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The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East
One fateful week in June 1967 redrew the map of the Middle East. Many scholars have documented how the Six Days War unfolded, but little has been done to explain why the conflict happened at all. As we approach its fiftieth anniversary, Guy Laron refutes the widely accepted belief that the war was merely the result of regional friction, revealing the crucial roles played by American and Soviet policies in the face of an encroaching global economic crisis, and restoring Syria’s often overlooked centrality to events leading up to the hostilities.
The Six Days War effectively sowed the seeds for the downfall of Arab nationalism, the growth of Islamic extremism, and the animosity between Jews and Palestinians. In this important new work, Laron’s fresh interdisciplinary perspective and extensive archival research offers a significant reassessment of a conflict—and the trigger-happy generals behind it—that continues to shape the modern world
The Six Days War effectively sowed the seeds for the downfall of Arab nationalism, the growth of Islamic extremism, and the animosity between Jews and Palestinians. In this important new work, Laron’s fresh interdisciplinary perspective and extensive archival research offers a significant reassessment of a conflict—and the trigger-happy generals behind it—that continues to shape the modern world
384 pages, Hardcover
Published February 21, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
November 22, 2022
This book is not really about the war itself, but the political mechanisms that led to the war. Mr. Laron spends a lot of time covering different aspects of the war, and the different players in a scatterbrained way. There is no real clear transition between talking about Egypt to Syria to Israel to the United States. It is kind of just thrown together and given as a tragedy of errors. Mr. Laron thinks that the war was a colossal waste of time and that cooler heads could have prevailed had John Kennedy still been in office, and I feel that JFK is the only likable character in this saga. A good book, but it is a slog and all over the place. 3.5
October 1, 2018
The six day war , it was mainly about the events both political and economic situation and the leading personalities of that time. Not much about the war at all, but still interesting seeing familiar stories about leaders Rabin, Day an, Bresnev being told from Larons research, anyway found it interesting and learnt that troubles economically rings fairly true to our own times. I did enjoy this story in the main.
August 7, 2018
I was in the Army stationed in Georgia during the Six-Day War. I and others I served with followed with interest the ominous runup to the war, the movement of Egyptian units into the Sinai, the harassing border incursions by the Syrians, and the disturbing late alliance of Jordan with Egypt. When the war did erupt we followed it closely on television at headquarters. In those days of scheduled broadcasts rather than the constant coverage we enjoy today, we gathered eagerly and regularly over the 6 days to watch as new developments unfolded. And we cheered enthusiastically at each announcement of Israeli success, as if at a ballgame. We appreciated what we felt was masterful execution of the military doctrines and principles we were schooled in and knew ourselves to be expected to practice. As soldiers we didn't think there was anything perverse in our taking such avid interest in a savage little war, or in so openly taking the Israeli side. Today I can't remember why we were pro-Israeli. It was probably because great power support for the warring nations followed Cold War interests. Our partiality owed as much to how we understood national interest as anything else. The U. S. strongly backed Israel, and so did we.
That was a long time ago. Memory is fuzzy and only partly accurate, I'm sure. Guy Laron's history supplies a mind-clearing appraisal of the war. My primary interest in the history was in the military operations. Laron's history is of the diplomatic and political maneuvering and national aspirations which led to the war (the history proper ends with the order to attack and military operations are sketched in the book's "Conclusion"). And it's fascinating. This is one of those books difficult to put down. He writes history as a riveting narrative and one involving people who display all the traits of humankind, good and bad. We often forget that historical event is fueled by the motivations of people. Laron doesn't. So in these pages Nasser and King Hussein come alive. The famous Israeli names and faces we remember from news broadcasts take on new textures and depth. Perhaps the eloquent Abba Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister, is less persuasive than we thought. Perhaps David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir are less politically dynamic than we thought, military leaders like Dayan and Rabin less heroic. The intricate weave of event was made by people displaying all the foibles of human behavior.
The story I read in Laron's book is quite different from the one I watched develop on the news in May and June of 1967. The armies of the Middle East--Arab and Israeli--were the prime movers, not governments. The Israeli Defense Forces were interested in expanding Israel's borders. Their enormous success in large part was the result of their aggressive approach to the war. The Arab armies were not offensive in nature. Their primary function was to protect the regimes sustaining them, probably still true today. Laron's right that the war transformed the Middle East. The expanded borders the Israeli generals sought and achieved are today considered the natural borders. The IDF remains the predominant institution in Israeli society, and its "cult of the offensive" continues to guide Israeli military doctrine. We just didn't realize all this 50 years ago, standing around, young and slenderly-uniformed, watching it on television.
That was a long time ago. Memory is fuzzy and only partly accurate, I'm sure. Guy Laron's history supplies a mind-clearing appraisal of the war. My primary interest in the history was in the military operations. Laron's history is of the diplomatic and political maneuvering and national aspirations which led to the war (the history proper ends with the order to attack and military operations are sketched in the book's "Conclusion"). And it's fascinating. This is one of those books difficult to put down. He writes history as a riveting narrative and one involving people who display all the traits of humankind, good and bad. We often forget that historical event is fueled by the motivations of people. Laron doesn't. So in these pages Nasser and King Hussein come alive. The famous Israeli names and faces we remember from news broadcasts take on new textures and depth. Perhaps the eloquent Abba Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister, is less persuasive than we thought. Perhaps David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir are less politically dynamic than we thought, military leaders like Dayan and Rabin less heroic. The intricate weave of event was made by people displaying all the foibles of human behavior.
The story I read in Laron's book is quite different from the one I watched develop on the news in May and June of 1967. The armies of the Middle East--Arab and Israeli--were the prime movers, not governments. The Israeli Defense Forces were interested in expanding Israel's borders. Their enormous success in large part was the result of their aggressive approach to the war. The Arab armies were not offensive in nature. Their primary function was to protect the regimes sustaining them, probably still true today. Laron's right that the war transformed the Middle East. The expanded borders the Israeli generals sought and achieved are today considered the natural borders. The IDF remains the predominant institution in Israeli society, and its "cult of the offensive" continues to guide Israeli military doctrine. We just didn't realize all this 50 years ago, standing around, young and slenderly-uniformed, watching it on television.
October 29, 2017
Netanyahu: “If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel"
When you really keep bias aside and analyze this statement you will appreciate the unique existential challenge that Israel faces. I think keeping this framework in mind is important to understand any part of Israeli history.
The book boils down to this:
The 1967 conflict could have been avoided. There was no real threat to Israel as Arabs were uncoordinated and esp the Egyptians were divided and Nasser might not have attacked. The IDF knew this and the war was a result of expansionist plans of the IDF/Military minded leadership."
The author shows his clear bias against the 'sabra' generals by throwing claims such as "Indeed, the pressure they applied had forced Ben-Gurion to change his position and declare independence in 1948, making a confrontation with the Arab world inevitable." implying that the fault of the war lies squarely on Israeli shoulders. Anyone who has read Benny Morris's 1948 can see the frivolity of this claim. With such an open bias, it is difficult to accept the authors commentary on the insidious plans of the militaristic faction against the peaceful Eshkol
The proportionality of IDF's response to terror attacks by Hamas/Hezbollah is a hot topic for debate even today. The author clearly shows which side he is on when he discusses the Fatah insurgencies of 1965-1966. To connect the more aggressive approach taken by the IDF in the face of increasingly devastating Fatah attacks to an overall expansion plan is a bit of a stretch. The author also downplays the role of Syria in pushing Egypt to the brink of war.
Guy Laron concedes that events such as Sinai re-militarization, blocking of Straits of Tiran might have hastened the conflicted and the fear of a three front attack forced Israel's hand and led to the launch of the war. What we need to consider is whether the fear was justified. In the three years after the war, Fatah attacks increased to 5500 (from 125 in 1965-66). Isn't this a huge statement in itself about the hawkish attitude of Israel's neighbors towards Israel and utter belligerency it faces from more than five huge countries. Surrounded on three sides by more numerous armies, hearing daily calls for its annihilation, wasn't Israel justified in its first strike?
It has been 50 years since the war and the world remains as divided as it was at that time. However, if you want an unbiased account of the war, this is not the book for you.
When you really keep bias aside and analyze this statement you will appreciate the unique existential challenge that Israel faces. I think keeping this framework in mind is important to understand any part of Israeli history.
The book boils down to this:
The 1967 conflict could have been avoided. There was no real threat to Israel as Arabs were uncoordinated and esp the Egyptians were divided and Nasser might not have attacked. The IDF knew this and the war was a result of expansionist plans of the IDF/Military minded leadership."
The author shows his clear bias against the 'sabra' generals by throwing claims such as "Indeed, the pressure they applied had forced Ben-Gurion to change his position and declare independence in 1948, making a confrontation with the Arab world inevitable." implying that the fault of the war lies squarely on Israeli shoulders. Anyone who has read Benny Morris's 1948 can see the frivolity of this claim. With such an open bias, it is difficult to accept the authors commentary on the insidious plans of the militaristic faction against the peaceful Eshkol
The proportionality of IDF's response to terror attacks by Hamas/Hezbollah is a hot topic for debate even today. The author clearly shows which side he is on when he discusses the Fatah insurgencies of 1965-1966. To connect the more aggressive approach taken by the IDF in the face of increasingly devastating Fatah attacks to an overall expansion plan is a bit of a stretch. The author also downplays the role of Syria in pushing Egypt to the brink of war.
Guy Laron concedes that events such as Sinai re-militarization, blocking of Straits of Tiran might have hastened the conflicted and the fear of a three front attack forced Israel's hand and led to the launch of the war. What we need to consider is whether the fear was justified. In the three years after the war, Fatah attacks increased to 5500 (from 125 in 1965-66). Isn't this a huge statement in itself about the hawkish attitude of Israel's neighbors towards Israel and utter belligerency it faces from more than five huge countries. Surrounded on three sides by more numerous armies, hearing daily calls for its annihilation, wasn't Israel justified in its first strike?
It has been 50 years since the war and the world remains as divided as it was at that time. However, if you want an unbiased account of the war, this is not the book for you.
June 5, 2018
An excellent, largely unbiased book. I see some reviewers stating it's too critical of Israel, and it makes me wonder if we read the same book. It is consistently critical of the governments that attacked Israel, but is also critical of the Israeli military and political establishments. Laron's argument is cogent and well-made, and he doesn't fallen into the trap of taking sides. If you want a fair analysis of the failings of the various states drawn into the conflict, then this is a much more reliable account than the nationalist, triumphalist, narrative of Michael Oren.
July 25, 2017
What I really enjoyed about this book is that it goes well beyond the situation between Israel and its neighboring countries to take a look at worldwide conditions at the time and how the Soviet Union and the US were being played off each other not only in this part of the world but in Asia as well and how events in both places influenced and played off each other.
August 8, 2023
Academic but still quite readable. This was the first book-length treatment I've read specifically about the Six-Day War, and thus has an outsize influence on my understanding of it, but it seems like a lucid and convincing analysis of the causes and, to a lesser extent, effects of that conflict. There is a good balance between Israeli and Arab perspectives, as well as those of the US and Soviet Union and other regional parties. Also made me want to find a good biography of Nasser. However, the title is misleading - it's really about the causes of the war, and not how the war itself unfolded (which is covered only superficially in the conclusion.)
December 14, 2017
This book was about the Six Day war, but I eventually learned that it was 99% about the events leading up to the war. There was only a few pages about the actual war, which made me wonder how Israel conquered so much territory. Some of the prewar information was mildly interesting, but most was not.
June 18, 2024
“Since the Yom Kippur War, Israel’s army has conducted innumerable raids and mini-wars, each bringing diminishing returns. Yet the Israeli cult of the offensive, born of the Six-Day War, still holds strong and the IDF remains the most powerful institution in Israeli society. The same can be said about the Arab countries that Israel fought against in 1967. The military regimes then controlling Damascus, Amman, and Cairo are still with us today, despite the many trials and tribulations over recent years. Like other parts of the late developing world, the Middle East remains in the grip of generals. Perhaps that is the reason why there the sound of gunfire never quite dies down.”
In this book, Laron rethinks the meaning of the Six Day War. Laron makes a number of provocative arguments, using reputable secondary sources and original research. Among these are:
- The balance of payment crisis in the 60’s strengthened the military and weakened the civilian institutions in the states of the three protagonist of the war (Israel, Egypt, Syria) leading to more hawkish foreign policy
- That US and Soviet aid policy and rivalry had a direct impact on the unfolding of regional crisis that began May 167
- that the poor Soviet intelligence that set off the crisis was the result of a parallel Israeli and Syrian disinformation operation
Laron believes this was a generals war and that worse yet, all these years later no one has taken the right lesson away from the unfolding of the war. A concise and engaging read that puts in a lot of effort to contextualize the regional crisis using the local politics of the different states.
In this book, Laron rethinks the meaning of the Six Day War. Laron makes a number of provocative arguments, using reputable secondary sources and original research. Among these are:
- The balance of payment crisis in the 60’s strengthened the military and weakened the civilian institutions in the states of the three protagonist of the war (Israel, Egypt, Syria) leading to more hawkish foreign policy
- That US and Soviet aid policy and rivalry had a direct impact on the unfolding of regional crisis that began May 167
- that the poor Soviet intelligence that set off the crisis was the result of a parallel Israeli and Syrian disinformation operation
Laron believes this was a generals war and that worse yet, all these years later no one has taken the right lesson away from the unfolding of the war. A concise and engaging read that puts in a lot of effort to contextualize the regional crisis using the local politics of the different states.
January 17, 2018
Made myself listen through the end of the audiobook so I can have a full picture, - big mistake, wasted 6 hours of my life.
The author is trying to make a name for himself by taking a revisionist stance on the history of the Six Day War (there might be other motives of which I am unaware). This is clear already from the subtitle of the book " The Breaking of the Middle East" which is an obvious attempt of subrogation of great Michael Oren's book titled "Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East ". Very biased narrative, - the author would not give credit to Israel or Israelis for anything, politically or militarily.
Read the Michael Oren's book "Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East " for a solid historical coverage of the events, for military perspective watch History Channel Battlefield Detectives Israel's Six Day War (find it on the YouTube).
The author is trying to make a name for himself by taking a revisionist stance on the history of the Six Day War (there might be other motives of which I am unaware). This is clear already from the subtitle of the book " The Breaking of the Middle East" which is an obvious attempt of subrogation of great Michael Oren's book titled "Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East ". Very biased narrative, - the author would not give credit to Israel or Israelis for anything, politically or militarily.
Read the Michael Oren's book "Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East " for a solid historical coverage of the events, for military perspective watch History Channel Battlefield Detectives Israel's Six Day War (find it on the YouTube).
May 10, 2019
This is not a military history of the war, it is a political history of the machinations on both sides that led to the war. Some will say that Laron's view is that Israeli generals wanted a war. I'm not sure. It is clear that Israel felt geopolitical pressure from the Arab world that was unpredictable in nature and it was being harassed militarily by Fatah and its backers. To be sure, looking at the pre-67 war boundaries, Israel was in an untenable position strategically and something had to change. At the time, it had no strong allies. Johnson was embroiled in Vietnam and didn't want another crisis on his hands. Britain was pro-Arab and France was unreliable as an ally. With all that said, the book is a well documented and written and is a fascinating read for those interested in political scheming. In many ways, it was its own version of Game of Thrones.
December 16, 2017
I remember the Spring of 1967 when I was a senior in high school: the little country surrounded by large neighbors declaring they would wipe it off the face of the earth. It was a surreal drama that didn't affect me directly or even indirectly, but was, nevertheless riveting to observe. Miraculously, Israel won. And forever after, the aggressors around Israel have belly-ached about the land they lost. This book gave me an appreciation for the intricacies of that time, as seen through the eyes of adults more knowledgeable than 17-year-old me.
November 2, 2022
An interesting book. More a history of events leading to the war than a military history of the war itself, which takes up just one chapter. A lot of useful coverage on the internal tensions in Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, as well as how matters fitted into the wider Cold War and US/Soviet policies as they developed during the 60s. A useful addition to any historian's bookshelf.
January 28, 2019
The narrative flow was a bit inconsistent but I did enjoy the emphasis on domestic factors in the lead up to the war. However, wish a little more had been spent on recounting the political situation and reactions during the war itself (only the final chapter).
May 8, 2022
While I enjoyed all the political machinations and the history leading up to the war in this book. I really wanted something about how the actual war went down. I thought it was very well written but the title is deceiving. It should be “Before the 6 Day War.”
July 4, 2017
Interesting read, new information and A LOT of detail.
May 28, 2019
Interesting book, particularly regarding the long term historical impact.
August 14, 2021
Fascinating reading and great background directly related to today's continuing problems.
December 4, 2023
Nice succinct history of the events leading to the sox day war.
July 15, 2020
This book’s full title is The Six-Day War, The Breaking of the Middle East. This is about the 1967 conflict that changed the map of the Middle East. I read this book to get a better understanding of the Middle East as it pertains to Israel. The Middle East is still a mess, but the only people who can really fix it is the people in the Middle East.
There is a show review at Yale University Press. Guy Laron wrote a long and interesting article about this war in the The Nation. There is, of course, lots of good reviews on Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre.
Wilson International Center for Scholars hosted this talk by Guy Laron. He starts talking about 7 minutes in about how he came to write this book. Questions start at 42 minutes in. Guy Laron talks at Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre. The other speaker was: Dr Ahron Bregman,
The most interesting quote I got was about Europe. It was said that NATO was established to keep, the Americans in, the Soviets out and Germany down. Brezhnev wanted a European order that kept the Americans out, the Soviets in and Germany down. This was on page 222 of my paperback copy.
Also, near the end the author says there was no settlement of the 1967 war for a number of reasons. The Israel army used its prestige to press the government not to withdraw. In the US, there was an Israel friendly White House. In Syria and Egypt, the civilian leaders were fighting with the military leaders. The Soviet Union wanted to augment its presents in the Middle East. This is on page 309 in my paperback copy.
There is a show review at Yale University Press. Guy Laron wrote a long and interesting article about this war in the The Nation. There is, of course, lots of good reviews on Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre.
Wilson International Center for Scholars hosted this talk by Guy Laron. He starts talking about 7 minutes in about how he came to write this book. Questions start at 42 minutes in. Guy Laron talks at Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre. The other speaker was: Dr Ahron Bregman,
The most interesting quote I got was about Europe. It was said that NATO was established to keep, the Americans in, the Soviets out and Germany down. Brezhnev wanted a European order that kept the Americans out, the Soviets in and Germany down. This was on page 222 of my paperback copy.
Also, near the end the author says there was no settlement of the 1967 war for a number of reasons. The Israel army used its prestige to press the government not to withdraw. In the US, there was an Israel friendly White House. In Syria and Egypt, the civilian leaders were fighting with the military leaders. The Soviet Union wanted to augment its presents in the Middle East. This is on page 309 in my paperback copy.
January 7, 2025
Laron reframes the Six Day War by focusing on the sociopolitical issues of the various players, providing a deep background on all the preexisting conditions, and then moving through the machinations that led to war. I came in with very little information about the subject. I know the war happened. And really that's about it. And I know that Laron is reframing some traditional ideas about the subject.
What made this book fascinating isn't just the subject, which I ended up finding fascinating, but Laron's impeccable still not just as a historian but as a storyteller. His ability to move the narrative, skipping back and forth between countries and time periods, while giving a clear, vivid picture of the personalities involved is fairly astonishing. But simply, Laron is a superb storyteller.
He also clearly has a deep knowledge of the reason and can impart the information concisely without gumming up the narrative.
So, on my end, a subject I knew little about had me rapt and interested from the get go. Part of it is, of course, because the subject matter is interesting, but most of it is because Laron really knows how to weave a tale.
What made this book fascinating isn't just the subject, which I ended up finding fascinating, but Laron's impeccable still not just as a historian but as a storyteller. His ability to move the narrative, skipping back and forth between countries and time periods, while giving a clear, vivid picture of the personalities involved is fairly astonishing. But simply, Laron is a superb storyteller.
He also clearly has a deep knowledge of the reason and can impart the information concisely without gumming up the narrative.
So, on my end, a subject I knew little about had me rapt and interested from the get go. Part of it is, of course, because the subject matter is interesting, but most of it is because Laron really knows how to weave a tale.
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August 25, 2017956.046 L331 2017
September 29, 2017
Very enjoyable read of the Six day war.This is not about the military tactics and battle details of war but a refreshing historical perspective of the socio-political climate and the intrigues between regional leaders backed by their Russian allies
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