Ever since the Hindu nationalists came to power in Delhi in 2014, India has seen sustained pressure on its Muslims, Christians, Dalits and the Tribal people to defer to the dictats of the upper caste Hindu vision of India. Violence has been unleashed on Muslims for eating beef. It is par for the course now to hear ruling party members openly questioning the Indian Muslim’s patriotism or his rights as an Indian citizen. It is only natural that the Indian muslim would have felt more alienated since 2014 than before. This book, by the veteran journalist Saeed Naqvi, is a sort of personal memoir. Along with his family history, the author embellishes it with commentaries on the ‘lost’ composite culture of Awadh, India’s partition, communal riots in independent India, proselytization of Hindus, the consequences of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the Kashmir conundrum. I have read much of what Naqvi has written over the years. This book though, is different from what I expected. The tone is pessimistic and so are his views on secular India’s future and the Muslim community’s place in it.
The book opens with chapters on Awadh, where Naqvi grew up, and talks about the syncretic culture of the place and the author’s family history. There is much reminiscing of Wajid Ali Shah, the last ruler of Awadh, and his writings on his exile away to Calcutta by the British rulers. I found these chapters quite absorbing for their exposition on Shia Islam, the traditions associated with the times and its glory. The author then moves on to the partition of India in 1947. He effectively blames Nehru and Patel as the principal villains responsible for India’s partition. He casts serious aspersions on Nehru’s commitment to secularism and castigates even Mahatma Gandhi for mixing religion with politics. Even Gandhi’s commitment to an unified India is doubted. The Congress party also comes under attack for its ‘phony’ secularism. Naqvi alleges that the Hindutva project was started right after 1947 by the Congress party. After this, the author deals with proselytization of Hindus and discusses the 1981 Meenakshipuram mass conversion episode in Tamilnadu in this context. Then, there are two chapters on the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the many communal riots in indepenedent India. The chapters on the various Prime Ministers of India surprised me by the strong endorsement of an RSS man like Atal Behari Vajpayee rather than Pandit Nehru. The final chapter traces the ‘Kashmir problem’. The book ends with an epilogue which tries to make some amends for the earlier negative prognosis for India and its muslims. There are suggestions as to what both Hindus and Muslims can do to integrate better.
To me, it seems that the author himself is confused about his own emotions regarding India and the Muslim citizen’s future in it. On the one hand, he keeps returning to the Ganga-Yamuni culture of syncretism that he experienced in Awadh and seems to think that partition was a betrayal of this idyllic India. On the other hand, he contradicts himself in the epilogue. He concludes that the truth about India is that we have lived in an un-institutionalized apartheid for centuries and that people are segregated by caste, religion and class. I wish the author had been courageous enough to question more deeply even his much-loved syncretic, Ganga-Yamuni culture. Had he done so, he might have realized that most of our inter-faith relationships are largely contractual. Except for a small educated elite, they are not the result of a deep understanding of each other’s culture. They flow more out of the needs of the context in which they live. For most Hindus and Muslims, Hindu-Muslim harmony is not experienced as living deeply within each others’ culture. This is probably the main reason why such gory violence erupted during partition and still keeps erupting periodically in politically engineered communal riots. Indian culture specializes in ‘othering’ its own people. Dalits have been othered for millenniums and so have OBCs (other backward castes) been. During the Mughal rule, most non-muslims probably felt ‘othered’. Under British rule, most Indians must have felt ‘othered’. Syncretism was probably experienced only in small pockets of exclusivity.
Though I don’t agree with the author dumping the entire blame on Nehru and the Congress party for partition, I can understand the alienation he feels as an Indian muslim and sympathize with his disappointment over Pandit Nehru. However, there are as many viewpoints on this issue as there are actors involved in partition. The causes range over Nehru, Patel, Jinnah, the Muslim League, the Congress Party, the British, the Second World War and so on. I doubt there could ever be a consensus on who was primarily responsible. I think the author has left this discussion a little incomplete by not dealing with the question of whether the broad Muslim elite was really inclined to live in a Hindu-majority India. In this context, journalist M.J. Akbar identifies a 'theory of distance' amongst the Muslim elite in India from the 18th century onwards. This theory holds that Hindus and Muslims are different people and that Muslim interests and way of life in India can only be secured by Muslims living as a separate 'nation'. Interestingly, this idea was propounded not by the Deoband Dar-ul-Uloom, the primary clergy of South Asia, but by the Muslim educated elite. The reasons for this primarily were the sharp decline of Mughal power in India under the British from the 18th century onwards and the consequent rise in British India of Hindus, who embraced the English language and modernity through education in western science and values. The Muslim elite stayed mostly away from English and modern education denouncing them as something 'foreign and despicable'. Additionally, the decline of the Ottoman empire in Europe also contributed to the feeling amongst the Muslim elite of the erosion of power and influence. M.J. Akbar says that this idea of a separate nationhood has always been there with Indian Muslim elite since the 18th century. Author Naqvi is one of the Muslim elites in India. He should know if this is plausible. If so, then why put all the blame on the Congress Party and Nehru?
The other criticism the author raises is about Mahatma Gandhi mixing religion with politics and thereby unleashing a dangerous trend. Naqvi quotes Jinnah as having warned the Mahatma on this decades before independence. But then, the author writes approvingly of Maulana Azad, who also believed that there is no contradiction in mixing religion and politics. Azad, as a Deobandi cleric, maintained that the Quran was the true guide for religion and politics. If Azad could be hailed for seamlessly merging his Islamic loyalties with secular Indian nationalism, why can’t the same latitude be extended to Gandhi as well?
As for the rest of the commentaries on the demolition of Babri Masjid, Kashmir, proselytization and communal riots, there are no new insights in the book. Much of it is along expected and well-worn lines. But I am always surprised by Muslim scholars putting communal riots and the Babri Masjid destruction on an even keel. Surely, the barbarism in communal riots is infinitely more damaging to the lives of the ordinary muslim compared to a mosque being demolished far away from their home.
Finally, I wonder how widespread today this sense of alienation is among Indian muslims. After all, Saeed Naqvi, with all due respect, is part of the elite among Indian muslims. One does not know how much his sense of betrayal and ‘otherness’ resonates among the ordinary Indian muslim. Does the middle-class, educated young muslim see hope for his future in India? What does the poor muslim labourer feel? If they share the despondency of the author, then it is ominous for the country’s future. On the other hand, if they see the current Modi-Shah-Bhagwat rule as a bad dream that would end in 2019, then there is hope for all secular Indians that the psychological damage can be healed. I, for one, believe this is what will happen.