This book chronicles the Allied struggle in the time period spanning from summer 1943 up to the beginning of Operation Overlord, the long-awaited June, 1944 cross-Channel invasion of Europe, in World War II. As usual, Winston Churchill, as Prime Minister and, essentially, British military war lord, discloses a wealth of information on the workings of the British and other Allied governments in prosecuting the war, as well as his personal dealings and thoughts at the time. Churchill was the only head of government of any of the leading combatants on either side of the conflict to survive the war and also to write his memoirs. Japan's General Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister during most of the war, barely survived his suicide attempt in September, 1945. He was then taken prisoner by the Americans and was hanged later. Of course, Russia's Joseph Stalin lived into the early 1950's, but the murderous Communist-party super-apparatchik was not going to write a tell-all about his dark past. "Closing The Ring" and its sister volumes are therefore a special literary treasure.
The complexity of the planning and decision-making challenges faced by Churchill form the background of much of the book. It is simply phenomenal how many political, diplomatic and military problems constantly demanded his attention. The basis of this book's title derives from the situation as it existed in the period, 1943 going-into 1944, when, as Churchill warns, the end of the war was nowhere near, but growing Allied strength and ensuing wartime successes produced what is clear in hindsight, that the noose was beginning to tighten around the Axis' collective necks. Placing the end of this volume while the Normandy battle raged is therefore appropriate, since this is the point in time where a successful invasion of Europe would assure the inexorable countdown to the defeat of Germany, while a failed amphibious landing on June 6, 1944 would lead to an uncertain end of the war, both in terms of timing and type of peace which would have had to be accepted by the Allied governments.
The previous volume ended with the final victory against Germany and Italy in the North African desert. Two figures who emerged to world-wide recognition during that time were Great Britain's General Bernard Montgomery and the USA's General Dwight Eisenhower. Both individuals would be essential players in the fighting which would transpire during the remainder of the war in Europe. As Churchill rightly brags during several sections of this book, the smooth-working relationship of the British and American leadership, from head of states down to the Generals and Admirals of the respective services, was really the most effective Allied weapon in the war, in Europe and in Asia. Much is written in these volumes about the close friendship between Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their sometimes strained, but ultimately successful attempts to form an effective collaboration with Stalin.
Churchill doesn't avoid admitting that there were occasional very forceful disagreements at times between himself and Roosevelt, and among their staffs, however. They could be piqued by each other, such as when Roosevelt insisted on bringing along the Chinese Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Sheck to the meetings in Cairo, en route to Teheran. Churchill found the attention paid to Chiang to be highly distracting and irritating then. This followed a tense period of arguing between London and Washington about Churchill's proposal to invade Rhodes and clear the Aegean Sea of Germans, which he claimed would enable the much-needed entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the Allies. Roosevelt and his advisors vehemently opposed the diversion of landing craft from the build-up for next year's Normandy landings for this operation, and Churchill eventually grudgingly surrendered in the interest of Allied cooperation. However, this continued to gall him, especially when Roosevelt promised Chiang significant help from American and British forces for an amphibious landing in the Bay of Bengal (later overridden) and the building of a road in extremely difficult terrain from Lido, in Burma, to supply Chinese forces for results of dubious value.
A lot of wire communications transpired among these leaders. However, it would be necessary to try to meet face-to-face when possible. "Closing The Ring" extensively covers the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec and the Big Three conference in Teheran. Besides war strategies, there was serious discussion at these conferences about the state of the world after the war. Roosevelt and Churchill, at both meetings, delved into their already-known ideas about post-war organizations that could maintain the peace. Some of these ideas were almost utopian, especially on Churchill's part, with talk about the most powerful survivors of the war, the U.S., Britain and Russia, continuing their improbable alliance as the main arbiters of any disputes which would occur in the future. These discussions, however, were essential preambles to the subsequent post-war founding of the United Nations.
Roosevelt, to Churchill's constant dismay, continued to champion China's Chiang Kai-Sheck as a fourth player in these scenarios. He referenced the four countries as the post-war world's "Four Policemen." It simply confounded Churchill and many other Europeans how Roosevelt and the American people in particular revered an idealized version of China that probably never existed and thereby placed the corrupt Chaing, leader of a large army that didn't hold its own in the fight against Japan while siphoning off huge amounts of American foreign aid, on such a high pedestal. In fairness to accuracy, these corruption allegations, however true historically, were not mentioned by Churchill in this book.
There were many more allied and co-belligerent nations than the "Big Four" mentioned above, taking the fight to the Axis. A sampling of some of the "United Nations" joining with the Allies is contained in the description of the struggle to wrest control of Monte Cassino in Italy, in which American, British, Moroccan, Indian and New Zealand army divisions were fighting toward common objectives, with the Monte finally being breached by Polish forces.
The last item on the above list highlights the predicament faced by the Allied leaders throughout the war concerning friendly, provisional governments formed by exiles from German-occupied Europe. Much thought and diplomatic talk took place among the Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin), along with sometimes difficult negotiations with the principals who considered themselves the leaders of the countries under siege. This book gives enlightening revelations of the various hurdles Churchill faced in this regard, especially concerning three countries.
First, there was the example of France, whose exiles consisted of a Free French Army and leaders of a Committee of National Liberation in Algiers. Roosevelt especially wanted this committee to be headed by General Giraud, but his rival, General Charles DeGaulle, became the strongest exiled French personality by far. Roosevelt and Churchill had numerous tense communications regarding the French situation, differing strongly as to the value of extending friendship to De Gaulle but also splitting hairs even to the advisability of using the term "recognition," since it was never clear to what extent the Committee should be considered the embodiment of French sovereignty; it was eventually decided that the Committee's civil authority over various colonial territories would be recognized, and its Free French forces would be co-belligerents with the Allies.
Likewise, there was a Polish government in exile in England, but in this as well as numerous instances, the Poles got short shrift when it came to Allied recognition during the War. To his credit, Churchill had tried to get concurrence from Stalin to back a United Nations effort to restore Poland's government after the war, but the Poles were basically treated as guests of the British and were not invited into any war planning. This extended even to the question of post-war borders. The Big Three discussed where Poland's east and west borders should lie, among their Teheran agenda items, with Churchill using match sticks to show how the current borders should shift, while no Polish representatives were even invited to the conference. This despite the fact that the war was started over Britain and France's guarantees to protect Poland if it was invaded.
One of the most satisfying parts of the book is the wealth of information provided by Churchill concerning Italy. He of course gives a thorough grounding of the entire conflict there, from Allied discussions and planning to invade, to the tragic Salerno landings and lengthly, hard-contested German resistance which delayed the liberation of Rome by many months, to just before Overlord. But there was also a huge story surrounding the political situation in the country, having to do with Mussolini's confinement by a new government sanctioned by the King, and later rescue by the Germans. For a while, who you recognized as your government, if you were an Italian, depended on which part of Italy you were in at the time.
After Mussolini fell, I found it highly interesting that the Allies didn't demand Italy's unconditional surrender, as would be required in the later event of German and Japanese capitulations. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed that a lighter hand was needed in the handling of Italy, both to ensure civil calm during Allied military occupation and to get the cooperation of Italian military forces to join the fight against the Germans, in events where they were able to break away from German control at the time of Italy's surrender. It was agreed, therefore, to consider Italy to be a co-belligerant, but not an Allied government.