The book tries to answer a clear question - how does one motivate Pakistan to prevent cross-border terrorism against India?
However, the answers, as the book lays out, are far less clear.
It demonstrates that every known option available to India - escalation along the land border, air strikes, covert operations, a rethink of its nuclear doctrine, etc. - all carry significant risks and costs that may not be offset by the benefits. In doing so, it holds a mirror to the strategic discourse in India, which at best is marked by satisfaction around India's conventional military superiority over Pakistan and at worst, reveals the perils of jingoism and non-nuanced debate. It advises caution and demonstrates the necessity of thinking through scenarios to their conclusions.
I daresay that a net effect of the book is that it gives the reader pause in rushing to celebrate recent tactical successes, because of the possible second order and strategic consequences.
However, it can also be said that the book merely lays out what the authors think will be the choices and the consequences of those choices, negative or positive. It is up to the policymaker to act in real life and in doing so, put the assumptions and conclusions of the book to test. The consequences may or may not be as dire as the book assumes. It would have benefited perhaps from the caveat that situations may play out in a different way that may be more to India's benefit.
All in all, this book is a necessary and comprehensive read.