What do you think?
Rate this book
The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece
The Western Way of War draws from an extraordinary range of sources to describe what actually took place on the battlefield. It is the first study to explore the actual mechanics of classical Greek battle from the vantage point of the infantryman - the brutal spear-thrusting, the difficulty of fighting in heavy bronze armor that made it hard to see and hear as well as to move, and the fear.
244 pages, Hardcover
First published April 15, 1989
99 people are currently reading
2857 people want to read
About the author
Victor Davis Hanson
84 books1,185 followersVictor Davis Hanson was educated at the University of California, Santa Cruz (BA, Classics, 1975), the American School of Classical Studies (1978-79) and received his Ph.D. in Classics from Stanford University in 1980. He lives and works with his family on their forty-acre tree and vine farm near Selma, California, where he was born in 1953.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 69 reviews
February 8, 2017
This is not a work of history. It is a bigoted, political treatise, aimed at rabble-rousing and satisfying fear-of-the-other in the post 9/11 west.
Hanson uses his admittedly excellent prose styling to craft an unsupportable narrative that associates individuality, free-thinking liberalism, and martial close-order valor with the "Western" world, and subterfuge, insurgency and mendacity with the "Eastern." It is a bald-faced jab at the Islamic world with whom tensions were so high at the time of the writing. It is also utter bullshit, as anyone with even passing knowledge of hoplite battle will see in an instant.
Hanson is a political pundit and right-wing provocateur. That he uses a topic so dear to me as top cover for his particular brand of nastiness makes it sting all the more. I had to go fight in Iraq three times because of chickenhawk bullshit artists like him: effete intellectuals who are only too happy to provide the "scholarly" underpinnings for wars, so that OTHER people (never them) can go fight and die in them.
I actually recommend you read the Western Way of War. Hanson's depiction of the mechanics of hoplite battle are accurate and enlightening, and his political message will provide you with an excellent example of how folks who actively work to make the world worse are going about it.
Hanson uses his admittedly excellent prose styling to craft an unsupportable narrative that associates individuality, free-thinking liberalism, and martial close-order valor with the "Western" world, and subterfuge, insurgency and mendacity with the "Eastern." It is a bald-faced jab at the Islamic world with whom tensions were so high at the time of the writing. It is also utter bullshit, as anyone with even passing knowledge of hoplite battle will see in an instant.
Hanson is a political pundit and right-wing provocateur. That he uses a topic so dear to me as top cover for his particular brand of nastiness makes it sting all the more. I had to go fight in Iraq three times because of chickenhawk bullshit artists like him: effete intellectuals who are only too happy to provide the "scholarly" underpinnings for wars, so that OTHER people (never them) can go fight and die in them.
I actually recommend you read the Western Way of War. Hanson's depiction of the mechanics of hoplite battle are accurate and enlightening, and his political message will provide you with an excellent example of how folks who actively work to make the world worse are going about it.
October 19, 2017
Much of what I write here about Hanson's Western Way of War is a summary of an older blog post of mine that was originally published on my personal website, but is now available on the website of Ancient Warfare magazine. In short, I think this is a bad book for a large number of reasons, the most important one is that it presents an entirely fictitious reconstruction of (the nature of) warfare in ancient Greece, relying on ideology and cheap rhetorical tricks to convince the reader into thinking it's actually any good.
According to Hanson, the ancient Greek hoplite was a simple farmer, fighting alongside his brothers to defend his home and farmstead. However, this is simply untrue. The "average" hoplite belonged to a fairly wealthy elite, who could afford the expensive equipment needed to fight. They were therefore not simple smallholders, but usually possessed considerable wealth, owning considerable numbers of agricultural plots and spending most of their time in the luxury and comfort of their townhouses.
Hanson also suggests that the Greeks invented the "Western way of warfare", namely honest pitched battles in open terrain. This, too, is simply untrue. Hanson ignores ambushes and other types of sneak attacks that were very common in ancient Greece regardless of period. One thinks of the ruse of the Trojan Horse, for example, a theme that remained popular throughout history for a good reason. Other authors have also shown how deception was important in Greek warfare, not in the least Peter Krentz and Hans van Wees.
And Hanson deliberately skews the picture when he considers pitched battles typical of the West, creating a dichotomy that does more harm than good. Already the peoples of the ancient Near East and Egypt fought pitched battles much earlier than Hanson's imaginary Archaic and Classical Greeks. And if you look further afield, we also have the ancient Chinese, for example, who fought pitched battles, and the Japanese of the Sengoku period. But Hanson never considers this evidence: he is either unable or unwilling to put the Greeks in a larger, let alone global, perspective.
One part of the book strikes me particularly as dishonest and cheap. On page 13 of the revised edition, Hanson contrasts the supposedly honest and open style of fighting used by Western armies with the tactics employed by their (our?) enemies:
In Hanson's mind alone, the ancient Greeks disliked hit-and-run tactics and we, poor honest "Westerners", are saddled with this legacy and therefore find such sneaking about similarly repugnant. The statement is clearly as much political as it is polemical: what we are presented with here is a kind of cheap "feel-good" philosophizing of the lowest order that can be easily abused.
As I said in my original blog post, the phrase "Western way of war" is useless and should be avoided by anyone who is a serious student of the past. The dichotomy between "East" and "West" only serves to drive people apart and to obfuscate matters. Certainly, anyone studying ancient Greece – of all cultures! – should be keenly aware just how difficult it is to separate East from West. One can even make the case, as I did in my doctoral thesis (now available as Henchmen of Ares: Warriors and Warfare in Early Greece), that it is virtually impossible to separate "typically Greek" elements from "typically Anatolian" elements in the Aegean, where the Greeks, Lydians and other Anatolian peoples formed a kind of cultural matrix. The Greeks borrowed the symposium from the East and together they probably came up with the equipment so typical of Archaic heavily-armed spearmen: Greeks and Carians, for example, were notorious in the Eastern Mediterranean as raiders.
As a result, I cannot recommend this book in good conscience. Hanson is not concerned with writing about the past, but about abusing the past to fit his own preconceived notions. He does not place the Greek style of warfare in a broader context and his source criticism is severely lacking. If you read this book, be sure to also read other works like Hans van Wees's Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities, a vastly superior scholarly work, or Louis Rawlings's The Ancient Greeks at War.
According to Hanson, the ancient Greek hoplite was a simple farmer, fighting alongside his brothers to defend his home and farmstead. However, this is simply untrue. The "average" hoplite belonged to a fairly wealthy elite, who could afford the expensive equipment needed to fight. They were therefore not simple smallholders, but usually possessed considerable wealth, owning considerable numbers of agricultural plots and spending most of their time in the luxury and comfort of their townhouses.
Hanson also suggests that the Greeks invented the "Western way of warfare", namely honest pitched battles in open terrain. This, too, is simply untrue. Hanson ignores ambushes and other types of sneak attacks that were very common in ancient Greece regardless of period. One thinks of the ruse of the Trojan Horse, for example, a theme that remained popular throughout history for a good reason. Other authors have also shown how deception was important in Greek warfare, not in the least Peter Krentz and Hans van Wees.
And Hanson deliberately skews the picture when he considers pitched battles typical of the West, creating a dichotomy that does more harm than good. Already the peoples of the ancient Near East and Egypt fought pitched battles much earlier than Hanson's imaginary Archaic and Classical Greeks. And if you look further afield, we also have the ancient Chinese, for example, who fought pitched battles, and the Japanese of the Sengoku period. But Hanson never considers this evidence: he is either unable or unwilling to put the Greeks in a larger, let alone global, perspective.
One part of the book strikes me particularly as dishonest and cheap. On page 13 of the revised edition, Hanson contrasts the supposedly honest and open style of fighting used by Western armies with the tactics employed by their (our?) enemies:
We have put ourselves out of business, so to speak; for any potential adversary has now discovered the futility of an open, deliberate struggle on a Western-style battlefield against the firepower and discipline of Western infantry. Yet, ominously, the legacy of the Greeks' battle style lingers on, a narcotic that we cannot put away. (...) There is in all of us a repugnance, is there not, for hit-and-run tactics, for skirmishing and ambush?
In Hanson's mind alone, the ancient Greeks disliked hit-and-run tactics and we, poor honest "Westerners", are saddled with this legacy and therefore find such sneaking about similarly repugnant. The statement is clearly as much political as it is polemical: what we are presented with here is a kind of cheap "feel-good" philosophizing of the lowest order that can be easily abused.
As I said in my original blog post, the phrase "Western way of war" is useless and should be avoided by anyone who is a serious student of the past. The dichotomy between "East" and "West" only serves to drive people apart and to obfuscate matters. Certainly, anyone studying ancient Greece – of all cultures! – should be keenly aware just how difficult it is to separate East from West. One can even make the case, as I did in my doctoral thesis (now available as Henchmen of Ares: Warriors and Warfare in Early Greece), that it is virtually impossible to separate "typically Greek" elements from "typically Anatolian" elements in the Aegean, where the Greeks, Lydians and other Anatolian peoples formed a kind of cultural matrix. The Greeks borrowed the symposium from the East and together they probably came up with the equipment so typical of Archaic heavily-armed spearmen: Greeks and Carians, for example, were notorious in the Eastern Mediterranean as raiders.
As a result, I cannot recommend this book in good conscience. Hanson is not concerned with writing about the past, but about abusing the past to fit his own preconceived notions. He does not place the Greek style of warfare in a broader context and his source criticism is severely lacking. If you read this book, be sure to also read other works like Hans van Wees's Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities, a vastly superior scholarly work, or Louis Rawlings's The Ancient Greeks at War.
February 8, 2022
La battaglia di fanteria nella Grecia classica (VIII-V seccolo a.C) vista con occhio rivolto non ai massimi sistemi militari, ma alla condizione del singolo oplite, contadino piccolo proprietario terriero, membro della citta'-stato, che dall'eta' di diciotto anni ai sessanta era tenuto ad equipaggiarsi e prendere le armi in caso di bisogno. Vengono analizzate le figure di questi personaggi, le motivazioni psicologiche, sociali ed economiche, per spiegare un tipo di combattimento che implicava un sanguinoso scontro all'arma bianca, faccia a faccia con il nemico, schierati nella falange serrata. Un combattimento altamente ritualizzato, molto cruento, che non durava di regola piu' di un paio di ore e che solitamente era risolutivo della controversia in corso. Proprio questa ritualita', in larga parte tradita gia' nei secoli immediatamente successivi, segnera' il modo di combattere degli eserciti occidentali (fanterie schierate che si combattono in campo aperto). Obiettivo della campagna militare allora, non era l'annientamento del nemico, la distruzione delle citta', dei campi, dei porti, lo sterminio di massa, ma soltanto il sopravvento nell'immediato, in quella sanguinosa prova che era la carica delle opposte falangi e il ristabilimento dell' equilibrio sociale perduto.
February 7, 2017
Much has been said about this book in other reviews, so I'll focus on one interesting aspect. Nassim Nicholas Taleb said that he thought the scientific community would be better served if scientists left their labs and spent more time going to parties. There, interacting with real people, they'd stumble upon interesting new angles to test or ways of thinking about things.
VD Hanson's book is fantastic proof of that suggestion. The author was tearing out trees from his Fresno farm when he realized just how flippantly historians had been treating the phrase "laid waste to the land." The reality is tearing out trees is hard in the year 2009. It would have been next to impossible for an army of hoplites to do much damage. From there, Hanson turns our perception of Greek battle on its head.
Could generals really have given long speeches before battle when their soldiers wore helmets that covered 95% of their face and didn't include earholes? Could soldiers have fought for long carrying 70+ pounds of armor? Did the wine they carried with them have any impact on the battle?
These are all questions he asks and subsequently answers in the book. They are most impressive because a large chunk of our Greek history has taken the wrong assumption completely for granted. Much respect to the author for being able to stare cross-eyed long enough to notice.
VD Hanson's book is fantastic proof of that suggestion. The author was tearing out trees from his Fresno farm when he realized just how flippantly historians had been treating the phrase "laid waste to the land." The reality is tearing out trees is hard in the year 2009. It would have been next to impossible for an army of hoplites to do much damage. From there, Hanson turns our perception of Greek battle on its head.
Could generals really have given long speeches before battle when their soldiers wore helmets that covered 95% of their face and didn't include earholes? Could soldiers have fought for long carrying 70+ pounds of armor? Did the wine they carried with them have any impact on the battle?
These are all questions he asks and subsequently answers in the book. They are most impressive because a large chunk of our Greek history has taken the wrong assumption completely for granted. Much respect to the author for being able to stare cross-eyed long enough to notice.
September 7, 2021
Hanson provides a grippingly 'up close and personal' examination of a specific conception of warfare that comes to us from Ancient Greece and still resonates to this day: the idea of a 'decisive battle', fought head-on and on fair ground, after which one side is clearly the loser and the other the victor. As illustrated adeptly in the early chapters, this is far from the most natural system for conflicts, which both then and now often included more flexible forms of conflict such as sieges, ambushes and tricky manoeuvring, not to mention guerrilla tactics.
The decisive battle, Hanson points out, was an institution particularly suited to Greek warriors, most of whom were only warriors for a brief time during the summer. Greek warriors were troops of mixed ages, heavily armed and armoured, and not well-suited to skirmishing or extended campaigns -- and they didn't have the time for it anyway, if they would soon be needed back home for harvesting. So the straightforward resolution for both parties was a straightforward collision -- the two hoplite armies would meet, line up, get into their uncomfortable armour, and charge directly at each other (listing a little to the right, as each man sought the shelter of the shield beside him). An hour or so was usually enough to completely decide whatever the conflict was, there were strong conventions for deciding who had won, and that was an end to it.
As a review of the means of Greek warfare, this would be an interesting enough book. However, Hanson brings a few extra qualities that make this book shine. Firstly, he brings some hands-on experience to his topic. Early on, the question arises of, well, why? Why did Greeks ever have these battles instead of (as Pericles would later innovate) just staying behind city walls and waiting for the invaders to go away? The conventional answer here is that the invading army would otherwise despoil the farms the polis rely upon. Hanson, however, actually owned a farm, and has some insight into how it's actually pretty difficult to significantly despoil Greek-style farmland. Olive trees are hard to damage and nigh-impossible to uproot, grape vines can for sure be cut, but vineyards contained thousands of such plants, and it would require significant amounts of manual labour to do lasting harm, some grain crops can be burnt -- but pretty much only just before harvest, exactly when the invading army is going to be needed at home. Hanson raises a different idea: that the need to fight invaders was less about long-term economic necessity, and more about territoriality, and the more abstract, almost spiritual harm that invaders cause by violating the national soil. I'm not entirely convinced by this line -- the invaders themselves being agriculturalists probably means they know exactly how to best inflict damage on a farm if they desire to -- but it's a brilliant line of inquiry, pressing in on the real roots of what we think we know about war.
The other great quality of Hanson's is his ability to not just present sources and extrapolation, but to create highly visual and intuitive renditions of Greek warfare, with evocative force. I'd understood before the relationship between Sparta's professionalisation of its soldiers and its long dominance in pitched land warfare, but Hanson does more than explain that. He takes you down to the viewpoint of the Attic warrior, crowded in amongst his friends and family, barely able to move or see, and gives you the intuition for why the Spartans were so scary, exactly how impressive it was that they could consistently do things like retreat in good order. He communicates the din of battle, the terror of the crush, the smell of voided bowels, the bellows and crashes of weapons and shields, the hopelessness of the wounded and the trampled. This was not, could not be, you realise, about skill at arms. Nobody in this mess needs to be dextrous. This really has to be about discipline and cohesion.
I've picked up a fair few book recommendations on Ancient and Hellenic Greek warfare recently. This is one I'd repeat to anyone with similar interests.
The decisive battle, Hanson points out, was an institution particularly suited to Greek warriors, most of whom were only warriors for a brief time during the summer. Greek warriors were troops of mixed ages, heavily armed and armoured, and not well-suited to skirmishing or extended campaigns -- and they didn't have the time for it anyway, if they would soon be needed back home for harvesting. So the straightforward resolution for both parties was a straightforward collision -- the two hoplite armies would meet, line up, get into their uncomfortable armour, and charge directly at each other (listing a little to the right, as each man sought the shelter of the shield beside him). An hour or so was usually enough to completely decide whatever the conflict was, there were strong conventions for deciding who had won, and that was an end to it.
As a review of the means of Greek warfare, this would be an interesting enough book. However, Hanson brings a few extra qualities that make this book shine. Firstly, he brings some hands-on experience to his topic. Early on, the question arises of, well, why? Why did Greeks ever have these battles instead of (as Pericles would later innovate) just staying behind city walls and waiting for the invaders to go away? The conventional answer here is that the invading army would otherwise despoil the farms the polis rely upon. Hanson, however, actually owned a farm, and has some insight into how it's actually pretty difficult to significantly despoil Greek-style farmland. Olive trees are hard to damage and nigh-impossible to uproot, grape vines can for sure be cut, but vineyards contained thousands of such plants, and it would require significant amounts of manual labour to do lasting harm, some grain crops can be burnt -- but pretty much only just before harvest, exactly when the invading army is going to be needed at home. Hanson raises a different idea: that the need to fight invaders was less about long-term economic necessity, and more about territoriality, and the more abstract, almost spiritual harm that invaders cause by violating the national soil. I'm not entirely convinced by this line -- the invaders themselves being agriculturalists probably means they know exactly how to best inflict damage on a farm if they desire to -- but it's a brilliant line of inquiry, pressing in on the real roots of what we think we know about war.
The other great quality of Hanson's is his ability to not just present sources and extrapolation, but to create highly visual and intuitive renditions of Greek warfare, with evocative force. I'd understood before the relationship between Sparta's professionalisation of its soldiers and its long dominance in pitched land warfare, but Hanson does more than explain that. He takes you down to the viewpoint of the Attic warrior, crowded in amongst his friends and family, barely able to move or see, and gives you the intuition for why the Spartans were so scary, exactly how impressive it was that they could consistently do things like retreat in good order. He communicates the din of battle, the terror of the crush, the smell of voided bowels, the bellows and crashes of weapons and shields, the hopelessness of the wounded and the trampled. This was not, could not be, you realise, about skill at arms. Nobody in this mess needs to be dextrous. This really has to be about discipline and cohesion.
I've picked up a fair few book recommendations on Ancient and Hellenic Greek warfare recently. This is one I'd repeat to anyone with similar interests.
December 1, 2023
“…Even breastplate might be driven into breastplate, as men in the front row lost control and were literally pushed into the enemy ranks, jammed together “chest against chest”. (Tyrtaios 8.33). And repeated sharp sounds indicated when ash spears snapped under the pressure of contact in what Sophocles called “the storm of spears” (Ant.670). The live sounds were more animal-like than human: the concerted groans of men exerting themselves, pushing forward in group effort with their bodies and shields against the immovable armor of the enemy –grunts such as one hears around men sweating at work in field or shop, for battle, after all as Homeric man knew, was “work” of the worst kind...
Here arose a tortured symphony of shrieks as a man went down with a wound to the groin, the steady sobbing of a soldier in extremis, a final grasp of fright as the spear thrust found its way home. Ugly indeed, Tyrtaios wrote, is the corpse in the dust (11.19)…
There was also an increased smell of sweat from the thousands toiling in the sun, the odor of blood and entrails from fresh, open wounds, and the occasional sent of excrement along the fearful or recently killed –though possibly the sense of smell was dulled along with vision and hearing…”
The Western Way of War describes the way of infantry battle in Classical Greece. The author masterfully, takes the reader into the battlefield where the Ancient Greeks slaughtered each other with extreme brutality. In a vivid and exciting style, Hanson uses every available source to reconstruct the collision between hoplites.
Many books have been written on the subject. But this is the first time that a scholar dares to describe the face of the hoplite battle, as it was experienced by those who participated in it. Hanson owes a lot to Sir John Keegan and his classical work “The face of Battle”, the first scholarly essay that focused on the practical mechanics of battle and the experiences of the individual soldiers of the time.
The book covers a period of three hundred years, from the 7th till the 5th century B.C. Three are the main theses in the book :
1.The Greek conflicts were tightly connected with the land, which was of great importance since the population of Greece was, in its overwhelming majority, living of it. Hanson, who also comes from a rural family and a farmer himself, remarks that the mere threat of the fields by the enemy troops was enough to raise their owners to take the arms to defend them.
2.It refutes the ‘traditional’ academic view on the collision of the hoplites. The hoplites did not use exquisite tactics. Even when they did use a few stratagems in some cases, their importance was not critical in the outcome of the battle. They simply moved in close order against the enemy aiming at a pitched battle. The two opposing phalanxes charged against each other trying to push the enemy back in a reverse tug-of-war style. Those who participated in such conflicts experienced the horror of war at its extreme form. However this inhuman slaughter had its positive side: In most cases the war was decided there, in the battlefield. The winner of the battle was recognized as the winner of the war.
3.The tradition of the hoplites was maintained unchanged during the 7th and 6th century BC. However, after the first decades of the 5th century it started to change. During the Persian Wars (490-480BC) Greeks came to contact with the Persians, which used different battle tactics. Since then the Greeks made a broad use of cavalry and of light troops. By the end of the 5th century the war became perennial, exterminating and more sophisticated. Despite this, the hoplite tradition was maintained in the Macedonian phalanx and in the Roman legions. Even later, up to the middle of the 19th century, the European armies depended on their close order infantry. Companionship and discipline, the main principles of the hoplite phalanx were maintained unchanged. Even when war tactics were critically affected by technology, the West despised the “hit and run” tactics of its eastern adversaries, and maintained the principles of the companionship of the fellow soldiers and the “esprit de corps”, aiming always at crashing the opponent with a single blow. All this comes straight from the Greek way of war, the war of the farmer-warrior who fought for his land where his own values were rooted.
«…Ακόμη και οι θώρακες μπορούσαν να προσκρούσουν ο ένας πάνω στον άλλον, καθώς οι άνδρες στην πρώτη σειρά έχαναν τον έλεγχο και κυριολεκτικά ωθούνταν επάνω στις γραμμές του εχθρού, συνθλιβόμενοι ο ένας επάνω στον άλλον «στήθος με στήθος». (Τυρταίος 8.33). Επαναλαμβανόμενοι οξείς ήχοι ακούγονταν όταν έσπαγαν τα κοντάρια από φλαμουριά κάτω από την πίεση της επαφής –αυτό που ο Σοφοκλής αποκαλούσε «θύελλα των δοράτων» (Αντιγ.670). Οι ήχοι των ζωντανών όντων ήταν περισσότερο ζωώδεις παρά ανθρώπινοι. Ήταν τα συντονισμένα βογγητά των ανδρών που υπερέβαλλαν τους εαυτούς τους και την ασπίδα εναντίον της αμετακίνητης πανοπλίας του εχθρού-γρυλλίσματα όμοια με αυτά που ακούγονται από ανθρώπους που αγωνίζονται κάθιδροι στη δουλειά τους ή το χωράφι ή στο εργαστήριό τους. Διότι η μάχη εν τέλει, όπως γνώριζε κάθε ομηρικός άνδρας, ήταν «δουλειά» του χειρίστου είδους …
…Από τη μια αντηχούσε μα βασανιστική συγχορδία από ουρλιαχτά, καθώς ένας οπλίτης έπεφτε με τραύμα στο εφηβαίο, από την άλλη ο σταθερός λυγμός ενός στρατιώτη στα τελευταία του, ένα τελευταίο αγκομαχητό τρόμου καθώς η ορμή ενός δόρατος έβρισκε το στόχο της...
…Μια αυξημένη οσμή ιδρώτα αναδυόταν από τις χιλιάδες των ανδρών που αγωνίζονταν κάτω από τον καυτό ήλιο, μαζί με τη μυρωδιά του αίματος και των εντοσθίων από τις χαίνουσες, νωπές πληγές , καθώς και την περιστασιακή οσμή κοπράνων όσων είχαν αφοδεύσει από το φόβο τους ή που είχαν μόλις θανατωθεί, μολονότι και η αίσθηση ακόμα της όσφρησης ήταν πιθανότατα αμβλυμμένη όπως η όραση και η ακοή…»
Ο Δυτικός τρόπος πολέμου περιγράφει τον τρόπο του μάχεσθαι των αρχαίων Ελλήνων της κλασικής εποχής. Ο συγγραφέας μας μεταφέρει με αριστοτεχνικό τρόπο μέσα στο πεδίο της αλληλοσφαγής των Ελλήνων οπλιτών της αρχαιότητας. Περιγράφει λεπτό προς λεπτό όλες τις φάσεις της οπλιτικής σύγκρουσης ανασυνθέτοντάς τες μέσα από τις πρωτογενείς πηγές.
Πολλά βιβλία έχουν γραφεί επί του θέματος. Για πρώτη φορά όμως αποτολμάται εδώ η λεπτομερής ανασύνθεση όλων των ανατριχιαστικών λεπτομερειών που συνθέτουν το σκηνικό του ελληνικού τρόπου πολέμου.
Το βιβλίο επικεντρώνεται καλύπτει την κλασική περίοδο από τον 7ο έως και τον 5ο π.Χ. αιώνα. Τρεις είναι οι κεντρικές θέσεις του:
1. Oι συγκρούσεις μεταξύ των Ελλήνων είχαν να κάνουν με την γη, η οποία ήταν πρωταρχικής σημασίας, αφού ο πληθυσμός της αρχαίας Ελλάδος ζούσε στη συντριπτική του πλειοψηφία από τη γεωργία. Ο Χάνσον (ο οποίος προέρχεται από αγροτική οικογένεια και ασχολείται και ο ίδιος με τη γεωργία) παρατηρεί ότι και μόνον η παρουσία εχθρών στους αγρούς μιας πόλης ήταν αρκετή για να ξεσηκώσει τους κατοίκους της προκειμένου να τους υπερασπιστούν.
2. Αντικρούεται η «παραδοσιακή» αντίληψη των εκ καθέδρας ιστορικών, σχετικά με την οπλιτική σύγκρουση: οι οπλιτικές συγκρούσεις δεν χαρακτηρίζονταν από εξεζητημένες τακτικές. Είναι αλήθεια ότι μερικές φορές εφαρμόζονταν ορισμένα στρατηγήματα, αλλά πολύ σπάνια είχαν καθοριστική επίδραση στην έκβαση μιας μάχης. Αυτό συνδεόταν στενά με τον τρόπο διεξαγωγής της: σε όλες τις περιπτώσεις οι Έλληνες επιδίωκαν την απευθείας σύγκρουση με τον εχθρό, με στόχο την συντριβή του στο πεδίο της μάχης. Οι αντιμαχόμενοι συσπειρώνονταν σε δύο αντίπαλες οπλιτικές φάλαγγες οι οποίες έπεφταν ορμητικά η μια πάνω στην άλλη με σκοπό την ανατροπή του αντιπάλου-σε ένα είδος αντίστροφης διελκυστίνδας. Όσοι συμμετείχαν σε αυτές τις εξαιρετικά φονικές συγκρούσεις βίωναν τη φρίκη στου πολέμου στην υπέρτατη μορφή της. Ωστόσο, η απάνθρωπη αυτή αλληλοσφαγή είχε και τη θετική της πλευρά: Στις περισσότερες περιπτώσεις, οι διαφορές των αντιμαχομένων λύνονταν εκεί, στο πεδίο της μάχης. Ο νικητής έστηνε επί τόπου τρόπαιο για να σφραγίσει τη νίκη του η οποία σημείωνε και τη λήξη του πολέμου.
3. Η παράδοση της οπλιτικής μάχης, η οποία διατηρήθηκε αναλλοίωτη κατά τον 7ο και 6ο π.Χ. αιώνα, άρχισε να αλλάζει μετά τις πρώτες δεκαετίες του 5ου π.Χ. αιώνα. Τότε οι Έλληνες, μέσω των Περσικών πολέμων (490-480 π. Χ.) ήρθαν σε επαφή με τους Πέρσες, οι οποίοι είχαν αναπτύξει διαφορετικές τακτικές μάχης. Έκτοτε οι Έλληνες άρχισαν να δίνουν έμφαση στο ιππικό και να χρησιμοποιούν ελαφρά οπλισμένες και ευέλικτες μονάδες στις μεταξύ τους συγκρούσεις. Προς το τέλος του 5ου αιώνα άλλαξε σε μεγάλο βαθμό και η φύση του πολέμου. Ο Πελοποννησιακός πόλεμος και πολύ περισσότερο οι πόλεμοι της ελληνιστικής εποχής, ήταν μακρόχρονοι, εξοντωτικοί και περιλάμβαναν περισσότερα στρατηγήματα. Ωστόσο η παράδοση της οπλιτικής φάλαγγας συνεχίστηκε στη μακεδονική φάλαγγα των ελληνιστικών χρόνων καθώς και στις ρωμαϊκές λεγεώνες. Αλλά και αργότερα, μέχρι τα μέσα του 19ου αιώνα οι ευρωπαϊκοί στρατοί βασίζονταν στο πεζικό τους, το οποίο χρησιμοποιούσαν σε πυκνούς σχηματισμούς, στους οποίους η συντροφικότητα και η πειθαρχία έπαιζαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην αντιμετώπιση του εχθρού. Τακτικές του τύπου «χτυπώ και φεύγω» ήταν κατά κανόνα ξένες προς τον δυτικό τρόπο πολέμου. Ακόμα και όταν η τεχνολογία επηρέασε καθοριστικά την διεξαγωγή του, οι βασικές αρχές του ελληνικού τρόπου μάχεσθαι διατηρήθηκαν αναλλοίωτες: το «πνεύμα της μονάδος», η συντροφικότητα μεταξύ συμπολεμιστών ενωμένων σε έναν αγώνα ζωής ή θανάτου και κυρίως η περιφρόνηση του πολέμου φθοράς, αλλά αντίθετα, η επιδίωξη της συντριβής του αντιπάλου με ένα αποφασιστικό πλήγμα, έχει τις ρίζες της στην αρχαία ελληνική παράδοση του αγρότη-πολεμιστή που υπερασπίζεται τον αγρό του και κατ’ επέκταση τη γη στην οποία βρίσκονται ριζωμένες οι αξίες του.
Here arose a tortured symphony of shrieks as a man went down with a wound to the groin, the steady sobbing of a soldier in extremis, a final grasp of fright as the spear thrust found its way home. Ugly indeed, Tyrtaios wrote, is the corpse in the dust (11.19)…
There was also an increased smell of sweat from the thousands toiling in the sun, the odor of blood and entrails from fresh, open wounds, and the occasional sent of excrement along the fearful or recently killed –though possibly the sense of smell was dulled along with vision and hearing…”
In our times of political correctness a warning should be added to the book, informing the reader that it contains descriptions of violence not suitable for young readers.
The Western Way of War describes the way of infantry battle in Classical Greece. The author masterfully, takes the reader into the battlefield where the Ancient Greeks slaughtered each other with extreme brutality. In a vivid and exciting style, Hanson uses every available source to reconstruct the collision between hoplites.
Many books have been written on the subject. But this is the first time that a scholar dares to describe the face of the hoplite battle, as it was experienced by those who participated in it. Hanson owes a lot to Sir John Keegan and his classical work “The face of Battle”, the first scholarly essay that focused on the practical mechanics of battle and the experiences of the individual soldiers of the time.
The book covers a period of three hundred years, from the 7th till the 5th century B.C. Three are the main theses in the book :
1.The Greek conflicts were tightly connected with the land, which was of great importance since the population of Greece was, in its overwhelming majority, living of it. Hanson, who also comes from a rural family and a farmer himself, remarks that the mere threat of the fields by the enemy troops was enough to raise their owners to take the arms to defend them.
2.It refutes the ‘traditional’ academic view on the collision of the hoplites. The hoplites did not use exquisite tactics. Even when they did use a few stratagems in some cases, their importance was not critical in the outcome of the battle. They simply moved in close order against the enemy aiming at a pitched battle. The two opposing phalanxes charged against each other trying to push the enemy back in a reverse tug-of-war style. Those who participated in such conflicts experienced the horror of war at its extreme form. However this inhuman slaughter had its positive side: In most cases the war was decided there, in the battlefield. The winner of the battle was recognized as the winner of the war.
3.The tradition of the hoplites was maintained unchanged during the 7th and 6th century BC. However, after the first decades of the 5th century it started to change. During the Persian Wars (490-480BC) Greeks came to contact with the Persians, which used different battle tactics. Since then the Greeks made a broad use of cavalry and of light troops. By the end of the 5th century the war became perennial, exterminating and more sophisticated. Despite this, the hoplite tradition was maintained in the Macedonian phalanx and in the Roman legions. Even later, up to the middle of the 19th century, the European armies depended on their close order infantry. Companionship and discipline, the main principles of the hoplite phalanx were maintained unchanged. Even when war tactics were critically affected by technology, the West despised the “hit and run” tactics of its eastern adversaries, and maintained the principles of the companionship of the fellow soldiers and the “esprit de corps”, aiming always at crashing the opponent with a single blow. All this comes straight from the Greek way of war, the war of the farmer-warrior who fought for his land where his own values were rooted.
«…Ακόμη και οι θώρακες μπορούσαν να προσκρούσουν ο ένας πάνω στον άλλον, καθώς οι άνδρες στην πρώτη σειρά έχαναν τον έλεγχο και κυριολεκτικά ωθούνταν επάνω στις γραμμές του εχθρού, συνθλιβόμενοι ο ένας επάνω στον άλλον «στήθος με στήθος». (Τυρταίος 8.33). Επαναλαμβανόμενοι οξείς ήχοι ακούγονταν όταν έσπαγαν τα κοντάρια από φλαμουριά κάτω από την πίεση της επαφής –αυτό που ο Σοφοκλής αποκαλούσε «θύελλα των δοράτων» (Αντιγ.670). Οι ήχοι των ζωντανών όντων ήταν περισσότερο ζωώδεις παρά ανθρώπινοι. Ήταν τα συντονισμένα βογγητά των ανδρών που υπερέβαλλαν τους εαυτούς τους και την ασπίδα εναντίον της αμετακίνητης πανοπλίας του εχθρού-γρυλλίσματα όμοια με αυτά που ακούγονται από ανθρώπους που αγωνίζονται κάθιδροι στη δουλειά τους ή το χωράφι ή στο εργαστήριό τους. Διότι η μάχη εν τέλει, όπως γνώριζε κάθε ομηρικός άνδρας, ήταν «δουλειά» του χειρίστου είδους …
…Από τη μια αντηχούσε μα βασανιστική συγχορδία από ουρλιαχτά, καθώς ένας οπλίτης έπεφτε με τραύμα στο εφηβαίο, από την άλλη ο σταθερός λυγμός ενός στρατιώτη στα τελευταία του, ένα τελευταίο αγκομαχητό τρόμου καθώς η ορμή ενός δόρατος έβρισκε το στόχο της...
…Μια αυξημένη οσμή ιδρώτα αναδυόταν από τις χιλιάδες των ανδρών που αγωνίζονταν κάτω από τον καυτό ήλιο, μαζί με τη μυρωδιά του αίματος και των εντοσθίων από τις χαίνουσες, νωπές πληγές , καθώς και την περιστασιακή οσμή κοπράνων όσων είχαν αφοδεύσει από το φόβο τους ή που είχαν μόλις θανατωθεί, μολονότι και η αίσθηση ακόμα της όσφρησης ήταν πιθανότατα αμβλυμμένη όπως η όραση και η ακοή…»
Στην σημερινή εποχή της πολιτικής ορθότητας θα έπρεπε να έχει προστεθεί μια προειδοποίηση προς τον αναγνώστη ότι το συγκεκριμένο βιβλίο περιέχει σκηνές βίας και πρέπει να διαβάζεται αποκλειστικά με δική του ευθύνη …
Ο Δυτικός τρόπος πολέμου περιγράφει τον τρόπο του μάχεσθαι των αρχαίων Ελλήνων της κλασικής εποχής. Ο συγγραφέας μας μεταφέρει με αριστοτεχνικό τρόπο μέσα στο πεδίο της αλληλοσφαγής των Ελλήνων οπλιτών της αρχαιότητας. Περιγράφει λεπτό προς λεπτό όλες τις φάσεις της οπλιτικής σύγκρουσης ανασυνθέτοντάς τες μέσα από τις πρωτογενείς πηγές.
Πολλά βιβλία έχουν γραφεί επί του θέματος. Για πρώτη φορά όμως αποτολμάται εδώ η λεπτομερής ανασύνθεση όλων των ανατριχιαστικών λεπτομερειών που συνθέτουν το σκηνικό του ελληνικού τρόπου πολέμου.
Το βιβλίο επικεντρώνεται καλύπτει την κλασική περίοδο από τον 7ο έως και τον 5ο π.Χ. αιώνα. Τρεις είναι οι κεντρικές θέσεις του:
1. Oι συγκρούσεις μεταξύ των Ελλήνων είχαν να κάνουν με την γη, η οποία ήταν πρωταρχικής σημασίας, αφού ο πληθυσμός της αρχαίας Ελλάδος ζούσε στη συντριπτική του πλειοψηφία από τη γεωργία. Ο Χάνσον (ο οποίος προέρχεται από αγροτική οικογένεια και ασχολείται και ο ίδιος με τη γεωργία) παρατηρεί ότι και μόνον η παρουσία εχθρών στους αγρούς μιας πόλης ήταν αρκετή για να ξεσηκώσει τους κατοίκους της προκειμένου να τους υπερασπιστούν.
2. Αντικρούεται η «παραδοσιακή» αντίληψη των εκ καθέδρας ιστορικών, σχετικά με την οπλιτική σύγκρουση: οι οπλιτικές συγκρούσεις δεν χαρακτηρίζονταν από εξεζητημένες τακτικές. Είναι αλήθεια ότι μερικές φορές εφαρμόζονταν ορισμένα στρατηγήματα, αλλά πολύ σπάνια είχαν καθοριστική επίδραση στην έκβαση μιας μάχης. Αυτό συνδεόταν στενά με τον τρόπο διεξαγωγής της: σε όλες τις περιπτώσεις οι Έλληνες επιδίωκαν την απευθείας σύγκρουση με τον εχθρό, με στόχο την συντριβή του στο πεδίο της μάχης. Οι αντιμαχόμενοι συσπειρώνονταν σε δύο αντίπαλες οπλιτικές φάλαγγες οι οποίες έπεφταν ορμητικά η μια πάνω στην άλλη με σκοπό την ανατροπή του αντιπάλου-σε ένα είδος αντίστροφης διελκυστίνδας. Όσοι συμμετείχαν σε αυτές τις εξαιρετικά φονικές συγκρούσεις βίωναν τη φρίκη στου πολέμου στην υπέρτατη μορφή της. Ωστόσο, η απάνθρωπη αυτή αλληλοσφαγή είχε και τη θετική της πλευρά: Στις περισσότερες περιπτώσεις, οι διαφορές των αντιμαχομένων λύνονταν εκεί, στο πεδίο της μάχης. Ο νικητής έστηνε επί τόπου τρόπαιο για να σφραγίσει τη νίκη του η οποία σημείωνε και τη λήξη του πολέμου.
3. Η παράδοση της οπλιτικής μάχης, η οποία διατηρήθηκε αναλλοίωτη κατά τον 7ο και 6ο π.Χ. αιώνα, άρχισε να αλλάζει μετά τις πρώτες δεκαετίες του 5ου π.Χ. αιώνα. Τότε οι Έλληνες, μέσω των Περσικών πολέμων (490-480 π. Χ.) ήρθαν σε επαφή με τους Πέρσες, οι οποίοι είχαν αναπτύξει διαφορετικές τακτικές μάχης. Έκτοτε οι Έλληνες άρχισαν να δίνουν έμφαση στο ιππικό και να χρησιμοποιούν ελαφρά οπλισμένες και ευέλικτες μονάδες στις μεταξύ τους συγκρούσεις. Προς το τέλος του 5ου αιώνα άλλαξε σε μεγάλο βαθμό και η φύση του πολέμου. Ο Πελοποννησιακός πόλεμος και πολύ περισσότερο οι πόλεμοι της ελληνιστικής εποχής, ήταν μακρόχρονοι, εξοντωτικοί και περιλάμβαναν περισσότερα στρατηγήματα. Ωστόσο η παράδοση της οπλιτικής φάλαγγας συνεχίστηκε στη μακεδονική φάλαγγα των ελληνιστικών χρόνων καθώς και στις ρωμαϊκές λεγεώνες. Αλλά και αργότερα, μέχρι τα μέσα του 19ου αιώνα οι ευρωπαϊκοί στρατοί βασίζονταν στο πεζικό τους, το οποίο χρησιμοποιούσαν σε πυκνούς σχηματισμούς, στους οποίους η συντροφικότητα και η πειθαρχία έπαιζαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην αντιμετώπιση του εχθρού. Τακτικές του τύπου «χτυπώ και φεύγω» ήταν κατά κανόνα ξένες προς τον δυτικό τρόπο πολέμου. Ακόμα και όταν η τεχνολογία επηρέασε καθοριστικά την διεξαγωγή του, οι βασικές αρχές του ελληνικού τρόπου μάχεσθαι διατηρήθηκαν αναλλοίωτες: το «πνεύμα της μονάδος», η συντροφικότητα μεταξύ συμπολεμιστών ενωμένων σε έναν αγώνα ζωής ή θανάτου και κυρίως η περιφρόνηση του πολέμου φθοράς, αλλά αντίθετα, η επιδίωξη της συντριβής του αντιπάλου με ένα αποφασιστικό πλήγμα, έχει τις ρίζες της στην αρχαία ελληνική παράδοση του αγρότη-πολεμιστή που υπερασπίζεται τον αγρό του και κατ’ επέκταση τη γη στην οποία βρίσκονται ριζωμένες οι αξίες του.
January 29, 2017
This book brings you up close and personal with the greek hoplite warrior.But not in the manner we may be accustomed to envision him but as a human being trying to survive a few hours of horrible,devastating violence.What actually happened in those few hours,what did he do,think and experience?What were his weapons,his role in the battle and ultimately why did he fight at all?The author seeks to provide those answers while proposing that the greeks invented the act of western warfare through their infantry.Well researched and written I would recommend this to anyone with an interest in greek history and warfare.
May 28, 2016
Pretty good tour of the aspects of hoplite battle. These bronze armored, and wooden shielded heavy infantry of the Greeks were the ancient 'tank' when in formation, charging toward each other into a crash, push, and eventual rout of one side. If you have seen the movie '300,' you have seen the likeness of Greek battle (with some mythology thrown in).
However, the most interesting question for us today is the purpose of this Greek / Western way of war. Hanson defines the 'Western Way of War' as being the Ancient Greek practice of lining up men to engage in a brutal, yet short and efficient, solver of disputes. The purpose of this was to centralize the violence away from the home and village, and make the battle end as quickly as possible to limit human death and damage. Hanson describes battles as usually lasting less than an hour when the Greeks fought each other. The Greek states would state their intentions, meet at a place, line up their men, charge, crash into each other with their shields and spears, push into each other while stabbing, one side would lose its formation and rout, and the battle was over. Minor wounds were bandaged, and major wounds were unlikely to be saved. The dead were carried away by their fellows. Men aged 16-60 were expected to fight, cowards and fleers were persecuted.
At the very end of the book, Hanson contrasts all this with modern warfare. Rather than a brutal but short war between the military of two opposing sides, such as what occurred in WW2, warfare (Vietnam, Iraq) has become less brutal, more drawn out, and endangers civilians. Rather than, like the Greeks, exerting as much force as possible to make the enemy submit as fast as possible so the fighting can be over, the drawn out modern war encourages civilian casualties, IEDs, terrorism, and other guerrilla tactics, increasing the violence. In the ancient world, these were called skirmishers, basically armed men who harassed villages or military (including sabotage) with missile weapons, fire bombs, poisoning of wells, or other trickery. A divergence from the Greek way of war has increased this modern form of war, and creates violence closer to home.
A minor criticism, almost not worth mentioning, is some points are repeated in the book, as if they were copied and pasted in different chapters, including the accompanying quote. If I could give it a 4.5, I would.
Stay tuned for a link to a video review of important points.
However, the most interesting question for us today is the purpose of this Greek / Western way of war. Hanson defines the 'Western Way of War' as being the Ancient Greek practice of lining up men to engage in a brutal, yet short and efficient, solver of disputes. The purpose of this was to centralize the violence away from the home and village, and make the battle end as quickly as possible to limit human death and damage. Hanson describes battles as usually lasting less than an hour when the Greeks fought each other. The Greek states would state their intentions, meet at a place, line up their men, charge, crash into each other with their shields and spears, push into each other while stabbing, one side would lose its formation and rout, and the battle was over. Minor wounds were bandaged, and major wounds were unlikely to be saved. The dead were carried away by their fellows. Men aged 16-60 were expected to fight, cowards and fleers were persecuted.
At the very end of the book, Hanson contrasts all this with modern warfare. Rather than a brutal but short war between the military of two opposing sides, such as what occurred in WW2, warfare (Vietnam, Iraq) has become less brutal, more drawn out, and endangers civilians. Rather than, like the Greeks, exerting as much force as possible to make the enemy submit as fast as possible so the fighting can be over, the drawn out modern war encourages civilian casualties, IEDs, terrorism, and other guerrilla tactics, increasing the violence. In the ancient world, these were called skirmishers, basically armed men who harassed villages or military (including sabotage) with missile weapons, fire bombs, poisoning of wells, or other trickery. A divergence from the Greek way of war has increased this modern form of war, and creates violence closer to home.
A minor criticism, almost not worth mentioning, is some points are repeated in the book, as if they were copied and pasted in different chapters, including the accompanying quote. If I could give it a 4.5, I would.
Stay tuned for a link to a video review of important points.
April 25, 2021
It's deeply saddening to see that Hanson in his later years has become a Trump apologist. This book, first published in 1989, is thankfully devoid of those undercurrents. It is a deeply engaging and informative study of ancient warfare written by a classicist and military historian in his prime. The best one-line summary of this book is that Hanson takes John Keegan's innovative methodology in The Face of Battle, with its focus on gritty, micro realism and individual/group psychology in the stress and confusion of battle—in modern military terms, the "human factors" of war—and applies it to classical Greek warfare. Hanson makes an interesting (though perhaps excessively sweeping) case that the classical Greeks pioneered the concept of "decisive battle" (in contrast to e.g. guerrilla warfare or prolonged campaigning), and this conception subsequently became the archetypal Western understanding of war.
January 9, 2019
An absolutely incredible book, especially the chapters that get into the psychology of hoplite battle. VDH is a top-notch classicist and war historian, not to mention a great stylist.
"Success or defeat depended only on the fighters’ ability to stand upright in bronze armor for the next hour or so, resisting the temptation to fall back or even to shy away from the lance head at his face and groin. Nor was the manner of death unexpected, unimagined, or unknown: men knew precisely how they would die in battle—driven through by spear or sword, crushed by shield and foot, right in the midst of family and friends.”
"Success or defeat depended only on the fighters’ ability to stand upright in bronze armor for the next hour or so, resisting the temptation to fall back or even to shy away from the lance head at his face and groin. Nor was the manner of death unexpected, unimagined, or unknown: men knew precisely how they would die in battle—driven through by spear or sword, crushed by shield and foot, right in the midst of family and friends.”
February 14, 2020
Utterly brilliant. The best military book I’ve ever read. It should be required reading for anyone with an interest in ancient history, literature or philosophy. VDH describes in vivid detail the experience of hoplites fighting in the phalanx, from the initial formation to the aftermath of battle. You’ll never read the Ancient Greeks in the same way after.
Note: Do yourself a favor and disregard those negative reviews. They’re almost all politically motivated against the author without regard for the content of the work. VDH will be read for hundreds of years while those losers are long forgotten.
Note: Do yourself a favor and disregard those negative reviews. They’re almost all politically motivated against the author without regard for the content of the work. VDH will be read for hundreds of years while those losers are long forgotten.
May 18, 2015
He has college kids mess about with Greek Hoplite armor and concludes that it's too heavy to wear for more than a couple of minutes. Did nobody else notice how that's like comparing apples to oranges?
Servicemen hump tons of gear for miles and miles, flack jacket, kevlar helmet, ammunition, machine gun and a full backpack... it's only heavy till your body gets used to it.
It was hard to take the rest of the book seriously after that.
Servicemen hump tons of gear for miles and miles, flack jacket, kevlar helmet, ammunition, machine gun and a full backpack... it's only heavy till your body gets used to it.
It was hard to take the rest of the book seriously after that.
April 14, 2020
An excellent look into the human dimension of war. Though focused on the specifics of Greek hoplite warfare there is plenty to pull out for the modern military professional. Extremely well researched, not only written documents but artistic representations and ancient Greek tragedies. The book is an easy and fun read.
January 29, 2024
While it's obvious from the text that VDH would become a right wing take haver permanently dissatisfied with the classical scholars of his era, here is some (relatively) normal, interesting research ultimately (and surprisingly) serving as an indictment against nuclear war. Time to dive deeper into the history of individual battles like Plataea.
November 23, 2015
Parlando di arte della guerra, in particolare quelle ai tempi della Grecia classica, la letteratura moderna ha sempre incentrato l’attenzione sulle campagne, le tattiche, le dimensioni delle forze in campo; a volte perfino sui discorsi dei generali prima della battaglia.
Grazie al lavoro di numerosi storici, abbiamo appreso molti particolari circa gli armamenti, l’addestramento, i movimenti e le strategie militari.
Tuttavia, spesso e volentieri, il loro punto di vista risulta in qualche modo distante dalla realtà, come se fossero sospesi in una mongolfiera al di sopra del massacro, con un atteggiamento anche distaccato rispetto al destino degli individui disperati sottostanti.
In sostanza le battaglie vengono descritte dal punto di vista privilegiato dei generali o della comunità nel suo complesso.
Il punto di vista del combattente che si trova in mezzo al massacro con solamente la propria spada e il proprio scudo come barriera tra sé e la morte, non viene quasi mai rappresentato.
Eppure fino alla seconda guerra mondiale, la battaglia è stata intesa come uno scontro più o meno frontale tra eserciti il più massicci possibile, di conseguenza il massacro tra esseri umani era la cosa più comune in ogni conflitto.
Negli ultimi cinquant’anni le cose sono cambiate.
Con l’era nucleare che ha sostanzialmente reso inutili simili prospettive di conflitto tra le superpotenze, la guerra ha assunto una forma differente trasformandosi in guerriglia.
Piccoli scontri e agguati sono il rifiuto dello scontro diretto e frontale da sempre visto nei libri di storia.
Il tutto con risultati che hanno reso spesso inutile la forza bruta dei mega-eserciti.
La guerriglia in Sudamerica e in Afghanistan, dopo quanto visto in Vietnam, ha confermato un cambiamento importante.
Il libro di Victor Davis Hanson L’arte occidentale della guerra ripercorre questi passaggi per poi concentrarsi sui singoli combattenti all’arma bianca e sul loro terrore, cercando di aprire un punto di vista dall’interno del campo di battaglia.
In particolare l’autore riconosce ad alcuni storici inglesi degli ultimi anni (Keegan e Pritchett) il fatto di essere riusciti a fornire un resoconto accurato dell’intera azione sul campo di battaglia secondo il combattente diretto, dall’impatto iniziale tra le falangi, al crollo e alla ritirata disperata della parte sconfitta.
Le regole che la battaglia greca seguiva erano infatti molto semplici e lineari:
carica, collisione, combattimento corpo a corpo, pressione e rotta finale.
Il tutto viene appunto descritto da Hanson secondo uno schema nuovo che egli stesso spiega:
Ho cercato di ricostruire l’ambiente in cui si svolgeva la battaglia, l’atmosfera entro cui l’individuo cercava di uccidere e di non farsi ammazzare, la successione degli eventi vista dall’interno della falange.
E per ogni fase dello scontro mi sono chiesto che cosa fosse e come dovesse essere.
Se questo saggio contiene un tema guida, confesso che si tratta del tormento.
Un libro che proprio per questo vale la pena leggere a patto di essere preparati ad entrare in situazioni davvero pesanti.
Tempo di lettura: 8h 24m
Grazie al lavoro di numerosi storici, abbiamo appreso molti particolari circa gli armamenti, l’addestramento, i movimenti e le strategie militari.
Tuttavia, spesso e volentieri, il loro punto di vista risulta in qualche modo distante dalla realtà, come se fossero sospesi in una mongolfiera al di sopra del massacro, con un atteggiamento anche distaccato rispetto al destino degli individui disperati sottostanti.
In sostanza le battaglie vengono descritte dal punto di vista privilegiato dei generali o della comunità nel suo complesso.
Il punto di vista del combattente che si trova in mezzo al massacro con solamente la propria spada e il proprio scudo come barriera tra sé e la morte, non viene quasi mai rappresentato.
Eppure fino alla seconda guerra mondiale, la battaglia è stata intesa come uno scontro più o meno frontale tra eserciti il più massicci possibile, di conseguenza il massacro tra esseri umani era la cosa più comune in ogni conflitto.
Negli ultimi cinquant’anni le cose sono cambiate.
Con l’era nucleare che ha sostanzialmente reso inutili simili prospettive di conflitto tra le superpotenze, la guerra ha assunto una forma differente trasformandosi in guerriglia.
Piccoli scontri e agguati sono il rifiuto dello scontro diretto e frontale da sempre visto nei libri di storia.
Il tutto con risultati che hanno reso spesso inutile la forza bruta dei mega-eserciti.
La guerriglia in Sudamerica e in Afghanistan, dopo quanto visto in Vietnam, ha confermato un cambiamento importante.
Il libro di Victor Davis Hanson L’arte occidentale della guerra ripercorre questi passaggi per poi concentrarsi sui singoli combattenti all’arma bianca e sul loro terrore, cercando di aprire un punto di vista dall’interno del campo di battaglia.
In particolare l’autore riconosce ad alcuni storici inglesi degli ultimi anni (Keegan e Pritchett) il fatto di essere riusciti a fornire un resoconto accurato dell’intera azione sul campo di battaglia secondo il combattente diretto, dall’impatto iniziale tra le falangi, al crollo e alla ritirata disperata della parte sconfitta.
Le regole che la battaglia greca seguiva erano infatti molto semplici e lineari:
carica, collisione, combattimento corpo a corpo, pressione e rotta finale.
Il tutto viene appunto descritto da Hanson secondo uno schema nuovo che egli stesso spiega:
Ho cercato di ricostruire l’ambiente in cui si svolgeva la battaglia, l’atmosfera entro cui l’individuo cercava di uccidere e di non farsi ammazzare, la successione degli eventi vista dall’interno della falange.
E per ogni fase dello scontro mi sono chiesto che cosa fosse e come dovesse essere.
Se questo saggio contiene un tema guida, confesso che si tratta del tormento.
Un libro che proprio per questo vale la pena leggere a patto di essere preparati ad entrare in situazioni davvero pesanti.
Tempo di lettura: 8h 24m
March 5, 2011
What a fascinating study. Hanson proposes that Greek hoplite warfare was a regular event and a means of contesting armies under conditions that limited casualties and interruptions to the critical rhythms of life. The battles, he states, did not last more than an hour, and their outcome was accepted by both parties. Greek men of all ages participated, and each felt more allegiance to his neighbors and family than higher ideals or notions. There was little specialization in the phalanx, and, with the exception of the front line, each man experienced the same trials in battle. Honor and bravery were not attributed to individual acts of heroism, rather they were associated with those men who held their place on the line and kept their shield raised in the face of ferocious fighting and bloodshed.
An interesting thesis on its own; what makes this such a fantastic read is Hanson's nose for details. Along with the historical record as pieced together from plays and archeological findings and art, Hanson refers to actual experiments in which graduate students replicated Greek armor, wore it, and tested how long they could sustain a charge, in phalanx formation, under a California sun that in turn substituted for the Mediterranean weather of the time. Reading a bit like this, I thought, "How do I find a class like that?!"
What Hanson does in this short, well-written treatise is humanize the militant traditions and actions of an ancient culture whose exploits have long since been surrounded in myths and glorification that detract from the actions of people who once walked and breathed and spoke and planned and lived and died. Thousands of years ago, Greek men fought and bled and died, and in this book, Hanson does a remarkable job describing what this may have been like.
An interesting thesis on its own; what makes this such a fantastic read is Hanson's nose for details. Along with the historical record as pieced together from plays and archeological findings and art, Hanson refers to actual experiments in which graduate students replicated Greek armor, wore it, and tested how long they could sustain a charge, in phalanx formation, under a California sun that in turn substituted for the Mediterranean weather of the time. Reading a bit like this, I thought, "How do I find a class like that?!"
What Hanson does in this short, well-written treatise is humanize the militant traditions and actions of an ancient culture whose exploits have long since been surrounded in myths and glorification that detract from the actions of people who once walked and breathed and spoke and planned and lived and died. Thousands of years ago, Greek men fought and bled and died, and in this book, Hanson does a remarkable job describing what this may have been like.
February 10, 2017
Военните историци и теоретици отдавна са отчели, че има съществена разлика между Изтока и Запада не само в начина на живот и световъзприятие, но и в начина на водене на война. Западният начин на воюване винаги е бил директен, брутален, хвърляне на цялата сила в атака, с цел бързо и тотално приключване на конфликта.
Според автора, този начин на воюване води началото си от древна Гърция, от наследството на нейните хоплити, които опаковани в тежка бронзова броня си уговаряли място за битка, подреждали се едни срещу други и се блъскали и мушкали в невероятно брутално пого (гръцката дума за тоя сблъсък се превежда като мелачка, а самият бой като мелене, смилане), където полуслепи от пот, кръв, жега и шлема си и толкова притиснати от свои и врагове, че често умрелите не падали, а стоели затиснати прави, хоплитите-фермери тъй както хоплитите-професионални войници от Спарта знаели само, че победата и славата са напред, загубата, срама и смъртта са назад.
Макар всъщност тая традиция да е общоевропейска още отпреди гърците и да започва може би с варварските войни, които излизайки пред своите и пред врага извиквали на висок глас името си, предците си, клана си и кого са победили в битка и призовавали който има смелост да излезе срещу тях, Виктор Дейвид Хенсън се справя добре с аргументацията за гърците като родоначалници на западните военни тактики, описва подробно както въоръжението, така и жи��ота, битието на хоплита-фермер, и особено самата битка от преди започването й, до нейните последици за участниците в нея и за градовете, които те представляват.
Също така обаче, не е зле да погледнете и това ревю, щото човек трябва да мисли за историята критично, а не романтично:
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Според автора, този начин на воюване води началото си от древна Гърция, от наследството на нейните хоплити, които опаковани в тежка бронзова броня си уговаряли място за битка, подреждали се едни срещу други и се блъскали и мушкали в невероятно брутално пого (гръцката дума за тоя сблъсък се превежда като мелачка, а самият бой като мелене, смилане), където полуслепи от пот, кръв, жега и шлема си и толкова притиснати от свои и врагове, че често умрелите не падали, а стоели затиснати прави, хоплитите-фермери тъй както хоплитите-професионални войници от Спарта знаели само, че победата и славата са напред, загубата, срама и смъртта са назад.
Макар всъщност тая традиция да е общоевропейска още отпреди гърците и да започва може би с варварските войни, които излизайки пред своите и пред врага извиквали на висок глас името си, предците си, клана си и кого са победили в битка и призовавали който има смелост да излезе срещу тях, Виктор Дейвид Хенсън се справя добре с аргументацията за гърците като родоначалници на западните военни тактики, описва подробно както въоръжението, така и жи��ота, битието на хоплита-фермер, и особено самата битка от преди започването й, до нейните последици за участниците в нея и за градовете, които те представляват.
Също така обаче, не е зле да погледнете и това ревю, щото човек трябва да мисли за историята критично, а не романтично:
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
November 27, 2019
This book is certainly not for everyone, but for those interested in ancient warfare it's very well researched and interesting. A little slow to start with, but it picks up steam around Chapter 3. Would be a lot better with some pictures of various items of armor and other artifacts plus a few maps.
February 2, 2017
Note that this review is emphatically *not* an endorsement of Hanson's newfound xenophobic culture wars bully pulpit - this is a review of a well-written and well-researched book on hoplite warfare. Nothing more, nothing less.
September 20, 2013
Loved the book. Well written and researched. Inspired me to do additional studies of ancient Greece and Rome. Wish I had read this book when I was in high school!
March 11, 2020
I was able to ignore the controversies in this book and it turned out to be an amazing read for undestanding hoplite battles!
August 28, 2018
Overall, this is a fine scholarly monograph on military history that demonstrates Hanson's skill in writing about the hoplite experience and how it was viewed in ancient and classical Greece. As someone with some interest in the subject [1], I was pleased to see that however poor the author may be at extrapolating his insights into Greek military history into the larger historical panorama, he at least has a sound understanding of the subject matter of this book. All that makes this short book of just over 200 pages a deeply interesting one to read. This is not a book that seeks to appeal to everyone, and there are likely many people who would not enjoy it, but if you are interested in how the Greeks fought and why that could matter for those of us who come from Western cultures with a similar interest in decisive battle, as hard as it is to find, this book is definitely worth a read. The author, at least, puts no unnecessary stumbling blocks in the way of someone understanding and appreciating this work.
Despite its short length, this book manages to have nineteen chapters in five parts. Before the book begins, there is an introduction by John Keegan that praises the book and helps it gain some credibility with the general reader of military history. There are then prefaces for both the first and second edition of the work and a chronological table to set Greek warfare in its proper context. The first part of the book then looks at the relationship between the Greeks and modern warfare (I) with chapters on the ordinary nature of Greek hoplite warriors (1), discussion about the author's thoughts on a distinctive Western way of war (2), his desire to avoid talking about strategic and tactical matters (3), the context of hoplite warfare in an agricultural society (4), and the sources of inquiry he will use in the book (5). After that the author discusses the ordeal of the hoplite (II), looking at the burden of arms and armor (6), the old men who participated in warfare (7), and the dread of massed attack and the fear it produced in others (8). After that the author looks at the issue of the will (III), including the ways that generals fought in the front to lead by example (9), the origins of the regimental system in preserving unit morale (10), and the importance of drinking to overcoming nerves and fear (11). Then there are a few chapters on battle (IV) that look at the charge (12), collision of men (13), gaps in the line (14), the push and collapse (15), and the problem of confusion, misdirection, and mob violence (16). Finally, the author closes with a look at the aftermath of battle (V), with chapters on the killing field (17), wounded (18), and an epilogue (19) after which the author includes various supplemental material.
What makes this book particularly worthwhile is that it manages to give the reader a sense of what the Greeks said and how they experienced their heavy infantry tradition. Warfare does not exist in a vacuum, and the author's practical experience with farming (quite rare among those who write about history of any kind) gives him insight as to how little damage was being done to the fields and how decisive combat would appeal to armies based on part-time citizen soldiers. Those of us who are part of nations whose military traditions praise that type of warrior--as does the United States--would do well to understand the military of the Greeks. Despite the differences in technology, the importance of leaders leading by example rather than by fiat, the concern for the use of self-medicate to deal with the horrors and trauma of war, and the strong preference for decisive warfare and contempt for those who cannot fight honorably are certainly part of the American military experience. The author does good work here in demonstrating that to understand our own military history and traditions it is worthwhile to understand the Greeks and how and why they developed the hoplite warfare that was so distinctive to them--even if other cultures and civilizations, like that of China, had strong infantry traditions that were similarly fond of decisive infantry battle as well.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2018...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
Despite its short length, this book manages to have nineteen chapters in five parts. Before the book begins, there is an introduction by John Keegan that praises the book and helps it gain some credibility with the general reader of military history. There are then prefaces for both the first and second edition of the work and a chronological table to set Greek warfare in its proper context. The first part of the book then looks at the relationship between the Greeks and modern warfare (I) with chapters on the ordinary nature of Greek hoplite warriors (1), discussion about the author's thoughts on a distinctive Western way of war (2), his desire to avoid talking about strategic and tactical matters (3), the context of hoplite warfare in an agricultural society (4), and the sources of inquiry he will use in the book (5). After that the author discusses the ordeal of the hoplite (II), looking at the burden of arms and armor (6), the old men who participated in warfare (7), and the dread of massed attack and the fear it produced in others (8). After that the author looks at the issue of the will (III), including the ways that generals fought in the front to lead by example (9), the origins of the regimental system in preserving unit morale (10), and the importance of drinking to overcoming nerves and fear (11). Then there are a few chapters on battle (IV) that look at the charge (12), collision of men (13), gaps in the line (14), the push and collapse (15), and the problem of confusion, misdirection, and mob violence (16). Finally, the author closes with a look at the aftermath of battle (V), with chapters on the killing field (17), wounded (18), and an epilogue (19) after which the author includes various supplemental material.
What makes this book particularly worthwhile is that it manages to give the reader a sense of what the Greeks said and how they experienced their heavy infantry tradition. Warfare does not exist in a vacuum, and the author's practical experience with farming (quite rare among those who write about history of any kind) gives him insight as to how little damage was being done to the fields and how decisive combat would appeal to armies based on part-time citizen soldiers. Those of us who are part of nations whose military traditions praise that type of warrior--as does the United States--would do well to understand the military of the Greeks. Despite the differences in technology, the importance of leaders leading by example rather than by fiat, the concern for the use of self-medicate to deal with the horrors and trauma of war, and the strong preference for decisive warfare and contempt for those who cannot fight honorably are certainly part of the American military experience. The author does good work here in demonstrating that to understand our own military history and traditions it is worthwhile to understand the Greeks and how and why they developed the hoplite warfare that was so distinctive to them--even if other cultures and civilizations, like that of China, had strong infantry traditions that were similarly fond of decisive infantry battle as well.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2018...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
March 1, 2025
Pour Hanson, les Grecs de l'époque classique ont inventé un modèle de combat qui a survécu jusqu'à notre époque, du moins en Occident, et c'est incrusté dans l'esprit des gens. Ce modèle, c'est celui de la bataille décisive. « Les batailles d'hoplites étaient des luttes entre petits propriétaires fonciers qui, d'un commun accord, cherchaient à limiter la guerre et, partant, la tuerie en un affrontement unique, bref et cauchemardesque. »
Pour les Grecs, la bataille était une affaire sérieuse, qu'ils ne cherchaient nullement à rendre romantique. L'iconographie de l'époque abonde d'images réalistes d'hoplites blessés, de fantassins aux flancs percés, agonisants ou morts...
Ce qui est absolument fascinant dans ce livre magistral, c'est qu'au-delà de l'omniprésent propos philosophique et historique (auquel on ne peut échapper et qui donne tout son poids à l'ouvrage), Hanson arrive à décrire l'intensité de l'affrontement des phalanges selon le point de vue de l'hoplite.
Elles sont absolument saisissantes les descriptions qu'il fait de ce que le fantassin pouvait éprouvé, de ce qu'il voyait du champ de bataille (ou de ce qu'il n'en voyait pas – car pour les soldats des rangs situés au-delà du troisième ou quatrième, il n'y avait rien à voir sinon le dos du camarade qui poussait devant et sur le dos duquel il poussait lui aussi), les cris, la sueur, la montée d'adrénaline, le choc de l'engagement, ce choc terrible de deux phalanges lancées l'une contre l'autre au pas de course, les hommes courant derrière leurs boucliers de bronze, la lance portée sous le bras avec un angle remontant pour atteindre l'ennemi à l'aine ou à la cuisse, l'unité de la phalange, sa cohésion militaire qui relevait tant de la cohésion sociale. Tout ça est aussi bon que le meilleur des romans, mais ici totalement documenté par les poètes et historiens de l'époque, l'analyse des fresques, des vases et des poteries. On reste ébahi par l'art du conteur et par l'érudition du maître.
L'avant-dernier chapitre, qui porte sur les blessures subies à la bataille, demande un cœur solidement accroché. Moi qui ai pourtant l'habitude de ce genre de littérature, je n'ai pu m'empêcher de ressentir un frisson aux multiples types de blessures que les hoplites pouvaient subir et décrites avec un luxe de minutie par les médecins du temps.
août 2008
Pour les Grecs, la bataille était une affaire sérieuse, qu'ils ne cherchaient nullement à rendre romantique. L'iconographie de l'époque abonde d'images réalistes d'hoplites blessés, de fantassins aux flancs percés, agonisants ou morts...
Ce qui est absolument fascinant dans ce livre magistral, c'est qu'au-delà de l'omniprésent propos philosophique et historique (auquel on ne peut échapper et qui donne tout son poids à l'ouvrage), Hanson arrive à décrire l'intensité de l'affrontement des phalanges selon le point de vue de l'hoplite.
Elles sont absolument saisissantes les descriptions qu'il fait de ce que le fantassin pouvait éprouvé, de ce qu'il voyait du champ de bataille (ou de ce qu'il n'en voyait pas – car pour les soldats des rangs situés au-delà du troisième ou quatrième, il n'y avait rien à voir sinon le dos du camarade qui poussait devant et sur le dos duquel il poussait lui aussi), les cris, la sueur, la montée d'adrénaline, le choc de l'engagement, ce choc terrible de deux phalanges lancées l'une contre l'autre au pas de course, les hommes courant derrière leurs boucliers de bronze, la lance portée sous le bras avec un angle remontant pour atteindre l'ennemi à l'aine ou à la cuisse, l'unité de la phalange, sa cohésion militaire qui relevait tant de la cohésion sociale. Tout ça est aussi bon que le meilleur des romans, mais ici totalement documenté par les poètes et historiens de l'époque, l'analyse des fresques, des vases et des poteries. On reste ébahi par l'art du conteur et par l'érudition du maître.
L'avant-dernier chapitre, qui porte sur les blessures subies à la bataille, demande un cœur solidement accroché. Moi qui ai pourtant l'habitude de ce genre de littérature, je n'ai pu m'empêcher de ressentir un frisson aux multiples types de blessures que les hoplites pouvaient subir et décrites avec un luxe de minutie par les médecins du temps.
août 2008
October 17, 2018
Recensione sul blog Alessandro Magno – Il blog su Alessandro il Grande
Sì purtroppo l’ho letto in due mesi ma non è a causa del libro ma di impegni lavorativi, infatti non ho proprio letto per un bel po’ di tempo ma appena sono riuscita a ritagliarmi del tempo libero ho ripreso in mano questo libro 🙂
Questa interessante lettura è anche parte della collaborazione con l’editore che ringrazio molto per questa possibilità. In cambio, come sempre, vi parlo sinceramente di questo libro.
Questa lettura non parla direttamente di Alessandro Magno ma più che altro delle battaglie avvenute prima di lui. Comunque è stata una lettura che mi è servita da inquadramento storico e di approfondimento della cultura del tempo.
I libri-testimonianze sulla guerra mi piacciono molto, infatti anche Yellow Birds di Kevin Powers e Ammazzare il tempo in Iraq di Colby Buzzell sono delle letture che anche a distanza di anni ricordo con piacere. Il libro di Hanson è molto simile: parla della guerra al tempo dell’Antica Grecia e lo fa da un punto di vista nuovo: quello dell’oplite, del fante, insomma del soldato che vive quest’esperienza breve ma intensa e non dal punto di vista dello spettatore da lontano della battaglia. Per rendere bene l’idea e spiegare il più possibile quello che vivevano i soldati usa un linguaggio semplice, si avvale di molte citazioni e riferimenti agli studi degli altri e riesce a spiegare concretamente al lettore quello che vivevano la stragrande maggioranza degli uomini del tempo.
Hanson ci spiega che la guerra non era vista e vissuta come avviene oggi ma ci sono profonde differenze sotto molti aspetti e lui li analizza uno ad uno, da ogni punto di vista possibile e ne esce un libro interessante, scorrevole e molto ben fatto. L’autore riesce a trasportarci nel mondo brutale e terribile che vivevano quei ragazzini, adulti e vecchi, lo descrive in maniera efficace e semplice
Non ho notato refusi o errori di altro tipo.
Secondo me è una lettura che se vi interessa l’argomento e anche i libri sulla guerra dovete prendere assolutamente in considerazione di affrontare!
Ringrazio l’editore per avermi dato questa opportunità!
Sì purtroppo l’ho letto in due mesi ma non è a causa del libro ma di impegni lavorativi, infatti non ho proprio letto per un bel po’ di tempo ma appena sono riuscita a ritagliarmi del tempo libero ho ripreso in mano questo libro 🙂
Questa interessante lettura è anche parte della collaborazione con l’editore che ringrazio molto per questa possibilità. In cambio, come sempre, vi parlo sinceramente di questo libro.
Questa lettura non parla direttamente di Alessandro Magno ma più che altro delle battaglie avvenute prima di lui. Comunque è stata una lettura che mi è servita da inquadramento storico e di approfondimento della cultura del tempo.
I libri-testimonianze sulla guerra mi piacciono molto, infatti anche Yellow Birds di Kevin Powers e Ammazzare il tempo in Iraq di Colby Buzzell sono delle letture che anche a distanza di anni ricordo con piacere. Il libro di Hanson è molto simile: parla della guerra al tempo dell’Antica Grecia e lo fa da un punto di vista nuovo: quello dell’oplite, del fante, insomma del soldato che vive quest’esperienza breve ma intensa e non dal punto di vista dello spettatore da lontano della battaglia. Per rendere bene l’idea e spiegare il più possibile quello che vivevano i soldati usa un linguaggio semplice, si avvale di molte citazioni e riferimenti agli studi degli altri e riesce a spiegare concretamente al lettore quello che vivevano la stragrande maggioranza degli uomini del tempo.
Hanson ci spiega che la guerra non era vista e vissuta come avviene oggi ma ci sono profonde differenze sotto molti aspetti e lui li analizza uno ad uno, da ogni punto di vista possibile e ne esce un libro interessante, scorrevole e molto ben fatto. L’autore riesce a trasportarci nel mondo brutale e terribile che vivevano quei ragazzini, adulti e vecchi, lo descrive in maniera efficace e semplice
Non ho notato refusi o errori di altro tipo.
Secondo me è una lettura che se vi interessa l’argomento e anche i libri sulla guerra dovete prendere assolutamente in considerazione di affrontare!
Ringrazio l’editore per avermi dato questa opportunità!
October 31, 2025
I feel like this book is like a finding from humanities research. But I did learn multiple things while reading this book. Even though there are some critics who opposed what Victor shared, I still found this pretty knowledgeable. I want to jot down some of the things I have learned from this book.
1. The Greeks believed that real courage and honor in war came from fighting face-to-face in open daylight, not by using tricks, ambushes, or long-distance weapons.
2. The Greeks’ way of fighting actually limited war in a strange way: it was dangerous and bloody, but it was organized, so wars didn’t drag on endlessly like in later centuries.
3. There are three main sources of knowledge about Greek warfare. They are Archaeology, Art, and Epigraphy.
4. For the Greeks, war wasn’t about glory or adventure; it was about duty, restraint, and the quick restoration of peace.
5. Greek warfare demanded facing your fear directly, and running away was seen as the ultimate shame.
6. Soldiers fought alongside people they knew and loved, courage came naturally, and cowardice was unbearable.
7. Leonidas, the Spartan king at Thermopylae, famously told his 300 soldiers to “eat well, for tonight we dine in Hades,” meaning: enjoy your last meal because we’ll die in battle today.
8. Greek hoplite warfare was not only physically demanding but mentally and emotionally extreme.
These are the things I have learned while reading this book. I would say that this book is slightly out of reach for me. Therefore, I had to use a summarizing tool in order to understand. Normally, I would give up if I find a book very challenging to read, but I don't want that barrier to stop me from unpacking this hub. I hope that I will be able to read this book line by line and analyze it in the future.
1. The Greeks believed that real courage and honor in war came from fighting face-to-face in open daylight, not by using tricks, ambushes, or long-distance weapons.
2. The Greeks’ way of fighting actually limited war in a strange way: it was dangerous and bloody, but it was organized, so wars didn’t drag on endlessly like in later centuries.
3. There are three main sources of knowledge about Greek warfare. They are Archaeology, Art, and Epigraphy.
4. For the Greeks, war wasn’t about glory or adventure; it was about duty, restraint, and the quick restoration of peace.
5. Greek warfare demanded facing your fear directly, and running away was seen as the ultimate shame.
6. Soldiers fought alongside people they knew and loved, courage came naturally, and cowardice was unbearable.
7. Leonidas, the Spartan king at Thermopylae, famously told his 300 soldiers to “eat well, for tonight we dine in Hades,” meaning: enjoy your last meal because we’ll die in battle today.
8. Greek hoplite warfare was not only physically demanding but mentally and emotionally extreme.
These are the things I have learned while reading this book. I would say that this book is slightly out of reach for me. Therefore, I had to use a summarizing tool in order to understand. Normally, I would give up if I find a book very challenging to read, but I don't want that barrier to stop me from unpacking this hub. I hope that I will be able to read this book line by line and analyze it in the future.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 13, 2025
This was an informative book that really helps the reader understand exactly what hoplite warfare might have been like. Hanson uses the literary sources to divide the clash into major stages that stress the brutality of Greek warfare— the charge, the clash of spears, the push, and the collapse. Each stage brings its own hellish distinctiveness.
The most unconvincing part of the book is his foreword and his explanation of hoplite warfare as an agreement between opponents to limit casualties and damage. I just don’t see enough evidence to convince me that’s true. There are almost always ceremonial or honorable rules that combatants follow in war on an individual level, but I find it hard to believe that this was as cut and dry as Hanson makes it sound. Many Greeks appeal to a golden age of hoplite warfare, but it seems more likely that it was based on the constraints of the time and the tactical superiority of an armored soldier rather than an imagined agreement among all combatants.
Nevertheless, this book is worth reading for anyone interested in ancient warfare to understand the experience on the frontlines.
The most unconvincing part of the book is his foreword and his explanation of hoplite warfare as an agreement between opponents to limit casualties and damage. I just don’t see enough evidence to convince me that’s true. There are almost always ceremonial or honorable rules that combatants follow in war on an individual level, but I find it hard to believe that this was as cut and dry as Hanson makes it sound. Many Greeks appeal to a golden age of hoplite warfare, but it seems more likely that it was based on the constraints of the time and the tactical superiority of an armored soldier rather than an imagined agreement among all combatants.
Nevertheless, this book is worth reading for anyone interested in ancient warfare to understand the experience on the frontlines.
February 12, 2018
Pensavo di aver preso un saggio storico, piuttosto tecnico, ed invece ho trovato un piccolo capolavoro!
Sorprendente nelle conclusioni, condivisibili per altro grazie ad un buon uso delle fonti primarie, mi ha entusiasmato in più punti.
La battaglia tra opliti è una sublimazione e sintesi della guerra che è sia ordalia sia male minore quasi necessario, nonchè archetipo del modo occidentale del fare la guerra, rivolto alla ricerca della battaglia campale decisiva.
Al di là delle parole, però, quello che più mi ha colpito del libro sono le sensazioni, Davis Hanson è stato capace di ridare vita a questi uomini coraggiosi che affrontavano una prova tanto brutale per poter vivere in pace. Sudore, polvere, fatica, paura, esaltazione si "sentono" grazie alla magia delle parole d'inchiostro su carta di un bravo autore.
Sorprendente nelle conclusioni, condivisibili per altro grazie ad un buon uso delle fonti primarie, mi ha entusiasmato in più punti.
La battaglia tra opliti è una sublimazione e sintesi della guerra che è sia ordalia sia male minore quasi necessario, nonchè archetipo del modo occidentale del fare la guerra, rivolto alla ricerca della battaglia campale decisiva.
Al di là delle parole, però, quello che più mi ha colpito del libro sono le sensazioni, Davis Hanson è stato capace di ridare vita a questi uomini coraggiosi che affrontavano una prova tanto brutale per poter vivere in pace. Sudore, polvere, fatica, paura, esaltazione si "sentono" grazie alla magia delle parole d'inchiostro su carta di un bravo autore.
April 10, 2023
Great book that reminds me of John Keegan's 1976 classic, "The Face of Battle," of which Hanson admits he was inspired by, and shows the reader what it was like to fight in a Greek phalanx to incredible detail. I have not read any other book quite like it.
I also believe Hanson was inspired by Pritchett's book on pitch battle in ancient Greek times of which he acknowledges the book could not have been written without Pritchett's books.
So, if you were curious about how the Greeks fought, and just how tough it was once a pitched battle began, then read this book. Hanson draws on sources from the ancient past like Homer, and to more modern ones (in comparison) like Xenophon, Thucycides and Herodatus. This, among other reasons, is why it is a 5-star book on ancient Greek warfare.
I also believe Hanson was inspired by Pritchett's book on pitch battle in ancient Greek times of which he acknowledges the book could not have been written without Pritchett's books.
So, if you were curious about how the Greeks fought, and just how tough it was once a pitched battle began, then read this book. Hanson draws on sources from the ancient past like Homer, and to more modern ones (in comparison) like Xenophon, Thucycides and Herodatus. This, among other reasons, is why it is a 5-star book on ancient Greek warfare.
September 30, 2025
Victor Davis Hanson’s The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece is a powerful study of the hoplite experience. Hanson vividly reconstructs what close combat might have felt like—bringing the brutality, discipline, and human cost of phalanx warfare to life. The book is highly readable and thought-provoking, though some of his broader arguments about the “Western way” can feel a bit sweeping. Still, it remains an influential and valuable perspective for anyone interested in Greek military history.
March 18, 2023
The failure of the book to explain how "eastern" armies were able to beat "western" armies in pitch battles where the "eastern" army was at a disadvantage, proves the lack of credibility of its claims that the western way of war is uniquely suited for pitched battles. The authors Mono-focus on Greece and the cherry-picking of historical battles to serve his arguments proves that Hanson, while well learned, is not a serious Historian.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 69 reviews