This book is meant to serve partly as an introduction to Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. Of course, as is typical of Sein und Zeit philology, it never really gets to a comprehensive explanation of its second division, and consequently dilutes the content of the book. In the case of Heideggerians I hate such introductions because they entail an uncritical endorsement of whatever is in the book by method of 'clarification' of Heidegger's claims. Given the partial success of Heideggerian introductions it always seems like they give an account that is never Heideggerian enough. They end up with an account of their own thinking that can only be made sense of in the context of Heideggerian philosophy, which for that reason never really succeeds in clarifying much - Heidegger is just that obscure. The only merit is that Carman himself is not oblivious that he deviates from Heidegger a little, precisely by mischaracterizing his notion of das Man in the last chapter and using fucking Strawson to problematize; but this is of course deals precisely with why he does not have a good account of the second division.
Carman's book is the epitome of Heideggerian introductions. It seems to be written with certain superficial obscurities in the Heideggerian framework in mind (trust me: there are far greater ones in S&Z, but primarily outside of S&Z too), resulting in awkward (but not wrong) suggestions like an ascription of realism to the concept of Being-in-the-World. His defence of Heidegger's theory of truth in reply to Tugendhat's critique takes center stage, but not only does he completely forget to give a decent reconstruction of Tugendhat's arguments, he also conjures up a concept that seems utterly foreign to Heidegger himself ('hermeneutical salience' - imagine Heidegger writing about the salience of Being...). Carman makes statements that are roughly in the same vein as Heidegger's, but it never really can quite cover up the fact that most of the problems he discusses are there to stay, at least when one interprets Heidegger as he does.
PS. First chapter on Husserl: clear example of 'I need an excuse to ascribe novelty and progress to the author I write about'