Royal Navy faced in confronting German minefields and the German Navy, itself, not the mention the total lack of air superiority at night.
However, for all that, there are some serious deficiencies in his analysis, specifically when it comes to interpreting the role of information warfare and moral warfare in the ultimate decision to postpone Sea Lion indefinitely. Forczyk is quick to dismiss Churchill's management of the war in 1940-41 as strategically incoherent and points to the "colonial style adventures" in Crete and Egypt as an example of Churchill frittering away men and materiel rather than conserving his forces for homeland defense.
These dismissals, it seems to me, refuse to even contemplate Churchill's own, stated, reasons for pursuing those actions, namely, that the Commonwealth armies were in no position to confront Hitler and his allies on the "main front" after the fall of France, but that they needed to find other venues to confront Hitler and his allies, and do so aggressively, for some very specific geopolitical reasons that Forczyk appears not to understand, or to dismiss as mere propaganda, not worthy of serious consideration. It's a shame, because his technical analysis is so good, but his political analysis is threadbare. Churchill's reasons, were, in fact, very real and were:
1. To persuade the Americans that the cause was not lost and that they needed to continue to provide material support and, when possible, to join the war. As we all know, once they did join, it proved decisive and, absent a crystal ball to look ahead to Pearl Harbor, the decision was always going to be an emotionally driven one and Churchill understood this better than most.
2. To demonstrate to Hitler and the OKW the aggressive spirit of the commonwealth militaries, including the army, so they did not assume that war with Britain, on British soil, would be the same as war with France had been. Even when you are already at war with an adversary, deterrence can play a strong role in military calculations. If you want Hitler to "think twice" about invading, it would help to give him some tangible examples of what he could expect were he to be foolish enough to invade. In this regard, the sacrifice of the New Zealand division, and other first class units, in Crete was far from a colonial adventure, it was a grand show of aggressive fighting spirit, and while the island of Crete was lost, Germany's elite airborne division was destroyed in the action, and never really recovered for the rest of the war, further throwing sand in the gears of planning for Sea Lion. As a German general sifting through the wreckage of Crete, one would have to wonder "If they fight this hard for a small mediterranean island that means little to them, how might they behave if we attempted to invade their homeland?". Yes, the Germans won the battle for Crete, but attrition matters and they were beginning to conclude that fighting the British Empire was an unpleasant business and one to be avoided if possible... (and so Barbarossa begin to seem more appealing).
While it's true that homeland defense was sorely lacking well into 1941, and that Sea Lion would, at a minimum, have achieved a stable lodgment in the invasion area, and possibly a knockout blow against London, these overseas "adventures" were designed to convince the Germans otherwise, and while hind sight is 20/20, it's hard to see any other way, other than air and naval battle (which were also pursued aggressively during the period), that Churchill could persuade Hitler not to authorize Sea Lion. After all, Hitler's intelligence services in the UK were not only a shambles, they were actually all double agents who'd be turned by MI5, so he really had very little idea about what was actually going on in the UK after the fall of France. The OKW had to go on what they saw... and what they saw was a highly bellicose and belligerent foe that was opposing them every step of the way, even if such opposition appeared suicidal to the Germans. Not knowing the British Army order of Battle in England, it would be quite reasonable to assume that all these troops fighting in the near east was a signal of strength, that the British had "tanks and men to spare", a sort of grand deception, projecting strength out of weakness in conjunction with MI5's ongoing intelligence deceptions.
So yes, Britain was weak, but did not LOOK IT, she looked bellicose, aggressive and ready to fight, and given Hitler's other strategic options, that was all that really mattered in the final decision NOT to pursue Sea Lion.
However, for all that, there are some serious deficiencies in his analysis, specifically when it comes to interpreting the role of information warfare and moral warfare in the ultimate decision to postpone Sea Lion indefinitely. Forczyk is quick to dismiss Churchill's management of the war in 1940-41 as strategically incoherent and points to the "colonial style adventures" in Crete and Egypt as an example of Churchill frittering away men and materiel rather than conserving his forces for homeland defense.
These dismissals, it seems to me, refuse to even contemplate Churchill's own, stated, reasons for pursuing those actions, namely, that the Commonwealth armies were in no position to confront Hitler and his allies on the "main front" after the fall of France, but that they needed to find other venues to confront Hitler and his allies, and do so aggressively, for some very specific geopolitical reasons that Forczyk appears not to understand, or to dismiss as mere propaganda, not worthy of serious consideration. It's a shame, because his technical analysis is so good, but his political analysis is threadbare. Churchill's reasons, were, in fact, very real and were:
1. To persuade the Americans that the cause was not lost and that they needed to continue to provide material support and, when possible, to join the war. As we all know, once they did join, it proved decisive and, absent a crystal ball to look ahead to Pearl Harbor, the decision was always going to be an emotionally driven one and Churchill understood this better than most.
2. To demonstrate to Hitler and the OKW the aggressive spirit of the commonwealth militaries, including the army, so they did not assume that war with Britain, on British soil, would be the same as war with France had been. Even when you are already at war with an adversary, deterrence can play a strong role in military calculations. If you want Hitler to "think twice" about invading, it would help to give him some tangible examples of what he could expect were he to be foolish enough to invade. In this regard, the sacrifice of the New Zealand division, and other first class units, in Crete was far from a colonial adventure, it was a grand show of aggressive fighting spirit, and while the island of Crete was lost, Germany's elite airborne division was destroyed in the action, and never really recovered for the rest of the war, further throwing sand in the gears of planning for Sea Lion. As a German general sifting through the wreckage of Crete, one would have to wonder "If they fight this hard for a small mediterranean island that means little to them, how might they behave if we attempted to invade their homeland?". Yes, the Germans won the battle for Crete, but attrition matters and they were beginning to conclude that fighting the British Empire was an unpleasant business and one to be avoided if possible... (and so Barbarossa begin to seem more appealing).
While it's true that homeland defense was sorely lacking well into 1941, and that Sea Lion would, at a minimum, have achieved a stable lodgment in the invasion area, and possibly a knockout blow against London, these overseas "adventures" were designed to convince the Germans otherwise, and while hind sight is 20/20, it's hard to see any other way, other than air and naval battle (which were also pursued aggressively during the period), that Churchill could persuade Hitler not to authorize Sea Lion. After all, Hitler's intelligence services in the UK were not only a shambles, they were actually all double agents who'd be turned by MI5, so he really had very little idea about what was actually going on in the UK after the fall of France. The OKW had to go on what they saw... and what they saw was a highly bellicose and belligerent foe that was opposing them every step of the way, even if such opposition appeared suicidal to the Germans. Not knowing the British Army order of Battle in England, it would be quite reasonable to assume that all these troops fighting in the near east was a signal of strength, that the British had "tanks and men to spare", a sort of grand deception, projecting strength out of weakness in conjunction with MI5's ongoing intelligence deceptions.
So yes, Britain was weak, but did not LOOK IT, she looked bellicose, aggressive and ready to fight, and given Hitler's other strategic options, that was all that really mattered in the final decision NOT to pursue Sea Lion.
December 6, 2018
This was a great book based on Operation Sealion, it enlightened and enlivened an area of history not so well understood. For my people in these islands, the Battle of Britain was the signal that Hitler could never defeat us! But this book shows just how close it came and if the Nazis took a chance they might have succeeded! Well researched and written! Enjoyed this very much!
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