Transcritique: On Kant and Marx

by Kōjin Karatani, Sabu Kohso (Translator)

Kojin Karatani's Transcritique introduces a startlingly new dimension to Immanuel Kant's transcendental critique by using Kant to read Karl Marx and Marx to read Kant. In a direct challenge to standard academic approaches to both thinkers, Karatani's transcritical readings discover the ethical roots of socialism in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and a Kantian critique of money in Marx's Capital.

Karatani reads Kant as a philosopher who sought to wrest metaphysics from the discredited realm of theoretical dogma in order to restore it to its proper place in the sphere of ethics and praxis. With this as his own critical model, he then presents a reading of Marx that attempts to liberate Marxism from longstanding Marxist and socialist presuppositions in order to locate a solid theoretical basis for a positive activism capable of gradually superseding the trinity of Capital-Nation-State.

Genres: Philosophy, Theory, Politics, Nonfiction, Economics, Japan

336 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2003

About the author

Kōjin Karatani (柄谷 行人 Karatani Kōjin, born August 6, 1941, Amagasaki) is a Japanese philosopher and literary critic.

Karatani was educated at University of Tokyo, where he received a BA in economics and an MA in English literature. The Gunzō Literary Prize, which he received at the age of 27 for an essay on Natsume Sōseki, was his first critical acclaim as a literary critic. While teaching at Hosei University, Tokyo, he wrote extensively about modernity and postmodernity with a particular focus on language, number, and money, concepts that form the subtitle of one of his central books: Architecture as Metaphor.

In 1975, he was invited to Yale University to teach Japanese literature as a visiting professor, where he met Paul de Man and Fredric Jameson and began to work on formalism. Starting from a study of Natsume Sōseki, the variety of the subjects examined by Karatani became so wide that he earned the nickname The Thinking Machine.

Karatani collaborated with novelist Kenji Nakagami, to whom he introduced the works of Faulkner. With Nakagami, he published Kobayashi Hideo o koete (Overcoming Kobayashi Hideo). The title is an ironic reference to “Kindai no chokoku” (Overcoming Modernity), a symposium held in the summer of 1942 at Kyoto Imperial University (now Kyoto University) at which Hideo Kobayashi (whom Karatani and Nakagami did not hold in great esteem) was a participant.

He was also a regular member of ANY, the international architects' conference that was held annually for the last decade of the 20th century and that also published an architectural/philosophical series with Rizzoli under the general heading of Anyone.

Since 1990, Karatani has been regularly teaching at Columbia University as a visiting professor.

Karatani founded the New Associationist Movement (NAM) in Japan in the summer of 2000. NAM was conceived as a counter–capitalist/nation-state association, inspired by the experiment of LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems, based on non-marketed currency). He was also the co-editor, with Akira Asada, of the Japanese quarterly journal, Hihyōkūkan (Critical Space), until it ended in 2002.

In 2006, Karatani retired from the chair of the International Center for Human Sciences at Kinki University, Osaka, where he had been teaching.

(from Wikipedia)

Reviews

[ArturoBelano · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kuramsal eserlere yıldız verme hususunda hep bir çekincem olmasına rağmen okundu de geç yapamıyorum. Bu tarz kitaplar üstüne yorum- eleştiri yazmak da pek olası değil ama şunu da söylemeden geçmeyeyim. Marksist teori-politika ve kategorilerle cebelleşmeyi seven bugünün okurunun ıskalamaması gereken bir kitap olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kant ve trans bölümü yorucu olsa da marx bölümü ile birleşince kafada şimşekler çakmaya başlıyor.

Abdesinden şüphesi olmayan dostlara ısrarla öneririm..

[Bilal Y. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Alt başlık Kant ve Marx Üzerine. Kant ve Marx buluşamaz. Böyle düşünüyordum. Kojin Karatani cahilliğimi yüzüme vurdu. Niye buluşmasın ki diyordu Karatani , gözlerini bana dikip aynı işi yapıyorlar diye ilave ederek, müstehzi ve küçümseyici bir ifadeyle. Her ikisinin de işi eleştiri. Farklı noktalardan eleştirilerini yapmış olmaları , meslektaş olmadıkları anlamına gelmez.

Kant'ın "kendinde şey" ile aşkın, "kendisi için şey" ile içkin eleştiri yaptığı zaten bilinmektedir. Marx belki salt içkin eleştiri yaptığını iddia edebilir ancak nedenler ve niyetler söz konusu olduğunda ex post factonun işe yaramayacağını Marx da bilir. Üstelik kapitalizmin bir din olduğunu söyleyen Karl Marx'tan başkası değildir, külçecileri veya meta fetişistlerini topa tutarken... Misal, çok param olsun, evim arabam olsun, tatile gideyim diyen kişi ihtiyaç temelinde düşündüğü için kapitalist olamaz, bu kişi kapitalist olduğunu söyleyerek boş yere günaha girmesin, içselleştirmemiş kapitalizmi çünkü, bir tür piyasa köktencisidir oysa kapitalist... Karatani ileri giderek meta mübadelesi ve artı değerin de aşkınsal bir düzlemde değerlendirilebileceğini söyler...

Karatani'nin çalışması, öznellik-nesnellik ikiliğinin her iki duayenin görüşleri ışığında birliğe dönüştüğünü toplum-birey sözde ikiliği üzerinden işlemekte. Nesnellik, öznel bakış açılarının toplamından başka bir şey olmaması gerekir bu durumda. Ortaklaşırken dolayısıyla herhangi bir bakış ya da duruşun diğerine indirgenmemesi gerekir. Örneğin kadın, eşcinsel, etnik aidiyet, çevre meselelerini sınıf kimliğine indirgeyemezsiniz. Aksi takdirde sınıf totatilitarizmi ya da sınıf faşizmine yelkenleri açarsınız.

Transkritik (aşkın eleştiri) Kant'ın tabiri olduğu için "Marx'taki Kant" gibi okunabilir eser ancak Kant'ın ne kadar rasyonel olursa olsun ampirizmden yola çıktığı bilinmektedir. Ahlak ve tarih bahislerinde ex post facto bir görüşe sahiptir Kant da, fenomenleri hesaba katmadan yürümez...

Çok fazla ayrıntılara düşmeden kabaca meseleyi özetlemeye çalıştım, elimde kalan notlara yazıklanarak. Şunu iddia edebilirim günün sonunda: Karşılaştırmalı Kant-Marx'ın yolda çok daha fazla şeyi aydınlattığına şahit oldum...

[Alex Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kojin Karatani argues for the formal equivalence of Kant and Marx as for Karatani, both thinkers critique their fields of study (Kant in philosophy and Marx in economics) by positioning themselves in the interstices. For both, all knowledge is a constructive difference, a synthesis of different transcendental fields. For Kant, we have empiricism and metaphysics suspending the transcendental apperception. For Marx, money weaves a field from which surplus value can perpetuate capitalism through the extension of merchant capital. This reading relies on the understanding that different spheres of money, different cultural, geological, economic and semiotic values allow merchant capital to attain surplus value through what is basically arbitration. Karatani then expands on Marx, applying him in various ways up to the current consumerist state. This reading by itself isn't enough -- Karatani emphasizes that such disparate spheres are created through the metaphoric union of the capitalist-nation-state. Much of Karatani's chapters on Marx are devoted to arguing for this articulation while correcting much simpler readings of Marx as perpetuated by Engels. Of course, Marx and Kant are both difficult thinkers to read. Kant is notoriously erudite, and Marx is notoriously long winded. Yet Karatani manages them both, along with various supporting thinkers and their various positions, to illuminate Marx and Kant while maintaining a slender volume just over 300 pages in text.

I highly recommend this book. This is my second time reading it. The first time, I was a little lost, better read on Kant but not very well read on Marx. This time around, about ten years later, I ate this book up. Karatani proves to be a close reader while being a precise reader, a difficult task. He brings up details when details are needed and illustrates broad topics when overviews are to be given. If I were to characterize his approach of transcritique, it is less about utopia (both Kant and Marx are prone to be understood as utopic thinkers) and more about understanding the context by which the logic of their fields of study are arranged. Marx did so in his volume 3 of capital, understanding the state's irrational role in supporting and promoting capital in relation to other states. This is much like how Kant, according to Karatani, in his 3rd critique moved forward to speak of a "plural subjectivity" often thought of as his thoughts on aesthetics.

It's strange that Marx and Kant can be read against one another with such similar structures.

In a way, I wish for Karatani to have included at least a conclusion, to tie both of these guys together, as he did so in the beginning. What have we to gain from this methodology of transcritique? It's true that his last chapter on Marx moves forward to provide alternatives and reasons as to why capitalism should not be allowed to persist, and why it will inevitably fail. Still, he leaves this methodological approach behind, and the first third of his book (on Kant) without mention in the conclusion. His big take on bracketing as being necessary for knowledge leaves me wondering -- what does this method of transcritique bracket, and where are Karatani's antinomies? What assumptions does he see himself making? Technology for Karatani is in pure service of capitalism's ability to create organic unity in production and capital as well as the creation of new temporary values in the form of lifestyles. He brackets the possibility for technology to create relations outside of the 4 social relations as he espoused by Marx.

In a way though, this book could stand a third section, one on information, knowledge and money together. This section would combine these two points and statistic a new domain of examination, namely that of the internet... with bitcoin and the like. Coming out in 2003, it's surprising that only 10 years later, transcritique could stand to be updated in this way. Technology has surly surpassed our ability to grasp what we are doing as it extends much more quickly how we can do it.

Still, a great book. It's amazing how little Marxists, even staunch communists, have read of Marx. They get too caught up trying to solve the problems of capital that they don't seem to appreciate or understand what capital is, and how it allows for much more than just problems. If you're on the fence about this book I would recommend reading it. Nearly every page has something worth taking away from, and that means you probably have to reserve two hours to read 50 pages. The time is well spent.

[Nazmiye Gül · Rating 5 out of 5]

For the sake of explaining how beautiful this book is, I can not have enough vocabulary in English. But anyway, I will try to write down something else in order to build an intimate gateway. Yes, in my humble opinion it is not an unputdownable book, on the contrary, it is a book must be read bit by bit. The philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx are both articulated by invoking not only their own books but also their contemporaries. But besides all these, I want to highlight an important thing which I finally and subtlety learned from this book. The thing is the distinction of the notions of generality and universality. As you may know, this is a very old discussion that almost every philosopher ponders and writes about. But Karatani accumulates it in a very luminous way. He gives the definition of generality as the opposition of repetition. And also for him in the meaning of generality, the experience is strongly hidden. But on the other hand, the universality needs leaping. As I merely understand, the notion of leaping transmits generality to universality. The generality can create universality but the universality can not create the generality. In the light of all the facts mentioned above, in order to understand generality&universality the notion of experience is so crucial. If you don't pay attention to the concept of experience , the generality and universality both hangs in the air. Of course, Karatani doesn't tell it obviously. But by juxtaposing the chapter of Marx behind Kant, I strongly feel he epitomises this fact.

[isaac smith · Rating 3 out of 5]

In the transcendental framework, as Kant, you see, defines it, there lies a certain inherent paradox. It is not some distant, otherworldly domain, but rather, an integral part of our very experience. Yet, it remains elusive, veiled from direct perception, for it is the presupposition of all experiences. A conundrum, to say the least. Kant's remedy, you see, is the act of self-reflection, a hallmark of the modern philosophical enterprise. But let me tell you, not all thinkers have embraced Kant's path.

Foucault, that astute observer of the philosophical landscape, acknowledged Kant's unique amalgamation of metaphysical discourse and contemplation on the boundaries of reason. But he discerned a troubling absence of continuity in Kant's "opening." What transpired, you might ask? Philosophy took divergent paths. One, areas"anthropology," delved into empirical analyses of the human condition. The other, "dialectics," veered towards emphasizing contradiction and totality, diverging from Kant's path of self-questioning.

Foucault, in his keen scrutiny, unveiled a philosophical dilemma, a riddle of sorts, which he dubbed the "empirico-transcendental doublet." It all began with Kant's noble attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism, a grand synthesis. But Kant, in his wisdom, charted a course of "contestation," steering clear of the perilous shores of positivism and the whirlpools of dialectics.

Now, enter Karatani. He, in his unrelenting quest for clarity, revisits Kant's "transcendental deduction" through the prism of the "Transcendental Dialectic" and Kant's musings on aesthetic taste. In this scholarly endeavor, he unites facets of Kant's work that were once separate entities, forging new connections in the philosophical tapestry.

Kant, you see, recognized the limits of human reason, an acknowledgment he eloquently conveyed in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason. These limits, they underscore the significance of the "Transcendental Dialectic," as Karatani astutely emphasizes by tethering it to the initial portion of the First Critique.

But let us not perceive Kant as a rigid regulator of thought, for there is a more nuanced perspective. Kant's own experiences of dissonance, of discord, when pushing the boundaries of reason, they inform the very limits he lays out. The Antinomies of Reason, they present contradictory propositions, and Kant, does not merely negate them through dialectical sleight of hand. The enigma persists, the puzzle endures, and in these tensions, we glimpse the essence of Kantian philosophy.

You see, Kant, in his profound wisdom, does not seek resolution but rather revels in the enigmatic "parallax." He places at its core an irreconcilable disjunction, an unbridgeable chasm between opposing perspectives, serving as the very foundation of his "transcendental" reflection. The Antinomies, those dialectical conundrums, are not to be neatly tied in a bow; they demand an incessant to-and-fro, a perpetual bracketing of each perspective, akin to what Karatani terms the "parallax."

Karatani, in his meticulous analysis, regards Kant's critique as a continuous "transcritique," an unceasing oscillation between divergent viewpoints without ever reaching a fixed or elevated vantage point for self-reflection. The transcendental conditions in Kant's realm remain shrouded in formality, be it in his moral or empirical expositions. The Ideas of Reason, they play a "regulative" role, guiding the course of inquiry, but they dare not assume the mantle of an inner principle of discovery.

Negativity, one might argue, bears a semblance to a parallax, where the fabric of reality intertwines with our perceptual gaze. But lo and behold, this notion stands at odds with Kant and Karatani's parallax, which firmly rejects the constitutive use of Ideas of Reason, operating under its own distinct logic. Parallax is no mere twin of negativity, nor does it negate it; it takes an altogether different route, a radical departure from the trajectory of negativity.

Karatani, ever the perceptive thinker, discerns a profound connection between Kant/Karatani and Lacan. He ardently favors a Kantian reading of Lacan over a Hegelian one, aligning Kant's noumenon with Lacan's elusive Real. In this alignment, Freud and Lacan offer a tantalizing proposition, what Karatani terms a "transcendental psychology," akin to Kant's deconstruction of rationalist psychology in the Transcendental Dialectic. Karatani, in his wisdom, urges us to reinterpret Freud and Lacan through the Kantian lens, a path less traveled but fraught with insight.

Now, let us not overlook the "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the Third Critique, a pivotal component of Kant's oeuvre in Karatani's view. While the Sublime has taken center stage in recent years, the discussion of the Beautiful is often dismissed as uninteresting, outdated, or regressive, a judgment that warrants a closer examination.

Karatani, Melissa McMahon, and yours truly, we unite to underline the profound significance of Kant's exploration of the Beautiful. The Analytic of the Beautiful, you see, delves into the intricate dance between singularity and universality. Kant boldly proclaims that a judgment of beauty, is utterly unmoored, afloat in the turbulent seas of subjectivity, a realm where empirical verification and categorical validity, akin to moral commandments, dare not tread.

Yet, paradoxically, in this ungrounded terrain, the judgment of beauty covertly seeks universal accord, a whisper of transcendental aspirations that distinguishes it from mere personal preferences. For instance, when I declare Proust as the supreme wordsmith, I venture beyond the shores of personal taste, hinting at a claim that stretches beyond the confines of my own perspective. These aesthetic judgments, they lack a stable objective footing, but let us not be fooled, for they are not purely subjective either.

In fact, they are entirely singular, unique in each instance, bereft of the customary rules found in areasempirical and moral judgments. Nevertheless, they slyly insinuate a universal resonance through the very manner in which they are expressed. Kant and Karatani, they discern in areasaesthetic judgment the birthplace of the transcendental inquiry. Here, singularity and universality collide directly, without intermediaries, hierarchies, or the labyrinthine mazes of dialectical mediation. Each aesthetic judgment, stands tall in splendid isolation, laying claims upon others and the enigmatic Other, with no prior justifications.

The enigma of aesthetic taste, akin to the Antinomies of the First Critique, births a perpetual tension, a groundless foundation for the positive transcendental conditions established in the initial half of the First Critique. While epistemology initially assumes a position of dominance in Kant's grand system, Karatani, with his characteristic insight, contends that aesthetics possesses logical and ontological primacy over cognition and epistemology.

Aesthetics introduces into the fold questions of singularity, universality, and the enigmatic Other, questions that are integral to the development of positive transcendental arguments. In the "Analytic of the Beautiful," Kant draws a crucial distinction between the universality claimed in singular aesthetic judgments and the commonplace consensus forged through the murky realm of "common sense" or sensus communis.

Ah, common sense, that reliable crutch of empirical consensus, akin to the comforting embrace of ideology. It's a necessary scaffold for our grand edifice of communication and recognition. But, let us not be deluded, for aesthetic judgment, that elusive specter, eludes the grasp of common sense. Transcendental conditions, they are no mere product of consensus; they involve a delicate dance, a tango between irreconcilable positions. Therefore, all judgments and transcendental reflections, in the end, trace their roots back to the paradoxes of aesthetic judgment.

Now, in the second part of Transcritique, the brilliant Kojin Karatani takes us on a voyage through the intellectual seas, where Marx, with Kant's Critiques as his compass, unravels the transcendental conditions of a capitalist economy. This, is no stroll in the park; it's a tumultuous journey through Antinomies, a relentless process of "parallax." Marx, as he traversed the diverse landscapes of thought, cast his critical gaze upon German idealism, French socialism, and British empiricism. In his trajectory, he echoed Kant's Antinomy, oscillating between idealism and empiricism, particularly within the British realm of empirical political economy.

On one side, Marx inherits Ricardo's labor theory of value, a formidable foundation. But then, along comes Samuel Bailey, challenging Ricardo with the audacious claim that value is but a web of relations, a notion devoid of intrinsic substance. Karatani proposes that Bailey's perspective, in a peculiar twist of fate, foreshadows the rise of neoclassical economics, which thumbs its nose at intrinsic value theories, instead, honing its focus on the capricious dance of market dynamics. Neoclassical economics dismisses Marx as irrelevant, relegating him to the annals of history, their lens fixated not on capital ownership, exploitation, or class, but rather on the holy grails of efficiency and utility.

Karatani, with his characteristic audacity, claims that Marx's encounter with Bailey was a turning point, akin to Kant's influence on Hume's idealist rationalism. Alas, no concrete evidence offers its unassailable support for this claim, and Marx's discussion of Bailey in Theories of Surplus Value appears to downplay Bailey's significance.

Nonetheless, we must grant that Karatani's interpretation of Marx's thoughts carries a certain allure, a resonance, and a tantalizing possibility worth pondering.

You see, some Marxist economists, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff among them, have long been engaged in a battle against the specter of Ricardian essentialism. In this intricate dance, Karatani, that astute thinker, posits that Marx's "critique of political economy" unfolds within the gaping Antinomy, a relentless tug of war between the labor theory of value and Bailey's resolute positivistic dismissal of value theory. And just as Hume hurled his criticisms at the Cartesian ego cogito, Bailey's skepticism regarding the labor theory of value echoes in the corridors of history.

Now, consider this: Kant, in his struggle against the might of Hume, acknowledged the insubstantial existence of the Cartesian ego but raised it to the status of a transcendental condition of apperception. Likewise, Marx, with his fierce rejection of Ricardian essentialism, underscores the necessity of "transcendental reflection on value" to fathom the workings of capitalism as a system, in stark contrast to Bailey's stark nominalism.

In essence, you must grasp this, just as Kant's "apperception" would crumble if it were as atomized as Hume suggested, the capitalist system, that intricate web of exploitation and exchange, would crumble into dust if it were as atomized as Bailey and the cunning neoclassical marginalists proclaim.

Kant, you see, explains that what lends continuity to our perceptual experience over time is the elusive "I," a hollow form devoid of substance. Similarly, Marx's "value-form" stands as a transcendental category, the unspoken glue that holds the capitalist economy together, allowing it to persist and expand through the relentless march of time. It's a parallel, to Kant's transcendental approach, a glimpse into the inner workings of capitalism's enigmatic machinery.

This intriguing interpretation, however, leads us to confront the formidable "transformation problem," a challenging conundrum in Marxist political economy. In Volume 1 of Capital, Marx unveils the complex structure of exploitation, elucidating it through the lens of "surplus value," shedding light on the inherent incommensurability between the value of labor-power as a commodified entity and... In the grand tapestry of Capital, Volume I, Marx ventures into the lofty areas of abstraction, where he dissects the intricate structure of capitalist society as a whole, with a keen focus on the gaping chasm that separates the value of labor-power, those wages in the hands of the workers, and the value of the commodities tirelessly churned out by their labor.

Ah, let us descend further into the labyrinthine realm of Marx's critique, where the surplus value, ruthlessly extracted by the capitalist class, emerges as the very wellspring of capital accumulation. In the hallowed halls of Volume III, Marx embarks on a daring expedition, seeking to unravel the inner workings of individual capitalist enterprises, to delve into the intricate mechanics of prices, and to scrutinize the distribution of profits.

But, alas, the path ahead is fraught with treacherous terrain. The leap from the lofty abstract realm of "value" to the gritty domain of actual commodity prices, from the ethereal "surplus value" to the tangible realm of real profits, proves to be a perilous journey. Marx's mathematical model for this transformation, a noble endeavor, I must concede, is known to bear certain flaws, and the problem itself, under the constraints of reality, remains an unsolvable enigma.

Critics, ever vigilant, brandish this as an inherent contradiction within the very core of Marx's thought, while those cunning neoclassical economists, ever the skeptics, argue that notions like "value," "surplus value," and "exploitation" are but relics of the past, urging us instead to fix our gaze solely on prices and profits.

The convoluted history of the transformation problem, fraught with the valiant attempts of Marxist economists to reconcile the ethereal concepts of value and surplus value with the concrete areas of price and profit, lies beyond the scope of our discussion today. Furthermore, the neo-Ricardian approach, embodied by the likes of Piero Sraffa, advocates for a systemic view of the national or global economy, shunning the atomistic microeconomic and marginalist approaches that are all too common.

But, the crux of the matter lies not in our futile quest to mend Marx's mathematics, for that endeavor, I assure you, is a Sisyphean task, hamstrung by its underlying assumptions. No, the true essence of our pursuit lies in challenging these very assumptions.

You see, the dilemma of transforming values into prices hinges upon the notion of capitalism as a closed, equilibrium-based system, a perspective shared by the majority of economists, be they classical or neoclassical. Yet, Marx dares to dissent, asserting that this view is inadequate, for capitalism is a dynamic, time-bound process, ever eluding the grasp of equilibrium. In Marx's vision, crises are not aberrations but intrinsic to the very fabric of capitalism, and they propel its inexorable march forward. Crises, are woven into the very fabric of capitalism, not exceptions, and this is so because capitalism is inherently temporal. In this context, crises and business cycles, they are the norm, while equilibrium, that theoretical chimera, proves itself to be of little practical use.

let us not be swayed by the siren song of neoclassical economics with its mathematical abstractions, for they find their roots in grave misunderstandings of 19th-century physics, as I have expounded upon elsewhere. We must not forsake the "transcendental" abstractions woven by Marx, for they offer us a different vantage point, one that reframes our understanding of capitalism.

You see, when we cast our gaze upon capitalism as a temporal, ever-evolving process, a diachronic perspective, rather than as a static, equilibrium-based edifice, a synchronic view, the transformation problem, that riddle of yore, ceases to haunt us. It loses its grip on our thoughts, not because it becomes solvable, but because it becomes irrelevant.

In a world shrouded in uncertainty, where the future remains an enigma, and unpredictable events lurk at every turn, the notion of equilibrium crumbles, like a house of cards in a tempest. Goods may languish unsold, and equilibrium can no longer be taken for granted. Trade cycles, those familiar patterns of boom and bust, they are not mere historical footnotes; they persist as perennial tendencies within the intricate fabric of capitalism. Yet, be warned, for these tendencies, as Marx so aptly christens them, are not etched in stone; countervailing factors, like capricious winds, can swoop in and dampen or reverse their course.

Karatani, in his ceaseless quest for clarity, posits that value and surplus value, unveiled in Volume 1 of Capital, serve as the transcendental conditions that grant the capitalists their dominion over areasprofit extraction. However, we must not forget that value and surplus value are ethereal concepts, abstractions that evade direct empirical encounter. In our daily dealings, it is prices and profits that engage our senses. The rejection of the concepts of value and surplus value by those neoclassical economists aligns, with the common understanding of economic agents. This isn't to say that the capitalist subjects harbor "false consciousness," but rather, it highlights the intricate dance of ideology, where prices and profits become an inherent part of our social reality.

And here, we reach the juncture where the perceived "discrepancy" between Volumes 1 and 3 of Capital mirrors Kant's approach in his critiques, my dear comrades. Just as the first critique addresses the subject in its generality, Volume 1 of Marx's work explores the essence of capital in a universal sense, delving into the transcendental conditions that underpin all experience. But as we journey to Volume 3, it becomes akin to Kant's third critique, where the perspective shifts, and the actions of individual capitals come into focus. This, is the terrain where universal structural aspects harmonize with the intricate dance of plural subjects, a realm that offers us a richer tapestry of understanding.

Volume 3, much like Kant's Third Critique, veers its gaze towards individual experiences, a realm where the intricate dance of transcendental conditions we both create and depend on unfurls. In this tapestry, Marx, in his relentless pursuit of truth, addresses the multifarious capitals and probes transcendently into the mechanisms by which they, in empirical reality, grasp profit or profit rates.

Continued ...

https://open.substack.com/pub/uncerta...

[Cengiz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kant introduces himself as a Copernicus revolutionary who place the object at the center of his perception or understanding. As it is well known before Copernicus' cosmological revolution erath was at the center of the cosmos, in other words, it was geocentric not heliocentric. Descarstes had put mind at the center of his philosophy. He said, "ı think, therefore I am." Rational subject is the perceiver and object is at a passive position. However, for the British empricism gives priority to experience, object, not mind.
Kant tries to find a reconciliation between Descartes's cogito and empricist thinkers experince.
Even though Subject reaches self-recognition through its object, in other words, he seems that he gives priority to object, in the long run, it is the self itsef which perceives experince and evaluates and critiques it. I mean in spite of reconciliation, for Kant what is more important is mind not experience. Through object which out of the mind, self acquires self-conciousness about itself. At this phase of thinking self, by becoming "a thing for itself" turns out to be autonomous. This autonomus self, in Hegel, becomes the free agent of history and actualizes his self and represents Spirit as cunning reason.
In Marx, "the thing in self" is working class who has no self awareness. When the working class
has consciousness about itself, "it is a class for itself." At this stage, working class becomes a historical, self concious political agent.

[Phil Wyman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Extremely difficult to read, but absolutely brilliant. This view of Marx through Kant is unique and groundbreaking work.

[Leonardo]

Quizá sea ésta la lección que hay que aprender de los traumas del siglo XX: mantener el Conocimiento y la función del Amo lo más apartados posible. Incluso la noción liberal de elegir como dirigente a la persona más «cualificada» no es suficiente. Hay que aplicar esto hasta el final y apoyar la perspectiva básica de la antigua democracia: que la elección por sorteo es la única elección democrática. Por eso, la propuesta de Kojin Karatani de combinar las elecciones con la lotería para determinar quién gobernará es más tradicional de lo que puede parecer a primera vista (él mismo menciona a la antigua Grecia); paradójicamente, cumple la misma función que la teoría de Hegel sobre la monarquía. Karatani aquí asume un riesgo heroico al proponer una definición, que suena a locura, sobre la diferencia entre dictadura de la burguesía y dictadura del proletariado: «Si el sufragio universal con papeleta secreta, la democracia parlamentaria en concreto, es la dictadura de la burguesía, la introducción de la lotería debería considerarse la dictadura del proletariado»

Primero como tragedia después como farsa Pág.99



Karatani, por ejemplo, insiste en que, a pesar de que la Darstellung de Marx del autodesarrollo del capital está llena de referencias hegelianas, el automovimiento del capital se encuentra lejos de ser equivalente al automovimiento circular de la Noción (de Espíritu) hegeliana: para Marx la cuestión es que este movimiento nunca se recupera a sí mismo, que nunca recupera su crédito, que su resolución queda pospuesta para siempre, que la crisis es su constituyente más profundo (la señal de que el Todo del capital es la no Verdad, como Adorno hubiera dicho), por lo que su movimiento es el de una «falsa infinidad», reproduciéndose a sí misma para siempre.

Viviendo en el Final de los Tiempos Pág.228



En su formidable Transcritique, Kojin Karatani se esfuerza por mostrar el potencial crítico de esta perspectiva de la paralaje.

Visión de Paralaje Pág.28

[Jez Latham · Rating 3 out of 5]

i have mixed feelings about this book. it took me a little longer to read than i had hoped [ i am on a strict timetable you know] and although the author's style is reasonable clear, he does get bogged down in reasserting his argument without necessarily moving it on any further or investigating some of the complexities.

i need to be more familiar with the original texts to really know what i think of this book but he seemed to be oversimplifying Kant and Marx's positions in my humble opinion and his political solutions seemed a tad utopian and naive too. but you cannot blame the lad for trying.

interesting but not fascinating.