Covering the volatile period from 1945 to 1962, Zubok and Pleshakov explore the personalities and motivations of the key people who directed Soviet political life and shaped Soviet foreign policy. They begin with the fearsome figure of Joseph Stalin, who was driven by the dual dream of a Communist revolution and a global empire. They reveal the scope and limits of Stalin's ambitions by taking us into the world of his closest subordinates, the ruthless and unimaginative foreign minister Molotov and the Party's chief propagandist, Zhdanov, a man brimming with hubris and missionary zeal. The authors expose the machinations of the much-feared secret police chief Beria and the party cadre manager Malenkov, who tried but failed to set Soviet policies on a different course after Stalin's death. Finally, they document the motives and actions of the self-made and self-confident Nikita Khrushchev, full of Russian pride and party dogma, who overturned many of Stalin's policies with bold strategizing on a global scale. The authors show how, despite such attempts to change Soviet diplomacy, Stalin's legacy continued to divide Germany and Europe, and led the Soviets to the split with Maoist China and to the Cuban missile crisis. Zubok and Pleshakov's groundbreaking work reveals how Soviet statesmen conceived and conducted their rivalry with the West within the context of their own domestic and global concerns and aspirations. The authors persuasively demonstrate that the Soviet leaders did not seek a conflict with the United States, yet failed to prevent it or bring it to conclusion. They also document why and how Kremlin policy-makers, cautious and scheming as they were, triggered the gravest crises of the Cold War in Korea, Berlin, and Cuba. Taking us into the corridors of the Kremlin and the minds of its leaders, Zubok and Pleshakov present intimate portraits of the men who made the West fear, to reveal why and how they acted as they did.
Vladislav M. Zubok (see also: Владислав Зубок) is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of A Failed Empire, Zhivago’s Children, and The Idea of Russia.
Although I surely had to race through it under a deadline in graduate school, I appear to have read a good portion of this book, judging by my highlighting and notes. Despite that, only pieces of it have really stuck with me since then, and I’m a little surprised to find how critical many of my comments were at the time. I guess that’s what graduate school trains in you, and you mellow out a bit after you’re through.
The book is an examination of Soviet foreign policy and leadership during the first vital years of the Cold War, performed by Russians at the time when the former Soviet archives were the most open and accessible, before Putin began to impose security restrictions almost as strong as those of the Soviets themselves. It therefore gives us an unusually intimate and informed look at the “other side” of the Iron Curtain, the actual personalities and processes that led to the decisions and actions that the West knew about only from their apparent effect. As such, it is remarkably informative, for example in clarifying how the UN action against North Korea came about, despite the permanent placement of China and Russia on the Security Council, with the authority to veto any action (as it happens, the new Chinese government had not yet been recognized by the UN, and Stalin chose this moment to withdraw and “boycott” the UN in response, thus losing his vote). The book is filled with telling anecdotes, such as the awkward pause in conversation that took place when Mao told Stalin that their bilateral actions must be “beautiful” and “tasty.” Even more astonishing is the scene in which intelligence-chief Beria, having witnessed the first explosion of a Soviet atomic device ran around asking the experts, “Did it look like the American one?...We didn’t screw it up?” To have that level of performance anxiety at a moment when a mushroom cloud is literally filling the sky requires that one had served under a master like Stalin.
The book is based on solid archival research and therefore qualifies as academic history, but as the above examples show, it is written in a lighter tone obviously intended for non-academics. It probably pushes its evidence a bit too far at times as well, either allowing for some literary license in describing details or taking those details from unverified sources. In the end, however, the major arguments the authors are making are justified by their work, and these details are less important. They accurately describe the shift from tyranny of an individual to that of a generation of apparatchiks, and give us a look at how that worked from the point of view of the men with responsibility. As a non-specialist in Russia with an interest in the period under study, I recommend it to scholars and interested non-scholars as well.
Remember the heady days before September 11, 2001 when it was fashionable to talk about and analyze the Cold War? Wasn't that fun? Laughing about "duck-and-cover" drills, Krushchev's shoe pounding incident, and the Miracle on Ice. Remembering the absurdity of the Berlin Wall, the frustration of the Korean War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. From 1992 until 2001, the Cold War was well combed over by historians, academics, and nostalgic members of aging generations.
Inside the Kremlin's Cold War is a product of the mid-90s. And a highly acclaimed one at that, and rightfully so. Zubok and Pleshakov craft a pleasing detailed narrative which covers the first 20-ish years of the standoff between Washington and Moscow. They cover the well trodden topics i mention above, but, they do so from a fresh Moscow-centric perspective. They provide exquisite detail into the Soviet elite power grab which took place after Stalin's death, the internal soviet machinations which preceded the erecting of the berlin wall, and they get into the surprisingly interesting nitty-gritty of the Sino-Soviet split.
Most interesting for me was their narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I learned a great deal about Krushchev's internal deliberations leading up to his decision to send Soviet personnel and nuclear weapons to Cuba. Fascinating. The authors even go into some excellent detail about the Soviet General who was put in command of the missile enterprise in Cuba. Is that of critical historical importance? Not entirely, but, the almost full story of the Cuban Missile from Moscow's angle fills an important gap in scholarship on a world-shaping event.
Pleshakov and Zubok provide a fascinating account of the thinking and decisions of Stalin, Khrushchev, and their entourages during the Cold War, from its origins to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban Missile Crisis. The structure, with each major phase of the Kremlin's evolving policies combined with short biographies of an important figure (including Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, and Zhdanov, as well as the titular Stalin and Khrushchev), makes the twists and turns easy to follow. I found this to be an especially effective book to use with my undergraduate Russian history students. Highest recommendation!
The author gives a view of things from the Russian side of the fence (wall) and I found this a most interesting read. Stalin, as the author wants to remind us, was a monster; Khrushchev not so much, but with both was the disdain and the bewilderment of Western leaders.
Fresh look at the Cold War through Soviet sources and a welcome and necessary addition to its historiography. A must read for those interested in how misconceptions and assumptions can influence foreign policy and international relations.
Has a lot of good information, and is detailed but not overwhelming. It’s really bland though, so I can’t say I enjoyed it. But it did the job fairly well.
Good overview of the cold war from the Kremlin eye view. The authors were using the newly released (for 1996) sections of the Kremlin archive, a resource that currently is probably unavailable due to the war in Ukraine. Whilst it's good to read up to Krushchev, either a second book or doing the whole of the period in one go would have been preferable, especially as the book itself is quite a short read.
some maddening insights practically ignored by a lot of western historians based almost entirely on archival material declassified after 1991. Ludicrous eye into the thoughts of the politbureau especially but without the western boastful bravado involved in a lot of cold war debate.
I bought this book while in the USA in 1998 and read it the year after. It's a very well researched and sourced (from then-newly opened KGB archives) account of the last years of Stalin's life all the way to Khruschev's consolidation of power. A gripping tale of distrust, intrigue and fight for survival. Stalin's death and events surrounding it is thoroughly described and to this day this books serves me as the go-to book in order to quote the events of March '53 and onwards. Plus, one can have a good insight into main actors' mindset at the time. The book is a must-read for anyone interested in the power struggle surrounding Stalin's death.
As a History Major I had to read this book for a class I was taking at my university, and I had little to no concrete knowledge about Joseph Stalin and the leadership in the USSR. This book did an incredible job of not only allowing people to understand the personalities of the leaders Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, but to also view and understand the Cold War from the perspective of the USSR. From the beginning's of Stalin, to the tail end of Khrushchev rule, this book shows the struggle that certain Soviet leaders faced when trying to disentangle themselves from Stalinism.
On the downside, it is a heavy read and a bit sad the book could not go into the leaderships of Brezhnev and Gorbachev. But this book is still great for anyone wanting to understand the Soviet side of the Cold War drama. I would highly recommend this book to anyone who enjoys learning about a different side of historical events or is simply interested in the Cold War and USSR leadership.
I thought it was interesting reading a book on the Cold War from a Russian viewpoint, rather than the triumphalist American perspective. I also really enjoyed all the inside details about members of the Kremlin, making the read feel more personal. Overall I found it quite tough-going to read - although I expect it would be a lot easier to read than some history books!
Enjoyed this bit - "[Hitler] might be described as an eagle in a thunderstorm. Stalin, by contrast, was more like an earthworm in constant fear of being stepped on or cut in two."
Read 52 pages. Absolutely below average book! Nothing of substance, all of the arguments are based on memos and transcripts rather than any statistics.
When getting this book I expected it to be about the elite coalition in the Kremlin and which groups rose and fell through the ranks. Instead I just read(questionable) personal anecdotes by Stalin that the author pulls off. The sources in this book are awful as well, skimmer through them and 90% of them are in English.