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Cavour
La vita di Camillo Benso di Cavour, il politico che riuscì a riunire l'Italia, ricostruita da un grande conoscitore del nostro Risorgimento. Gli anni della giovinezza e dell'apprendistato all'estero, i primi approcci alla vita pubblica, l'attività parlamentare, il ministero dell'Agricoltura, la presidenza del Consiglio, la spedizione in Crimea e l'alleanza con la Francia, la guerra del '59, il trattato di Villafranca e le dimissioni dal governo, il dilemma tra Stato centralizzato e decentrato, il consolidamento della fragile unità raggiunta. Un uomo con le sue grandezze e le sue miserie, le geniali intuizioni e le piccole meschinerie, le sue astuzie e la sua abilità.
317 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
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June 4, 2015
Among the usual cast of the Risorgimento, Cavour hold the ambiguous role of the anti-hero: Mazzini the tragic plotter of a bygone idealistic age, Victor-Emmanuel, the comical incompetent and Garibaldi the epic leader of international revolutions, all stand, left, right and center, as holy men whose individuality was sacrificed on the altar of the “grandeur or rather sanctity of our national objective” (Mamiani, p.118);
Denis Mack Smith was probably liberal Italy’s most famous historian outside Italy: in the fifties, at the time of an increased polarization in the new republic between (neo) Crocean apologists and Marxist critics, that British gadfly landed squarely on the backside of the southern ruminant having in mind of stinging it out of complacency. Against both sides’ hagiographic aspirations, Mack Smith delights in depicting the forefathers of the nation as deeply flawed and all too often corrupt. Although this approach proved its limits (most notably in his depiction of Mussolini as pure opportunists) such a reading lends itself particularly well to the Risorgimento, inasmuch as it departs as much as can be done from the “roman national” and give back to the actors the individual substance that other histories lack.
As was often noted at the time, Cavour’s own “connubio”, his autocratic construction of a right/center-left coalition government legitimized by the threat of the clerical and republican extremes, was never far from dictatorship : along with a domineering streak and a self-professed “pragmatism” (Palmerston preferred the term “unprincipled” - and he was British!), this allowed him to construct a self-negating ideological construct out of the moderate liberal tradition: the constitution and liberalism allowed him to transgress traditions when required, while reason of state and “pragmatism” allowed for his transgression of the constitution, and his much touted conservatism allowed him to circumvent those claims to national interest when his own fancy demanded so.
The result is an authoritarian personality looming large on the Piedmontese government, across ministries (Prime, Finance, Foreign Affairs, often Trade or Interior) with only theoretical respect for parliament and not much respect for theory anyway.
Of course Mack Smith’s portrait is not neutral: the political climate in which it was drawn up, and the author’s own taste for bold and acerbic outlines need to be taken in consideration, but it does suggest the existence of a genealogy to Mussolini’s autocracy: Mack Smith argues elsewhere for reading Mussolini as an opportunist, ready to all sacrifices and contortions to achieve power. The filiation of his own brand of mass-based dictatorship with that of Crispi is often noted by those eager to see fascism on the left, but Mussolini’s own constant reference to the primacy of movement over doctrine, of action over theory and to pragmatism is not without echoing Cavour’s.
On the left, the anti-giolittian phenomenon, cutting across the political divides but leading up to fascism, is often said to be a reaction to the floundering of trasformismo and to the narrow electoral basis of Italian representative democracy. Alternatively, it would seem who could see the fascist “revolution” as the unveiling of an autocratic tradition that had remained so far occulted by the shroud of liberalism, but which stretched back to the roots of unification. The search for proto-fascists seem doubly anachronistic in that it abuses a historical label to dismiss a historical figure, but it might be time to give the same attention to Fascism’s relationship with a polyphonic Risorgimento as that which has been given to its relation to Ancient Rome.
As Italian policy in the following decades will be torn between the models of French cosmopolitanism and “Prussian socialism”, Cavour navigates the European checkerboard of the XIXth century with great freedom, turning to Russia right after the Crimean War, supporting both the creation of Romania and its occupation by Austria, playing France against Britain and Britain against France... Those nations were from early on the inspiration for his liberal conservatism, with France, and Napoleon III, showing the way for a conciliation of conservatism and the national idea, and Britain offering a model of free-trade and socially pacified economy.
The reader cannot help but think of Machiavelli when reading this life: there is a sense in which Cavour’s profoundly unprincipled opportunism is sublimated into a principle. Virtue here is the absence of honour, a form of political modernity that maybe alone could drag an archipelago of small Italian states outside of the archaic influence of Austria to form a new nation. Fortune, parliament, constitution, honour and tradition are all women that Cavour beats and ill-use to advance his nation’s and his own interest, which miraculously seem to converge.
How much was (is?) “pragmatism” a code-word for low cunning and autocratic self-indulgence? How much is such pragmatism synonymous with revolution? It is easy to find Cavour detestable, not least because he curtailed the actual democratic potential of the events he all too often appropriated through manipulation and ruthlessness.
There is a sense, however, in which all revolution must be conservative for all but those who suffer it: by its very definition as historical caesura, its possibilities seem limitless, always already including some more extremes than those sought by its engineers. Whatever little institutional continuity is meant to survive the tidal wave has to negotiate, and resist, the maelstrom of the masses rising. Some (Garibaldi) seem better equipped, because of their position in the field and their inclinations, to survive the experience. Others, like Cavour, have to give up more and more of whatever little ideal was moving them in the first place, scarifying freedom of the press to his foreign relations or scarifying decentralization to national unity.
Maybe the most telling in this story is what he managed not to give up, despite pressure from all sides: a deeply secular vision of the state, and an unflinching commitment to free trade.
Denis Mack Smith was probably liberal Italy’s most famous historian outside Italy: in the fifties, at the time of an increased polarization in the new republic between (neo) Crocean apologists and Marxist critics, that British gadfly landed squarely on the backside of the southern ruminant having in mind of stinging it out of complacency. Against both sides’ hagiographic aspirations, Mack Smith delights in depicting the forefathers of the nation as deeply flawed and all too often corrupt. Although this approach proved its limits (most notably in his depiction of Mussolini as pure opportunists) such a reading lends itself particularly well to the Risorgimento, inasmuch as it departs as much as can be done from the “roman national” and give back to the actors the individual substance that other histories lack.
As was often noted at the time, Cavour’s own “connubio”, his autocratic construction of a right/center-left coalition government legitimized by the threat of the clerical and republican extremes, was never far from dictatorship : along with a domineering streak and a self-professed “pragmatism” (Palmerston preferred the term “unprincipled” - and he was British!), this allowed him to construct a self-negating ideological construct out of the moderate liberal tradition: the constitution and liberalism allowed him to transgress traditions when required, while reason of state and “pragmatism” allowed for his transgression of the constitution, and his much touted conservatism allowed him to circumvent those claims to national interest when his own fancy demanded so.
The result is an authoritarian personality looming large on the Piedmontese government, across ministries (Prime, Finance, Foreign Affairs, often Trade or Interior) with only theoretical respect for parliament and not much respect for theory anyway.
Of course Mack Smith’s portrait is not neutral: the political climate in which it was drawn up, and the author’s own taste for bold and acerbic outlines need to be taken in consideration, but it does suggest the existence of a genealogy to Mussolini’s autocracy: Mack Smith argues elsewhere for reading Mussolini as an opportunist, ready to all sacrifices and contortions to achieve power. The filiation of his own brand of mass-based dictatorship with that of Crispi is often noted by those eager to see fascism on the left, but Mussolini’s own constant reference to the primacy of movement over doctrine, of action over theory and to pragmatism is not without echoing Cavour’s.
On the left, the anti-giolittian phenomenon, cutting across the political divides but leading up to fascism, is often said to be a reaction to the floundering of trasformismo and to the narrow electoral basis of Italian representative democracy. Alternatively, it would seem who could see the fascist “revolution” as the unveiling of an autocratic tradition that had remained so far occulted by the shroud of liberalism, but which stretched back to the roots of unification. The search for proto-fascists seem doubly anachronistic in that it abuses a historical label to dismiss a historical figure, but it might be time to give the same attention to Fascism’s relationship with a polyphonic Risorgimento as that which has been given to its relation to Ancient Rome.
As Italian policy in the following decades will be torn between the models of French cosmopolitanism and “Prussian socialism”, Cavour navigates the European checkerboard of the XIXth century with great freedom, turning to Russia right after the Crimean War, supporting both the creation of Romania and its occupation by Austria, playing France against Britain and Britain against France... Those nations were from early on the inspiration for his liberal conservatism, with France, and Napoleon III, showing the way for a conciliation of conservatism and the national idea, and Britain offering a model of free-trade and socially pacified economy.
The reader cannot help but think of Machiavelli when reading this life: there is a sense in which Cavour’s profoundly unprincipled opportunism is sublimated into a principle. Virtue here is the absence of honour, a form of political modernity that maybe alone could drag an archipelago of small Italian states outside of the archaic influence of Austria to form a new nation. Fortune, parliament, constitution, honour and tradition are all women that Cavour beats and ill-use to advance his nation’s and his own interest, which miraculously seem to converge.
How much was (is?) “pragmatism” a code-word for low cunning and autocratic self-indulgence? How much is such pragmatism synonymous with revolution? It is easy to find Cavour detestable, not least because he curtailed the actual democratic potential of the events he all too often appropriated through manipulation and ruthlessness.
There is a sense, however, in which all revolution must be conservative for all but those who suffer it: by its very definition as historical caesura, its possibilities seem limitless, always already including some more extremes than those sought by its engineers. Whatever little institutional continuity is meant to survive the tidal wave has to negotiate, and resist, the maelstrom of the masses rising. Some (Garibaldi) seem better equipped, because of their position in the field and their inclinations, to survive the experience. Others, like Cavour, have to give up more and more of whatever little ideal was moving them in the first place, scarifying freedom of the press to his foreign relations or scarifying decentralization to national unity.
Maybe the most telling in this story is what he managed not to give up, despite pressure from all sides: a deeply secular vision of the state, and an unflinching commitment to free trade.
July 27, 2023
Mack Smith, Denis, Cavour (New York: Alfred A. Lo Knopf, 1985). “The most notable achievement in the life of Count Camille de Cavour was to preside over the unification of Italy,” zo opent historicus Denis Mack Smith (Oxford University) kort maar krachtig deze biografie over de controversiële politicus en staatsman die als minister-president van Piedmont het pad van de risorgimento plaveide. Vlak na de proclamatie van het Koninkrijk Italië in 1861 overleed hij, pas 50 jaar oud, tot ontsteltenis van vriend en vijand. Zijn politieke loopbaan was er een geweest van vallen en opstaan, met groots resultaat: “The unification of Italy was in the end a great success story, but some incidental mishaps along the way are an essential part of the picture and throw into relief the full extent of the ultimate triumph. Sometimes Cavour appeared to be at the edge of total failure; sometimes he made what by his own admission were serious mistakes of judgment and employed methods that he knew would be thought discretable; often he appeared to be the plaything of circumstance as events seemed to conspire against him. Cavour’s ability can be appreciated only after tracing not only his successes, but the difficulties, the uncertainties, the errors, and what he himself referred to as the less admirable side of his handiwork. His capacity to recover from mistakes and exploit adverse conditions was an essential ingredient in what was empirical statesmanship of the highest order. No politician of the century — certainly not Bismarck — made so much out of so little.” (xiii)
Cavour beschikte over een krachtige persoonlijkheid en was een man van scherpe tegenstellingen. Hij was energiek, levendig, hartelijk, sociaal, praktisch, bruut, koppig, opvliegend, leugenachtig, liberaal, autoritair, opportunistisch, lastig (niet alleen voor anderen, maar ook voor zichzelf). Mack Smith heeft oog voor Cavours kwaliteiten, maar hij heeft zeker geen hagiografie geschreven. Als jongeman speelde Cavour dikwijls met de gedachte zelfmoord te plegen, gedeprimeerd door de gekmakende saaiheid van het provinciaalse en oerconservatieve Piemonte. Hij had relaties, maar trouwde nooit. Als politicus was hij pragmatisch en, als conservatief-liberaal, vernieuwingsgezind. Hij was tegen autocratie en revolutie, en voor de weg der geleidelijkheid en de politiek van ‘het juiste midden’ (juste milieu). In het parlement was hij ongenaakbaar. Hij beheerste de dossiers beter dan wie ook en domineerde het parlement. Hij was een meester van de “art of the possible”. Zijn relatie met de dommige, ijdele koning Vittorio Emmanuele was abominabel; de twee hadden vaak openlijk ruzie en hun scheldpartijen vulden de gangen van het koninklijk paleis in Turijn. Dat hij desondanks lang minister-president van Piedmont bleef, tekent zijn politieke kracht.
Als minister-president van Piedmont ontpopte Cavour zich tot een staatsman die zeer bedreven was in het versterken van de positie van Piedmont door de grootmachten van Europa tegen elkaar uit te spelen. Dat leverde hem de reputatie op onbetrouwbaar te zijn, wat hij ook was. Napoleon III noemde Cavour a “Piedmontese Machiavelli” and “a most unprincipled politician” (139). Baron de Talleyrand tekende na een lang gesprek met hem op dat zijn “genius for intrigue is of quite heroic proportions.” (197) Cavours soms wonderlijke internationaal-politieke machinaties worden in het boek ruimschoots uit de doeken gedaan. Zo gaf Cavour in 1860 Hongaarse revolutionairen heimelijke materiële en financiële steun om het gezag van Oostenrijk te ondermijnen: “The extent of this support would have startled Garibaldi had he known and be able to compare it with the thousand dilapidated muskets and ten thousand lire he had received from the National Society for his expedition five months earlier. It might have also surprised Mazzini, whose simplistic belief in revolutionary action was so often scorned by Cavour, yet whose unrealistic and utopian schemes were never on quite this scale.” (228) Erg succesvol waren dit soort operaties niet. Toch wist Cavour zich een reputatie als staatsman te verwerven. Vooral hoofdstuk 17 over Cavour als ‘the mature statesman’ is lezenswaardig.
Dat Cavour een ‘founding father’ zou worden van Italië stond geenszins in de sterren geschreven. Hij kreeg de liefde voor ‘Italië’ allerminst met de paplepel ingegoten en zijn Italiaans was tot aan het einde van zijn leven gebrekkig. Als telg van een aristocratisch geslacht in Piedmont was hij van jongs af aan georiënteerd op Frankrijk en Zwitserland, waar zijn familie wortels had. Als jongeman bewonderde hij de Engelse staatslieden, in het bijzonder Pitt de Jongere die hij de grootste staatsman van de eeuw noemde, en hij bezocht Engeland meermaals. Hij bewonderde De la démocratie en Amérique van Alexis de Tocqueville. Cavour “had no thought at all of Italian unity unless and until he could discover whether the idea was practicable and well supported” (85) en “confessed to knowing far more about England than Southern Italy — he once told Parliament that he thought Sicilians spoke Arabic.” (216)
Het is hoe dan ook ontluisterend om te lezen dat de persoonlijke en politieke verstandhoudingen tussen de hoofdrolspelers van de risorgimento — Garibaldi, Cavour, Mazzini en Vittorio Emanuele — nauwelijks slechter hadden gekund. Cavour had bijvoorbeeld een grondige hekel aan het patriottische fanatisme van Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), de Italiaanse balling, schrijver en revolutionair die hij overigens maar één keer heeft ontmoet. Cavour meende dat “the national enterprise had at all costs to be dissociated from democratic or social movements that would have antagonized his friends in Napoleonic France and Tsarist Russia. Too radical a policy would also certainly have alienated the conservative and propertied classes in Italy whose active or at least passive connivance would be needed in the process of national regeneration.” (137) Hun relatie bleef moeizaam: “Mazzini distrusted Cavour as too subservient to imperial France and too much opposed to to popular movements of any kind; Cavour looked on Mazzini as a republican and social revolutionary, indeed as ‘the greatest enemy of Italy’ and someone whose alliance the government would have to repudiate whenever it was offered.” (209)
Ook Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) was geen vriend van Cavour. Zo probeerde Cavour Garibaldi’s roemruchte expeditie naar Sicilië (vanuit Genua) uit alle macht te dwarsbomen. Hij kon het vertrek van Garibaldi en zijn ‘1000 man’ uiteindelijk niet voorkomen, maar onthield hen de moderne wapens die in het arsenaal lagen opgeslagen en gaf zelfs de opdracht Garibaldi te arresteren als deze onderweg in Sardinië voet aan de grond zou zetten (214). Tegen alle verwachtingen in werd Garibaldi’s expeditie naar Sicilië een eclatant succes, “one of the most astonishing military enterprises of the century” in de woorden van Friedrich Engels. De snelle ineenstorting van het Bourbon-regime in Sicilië en het publieke enthousiasme voor Garibaldi gaf de risorgimento pas echt momentum en legitimatie. Cavour bleef Garibaldi echter tegenwerken, ook toen de laatstgenoemde plannen maakte voor de oversteek van Sicilië naar het vasteland van Italië. Nadat Garibaldi zich desondanks meester had gemaakt van Napels, gaf Cavour zijn leger, dat de Pauselijke Staat was binnengetrokken, de opdracht af te rekenen met “the Garibaldian hordes” (229). Garibaldi daarentegen — “far more eager than Cavour for the whole of the south to be united with northern Italy” (234) — zocht de samenwerking en ontweek de confrontatie. Garibaldi komt er in het oordeel van Mack Smith hoe dan ook het beste van af: “Whereas Garibaldi had won the trust and cooperation of many southerners by his good nature and honest concern for their welfare, the new Piedmontese administration chose to impose an authoritarian and military rule over a population that they all too clearly disliked and treated often with open contempt.” (238)
Toch was ook Cavours rol als minister-president van Piedmont in het verhaal van de risorgimento onontbeerlijk. Allereerst omdat de steun van Piedmont voor de Italiaanse eenwording onontbeerlijk was: “Piedmont alone had the resources and the military force needed to defeat Austria. Only Piedmont had free institutions; only Piedmont possessed a statesman of international repute; and therefore the government in Turin deserved at least conditional if not unconditional support.” (138) Cavour stuurde doelbewust aan op oorlog met Oostenrijk over heerschappij in Noord-Italië en stond daarin grotendeels alleen. Zijn opzet leek aanvankelijk te mislukken, wat hem tot razernij en diepe wanhoop bracht (waardoor zijn zelfmoordneiging wederom aan de oppervlakte kwam) — totdat Oostenrijk zelf Piedmont de oorlog verklaarde, tot grote opluchting van Cavour. Die oorlog bracht enkele militaire overwinningen voor het Frans-Piedmontese kamp (de veldslagen bij Magenta en Solferino). Al leidde deze overwinningen niet tot de gehoopte patriottische golf door Italië en legde Cavour korte tijd het premierschap in wanhoop neer, daarna gingen de ontwikkelingen zijn kant op. Door een samenloop van omstandigheden en de politieke steun van het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Frankrijk behoorde de Italiaanse eenwording onder leiding van Piedmont — en de wederom als minister-president aangetreden Cavour — in 1860 plotseling tot de mogelijkheden. Hij ruilde Savoie en Nice uit tegen Franse steun voor Piedmontese gebiedsuitbreiding in Noord-Italië — een controversieel besluit, te meer omdat Garibaldi in Nice was geboren. Net als Garibaldi en Mazzini pleitte Cavour al snel voor Rome als hoofdstad van het Italië-in-wording, een gedurfde stellingname. Zonder Cavour had Italië niet bestaan.
Het was allerminst zeker dat het nieuwe koninkrijk Italië, dat in 1861 als zodanig werd erkend door het VK, de VS en Frankrijk, een lang leven beschoren was. Het noorden en het zuiden verschilden wezenlijk van elkaar. Juist in 1861 brak de Amerikaanse burgeroorlog tussen het noorden en het zuiden uit. Deze oorlog zette een rem op de decentralistische voorkeuren van Cavour bij de inrichting van het nieuwe Koninkrijk Italië: “He certainly took events in America as a warning of what might happen if a state abdicated too many powers to its constituent regions.” (264) Bovendien: “… more and more evidence was accumulating to suggest that regional autonomy was wanted by dubious elements close to the mafia and the camorra, and in general by local notables who saw it as the best way to keep their patronage systems intact.” (264) “The Piedmontese prefectorial system was therefore imposed on other regions, despite the fact that a centralised administration was something different from what nearly all the political thinkers of the risorgimento would ideally have liked. This was not a carefully deliberated policy but a hurried and emergency answer to a largely unexpected problem. Nor was Parliament asked to vote on the matter.” (264) Kortom, Cavour heeft ook een belangrijke stempel gedrukt op Italië als gecentraliseerde eenheidsstaat.
Cavour overleed in 1861. Hij was overwerkt. Hij werkte tot in nachtelijke uren, stond zeer vroeg weer op en leed aan slapeloosheid. Hij kon niet delegeren en had al jaren verschillende ministeries onder zich. Ook leed hij aan malaria, waarschijnlijk opgedaan op zijn boerderij in de rijstvelden van Leri. Hij had relaties, maar was niet getrouwd. Kortom, de werk-privé balans was niet op orde.
Gelezen: juni-juli 2023 (tijdens vakantie in Noord-Italië). Cijfer: 7.5.
Cavour beschikte over een krachtige persoonlijkheid en was een man van scherpe tegenstellingen. Hij was energiek, levendig, hartelijk, sociaal, praktisch, bruut, koppig, opvliegend, leugenachtig, liberaal, autoritair, opportunistisch, lastig (niet alleen voor anderen, maar ook voor zichzelf). Mack Smith heeft oog voor Cavours kwaliteiten, maar hij heeft zeker geen hagiografie geschreven. Als jongeman speelde Cavour dikwijls met de gedachte zelfmoord te plegen, gedeprimeerd door de gekmakende saaiheid van het provinciaalse en oerconservatieve Piemonte. Hij had relaties, maar trouwde nooit. Als politicus was hij pragmatisch en, als conservatief-liberaal, vernieuwingsgezind. Hij was tegen autocratie en revolutie, en voor de weg der geleidelijkheid en de politiek van ‘het juiste midden’ (juste milieu). In het parlement was hij ongenaakbaar. Hij beheerste de dossiers beter dan wie ook en domineerde het parlement. Hij was een meester van de “art of the possible”. Zijn relatie met de dommige, ijdele koning Vittorio Emmanuele was abominabel; de twee hadden vaak openlijk ruzie en hun scheldpartijen vulden de gangen van het koninklijk paleis in Turijn. Dat hij desondanks lang minister-president van Piedmont bleef, tekent zijn politieke kracht.
Als minister-president van Piedmont ontpopte Cavour zich tot een staatsman die zeer bedreven was in het versterken van de positie van Piedmont door de grootmachten van Europa tegen elkaar uit te spelen. Dat leverde hem de reputatie op onbetrouwbaar te zijn, wat hij ook was. Napoleon III noemde Cavour a “Piedmontese Machiavelli” and “a most unprincipled politician” (139). Baron de Talleyrand tekende na een lang gesprek met hem op dat zijn “genius for intrigue is of quite heroic proportions.” (197) Cavours soms wonderlijke internationaal-politieke machinaties worden in het boek ruimschoots uit de doeken gedaan. Zo gaf Cavour in 1860 Hongaarse revolutionairen heimelijke materiële en financiële steun om het gezag van Oostenrijk te ondermijnen: “The extent of this support would have startled Garibaldi had he known and be able to compare it with the thousand dilapidated muskets and ten thousand lire he had received from the National Society for his expedition five months earlier. It might have also surprised Mazzini, whose simplistic belief in revolutionary action was so often scorned by Cavour, yet whose unrealistic and utopian schemes were never on quite this scale.” (228) Erg succesvol waren dit soort operaties niet. Toch wist Cavour zich een reputatie als staatsman te verwerven. Vooral hoofdstuk 17 over Cavour als ‘the mature statesman’ is lezenswaardig.
Dat Cavour een ‘founding father’ zou worden van Italië stond geenszins in de sterren geschreven. Hij kreeg de liefde voor ‘Italië’ allerminst met de paplepel ingegoten en zijn Italiaans was tot aan het einde van zijn leven gebrekkig. Als telg van een aristocratisch geslacht in Piedmont was hij van jongs af aan georiënteerd op Frankrijk en Zwitserland, waar zijn familie wortels had. Als jongeman bewonderde hij de Engelse staatslieden, in het bijzonder Pitt de Jongere die hij de grootste staatsman van de eeuw noemde, en hij bezocht Engeland meermaals. Hij bewonderde De la démocratie en Amérique van Alexis de Tocqueville. Cavour “had no thought at all of Italian unity unless and until he could discover whether the idea was practicable and well supported” (85) en “confessed to knowing far more about England than Southern Italy — he once told Parliament that he thought Sicilians spoke Arabic.” (216)
Het is hoe dan ook ontluisterend om te lezen dat de persoonlijke en politieke verstandhoudingen tussen de hoofdrolspelers van de risorgimento — Garibaldi, Cavour, Mazzini en Vittorio Emanuele — nauwelijks slechter hadden gekund. Cavour had bijvoorbeeld een grondige hekel aan het patriottische fanatisme van Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), de Italiaanse balling, schrijver en revolutionair die hij overigens maar één keer heeft ontmoet. Cavour meende dat “the national enterprise had at all costs to be dissociated from democratic or social movements that would have antagonized his friends in Napoleonic France and Tsarist Russia. Too radical a policy would also certainly have alienated the conservative and propertied classes in Italy whose active or at least passive connivance would be needed in the process of national regeneration.” (137) Hun relatie bleef moeizaam: “Mazzini distrusted Cavour as too subservient to imperial France and too much opposed to to popular movements of any kind; Cavour looked on Mazzini as a republican and social revolutionary, indeed as ‘the greatest enemy of Italy’ and someone whose alliance the government would have to repudiate whenever it was offered.” (209)
Ook Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) was geen vriend van Cavour. Zo probeerde Cavour Garibaldi’s roemruchte expeditie naar Sicilië (vanuit Genua) uit alle macht te dwarsbomen. Hij kon het vertrek van Garibaldi en zijn ‘1000 man’ uiteindelijk niet voorkomen, maar onthield hen de moderne wapens die in het arsenaal lagen opgeslagen en gaf zelfs de opdracht Garibaldi te arresteren als deze onderweg in Sardinië voet aan de grond zou zetten (214). Tegen alle verwachtingen in werd Garibaldi’s expeditie naar Sicilië een eclatant succes, “one of the most astonishing military enterprises of the century” in de woorden van Friedrich Engels. De snelle ineenstorting van het Bourbon-regime in Sicilië en het publieke enthousiasme voor Garibaldi gaf de risorgimento pas echt momentum en legitimatie. Cavour bleef Garibaldi echter tegenwerken, ook toen de laatstgenoemde plannen maakte voor de oversteek van Sicilië naar het vasteland van Italië. Nadat Garibaldi zich desondanks meester had gemaakt van Napels, gaf Cavour zijn leger, dat de Pauselijke Staat was binnengetrokken, de opdracht af te rekenen met “the Garibaldian hordes” (229). Garibaldi daarentegen — “far more eager than Cavour for the whole of the south to be united with northern Italy” (234) — zocht de samenwerking en ontweek de confrontatie. Garibaldi komt er in het oordeel van Mack Smith hoe dan ook het beste van af: “Whereas Garibaldi had won the trust and cooperation of many southerners by his good nature and honest concern for their welfare, the new Piedmontese administration chose to impose an authoritarian and military rule over a population that they all too clearly disliked and treated often with open contempt.” (238)
Toch was ook Cavours rol als minister-president van Piedmont in het verhaal van de risorgimento onontbeerlijk. Allereerst omdat de steun van Piedmont voor de Italiaanse eenwording onontbeerlijk was: “Piedmont alone had the resources and the military force needed to defeat Austria. Only Piedmont had free institutions; only Piedmont possessed a statesman of international repute; and therefore the government in Turin deserved at least conditional if not unconditional support.” (138) Cavour stuurde doelbewust aan op oorlog met Oostenrijk over heerschappij in Noord-Italië en stond daarin grotendeels alleen. Zijn opzet leek aanvankelijk te mislukken, wat hem tot razernij en diepe wanhoop bracht (waardoor zijn zelfmoordneiging wederom aan de oppervlakte kwam) — totdat Oostenrijk zelf Piedmont de oorlog verklaarde, tot grote opluchting van Cavour. Die oorlog bracht enkele militaire overwinningen voor het Frans-Piedmontese kamp (de veldslagen bij Magenta en Solferino). Al leidde deze overwinningen niet tot de gehoopte patriottische golf door Italië en legde Cavour korte tijd het premierschap in wanhoop neer, daarna gingen de ontwikkelingen zijn kant op. Door een samenloop van omstandigheden en de politieke steun van het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Frankrijk behoorde de Italiaanse eenwording onder leiding van Piedmont — en de wederom als minister-president aangetreden Cavour — in 1860 plotseling tot de mogelijkheden. Hij ruilde Savoie en Nice uit tegen Franse steun voor Piedmontese gebiedsuitbreiding in Noord-Italië — een controversieel besluit, te meer omdat Garibaldi in Nice was geboren. Net als Garibaldi en Mazzini pleitte Cavour al snel voor Rome als hoofdstad van het Italië-in-wording, een gedurfde stellingname. Zonder Cavour had Italië niet bestaan.
Het was allerminst zeker dat het nieuwe koninkrijk Italië, dat in 1861 als zodanig werd erkend door het VK, de VS en Frankrijk, een lang leven beschoren was. Het noorden en het zuiden verschilden wezenlijk van elkaar. Juist in 1861 brak de Amerikaanse burgeroorlog tussen het noorden en het zuiden uit. Deze oorlog zette een rem op de decentralistische voorkeuren van Cavour bij de inrichting van het nieuwe Koninkrijk Italië: “He certainly took events in America as a warning of what might happen if a state abdicated too many powers to its constituent regions.” (264) Bovendien: “… more and more evidence was accumulating to suggest that regional autonomy was wanted by dubious elements close to the mafia and the camorra, and in general by local notables who saw it as the best way to keep their patronage systems intact.” (264) “The Piedmontese prefectorial system was therefore imposed on other regions, despite the fact that a centralised administration was something different from what nearly all the political thinkers of the risorgimento would ideally have liked. This was not a carefully deliberated policy but a hurried and emergency answer to a largely unexpected problem. Nor was Parliament asked to vote on the matter.” (264) Kortom, Cavour heeft ook een belangrijke stempel gedrukt op Italië als gecentraliseerde eenheidsstaat.
Cavour overleed in 1861. Hij was overwerkt. Hij werkte tot in nachtelijke uren, stond zeer vroeg weer op en leed aan slapeloosheid. Hij kon niet delegeren en had al jaren verschillende ministeries onder zich. Ook leed hij aan malaria, waarschijnlijk opgedaan op zijn boerderij in de rijstvelden van Leri. Hij had relaties, maar was niet getrouwd. Kortom, de werk-privé balans was niet op orde.
Gelezen: juni-juli 2023 (tijdens vakantie in Noord-Italië). Cijfer: 7.5.
June 1, 2012
Denis Mack Smith's biography of Camillo di Cavour the most comprehensive modern English-language biography of the Piedmontese politician who was a key figure in Italian unification. It provides a good overview of his political career, though one lacking in personal details and any larger historical context. As such it's recommended for anyone seeking to learn about Cavour largely in the absence of anything better.
February 26, 2012
Reads like an extended encyclopedia entry.
January 18, 2023
Biografia più corta rispetto a quella, in volumi, di Rosario Romeo, quella firmata dal grande storico inglese: tuttavia la ricchezza delle informazioni e lo stile limpido e schietto, tipico della scuola inglese, ne fanno un saggio consigliato per tutte le persone che intendono avvicinarsi alle vicende politiche e umane del grande statista piemontese, padre della patria (da notare il sottotitolo del volume:” il grande tessitore dell’Unità d’Italia).
June 4, 2022
Molto, molto bello. Scritto benissimo, un ottimo libro. Lo "straniero" Denis Mack Smith parla a più riprese della questione meridionale, e da un punto di vista neutro quale è il suo, quanto dice dovrebbe essere preso in grande considerazione.
October 26, 2014
This is a bizarre and very unsatisfactory biography of a key figure in the Risorgimento. I had very high expectations of the this book written by a "senior Research Fellow and sub-warden at All Souls College, Oxford." Not only was he teaching at one of the world's leading universities, Smith had also published books on Mazzini, Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel. I was expecting something like a definitive biography of Cavour and got instead a quirky review of the major events in his life.
Since, Cavour spent his entire career locked in conflict with Mazzini, Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel, I expected an assessment of their careers. Instead Cavour simply includes these figures in the narrative when their paths directly cross those of Cavour.
I also expected an overall expectation of the intellectual and cultural forces supporting the Risorgimento of which there was none at all. Smith's principal comment on the cultural and intellectual context of the era was to say that Cavour always expressed and admiration for Verdi in public but that he was unable to determine exactly it was about Verdi that he admired.
Smith presents Cavour as a loyal member of the Piedmontese nobility. His political program was:
-1- to expand Sardinia-Piedmont by seizing territory from the Papal States and Austria
-2- to increase the power of the Sardinian-Piedmontese nobility at the expense of the King and the liberal bourgeoisie
-3- to make sure that radicals with socialist leanings like Mazzini and Garibaldi never acquire any power
One is left at the end of the book that Smith has judged Cavour correctly but there is simply no overview or the period. Presumably this could be acquired by reading Smith's other books on Garibaldi, Vittorio Emmanuelle, Mazzini and his overview of the Risorgimento.
At the end of this book you really feel that a lot, perhaps too much, is missing.
Since, Cavour spent his entire career locked in conflict with Mazzini, Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel, I expected an assessment of their careers. Instead Cavour simply includes these figures in the narrative when their paths directly cross those of Cavour.
I also expected an overall expectation of the intellectual and cultural forces supporting the Risorgimento of which there was none at all. Smith's principal comment on the cultural and intellectual context of the era was to say that Cavour always expressed and admiration for Verdi in public but that he was unable to determine exactly it was about Verdi that he admired.
Smith presents Cavour as a loyal member of the Piedmontese nobility. His political program was:
-1- to expand Sardinia-Piedmont by seizing territory from the Papal States and Austria
-2- to increase the power of the Sardinian-Piedmontese nobility at the expense of the King and the liberal bourgeoisie
-3- to make sure that radicals with socialist leanings like Mazzini and Garibaldi never acquire any power
One is left at the end of the book that Smith has judged Cavour correctly but there is simply no overview or the period. Presumably this could be acquired by reading Smith's other books on Garibaldi, Vittorio Emmanuelle, Mazzini and his overview of the Risorgimento.
At the end of this book you really feel that a lot, perhaps too much, is missing.
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