Commander In Chief: FDR's Battle with Churchill, 1943 – The President's High-Stakes Showdown Over D-Day Strategy and Victory

FDR at War #2

by Nigel Hamilton

From Nigel Hamilton's acclaimed World War II saga, the astonishing story of FDR's yearlong, defining battle with Churchill in 1943, as the war raged in Africa and Italy.

1943 was the year of Allied military counteroffensives, beating back the forces of the Axis powers in North Africa and the Pacific—the “Hinge of Fate,” as Winston Churchill called it. In Commander in Chief, Nigel Hamilton reveals FDR’s true role in this overruling his own Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordering American airmen on an ambush of the Japanese navy’s Admiral Yamamoto, facing down Churchill when he attempted to abandon Allied D-day strategy (twice). This FDR is profoundly different from the one Churchill later painted. President Roosevelt’s patience was tested to the limit quelling the prime minister’s “revolt,” as Churchill pressured Congress and senior American leaders to focus Allied energy on disastrous fighting in Italy and the Aegean instead of landings in Normandy. Finally, in a dramatic showdown at Hyde Park, FDR had to stop Churchill from losing the war by making the ultimate threat, setting the Allies on their course to final victory.

In Commander in Chief , Hamilton masterfully chronicles the clash of nations—and of two titanic personalities—at a crucial moment in modern history.

Genres: History, Biography, World War II, Nonfiction, Politics, Presidents, Us Presidents

496 pages, Paperback

First published June 7, 2016

About the author

Nigel Hamilton is an award-winning British-born biographer, academic and broadcaster, whose works have been translated into sixteen languages.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

“There is a longing in the air. It is not a longing to go back to what they call ‘the good old days.’ I have distinct reservations as to how good ‘the good old days’ were. I would rather believe that we can achieve new and better days. Absolute victory in this war will give greater opportunities to the world, because the winning of the war in itself is certainly proving to all of us…that concerted action can accomplish things. Surely we can make strides toward a greater freedom from want than the world has yet enjoyed. Surely by unanimous action in driving out the outlaws and keeping them under heel forever, we can attain a freedom from fear of violence…I would rather be a builder than a wrecker, hoping always that the structure of life is growing – not dying.”
- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to the Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, Canada, August 25, 1943

“Aided by his ‘syndicate’ of researchers, civil servants, and historian-aides, [Winston] Churchill was able to have his day in literary court, in his six-volume opus, The Second World War, which helped win him the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953…For the memory of President Roosevelt…it was, however, near-devastating, since its magisterial narrative placed Churchill at the center of the war’s direction and President Roosevelt very much at the periphery…In many ways, then, this book and its predecessor are a counternarrative, or corrective: my attempt to tell the story of Roosevelt’s exercise of high command from his – not Churchill’s – perspective.
- Nigel Hamilton, Commander in Chief: FDR’s Battle with Churchill, 1943

History is not simply written by the victors; it is written by those who know how to tell good stories. To that end, Winston Churchill has had a marked impact on the historiography of the Second World War. First and foremost, of course, was his role as Prime Minister of Great Britain, where he took an incredibly hands-on approach to running the war. No matter the mistakes he made – and he made a boatload – one can only admire the pugnacious way he stood up to Adolf Hitler, even after France had fallen, and even while the Soviet Union still held the hands of the Nazis.

Beyond his influence as a historical actor, though, Churchill also had extraordinary literary skills. His way with words is almost awe-inspiring, and this skill – combined with an exceptionally long life – ensured that his time as Prime Minister only grew with time. Carefully shaping, exaggerating, and eliding events allowed him to build a lasting memorial – to himself.

As Nigel Hamilton observes, this was an advantage denied to the American leader, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. FDR never had the chance to write his memoirs or defend his actions or give a speech at the United Nations, which he had called into being. Instead, he died suddenly before the great world war – which he had done so much to win – even ended.

Hamilton has taken it upon himself to attempt to wrest the grand narrative away from Churchill and retell a familiar story in an FDR-centric way. To do this, he has undertaken an ambitious, three-volume project designed to reclaim some lost glory.

In Mantle of Command, the first volume in the series, Hamilton set the stage for his argument, positioning Churchill as an empire-obsessed blunderer whose soaring rhetoric could not quite match the string of defeats suffered by his nation. Covering the time-period from Pearl Harbor to the landings in North Africa, Hamilton posited that FDR convinced both Churchill and his own chiefs of staff that Operation Torch was the only way to get into the war without being mercilessly slaughtered by the Wehrmacht.

Hamilton continues the tale in Commander in Chief, this time focusing on the post-Torch wrangling over where the Allies would strike next. Specifically, Hamilton tries to make this a battle of wills between Churchill (who wanted to nibble on the periphery of the Axis’ ill-gotten empire) and Roosevelt (who supported a cross-Channel invasion in 1944).

As in the first book, Commander in Chief is not a chronological narrative. Rather, it is structured as a series of “episodes,” twelve in all, that Hamilton feels are useful in highlighting FDR’s skills as overall commander of American forces (and in a broader sense, the free world). These so-called episodes really run the gamut. Some are useful (the section on the Casablanca Conference), some are useless (such as the chapters on Roosevelt’s flight to Morocco, which does nothing more than teach us that flying boats are really, really cool), and some are simply perplexing (such as Hamilton’s contention that FDR used the leverage of atomic secrets to get Churchill to agree to Operation Overlord, without providing any supporting evidence).

Hamilton’s style is informal and pugnacious. He peppers his writing with rhetorical questions, exclamatory asides, and broad interpretations about what various figures were thinking and feeling. His method is readable and engaging and it took me just a handful of days to get through the 399 pages of text. (And I was drunk for a couple of those days!)

Unfortunately, overall, Commander in Chief is quite disappointing. While Mantle of Command had its weaknesses, it also provided a number of helpful insights (and also hit Churchill right in the groin of his reputation: his position as an unreconstructed colonialist). Instead of rectifying the issues that plagued Mantle of Command, Hamilton tends to repeat them, and then repeat them again, and then again (repetitiveness being one of this book’s flaws).

Commander in Chief’s major issue is a lack of sourcing. Hamilton has a reputation as a dogged researcher and library hound. Those skills are not put on display here. His list of sources is painfully thin, and he tends to draw on a very few people for the bulk of his contentions. For instance, he quotes extensively from FDR’s distant cousin Daisy Suckley, whose patent adoration for Roosevelt makes her less-than-objective. (On the other hand, I appreciated his use of Canadian PM Mackenzie King, who kept detailed diary entries covering his face-to-face conversations with the American President). The paucity of actual witnesses is made all the more apparent by Hamilton’s tendency to cut away from Roosevelt’s story to spend time with Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Granted, Goebbels’ diary entries are fascinating; at the same time, they have only the most tenuous connection to the points Hamilton is trying to make, and thus feel like filler.

Hamilton is an extremely opinionated historian. In general, I am fine with this. Most historians have their biases and blind-spots, and I prefer honesty in this regard than the false veil of “objectivity.” But if you are going to give an opinion, you have to provide the factual premises upon which your conclusion is based. If you don’t give me the foundation, if you don’t give me the evidence, then you’re no better than Cliff Clavin, perched at the end of the bar, spouting confident nonsense. Too often in Commander in Chief, Hamilton would write something provocative without including that little superscript at the end of a sentence, denoting an endnote.

Hamilton’s agenda is to raise Roosevelt up to the heights he imagines occupied by Churchill. Alas, when you advance such an agenda without proofs, you tend to make your position seem weaker, not stronger. Oddly, then, I thought that Commander in Chief tended to diminish FDR rather than enlarge him.

The reason, I fear, is that Hamilton has taken the wrong course. It could very well be that Roosevelt simply can’t compare to Churchill, for the simple reason they played such different roles. Churchill was both the bellicose warrior and the eager strategist, with very keen ideas about the direction of the war. Yet he was also enraptured by a fading vision of the world, inextricably tethered to Empire and colonialism and notions of racial supremacy.

Roosevelt, in my opinion, simply wasn’t as involved in the daily mechanics of war-making as Hamilton asserts, at least not relative to his orotund, cigar-smoking, scotch-swilling counterpart. Yet he possessed a prominence all his own. FDR recognized the dangers of totalitarianism early on, and oversaw the massive transformation of American industry from Model Ts and refrigerators to aircraft carriers and long-range bombers. For good and for ill, he took an isolationist nation and turned it into a global military machine that would soon ascend to be the most powerful on earth. He also had a far-reaching vision of the postwar world that Churchill – still clinging to his Indian dreams – sorely lacked.

Hamilton is not wrong in identifying Franklin D. Roosevelt as a world-historical figure, an equal to Churchill and Stalin as the titans of an age. His error is in attempting to demonstrate FDR’s greatness in reference to theirs, rather than accepting – and celebrating – his own uniquely transformative gifts.

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Shoutout to William Lyon Mackenzie King! The 10th Prime Minister of Canada made this book possible with his dedicated journals of his war-time conversations with Churchill and FDR (they both trusted him implicitly).

Because FDR died before he had a chance to write his version of events, we can only see through his eyes because of the the people closest to him - their letters back and forth, diary entries. Hamilton does a fantastic job putting it all together and it’s an important job too - the true story of FDR’s leadership during WWII needs to be told. He wasn’t just battling Germany and Japan to win the war, but Stalin and Churchill to keep the future safe for democracy.

This is the second book of three. I enjoyed the first a little more but only because it was so exciting to get to see behind the scenes for the first time. This continues the fascinating story.

My favorite parts were the ones with King. I will have to read more about him.

[Aaron Million · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the second volume of Nigel Hamilton‘s trilogy about FDR and his military management of World War II. This picks up at the beginning of 1943, with much of the first half of the book surrounding the Casablanca conference. While international travel is routine and normal now for world leaders, especially the U.S. president, back then it was a novelty. In fact, FDR became the first president to fly, and he also became the first president to visit American troops overseas during wartime. For someone of FDR‘s physical disability this long trip had to be even more daunting than it would be for most people. This was well before jet travel, so this entailed a journey that had to use the railroad, the sea, and planes. A combination of all three modes of travel took FDR thousands of miles away from Washington DC and deposited him in North Africa.

At the conference in Casablanca, FDR had to twist Winston Churchill‘s arm hard enough to where he would finally commit to moving forward with a cross channel invasion sometime in 1944. Churchill continued to obsess over attempting to delve further into the Mediterranean, and to try to cut up the “soft underbelly“ of the German war machine. Churchill wanted to dabble on the periphery, slowly inching closer to Germany, but in a roundabout fashion. Whereas FDR knew that the only legitimate hope for success on the Allied front would involve opening up a second front to counterbalance the eastern front, where Germany had become somewhat stalemated inside Russia. But getting Churchill to see this, and to at least set aside his overwhelming concern with imperialism and maintaining the British Empire, was an incredibly difficult thing for FDR to be able to accomplish.

Even given FDR‘s herculean efforts to get Churchill to commit to the second front, he later tried to back out and renege on his promise to commit British resources to an invasion of France. This greatly upset FDR, but he had to keep one thing in mind at all times: he absolutely had to have the support of Winston Churchill in the British government. The British, will not being able to win the war on their own, were essential to helping America win the war. FDR knew this, and thus cultivated Churchill to keep him in the boat so so to speak. Nonetheless, it wasn’t easy and added to an already incredibly stressful time for the president.

Dwight Eisenhower was 52 years old during most of the events of this book. However, almost each time that he was mentioned – especially in the first half of the book – Hamilton prefaced his name as “young“ General Eisenhower. It got to the point where it was somewhat distracting. And while 52 is certainly not elderly nor close to it, I would not consider it to be “young” by any means (although I have to admit that if I were to read today about someone dying at 52 I would think “Wow that’s young”). nonetheless, 52 back during this time. Was not considered to be the age of a young man. Only ten years later, Eisenhower would be considered to be “old“ when he assumed the presidency.

Much of this volume is taken up with the battles between the American and British chief of staff concerning where to put the primary Allied resources at for both 1943 and 1944. The British, following Churchill‘s lead, consistently argued for a preference to Mediterranean operations, while the US generals and admirals under FDR kept pushing for a cross channel invasion into France. I do believe that Hamilton makes a good case that without Roosevelt’s unyielding persistence in the matter, the Allies could very well have ended up following Churchill’s strategy, which would’ve resulted in a very different and most likely much more costly war.

The second half of the book focuses a lot on the invasion of Sicily, and then the Allies trying to follow up with invading the mainland of Italy, finally getting some troops onto mainland Europe. This was a big deal for Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, as he unfairly continued to think that the Allies were not really helping rush out. Hamilton shows that the military planners really had seriously underestimated the German soldiers’ will to persevere and fight. While most of the Italian soldiers willingly gave up their arms and submitted to the United States, the Germans were the exact opposite. Hitler rushed several German divisions into Italy, with orders to annihilate the Allies, and also kill any Italians who surrender or attempt to help the Allies. This seemed to catch the US Generals off guard as they did not think Germany would commit so many resources to Italy, and also be so committed to taking over Italy.

Hamilton also reviews Churchill coming over to the United States and Canada, and Roosevelt’s multiple trips up to Canada for a Quebec conference with Churchill and Canadian Prime Minister William Mackenzie King. He once again makes good use of diary entries from many of people that were near FDR, and also interspersing the diary entries of German propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels to show a German perspective.

The focus was almost singularly on the European theater of war for this volume. Almost completely absent is any talk of the Pacific Theatre. There was a brief chapter about FDR authorizing a mission to kill Japanese fleet admiral Yamamoto, but outside of that we spend essentially no time in that theatre of war. Also missing here is any talk of how the war is going on the domestic front, with essentially no mention of James Byrnes, who is effectively running domestic side of the country while FDR focused almost totally on the war. I do get that the aim of Hamilton‘s book is to talk about FDR‘s war management, but it seems to be almost to the total exclusion of anything domestically.

And even FDR himself didn’t quite seem to be at the center of the book as much as he was in the first volume. I think that simply had more to do with the changing nature of the war, with FDR no longer needing to focus on bringing the United States into the war, but rather managing the overall direction of it, and then increasingly focusing more on what will happen after the war. He had serious concerns about Stalin and the Soviet Union during this year, and already knew that no matter when Hitler would be defeated, the United States would not be able to prevent at least some Soviet domination in parts of Europe. He becomes increasingly worried about this as the book moves forward, with the end coming slightly before his first meeting with Stalin at the end of 1943.

I should make a note here, that I find that when you look at Hamilton’s sources in the back of the book, they are thinner than what I would’ve expected for a historian of his caliber. I saw this in the first volume also, but it seems a bit more glaring here. At times, I think he over relies on diary entries – which are very important! But it seems to be almost a single-minded determination on his part to build up FDR‘s military management reputation, often at the expensive Churchill. I definitely think a correction is needed from how history has overall interpreted Churchill’s handling of the war, usually quite generously. But I am starting to wonder if Hamilton is reaching just a bit too far.

Overall, this is a good book, and Hamilton writes in a very engaging manner, while structuring the chapters so that this is easily readable. I didn’t care for it as much as volume one, but it is still worth reading and continues the saga of FDR trying to grope for a solution not just to winning the war, but also to winning the peace after the war.

Grade: B

[Julian Douglass · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic and phenomenal history of the pivotal year of 1943 when it seemed like the Western Alliance would break and the US and UK would be fighting the same, yet separate wars. Mr. Hamilton does a remarkable job of keeping the suspense of the entire year and discussion between the American and the British COS, even though anyone who passed High School world and U.S. history knows the outcome of the war already. I love the human touch he brings to these deliberations as well, not only showing the infighting and battle of wills between the US and UK armies, but the reactions and what any normal human would have done if the situations arose. Wonderful book, and I am ready for Volume 3.

[Scott · Rating 4 out of 5]

Certain topics seem like they have been sufficiently covered, and the American role in World War II would seem to be one of them, as is the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The books that have been written on these topics can be measured in metric tons or by the millions of pages. What else is there to say?

Well, according to Nigel Hamilton, plenty. Hamilton is no stranger to biography ("JFK: Reckless Youth," and "Monty" have both won acclaim and awards in addition to stratospheric sales), and this is Hamilton's second book on Franklin Delano Roosevelt, following up on "The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941-1942." One of the main reasons Hamilton decided to write about FDR was to combat the universal truth of history - history is not really written by the victors, it is written by the survivors.

As a child of Britain and an historian, Hamilton is very familiar with Winston Churchill's epic six-volume history, 'The Second World War,' for which the former Prime Minister won the Nobel Prize for history. Churchill wrote that history in large part because of his incredibly massive brain and understanding of history, but also due to his insatiable desire for fame. While Churchill's importance in the Allied victory in World War II is undeniable, it can be overstated . . . as Churchill himself did in his history. While nobody can deny the brilliance of his prose, many historians, Nigel Hamilton included, deny the accuracy of Churchill's version of the story.

But we do not have FDR's competing assessment thanks to the sad fact that he died while World War II was still raging, and he did not have the opportunity to write or publish his own memoirs.

In Churchill's telling, Churchill often led the well-meaning but overwhelmed American president. Hamilton refutes this with rigorous attention to contemporary documents, including diaries and letters sent by parties who can be perceived as reasonably objective - such as the Canadian prime minister.

Indeed, if FDR had not stood up to Churchill, the Allied victory in World War II was not certain. Churchill was focused in many ways on retaining the British Empire, which required control of the Mediterranean and other sea lanes. And so it was the Churchill advocated for a broad Allied push up to Germany through the Balkans, Greece, and Italy rather than the cross-Channel invasion that was achieved in D-Day. Such a strategy may well have led to an Allied bloodbath fighting through brutal terrain . . . and may well have allowed Germany the time to negotiate a peace.

Such speculation is interesting, but two things are beyond doubt: the Allies won the war, and they did so by following a strategy that FDR pushed for rather than Churchill.

To be fair, in Hamilton's telling, this was far more than an 'FDR versus Churchill' dispute. But that makes FDR's achievement all the more important as he pursued his agenda against the British leadership, against the wily Stalin, and even a few American generals . . . all while balancing the need to help in Europe against the American people's furious desire for revenge against Japan.

There is a line about FDR - that he had a second-rate mind but a first-rate temperament - that is on display a bit in this story, but it seems that FDR had several more first-rate attributes than just his temperament. Highly recommended.

[Matt Carmichael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the second book in Hamilton’s trilogy on President Roosevelt’s role as “Commander in Chief” during WW2. (*see my October 2021 review of book one.) One of the author’s main points is to assert F.D.R. was the leader of the Allied effort to defeat the Nazis, not Churchill. (*Churchill paints in his six-volume retelling of the war, that he was the architect of the North Africa campaign to defeat Rommel, the later invasion of Italy, & early supporter of the D-Day landings…Hamilton reveals this is false). …unfortunately Roosevelt died shortly after Allied troops were approaching Berlin, …Hitler committing suicide within a month of Roosevelt’s death. So, we do not have the benefit of his memoirs to hear “his side” of the story, as we do Churchill’s. We do have meticulous research from the author via eyewitnesses, meeting notes, personal papers, etc. backing up his claims.
I was struck by three things, regarding Roosevelt, as told by the author: First, how difficult it is for a democracy to navigate the politics of war. How much easier a totalitarian leader to marshal resources, direct policy, etc. when there is no opposition (or opposition is exterminated!). Roosevelt navigated Republican efforts to block his agenda well. Also, I was reminded how much Roosevelt’s disabilities contributed to his empathy for the failures of human nature. He seemingly was always the optimist and relentlessly positive, always mindful that wartime decisions may cost human lives.
Lastly, Eleanor is largely absent. The author describes her political support for her husband and helping the war effort. But the author highlights the great loneliness of F.D.R. once the drama of the day retreated with Eleanor’s absence from the White House particularly felt. Other biographies I think touch on F.D.R.’s unfaithfulness and hint at Eleanor’s fluid sexuality. But I am reminded how supremely helpful Eleanor was to Truman after Roosevelt’s death (advising on the Marshall plan/management of post-war Europe, genesis of the United Nations, creation of Israel, Atomic Bomb treaties, …Human Rights …big stuff!). I would like to have heard more about her thoughts and their marriage dynamics. Truman called her the “First Lady of the World” after all.

Maybe all this is covered in book three!

[Kathleen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nearly 75 years after WWII has ended; Hamilton presents a compelling case that Roosevelt not only was fighting the Axis powers, but also his key partner, Winston Churchill. Churchill was determined to maintain the British Empire which affected his overall strategic vision of how to conduct the war—particularly in the Asian sub-continent. While he was determined to win President Roosevelt’s cooperation—the U.S. was key to providing the means to wage war after all—he was obstinate as to how to pursue the war. Churchill was preoccupied with the Mediterranean effort and continually underestimated the power and skill of the Wehrmacht. The cross channel invasion would likely have never occurred if Churchill's strategy prevailed. On the other hand, Churchill understood better than most the threat posed by the Allies’ Soviet partner, Stalin. Recommend.

[Edgar Raines]

This is a very readable account restoring FDR to his central place in directing the American war effort. It is at times too dismissive of those who disagreed with FDR and at times the writing could be tighter. This is the second volume in a projected three-volume study of FDR as wartime commander-in-chief. One of the advantages of this account is that it clears away seventy year old partisan barnacles. Hamilton's FDR is neither naive or deluded in dealing with the Russians. This is an interesting and important addition to a series that should in future years become the standard reference on the subject.

[Urey Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

In this, the second of his three volume history of Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime leadership, Hamilton continues his fawning treatment of FDR and his rather demeaning treatment of everybody else that was so evident in the first volume “The Mantle of Command.” Hamilton presents FDR as an oracle, a beneficent philosopher king with an unerring vision of the future dealing with a host of advisors and colleagues who are lesser intellects, lacking not only FDR’s visionary genius but also failing to recognize it or to implement it faithfully. It is a troubling view of a man who was a superb war leader but not without faults, who surrounded himself with strong and capable men who were given discretion to pursue war goals ultimately decided by him, and whose own manifold flaws affected his war leadership in ways large and small. How much better if Hamilton had chosen to write that history, given the vast assortment of materials he had upon which to draw.

A regularly repeated theme for Hamilton is Churchill’s 6-volume memoir of the war in which he (Churchill) presents himself in overwhelmingly favorable terms, omitting some events and details along the way that would not reflect so well upon him – as is characteristic of memoirs written by historical figures always, and why they are read with a discerning eye. Hamilton takes frequent offense at Churchill’s liberties with the historical record, and explains that his intention with this three-volume work is to create a counter-balancing memoir as seen from FDR’s perspective. What he has created is an unbalanced and relentlessly positive hagiographic exposition of FDR as he imagines such a memoir should be. It is more subjective and uncritically “self” laudatory than Churchill’s personally congratulatory but historically compelling war memoirs. That’s a shame.

FDR was a master of manipulation and ambiguity. His leadership style was to constantly play one advisor against the other, to never let the left hand know what the right hand was doing, to obfuscate, delay and propagate diverse competitive views. Ultimately, he would make final difficult decisions when he had to and stick with them, but he almost never telegraphed a decision, or his own true thinking or how he was leaning. He was a superb evaluator of talent and put strong, capable people in responsible positions. Hamilton belittles them – Marshall, King, and others – as irresponsible if not incompetent, which begs the question of how they stayed in place for the duration of the war.

He constantly belittles Marshall’s strong push for a cross-channel invasion from the start of hostilities with Germany. But he (FDR) tasked Marshall with planning to beat Germany, and Marshall was right – the only (and I stress ‘only’) way to defeat Germany was to strike across the English Channel directly into the heart of Germany. Marshall wanted to do that from the start and never stopped advocating for that as the only way to end the war. Now it is fair to argue, as did the British, that a cross-channel invasion was premature, that the allied forces and specifically the Americans were not ready or capable of successfully staging such an invasion. But it remains that Marshall was right in the strategy, if not the timing. FDR never told Marshall to forget it – that won’t work. As he did with all of his advisors, he left them thinking that he agreed with them without ever staking out his own positions. Hamilton thinks Marshall and his subordinate planners were being irresponsible if not mutinous for continuing to push a cross-channel invasion when Roosevelt had so clairvoyantly decided upon invading North Africa to give American forces necessary experience and training in battle (Hamilton’s view of the necessity for Torch – the invasion of North Africa – that it was a essentially training exercise.). Yet in the absence of a firm decision to the contrary, why wouldn’t Marshall continue to advocate for the strategy that in his view was necessary to actually win the war? A point he raised with the British in response to their adamant preference for campaigns in the Mediterranean and around the edges… how do you propose to actually win the war? They had no answer.

The North African campaign arose in the alternative for reasons that had nothing to do with gaining experience and training. The British were steadfastly opposed to a cross-channel invasion – then and later, even on the brink of D-Day in June 1944. Their historical experience argued against such direct confrontations with peer level enemies. They had lost every confrontation with German and Japanese forces to date (a fact that Hamilton attributes to incompetence and cowardice, overlooking the larger truth that everybody lost every confrontation with German and Japanese forces up to then – they were running amok across Europe and the Pacific). The searing experiences of WW I had imposed a broad military and cultural revulsion to large army set piece battles on the mainland. Britain, as exemplified by Churchill, never stopped advocating nibbling around the edges, forestalling a direct armed confrontation with Germany for as long as it took to bleed them into some sort of status quo armistice or submission by attrition, even more so with the entry of the Soviet Union into the war and the huge commitments of men and resources in direct conflict on the Eastern Front. Why do that on the Western Front – from the British point of view. The answer, of course, as insisted upon by Marshall and others was because there simply was no other way to win the war.

So by late 1942, the British were engaged and had been engaged against the Germans. The Russians were engaged against the Germans. Free French forces, as small as they were, were engaged against the Germans. The US was not – the US was idle, providing resources and support to allied combatants, certainly engaged in naval action but out of sight. Logistically, a cross channel invasion was impossible for lack of ships and landing craft alone, not to mention sufficient men in arms and supporting functions. Politically, FDR saw this as a huge liability – it was politically necessary for US forces to be engaged in battle with German forces, both domestically and internationally. His primary allies – necessary for any confrontation with Germany – were not remotely available for a cross -channel invasion (the British by adamant choice, the Russians by geography) so the only way to defeat Germany had to wait. More urgently, there was a genuine worry that the Russians would sue for a separate peace with Germany once they stalemated the German advances. And when a choice could no longer be deferred, FDR decided on Torch – pushing hard for the landings to occur before the elections of 1942 in order to shore up his standing with the electorate. To his credit, when Marshall asked for a short delay to better prepare for the invasions (that meant the landings would happen a week after the election) FDR concurred for all the right military reasons. It remained a disappointment, however, that he was unable to reap the political rewards he tried to arrange.

The American experience during the evolution of Torch and the ultimately successful campaign to liberate North Africa taught some hard and bloody lessons – the Americans learned the same costly lessons that had been dealt to the British and Russians earlier, and yet they prevailed and won. As did the British at El Alamein and the Russians at Stalingrad. They became combat veterans, gaining experience and perspective that they lacked, but of which they were unaware of needing before Torch. British intransigence lead to Sicily, and subsequently the invasion of Italy… the latter arguably a huge mistake, despite constant and insistence US demands for commitment to a cross channel invasion at the soonest practicable date.

Yet Hamilton considers those advocating cross channel invasion to be irresponsible and insubordinate. It’s a criticism too far. As one small example, early on he cites a conversation between Secretary of War Stimson and Marshall in which Stimson asks Marshall if the President supports a cross channel invasion, and Marshall answers, “yes.” Hamilton is outraged, accusing Marshall of misrepresenting what he knows to be the truth, that FDR opposes it and wants to invade North Africa. Yet soon thereafter in describing a meeting with Roosevelt in which Roosevelt asks Marshall a pointed question about invading, he lauds Marshall for answering honestly, stating that Marshall had too high a sense of honor to ever lie. He doesn’t see the paradox, nor the more likely possibility that, as he did all the time with advisors, FDR listened to Marshall advocate the cross channel option and let him leave thinking that he (FDR) was in agreement… that he could just let things percolate longer before making any decision. Strong personalities (Marshall, King, et al.) were enabled by FDR to do their job – and they did so. They continued to push for what they rightly viewed as the single best way to win the war, even when logistical necessity, politics, or intra-alliance relations intruded and delayed or side tracked that key effort. Roosevelt was in total command, and his decisions were made when and as circumstances and the factors of politics, logistics and alliance issues dictated. They complied and did as they were ordered, all the while keeping the ultimate goal of winning the war in mind and working towards that goal. That is not irresponsible or incompetent or mutinous – it is doing what is required and expected.

Another of Roosevelt’s flaws was his own personality – his unshakable belief in his natural ability to charm, persuade or enamor people to adopt his views or do his bidding. His post-war plans reflect this self-centered approach and his odd belief in international democratic ideals (including the Soviet Union!!) and an international police force to enforce democratic ideals. The enforcement arm would be composed of military forces of the US, Britain, China (notoriously weak and fractured) and the Soviet Union (notoriously dictatorial and intent upon coercion and domination). He believed that he could influence and impel Stalin and the Soviet Union to change their very nature by the force of his personality. It is a measure of his hubris, as was his unchanging approach to wooing Stalin or with his own personnel mistakes such as MacArthur. It can be argued that the reverse happened – Stalin diligently manipulated Roosevelt with considerable success, from the Soviet point of view and it never dawned on Roosevelt. None of which seems to occur to Hamilton.

I started this trilogy with great interest – I have to say that I am disappointed, at best, in the reading. The account is extremely jaundiced in favor of Roosevelt, beyond what I think even he would have written if it were his memoir (recognizing that “history is written by the victors” and thus lacking to a degree in objective truth)… to some degree less than the first volume, but still evident and, to me, irritating because it is so readily apparent from Hamilton’s research and the resources available to him that it could have been so much more.

[Christopher · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books of history I have read in recent years was Nigel Hamilton's The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941–1942. It did much to challenge the old narrative that FDR was, mostly, a hands-off commander-in-chief who gave some direction to the military, but left them to do most of the strategizing. In reality, as that book makes plain, FDR overcame a serious challenge to his authority from his military chiefs and urged the invasion of North Africa, which turned out to be an incredible diplomatic and military coup. I was so impressed by that book that I did not feel there needed to be another. Imagine my delighted surprise then to find Mr. Hamilton continuing his story here with another impressive entry.

In this book, having overcome dissent within the ranks of his military chiefs, FDR spends most of 1943 asserting the United States as the preeminent leader of the Western Allies. That means overcoming Great Britain's courageous, but volatile, prime minister, Winston Churchill. Mr. Hamilton deftly shows how this was no small task. Churchill was very afraid to launch a Cross-Channel invasion of mainland Europe and FDR had to constantly keep him, and the entire Allied war effort, from being derailed by one of Churchill's pet schemes in the Mediterranean. Indeed, just as soon as Churchill would leave one conference, having assented to the Operation Overlord, he would start to renege. It must have been incredibly frustrating and nothing less than success in the war, as well as the Post-War World Order FDR was envisioning, hung on the success of their partnership.

Indeed, FDR's ideas for a new Post-War World Order is a constant leit motif throughout this book. There has been some debate as to whether or not FDR envisioned how difficult dealing with the Soviets would be or whether or not he was truly giving up Eastern Europe to Soviet domination after the war. Backed by incredible research into, among other documents, then-Canadian Prime Minster Mackenzie King's extensive diaries during these days, Mr. Hamilton shows that not only was FDR envisioning a Post-War World Order at the same time American forces were landing in North Africa, but that FDR was well aware that Stalin was just as bad as Hitler, but the U.S. could only do so much for Eastern Europe and the Balkans at that time. Indeed, Mr. Hamilton seems to suggest that FDR was already seeing the contours of the conflict that would become the Cold War long before anyone else could, which is why he kept Churchill and Great Britain so close to himself and America as a sign of Western resolve not just to Nazi Germany and Japan then, but to the Soviets later.

The one thing I have against this book is that Mr. Hamilton, for the sake of creative license, seems to act as if he knows exactly what is going on FDR's head. Often times he'll write about how FDR "could only shake his head" at Churchill or the military chiefs saying or suggesting something supremely stupid. It smacks of the 20/20 hindsight that historians often enjoy when looking at past events. However, I will say that Mr. Hamilton, backed by the personal diaries of key figures surrounding FDR and Churchill during these days, must be very close to truth. In summation, this is another surprisingly enlightening look at FDR as Commander-in-Chief not just of American forces, but of Allied forces as well.

[Marshall · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent follow up to Hamilton's previous book. I think he might overstate the case against Churchill, but not by much. Churchill's problem was that he lacked a team of subordinates who could argue or contest certain tactical approaches to the Prime Minister's strategic insights. Churchill was a legend after 1940 and that at times proved problematic.

The book retains the essential strength of the first book which is that it provides Roosevelt's essential strategic vision for the war and its outcome. Roosevelt sought an approach that provided the US with the ability to develop battle hardened forces when 1944 began. He also demonstrates the struggles Roosevelt had not only in winning the war, but the thankless task of managing the Grand Alliance.

[Russell · Rating 5 out of 5]

This thoroughly-researched and well-written account covers a single year of World War II, 1943. It was a year that began with the Allies pressing their first amphibious landing in North Africa, resulting in the clearing of Africa of German and Italian resistance. Building on the battle experience, at the infantry and command levels, gained in that campaign, US and British forces successfully invaded Sicily. A side-effect of this invasion was drawing German attention and forces from fighting the Soviets at Kursk, which would prove to be the last major offensive chance that Germany would have in their Eastern Front. Through it all, Roosevelt continued to focus on the objective of defeating Germany completely through an invasion across the English Channel, once again insisting in a battle of wills against the desire of Churchill, and some US commanders, to drive up through Italy to Germany. Though dealing with only a single year of the war, it was a pivotal time, which saw the US military recognize and begin to wield its enormous strength, not only of materiel, but of heroic leadership and ground-level determination.

[Don Siegrist · Rating 5 out of 5]

Volume two of Nigel Hamilton's trilogy about FDR's leadership during WWII. His goal is to rehabilitate FDR's reputation, one in which most people see him as Churchill's junior partner vs his rightful place as the senior partner in the Allied victory. He makes a compelling case that FDR not only directed the overall strategy but that Churchill continually undermined him with various ideas that were doomed to fail. He produces strong evidence that Churchill was dead set against any cross channel invasion and it was only after the success of D-Day that Churchill began to take credit for the plan.
FDR early on began to plan for a post war world while Churchill had no interest. Churchill is painted as only wanting to ensure that Britain, as well as its Empire, would maintain its rightful place in the post war world. FDR, on the otherhand, deplored colonialism and made it clear he had every intention of dismantling all European overseas empires.
FDR's ability to manage a two front war, manage his unreliable allies (mainly Stalin) and juggle domestic issues is nothing short of amazing. We usually imagine the US populace being 100% behind the war effort, but nothing could be further from the truth. Republican isolationists fought him at every turn and the largest coal miners strike in U.S. history occurred during the war. It's also asssumed that Allied victory was a forgone conclusion by 1943 but Hamilton explains Hitler's strategy to hold on until his V rockets could be deployed to destroy London. Fortunately he ran out of time. My only criticism is that Hamilton almost overdoes it and portrays FDR as having almost faultless judgement. A very important series of books (I can't wait to read Vol 3).

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

Commander in Chief is Nigel Hamilton’s second book in the Trilogy of FDR at War. This book covers the year of 1943 and follows the Torch landings, the invasion of Sicily and the surrender of Italy leading up to operation Overlord. This book focuses heavily on the relationship between Churchill and FDR and FDR and Stalin. There is also a lot in here about the US relationship with Canada during this time. We see the growing disconnect between Churchill and FDR and FDR’s attempts to put on a face for the world. The balancing of defeating Germany with the growing threat of Russia is also on display. Hamilton as always displays a masterful grasp of the topic and writes in a very engaging manner that is easy to read. If you are interested in FDR or World War II you will not be disappointed in this book.

[Mary · Rating 3 out of 5]

DNF. Dry but seemed well researched.

[John Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Detailed book on FDR as commander of our military and calling the shots that helped us win WWII, highlighting his ability to departmentalize, play the long game, understand people and plot to get his way. Hamilton reminds the reader throughout his book that Roosevelt had a long interest in the Navy, with a childhood desire to attend the navy college (instead of graduating from Harvard) and his long tenure as assistant secretary of the Navy; the author doesn’t go into detail on how FDR often overstepped the traditional role as assistant when helping to make decisions with the navy earlier in his career.

One of the compelling points of this book is how Roosevelt was thinking through the post war order of the world when dealing with both of his partners – Churchill, whose country had a colony view of the world, and Stalin, who wanted to spread communism. FDR was hoping to get a stronger League through that President Wilson failed to do, but an “United Nations” that had teeth through the four policemen – UK, Russia, China, and the US. He wanted to keep peace and country lines by “irresistible force.” The author shared discussions between FDR and his son, Elliot, pushing for a postcolonial world where people could control their own destiny. FDR shared how he was working then on limiting UK’s colonies and their help France keep their controlled countries. Elliot knew that India’s independence was a major issue between his dad and the UK Prime Minister.

Crossing the Channel invasion was key to win the war against Hitler, dividing his forces with Russia on one front and the allies on the other, lead by America. It is the backdrop of this book, trying to get everyone on the same page and the ups and downs, the rollercoaster to get the UK to commit. Ultimately FDR used the atomic bomb development as a way to secretly move the Prime Minister to embrace his position to a decision that allowed us to win the war – and win it perhaps over a year earlier.

While FDR’s confrontation with Churchill was up close and, while not personal, tough on both men despite their respect for one another, his fight with Stalin was more remote. FDR was bothered by Stalin’s earlier nonaggression Pact with Hitler, with some concerned they might make another agreement at some point. FDR was also concerned about Russia’s massacre of 20,000 Polish officers and members of the intelligentsia in 1940. On the order of the Russian dictator, they committed mass murder of convenience. Stalin controlled his nation with oppressive actions of arrest and executions.
Like other books, this book highlighted how the United States manufacturing ability was a major component of winning the war. The author stated that in 1942, America produced, “48,000 military planes – more than the airplane production of Germany, Italy, and Japan” combined. He cited that those figures would double again the following year. FDR was able to lead that ability by nearly eliminating consumer good production and bringing women into the workforce, something not mentioned in the book but a significant accomplishment. It showed a focus that our nation no longer possess. FDR was able to do this with targeted radio addresses and speeches before Congress. He knew that having Churchill hosted at the White House for weeks demonstrated to Americans our partnership, even when it was frayed. Our nation didn’t see this expertise until Reagan four decades later.

One example of FDR’s messaging skill was when he spoke about the “unconditional surrender meeting,” pushing to get the allies around the idea of no compromises, no peace discussions like at the end of WWI, and total win. While he had spoken with Churchill about this approach, when FDR reported it to the media, Churchill was “stunned” as was the press. More importantly, it caught the full attention of the Third Reich. Evil press expert, Goebbels, didn’t even know that the leaders were meeting for over a week when the announcement was made worldwide. Neutral countries were moved by the decision.

FDR’s unique relationships mentioned in this book could be a book by itself. The president repeatedly spent time with Churchill – going fishing, hosting him at his family home, bringing him to the White House for exceptionally long visits, and drinking too much, too often. He knew he had to bring him close to try to move him back to a strategic military decision the Prime Minister had promised earlier. FDR tried repeatedly to meet with Stalin – alone – to work on the postwar world only to be shot down after long pauses through telegrams. There was a fascinating story about how FDR and de Gaulle were crossed with one another but held their tongue, leading to the French leader doing what FDR later wanted him to do at the Casablanca forum. And FDR had a special relationship with Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, hoping to groom him to be in charge of the new United Nations.

The book also contrasted the leadership styles of those who were locked in this world conflict. FDR would use food and wine to break down barriers with Churchill and his hundreds of military aides who would travel to the states for important discussions. It’s shocking that many top leaders would be under one roof. Hitler was then dinning alone, only making two public appearances in over a year, reminding this read of today’s dictator of Russia – alone and hidden. America was moved by their elected leader while Germany was driven by the orchestrated media, marches, and drive for their nationalistic approaches. The author points out that the “very concept of democracy was foreign’ to Germany, which is largely true although Hitler was first elected.

Unlike many other books on our nation’s longest serving president, this book highlights the slights and contributions of FDR’s various aides and his own style of moving people to his goals. The author speaks about how he liked to run meetings in a friendly approach without an agenda and bringing his chief assistants into the discussion with questions. FDR was careful when pushing major aides like General Marshal when he felt that Marshal’s advice was not well researched, to assure he was not on the spot in front of others. Other aides, like Admiral Pound, was serving while suffering from an undiagnosed brain tumor. And these were not just passing presidential advisers, they were big, substantial names like General Marshal and Eisenhower, Secretary Stimson, Harry Hopkins, and General Deane.

After reading this book, there is no question why FDR died at just 63. Even more than other, more substantial books on the president elected four times, Hamilton highlights the pressures he was receiving from all sides – Churchill, Stalin, the American people, and the strategy to win the war and the peace. Churchill had an orientation of a colony prone world and would backtrack from earlier decisions, thinking he understood war strategy better than he did. Stalin wouldn’t engage or even meet with the president yet wanted to have a say; he would claim that he couldn’t meet because he was with his troops on the front lines when he, unlike FDR, wouldn’t go to the front lines. During these tough times, FDR was up for an unprecedented fourth term and, while the book didn’t mention it, he was fighting earlier supporters like the CIO, long-time opponents like Ohio Senator Robert Taft, plus he had to resist those who wanted change. All these pressures were on top of the regular issues that confront the leader of the free world, such as when FDR was confronted with the largest single strike that was ever called in American history when a half million miners went on strike. The author also hinted about his estranged relationship with his powerful wife and his own disability that the media hid from the public but impacted his health and caused him incredible pain.

Hamilton provides a well-researched book, utilizing journals from so many leaders, letters, and telegrams. The author repeatedly warns the reader that his book contrasts with Churchill’s own account of decisions made to win the war. Interesting, Hamilton points out that Churchill said he would wait until the war is over to write his reflections on the war, rather than keeping a journal, to be able to bury his mistakes.

[M Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the second volume of Nigel Hamilton’s series on “FDR at War” and it is a gem. In this series of volumes the author has embarked on a mission to present Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief and to tell the story of how he directed when and where the war would be fought. This is an important story because Roosevelt’s direction of the Western Allies has not really been told before.

This sequel to “Mantel of Command” covers the conferences of 1943 that decided what would happen after Nazi forces were defeated in North Africa. Hamilton has written a very lively and entertaining story that demonstrates that FDR was the senior partner of the Western Allies. The author exquisitely shows that Roosevelt had the clearest vision of how the war should progress, that he understood that this war must end with unconditional surrender, and that, of the Big Three leaders, only Roosevelt understood that an international organization would be necessary to ensure the peace in the post war world. What I really appreciated was Hamilton’s efforts to inform and remind the reader that the war could not have been won without full US participation and the war with Hitler would most probably have been lost if Churchill had been allowed to direct it.

It should be noted that even though this book is titled “Commander in Chief: FDR's Battle with Churchill, 1943” it does not cover all of 1943. The narrative begins with the opening of 1943 and ends in September of that year; just after the QUADRANT Conference in Quebec. FDR’s battle with Churchill was all about the cross-channel invasion. Winston did not want to do it under any circumstances other than a collapse of the Nazi war effort. It took three separate conferences to settle the matter. Roosevelt and his Joint Chiefs thought the matter settled after each conference only to later have Churchill insist that he had not committed to a cross-channel invasion. This duplicity on the part of Churchill did the most damage to the Anglo-American partnership and only Roosevelt’s patients, determination, scolding and threats kept the partnership together. Thanks to FDR’s efforts he finally did force Churchill to accept that the invasion of Northern France would take place in the spring of 1944.

I do find fault in the author’s assertion that Roosevelt blackmailed Churchill into accepting a firm commitment to the invasion. Hamilton says, “If Churchill would not adhere to the American Overlord strategy, as per the Trident agreement reached in May [1943], the President thus quietly indicated to the Prime Minister that the United States would have to withhold an agreement to share development of the atomic weapon.” (p. 313) No citation is given for this assertion so I assume no such ultimatum can be verified. I am willing to believe the author’s conclusion but it would have been wonderful for him to elaborate on what evidence persuades him.

All-in-all this is a very good, very entertaining and very fast read and I am hoping the author does continue his story with a final third volume.

[Steven Meyers · Rating 5 out of 5]

“WHEN EGOS COLLIDE”

Mr. Hamilton continues his story in ‘Commander in Chief’ about President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) role as the leader of America’s military engagements during World War II. Central to the second volume are his struggles with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the author’s counterargument that FDR was the real architect of many World War II events, not Churchill as many of the British Bulldog’s fans and Churchill himself would like people to believe. The president’s personal life is skimmed over as well as the specifics about various battles. His wife, Eleanor, makes a few very brief cameos. His struggles with a diminished Democrat Congress because of the midterms and adamant outspoken isolationists factored into his decisions involving the war. ‘Commander in Chief’ was published in 2016.

‘Commander in Chief’ does explain that President Roosevelt was thinking beyond just battle engagements and was aggressive in planning on what happens after the Axis is defeated. FDR correctly saw the failures of the Versailles Treaty and how it allowed World War II to come to fruition. The United Nations blueprints were started solely because farsighted FDR sought a better way where democracy and self-determination became the world paradigm. Colonialism needed to die. The big problems with his plan were Churchill, Charles de Gaul, and Joseph Stalin. They wanted to keep their countries’ boot heals on colonies they conquered after the war. Stalin wanted to expand the Soviet Union’s reach. The imperialists had no intention in letting other countries that were exploited have self-determination.

I swear, I’ve never read any book that puts de Gaul in a positive light. The “quirky, proud, imperious” A-hole believed everyone should be subordinate to him or were his enemy, but as the old saying goes, the enemy of my enemy is my friend… for the time being. De Gaul did a lot of strutting and crowing for a guy that had no country and needed to rely on other countries to save his and his German-occupied country’s bacon. Blunt De Gaul, however, was less Machiavellian than Winston Churchill. FDR also understood that if the Allies won, U.S.S.R.’s psychopathic Joseph Stalin was going to be a huge threat once World War II was over. The largest challenge would be democracy vs communism. There were a lot of diplomatic flaming balls FDR had to juggle in keeping the alliance together. The Allies presented a façade of unity when internally shit was hitting the fans from many directions. The book does a good job explaining why an American was needed to coordinate the planned 1944 Normandy invasion (known as Operation Overlord or D-Day) instead of a British commander.

The decisions made often had large life-and-death consequences. Some soldiers were sacrificed simply to play with the opponent’s head. As in all wars, psychological warfare was an integral part of World War II. FDR was excellent at public relations and knew how to use it to not only get into the enemies’ heads but also give hope to his allies. ‘Commander in Chief’ also explains the importance of the January 1943 Casablanca Conference; the decision to require Germany, Italy, and Japan accept “unconditional surrender”; and the necessity of American troops needing real battle experience against the far-superior seasoned German army before invading Europe by crossing the English Channel. As Mr. Hamilton aptly wrote “Combat, command, and campaign experience: these were crucial – not only at the unit level but in senior command and international-coalition cooperation.” This point was driven home when American forces first encountered German troops in Tunisia. The positive result in us seriously getting our asses kicked was military command and most U.S. citizens stopped fantasizing about Allies crossing the English Channel anytime soon. Our green troops were no match (for now) against the German troops.

The book also examines FDR’s declining health. I was surprised at the measly treatment he received from his White House physician. Mr. Hamilton explains the first thoughts of forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because of very valid concerns over the Soviet Union’s predatory totalitarian dictatorship desire to envelop most of Europe; and the assassination of Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto, in a daring American air assault, who was the key implementer of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

FDR had a clear understanding of the problems the world faced IF the Allies won the war. Stalin was just as bloodthirsty and nasty as Hitler. The Allies' partnership with the Soviets was tentative at best. The second book ends with the Allies having a toehold in Italy and Hitler eager for their secret weapon, V-rockets, to be ready for use. All the major nations knew that 1944 was going to be a bloody climatic year. Either the Allies or Germany would win.

‘Commander in Chief’ is not meant to give the reader the entire scope of every key player during World War II. Even a three-volume effort can’t come close to achieving such a lofty goal. The book did, however, pique my interest in knowing more about Germany’s vicious assault on Stalingrad and how the Soviets beat them back. A book that is considered topnotch on it is titled ‘Stalingrad: The Fateful Sierge: 1942-1943’ by Antony Beevor. If you are interested in understanding FDR’s struggles as Commander in Chief, Mr. Hamilton gives a solid interesting presentation in this second volume of the trilogy. Now on to the third volume ‘War and Peace.’

(If you are looking for a good, more encompassing biography about our thirty-second president, I highly recommend Jean Edward Smith’s (1932-2019) ‘FDR.’ It was published in 2007.)

[Eric Gilliland · Rating 5 out of 5]

Commander in Chief is the second volume of Nigel Hamilton's study of FDR as a grand strategist, the first volume The Mantle of Command focused on the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the key decisions made by the Allies in 1942, specifically FDR's determination to open a second front in North Africa which led to a confrontation with his generals. As the title suggests, the middle volume takes a close look at FDR and Churchill's clash over war strategy through 1943, specifically whether the Allies were best served by focusing on the Mediterranean front with the eventual goal of overtaking Germany from the south or by opening a front in Western Europe through a cross-channel invasion. Churchill favored the former, while FDR advocated for the latter.

Hamilton's objective with the trilogy was to compile a narrative of events from FDR's perspective. Much of the discourse around the grand strategy of the war was shaped by Churchill's own six-volume history, which remains invaluable, but must also be recognized as biased and self-serving. From FDR's mindset, recognizing the immediate threat posed by Hitler, while at the same time realizing Stalin was also a monster but an essential ally if the Third Reich would ever be defeated. He worried about the USSR and Germany reaching an armistice that would split the alliance and forever decide the fate of Europe.

But the immediate concern was Churchill's insistence on taking the fight to Hitler through Italy, an idea supported by many in FDR's inner circle. The argument for the Mediterranean strategy was that a cross-channel invasion of France was too risky, Hitler's Atlantic wall would decimate any attempt to land a major invading force. History was on Churchill's side since there had not been a successful cross-channel invasion since 1066. The Dieppe raid in August of 1942 was a small-scale attempt at an amphibious invasion of France by the Allies that ended in disaster. Churchill argued for hitting weak points across Southern Europe to weaken Germany with far less casualties and eventually more leverage in shaping the fate of Europe before the Soviets swept across the entire continent.

FDR saw it differently and had to play a complicated game of keeping the alliance together while never losing sight of the main goal. He was wise enough to realize preparations for a cross-channel invasion would take time. Many of his generals had favored an attempt in 1942, and many pushed for 1943. From FDR's perspective the situation was far more complex. His military advisors felt landings in North Africa served little purpose in defeating the Axis powers, but FDR saw the importance of engaging German armies to gain experience that would prove pivotal when the time was right for D-Day. Similarly, the July 1943 invasion of Sicily provided experience with amphibious operations. By mid-1943, FDR decided the time for peripheral strategies was over and the invasion of France must move forward the next spring to bring a swift end to the conflict.

The imperative to ease pressure on the Soviets by forcing Germany to fight on two European fronts cannot be overstated. Churchill fantasized about moving into Italy as a launching point of securing the Balkans. But these "pinprick" operations on the periphery were a way of avoiding the difficult task of defeating the Germans where they were strongest. With the Allied war aim of unconditional surrender, the end could only come with total capitulation, best achieved by landings in France. Churchill also underestimated how fiercely the German army would resist, the Wehrmacht did not collapse after the landings in Italy, and it took the Allies months to secure Rome. By the end of summer 1943, FDR's plan for a cross-channel invasion prevailed, it was the riskiest but surest way to end the war.

Hamilton also lets the reader see things from the German perspective in 1943, although the Soviet invasion had stalled and they had retreated in North Africa, Hitler and the top leadership believed they could drive a wedge into the alliance; confident their domination of Europe was permanent. They welcomed more attacks on the periphery of Europe since they had shorter supply lines and less to lose, and were also confident a cross-channel invasion by the Allies would meet with swift defeat. With fantasies of super weapons and a belief in their national fate, the German leadership in 1943 still saw many paths to victory (or stalemate) despite the recent setbacks.

Even during the war's darkest moments FDR was planning for the post-war world. He envisioned the United Nations and the end of colonialism (another sore spot with Churchill), creating the structures that would lead to a long peace. If Churchill was the ultimate frenemy, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King was a close confidante who kept records of his meetings with FDR. I can't imagine what FDR would think of an American President antagonizing Canada (apologies for the contemporary reference.) He also had a gift for recognizing talent, he supported Eisenhower even through his shaky performance during Operation Torch.

While hundreds of studies have been written on the Second World War, Commander and Chief is a clear-eyed view of 1943 and the challenges facing the Allied leadership. Hamilton's sense of narrative is dramatic, and he avoids pushing personal agendas or engaging in armchair generalship. He sticks to the facts and presents readers with the complexities facing leaders at the highest levels during a pivotal moment of world history.

[Ryan Winfield · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall a good read, and an interesting look into an interesting relationship between two leaders with the weight of the world's future on their shoulders.

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 3 out of 5]

I can't rate it more than three stars in part for one thing that applies to Hamilton's whole trilogy (this is the last of the three to have been read by me).

This is not the second volume in a biographical trilogy of FDR as commander in chief, but as half commander in chief, as Hamilton nowhere in these volumes discusses the Pacific war, and there's plenty to critique FDR on. And, I'm going to do a bit of that here, since I read Vols 1 and 3 long ago.

First, the span. From helping enhance the legend of Dugout Doug MacArthur to not telling Truman about the Bomb (about which Hamilton basically lies in Vol. 3) and many things in between, such as FDR's large levels of cluelessness about 1930s-40s China, his pretensions based on Clipper Ship/opium smuggling Delano family history aside, FDR was not so "hands on" in the Pacific Theater and to the degree he was, it enabled arguable mistakes of the likes he tried to avoid in the ETO.

Take Dugout Doug's "I shall return" to the Philippines. By early 1945, this was clearly a sideshow. With the certainty of a plutonium bomb nowhere certain, wasting US lives in the Philippines was as bad as wasting them in Italy. Mac should have been cut off from further troops. And, given some of his intelligence failures and shoddy staff work in Korea, US troops are probably very fortunate that Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the Pacific war, and not invasions of the Japanese home islands.

On the positive side, Roosevelt keeping the US to a Germany-first strategy was hands-on, and important. (What would have happened, in alt history, if Hitler hadn't declared war on us right away? Remember, the US ONLY declared war on Japan Dec. 8.)

OK, now, on to this book as far as what Hamilton actually covers.

Shades of third book’s wrongfulness early on. Attacks Churchill in preface for not going to FDR’s funeral, even tho it was in the middle of the tail end of ETO war, and was only three days after his death, and was designed as a largely private affair, not an affair of state. Beyond that, Churchill originally thought of going https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.ed...

Repeats book three’s canards, by mix of insinuation and full statement, about Dieppe. I note it in more detail there.

Good, and perhaps even better than in the first volume, on Marshall’s obstinance about wanting a 1943 Bolero as well as Stimson’s cluelessness. Very good on basically having had it with Stalin at about the time of the Quebec conference. Good on early battles between US and British Chiefs of Staff, then the British Chief’s attempts to rein in Churchill.

Good on the Torch campaign after the landing. To the degree that Italy is covered, OK there. But, cuts off early with the arbitrary 1943 date, and as far as I recall, he treated Italy little in volume 3 outside of Shingle. I note that because he gushes over Mark Clark’s handling of the last touch and go at Salerno and I don’t recall how much or how little he talked about his glory-hogging rush for Rome in 1944. That said, Hamilton skips over Roosevelt the partisan politician hoping that Torch would happen before the midterm election date. (It didn't.)

In short, as I see from reading some of the reviews of Hamilton’s “Reckless Youth,” all three volumes show a fair bit of his polemical style, with accuracy being damned a fair amount of the time. Indeed, per that book, his hatred of Churchill at times approaches that toward Joe Kennedy.

[Mr N P Leversuch · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting read, but spoiled, at least for me, by the relentlessly biased presentation of Roosevelt as the sole visionary genius. Hamilton compounds this flaw by portraying everyone else as deeply flawed individuals pursuing personal agendas.
The author repeatedly criticises Churchill, and particularly Churchills self-justification in his multi-volume history of the second world war, while seeming to be oblivious of his same behaviour towards Roosevelt.
Hamilton presents the high-level management of this period of the war and the interaction of the major players in a fresh and thought-provoking manner that is of value to the reader. However, because of the biased, almost fawning, treatment in favour of Roosevelt, I always had the feeling that the book was leaving out the imperfections of Roosevelt’s behaviour, while at the same time highlighting the imperfections of the other players and minimising their positive aspects.
I felt this book is a disservice to all the main characters. All of them, including Roosevelt, were flawed individuals, but, except for the Axis leaders and Stalin, they had strong counterbalancing positive qualities.
These individuals found themselves by accident in the role of leaders at a time of world war. There were extraordinary demands made on them, and they rose magnificently to the challenge.
It would not detract from the high reputation they deserve if they had all been portrayed in a more balanced manner.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

This second volume of Hamilton's FDR trilogy is definitely a step up from the first. His prose is more balanced and less fawning toward FDR. I did feel, however (and maybe I am wrong), that some portions seemed repetitive. I liked that he drew upon MacKenzie King's notes as a contemporary witness to show that his impressions were shared at the time. He did repeat his lack of knowledge of Canadian geography by twice calling Quebec its capital early on, before later getting it right later on. He also called a 500+ bomber raid on Rome on July 19, 1943 the largest yet of the war, though the Brits (arguably) did a 1,000 plane raid on Cologne on May 30, 1942. OK, that's picky stuff. What Hamilton does do well in this volume is to detail Churchill's maddening flips on Overlord, constantly reverting to his obsession with Mediterranean diversions, and attempts to get Turkey to enter the war. Perhaps Winston wanted to make up for his disastrous WW1 invasion of Gallipoli by trying it again. It also continues to expose FDR's constant need to deal with his own advisers' and generals' backbiting and going counter to his strategic aims. I will read the last volume when it is released.

[Tony Styles · Rating 5 out of 5]

…and it thankfully continued.

In the last pages of this excellent volume Hamilton remarks that FDR was a ‘hands off’ Commander in Chief. For me, with his deft handling of the pernickety Churchill, - which is predominantly what this volume is about - and his firm grip on his inexperienced generals, he was very much, ‘hands on.’ There is no doubt that Hamilton intimately knows his subject and never fails to point out criticism of his, let Stalin immerse Czechoslovakia within the Soviet post war sphere of Eastern Europe, explaining that it would return to the West in 20 years or so when it actually took twice as long. His critics saw this as shortsighted but with the burgeoning power of the Soviet Union ruled by fear by the acknowledged psychopath Stalin, FDR was brashly perhaps, resigned to the short term inevitability of the Red Wave approaching from the East; with no Allied boots on the European mainland what could FDR have done about it…? Hamilton explains this expertly and I am much looking forward to Volume 3. As Volume 1 an eye opening read of arguably the greatest political figure of the 20th century. Recommended 5 stars.

[Bill Wagner · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is the second of the FDR at war trilogy. It covers time frame of shortly after the successful invasion of North Africa, Operation Torch, to the Allies grabbing a foothold in Italy. As the subtitle indicates, it focuses predominantly on the relationship between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, especially as relates to the conflict over a cross channel invasion of Europe by the United States and Britain.

In this volume the author is not quite as critical of Churchill, General Marshall and others as he was in the first book. He does not seem to portray them nearly as negatively. It’s a more even coverage of the major players involved. That is definitely a good thing.

There are other issues though. One for me is the excessive use of non-English phrases, many that are not that common. Another is the number of times that the author mentions prior to the landing in Italy that the western Allies didn’t have any soldiers on the ground in Europe. Too many times. Finally, and maybe most importantly, many other aspects of FDR’s role as Commander in Chief are ignored or just touched on. Still, this is a very readable book and would recommend it.

[Laura L · Rating 5 out of 5]

It took me a long time to finish this book, maybe a couple of years. I read small sections in between other books. I am really glad I read it, because I learned a lot about my favorite president and WW II. The author did amazing research and dives deep into details demonstrating that FDR really was THE Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in WW II. FDR did not have a chance to write his own memoir like Winston Churchill did, but this author essentially wrote it for him. FDR spent alot of time convincing Churchill that D-Day was necessary. Churchill wavered amongst his own, although to the president, he acknowledged he was on board. The relationship between these two powerful men is fascinating to read. I also learned quite a bit about Eleanor Roosevelt too. FDR and Eleanor are some of the most impressive Americans to have ever lived. Their goals and aspirations make you feel proud to be an American.

[Robert Sparrenberger · Rating 4 out of 5]

As someone who grew up in the post wwii world, it is always assumed that the United States and Britain defeated the nazis and sailed into the sunset.
This book points out the difference between Churchill and Roosevelt as to the execution of the war and where it would be fought.
The main theme is that Churchill and Roosevelt were not unified and Roosevelt had to bring Churchill around to his way of thinking about the cross channel attack. The author really wants the reader to know that Churchill’s strategy to attack from the underbelly was a bad one and that Roosevelt had the winning ideas.
This is a dry book for people with details about 1943. It’s an interesting read however.

Recommend

[JwW White · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another excellent installment in a wonderful series

Mr. Hamilton follows up his first excellent book on the Roosevelt-Churchill relationship with another tour de force. Like it’s predecessor, this book is well written, prodigiously researched, and a joy to read.

Just as importantly, Hamilton does what far too WWII historians have sadly failed to do: show from whence the true direction of the war was decided. Whereas Churchill rewrote history in order to immortalize himself as the deciding leader in the war, Roosevelt did not live long enough to tell his version, which readers might reasonably assume would be far closer to the true story. Hamilton sets the record straight. I am eager to start the third and final book in the series!

[Richard Walden · Rating 4 out of 5]

FDR's decisive strategy to win the war and Churchill's often contradictory plans, aimed more towards preserving the British empire rather than focusing on the most rapid defeat of the Nazis, is well-presented here. Churchill, the 'brilliant' strategist who perpetrated the Dardanelles debacle in WWI, is portrayed as an eventually loyal junior partner to FDR, but he was usually inebriated, often lied, and often frustrated his own commanders. Hamilton is somewhat repetitive, but then again Churchill would often promise one thing and proceed to do another. A splendid orator who inspired his people, Churchill failed in all his efforts to dissuade FDR from Operation Overlord in favor of attacking Germany via the Italian Alps or the Balkans.

[Mark Valentine · Rating 3 out of 5]

Titled correctly. FDR's leadership in moving the United States out of the Great Depression is well-documented, but here, Hamilton writes about his leadership in moving the U.S. to victory in World War II.

Subtitled not so well, in my view. Hamilton sees Churchill as the lesser figure in this dual biography and paints the PM as more emotional and stubborn. Most of Hamilton's focus is on FDR. Therefore, the "Battle" in the subtitle may not be the best word.

Also, I began to sense that this held the curse for a historical study--what Henry Ford described as one damned thing after another. I believe a hundred pages could be sliced, and the core of the story still maintained.