Sense and Subjectivity: A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty

by Philip G. Dwyer, M.A. Notturno (Editor)

The aim of this study is to show how the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein serve to establish, in very similar ways, (1) that subjects (persons) and what is subject-dependent, or in short, 'subjectivity', must be categorically distinguished from objects and what is subject-independent, or in short 'objectivity' and (2) that the 'sense' of the world as perceived, including linguistic sense, is a matter of the appearance of things and is therefore perception-dependent, and as such is in the category of subjectivity, not objectivity. The first claim is established not only by a study of the content of the arguments of the two philosophers, but also by a study of the form of their arguments: the kind of fallacy detection they deploy against their opponents exploits a logic dictated by the subject matter. In the course of examining a wide range of issues in meta- physics, epistemology, and the philosophies of mind, language, and mathematics, the 'Gestalt Philosophy' of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty can be seen to constitute a new sort of 'anti-realism'.

236 pages, Leather Bound

First published January 1, 1990

About the author

Philip Dwyer studied in Perth, Paris and Berlin before receiving his doctorate from the University of Western Australia. His first posting was as a Leverhulme Fellow at the University of Dundee. He has taught European History at the University of Newcastle since 1994. His primary research interest is eighteenth-century Europe with a particular emphasis on the Napoleonic Empire. Volume one of his study on Napoleon won the National Biography Award in 2008. The second volume published in 2013 was short-listed for a number of prizes. The third and final volume of Napoleon is due out in 2017. He is currently working on a global history of violence. Philip is founding Director of the Centre for the History of Violence.