Ad Hominem Arguments

Studies in Rhetoric and Communication

by Douglas N. Walton

Essential to an understanding of argumentation and logic, Ad Hominem Arguments is a vital contribution to legal theory and media and civic discourse.

In the 1860s, northern newspapers attacked Abraham Lincoln's policies by attacking his character, using the terms "drunk," "baboon," "too slow," "foolish," and "dishonest." Steadily on the increase in political argumentation since then, the argumentum ad hominem, or personal attack argument, has now been carefully refined as an instrument of "oppo tactics" and "going negative" by the public relations experts who craft political campaigns at the national level. In this definitive treatment of one of the most important concepts in argumentation theory and informal logic, Douglas Walton presents a normative framework for identifying and evaluating ad hominem or personal attack arguments.

Personal attack arguments have often proved to be so effective, in election campaigns, for example, that even while condemning them, politicians have not stopped using them. In the media, in the courtroom, and in everyday confrontation, ad hominem arguments are easy to put forward as accusations, are difficult to refute, and often have an extremely powerful effect on persuading an audience.

Walton gives a clear method for analyzing and evaluating cases of ad hominem arguments found in everyday argumentation. His analysis classifies the ad hominem argument into five clearly defined subtypes—abusive (direct), circumstantial, bias, "poisoning the well," and tu quoque ("you're just as bad") arguments—and gives methods for evaluating each type. Each subtype is given a well-defined form as a recognizable type of argument. The numerous case studies show in concrete terms many practical aspects of how to use textual evidence to identify and analyze fallacies and to evaluate argumentation as fallacious or not in particular cases.


 

240 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 1998

About the author

Douglas Neil Walton (PhD University of Toronto, 1972) is a Canadian academic and author, well known for his many widely published books and papers on argumentation, logical fallacies and informal logic. He is presently Distinguished Research Fellow of the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric (CRRAR) at the University of Windsor, Canada, and before that (2008-2014), he held the Assumption Chair of Argumentation Studies at the University of Windsor. Walton’s work has been used to better prepare legal arguments and to help develop artificial intelligence. His books have been translated worldwide, and he attracts students from many countries to study with him. A special issue of the journal Informal Logic surveyed Walton’s contributions to informal logic and argumentation theory up to 2006 (Informal Logic, 27(3), 2007). A festschrift honoring his contributions, Dialectics, Dialogue and Argumentation: An Examination of Douglas Walton’s Theories of Reasoning and Argument, ed. C. Reed and C. W. Tindale, London: College Publications, 2010, shows how his theories are increasingly finding applications in computer science. A list of titles of many of Walton’s books is given below. Links to preprints of many of his published papers can be found on the website

http://www.dougwalton.ca

Reviews

[MJD · Rating 5 out of 5]

While this book covers a lot of ground (origin and history of the argument's classification, current classifications of it, etc.), I think that the best thing going for this book is the interesting line of argument by Walton that the ad hominem argument is sometimes non-fallacious.

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

Comes in at 385 pages in my reader. Walton is always clear and easy to read and understand. I've had his books in my library since 1989. He's amazing.

[Rory Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

An academic study of the argument type known as an ‘ad hominem.’

One of the central foci of the book is to properly distinguish the various types of arguments which cluster under the name of ‘ad hominem.’ Working through historical examples, and going through 66 contemporary logic books, the author notes that there are five main types which have appeared under various names and forms.

There is the abusive ad hominem argument, which is essentially just attacking the opponent who is affirming or denying something. This is also known as mud slinging, among a wide range of other labels.

Then there is the circumstantial ad hominem, which attacks some feature of the person, or of the person’s context, rather than simply attacking the person him or herself. These kinds of arguments often appear in contexts of prejudice. Oh dear so and so is a member of community X…

The third kind of ad hominem argument is the attribution of bias or vested interests to the person. These kinds of arguments often appear in political contexts, where politicians are said to be only doing something for votes.

The fourth kind of ad hominem argument is the ‘tu quoque’ (or You too) argument. It is where a person is effectively accused of hypocrisy, or some other behaviour which is inconsistent with what is being said or argued. But, of course, just because a person is an alcoholic, it doesn’t in any way lessen the truth or importance of what the person describes as the dangers of alcoholism. Just because a person cannot live up to an idea, doesn’t automatically make the person unable to coherently talk about that idea.

The fifth kind of ad hominem argument is ‘poisoning the well.’ It is a more general attack on the source of argumentation. Once again it misses the point, as all the ad hominem arguments do. The point of argument is to rationally engage with ideas, and to refute arguments. Attacking people, rather than ideas, and discrediting sources rather than reasons, may gain admiration and credit from others, but it completely misses the point of rational dialogue.

Or does it?

One of the points made well by the author is that there are situations where the five examples of ad hominem argument may well be justified. If a person is reporting information, then ad hominem arguments which show the person to be an unreliable witness become entirely relevant to the situation. Similarly, if a person is presenting data, then considerations about the source of the data and its reliability can be completely relevant.

The fact that ad hominem arguments are generally examples of fallacious reasoning, does not mean that they are always fallacious. Arguing appropriately in one set of circumstances can look differently to how it might transpire in another context. And part of what it means to understand logic and be a rational agent is to understand when an ad hominem argument is an inappropriate fallacy, and when actually it is a rationally relevant contribution to a discussion.

Overall, this is a technical book which is most suitable for an academic readership. It is definitely an interesting read, and the historical research is fascinating. However, general readers who are just looking to get a basic understanding of what an ad hominem argument is, will most likely find there is too much detail and complexity in the book. General readers would be better suited just looking up ‘ad hominem argument’ in a philosophical dictionary or scanning an online encyclopaedia.