Kroppens fænomenologi

by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Bjørn Nake (Translator)

Together with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty was the foremost French philosopher of the post-war period and Phenomenology of Perception, first published in 1945, is his masterpiece. What makes this work so important is that it returned the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Psychology, Theory, France, Art, Classics

218 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1945

About the author

French phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in addition to being closely associated with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role that perception plays in understanding the world as well as engaging with the world. Like the other major phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty expressed his philosophical insights in writings on art, literature, and politics; however Merleau-Ponty was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the Twentieth Century to engage extensively with the sciences, and especially with descriptive psychology. Because of this engagement, his writings have become influential with the recent project of naturalizing phenomenology in which phenomenologists utilize the results of psychology and cognitive science.

Merleau-Ponty was born in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Maritime. His father was killed in World War 1 when Merleau-Ponty was 3. After secondary schooling at the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty became a student at the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied alongside Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil. He passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1930.

Merleau-Ponty first taught at Chartres, then became a tutor at the École Normale Supérieure, where he was awarded his doctorate on the basis of two important books: La structure du comportement (1942) and Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945).

After teaching at the University of Lyon from 1945 to 1948, Merleau-Ponty lectured on child psychology and education at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952. He was awarded the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 until his death in 1961, making him the youngest person to have been elected to a Chair.

Besides his teaching, Merleau-Ponty was also political editor for Les Temps Modernes from the founding of the journal in October 1945 until December 1952.

Aged 53, he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961, apparently while preparing for a class on Descartes. He was buried in Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.

Reviews

[Feliks · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have to suspect that this is probably the most thrilling and exciting book I have ever read, in any genre, in any format, on any subject matter. Just an astounding book. Electrifying. On fire.

Makes you want to race around the room and scramble up the walls like a lab mouse on stimulants. Why? Because after this blazing introduction to phenomenology, you suddenly realize that so much of the topics we typically preoccupy ourselves with are hardly even apprehended correctly by our own senses. All the ideas in our brains are based on fragments; on false impressions. It is not just that we 'glance' at things, 'half-hear' what is spoken to us; or that we only give our environments a distracted smidgen of our attention. No, not merely this --many other authors have written on such matters. Instead, Merleau-Ponty proves that even when we are gazing directly at what's before us we never truly see it. There is no 'pure thought'. The world is not Schopenhauer's idea, nor Descarte's objective, nor Sartre's subjective --but a 'phantom limb' like that which haunted the disabled soldiers Merleau-Ponty studied. It is sensory, it is 'approximation'.

In the course of our daily routines, we're accustomed to skip right over skeptical hesitation which would make us pause. But this makes us fools. We should all countenance much deeper, graver mistrust of our faculties. The truth is, that we never perceive anything fully or correctly through our senses. Perception--the crux of everything--of course! The most fundamental step towards ratiocination: we fail. We can't even congratulate ourselves on handling this species-task accurately! Merleau-Ponty really shows up the rich (and false) self-conceit we possess in our own powers.

How do we 'know' anything, how can we 'trust' anything ...when we can't even validate the functioning of the faculties upon which we judge the world? How can we agree/disagree between ourselves --on any topic --when each of us is wrapped in fog? The 'internal world' (versus) the 'external world'...this book reveals that neither exists in any definable mode. All such questions like, 'is this thing part of this other thing?' and 'are you seeing the same thing I am seeing?' come under scrutiny by this man Merleau-Ponty, and are definitively settled by this great thinker.

Gentlemen: we've all been sleepwalking.

To conclude: t-P-o-P is certainly all that I could have asked for or desired. Immediate 5-star rating. I'm placing it in the very highest tier in my ratings--the most distinctive, singular ranking I offer any book in my shelves. A select position where it will rub shoulders with maybe only 4-5 other books--those being my top picks from the entire field of philosophy. I close this narrow hierarchy to all but a distinct few. To merit a slot, a philosophical treatise must contain (what I feel is) the most salient and relevant wisdom to offer our lives today. 'Phenomenology' certainly does that.

Here are the others:
Being and Nothingness - Sartre
Being and Time - Heidegger
The Discourses - Epictetus
Metaphysics - Aristotle

Elite company, indeed. If only every child in North America could read these (accompanied by some wonderful work of vernacular empiricism such as Robert Burton's "Anatomy of Melancholy") before the age of eighteen... if only the 'USSA-of-Amerika' jingoistic-hokum in our woeful K-12 school system could be eliminated and replaced by grand works such as these...what a different country we might have. It'd be a different world.

[Roy Lotz · Rating 3 out of 5]

There are few things more unpleasant than reading a book that you do not understand. One is writing a review of one. But as this is the life I have chosen, I must come to terms with the hardship. There are various strategies for this predicament, none perfect. You can admit that you do not understand (embarrassing), pretend that you understand (risky), or try even harder to understand (exhausting). I have found that the surest method is usually to mix all three, hopefully keeping the reader guessing as to which strategy was employed at any given moment.* On we go.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, along with Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre, formed the third wheel of the great existentialist tricycle that rolled through the twentieth century. While his two flashier comrades were busy plotting all sorts of revolutions in cafés (social, political, philosophical, aesthetic, sexual), Merleau-Ponty—more respectable, more sedate, and, dare I say, more bourgeois—was busy editing the magazine, Les Temps Modernes, shaping a solid academic career for himself, and enjoying the married life. The Phenomenology of Perception, his most famous contribution to philosophy, was just one of many triumphs in a parade of intellectual distinction.

Now, to cut to the chase, I did not enjoy this book very much, nor did I ultimately agree with much of what Merleau-Ponty (henceforth MP) had to say. But the man was brilliant and must be given his due.

The most influential parts of this book are concentrated in Part 1, on the body. It is telling that, before the twentieth century, this subject was almost entirely neglected by the philosophical tradition. For this alone, MP deserves quite a lot of credit. He also includes a chapter on sex, a subject that had hardly been touched since Plato advised that it is best avoid it entirely (the act, not the subject). Perhaps it helped that MP was married. (The list of unmarried philosophers is virtually identical to the syllabus in an introductory course.)

Another great virtue of MP is his engagement with psychological research. There is a long section devoted to the phenomenon of phantom limb, and an even longer one about a patient with brain damage known as Schneider. This latter case is quite fascinating, as Schneider’s injury profoundly impacted his ability to function, without either impeding his intellect or his motor function. His impediment consisted, rather, in his ability to sense his body, known as proprioception. That is, for Schneider, his body is rather like an object that he clumsily manipulates rather than an extension of his being. When asked to, say, draw a circle in the air, he must first wave his hand in the air, making shapes at random, until he can see what he is doing and, by trial and error, finally make the circle.

This is not an Oliver Sacks book, however; this (unfortunately) is a tome of French philosophy. So what is MP trying to say with all this? In a nutshell, his philosophy is Anti-Cartesian. By this I mean that he wants to dislodge the view that our subjective consciousness and the objective world stand irreconcilably opposed, totally distinct yet somehow in communication. MP prefers to see the subject and the world as two poles of a continuous field, with the body smack dab in the middle—both object and subject. This is in contrast to scientific materialism, which seeks to reduce the subjective to the objective, or to philosophic idealism, which seeks just the opposite.

Throughout the book, MP is at pains to contrast his own views with both the materialistic and the idealistic views, intending to sail a middle course that avoids the pitfalls of both. His solution is to turn reductionism on its head—that is, in characteristic phenomenological fashion, to regard basic human experience as fundamental and everything else as derivative. This basic human experience normally takes the form, in his view, of a gestalt—of a totality that transcends the combination of elements that compose it.

This is entirely within the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger (the two great influences on this book), in which logical arguments are discarded in favor of what an anthropologist might call a “thick description” of consciousness—that is, rather than trying to explain the world in the manner of a scientist, with theories about causal underpinnings, the phenomenologist operates more like an ethnologist writing a study of a particular village.

Advocates of this approach will argue that it is both logical and honest, since of course our experience is the only reality we have direct access to, and arguably all of our other theories and ideas are evolved from this primordial pool. And MP cannot, in fairness, be compared to the mystic or the monk who issues verdicts on the nature of reality based on his own private experience. As I tried to indicate before, MP’s philosophy is anti-Cartesian, by which I mean that he hardly even believes in “private” experience, much as Wittgenstein did not believe in private language. Experience is fundamentally worldly and only accidentally secret. In one of MP’s more poetic turns of phrase, he describes humanity as a “hollow” or a “fold” in being, “which can be made and which can be unmade.” (This is in contrast to Hegel, who considered us a “hole,” and Sartre, who considered us a “nothingness.”)

This is reasonable enough. What irks me is that MP substitutes description for explanation. It could be perfectly valid, for example, to argue that depression—which responds to both medication and therapy, and which seems to have both physiological and psychological causes—is a non-reducible gestalt. And a phenomenologist as brilliant as MP may be able to pinpoint the exact structure of the depressed experience. Nevertheless, if we want to actually help a depressed patient, the irreducible richness of human experience will do little to avail us. We need either a therapy (inevitably based on some theory of the mind) or a drug (based on theories of biochemistry). In short, we need reductionism.

This is why much of MP’s philosophy rang hollow for me: it lacks the essential characteristic of an explanation, to reduce the complex to the simple. I must immediately grant, however, that reduction can easily be taken too far. As MP ably shows, for an awfully long time reductionist theories of human consciousness effectively ignored the uncomfortable fact that we have a body in addition to a mind. Similar criticisms can be lodged at any number of sociological or psychological theories of human behavior. Often these dogmas can blind us to the reality of the phenomena under study. Careful observers (and MP certainly qualifies) perform a great duty in puncturing these errors.

In short, my opinion of MP’s philosophy is rather mixed. But my opinion of his writing is decisive: I hated it. Whoever taught MP and Sartre how to write (someone at the École nórmale supérieure presumably) apparently did not believe in paragraphs. This book is one long block of text. I know this sounds petty, but for me the paragraph is the unit of writing, the fundamental organizing principle of prose. It tells us when one train of thought ends and another begins. At the very least, it provides a ledge where the mind can take a break from the relentless climb. Without at least two paragraphs per page, I feel lost and adrift. And it did not help that his prose is rather awkward and cumbersome:

The Gestalt of a circle is not its mathematical law but its physiognomy. The recognition of phenomena as an original order is a condemnation of empiricism as an explanation of order and reason in terms of a coming together of facts and natural accidents, but it leaves reason and order themselves with the character of facticity. If a universal constituting consciousness were possible, the opacity of fact would disappear.

The result is a book where some very sharp thinking is covered in dross and surrounded by masses of unfocused material. After Part 1, in which he makes impressive and original contributions, he spends the next two thirds of the book taking up every philosophical problem he can think of, fiddling with it, and then moving on, as if he thought the psychological material was not heavy enough. Thus it is a book that, while quite profound, is not nearly as profound as its author intended it to be. But if you shoot for the stars…

________________________
*A fourth strategy is to write about something else entirely and hope nobody notices.

[David M · Rating 5 out of 5]

All hitherto existing models of perception are false. From the outset empiricism would do violence by mis-describing its most basic datum, the act of perceiving. Idealism would come about to try and correct the absurdities that arise when empiricism is taken as doctrine. However, by failing to provide an alternate account of perception, idealism left the crucial point unchallenged.

There are no atoms of perception. Perception is already a whole. That, I think, is the crucial point, and from there...

Most profound, far-reaching book of philosophy in the past hundred years or so. Anyway, it's my favorite. I want to call it an abyss, in the sense that it's infinite and unfathomable, but it's a joyous abyss, a teeming abyss. And there are arguments, too. It's at once an extremely rigorous treatise and a long tracking shot by Andrei Tarkovsky... This is one of those books that makes GR's star system seem pretty ridiculous (sorry!).

[د.سيد (نصر برشومي) · Rating 4 out of 5]

هناك في مكان قريب أو بعيد أو يحيط بك أو داخلك
عالم قائم في ذاته
له وجوده وماهيته وتكويناته وعناصره
تاريخه وسيرورته وانعكاساته في أذهان ووجدان
له كيانه الذي قد يراه بعضنا
يتأمله بعضنا
يستغله بعضنا
يغفل عنه كثير منا
العالم مساحة للتفكير
ظاهرة حافة بظواهر
لكن ذاك العالم المادي الطبيعي الحيوي المتسق الصلب السائل
لايدرك نفسه لأن الإدراك ظاهرة أيضا
تخصّ الكائن الذي منحه الله العقل
فتحمّل المسئولية
لكنه مضى بقوة إرادية غير واعية في أحيان ليست بالقليلة
لفرض تصوّراته على العالم الحافل بالآخرين
يقول ديكارت في مقاله الذي يسعى فيه للبحث عن الحقيقة
إن الإنسان حينما يفكر فهو موجود
أي أن وجودنا هو تاريخنا الفكري
انتسابنا للعقل الكلي الذي يمارس كل منا فيه دوره الصغير
لكن بماذا نفكر يا ديكارت؟ إن موضوع التفكير لا يقل أهمية عن فعل التفكّر
لا يوجد تفكير دون موضوع
تلك هي القصدية أو المقصدية أو التوجّه الفكري أو استكمال درس إنجاز الأفعال بالكلام
بعد أوستن وميرلو بونتي عند جون سيرل
هذه قضية مهمة وليست نظرية ذهنية
يطرحها الفلاسفة من قبيل المتعة الشعورية
إن الإعلام يطرح عليك النافع والضار
أنت هدف لمن يفكر
لمن يقصد الاستحواذ على عقلك
أو ثمار عملك
أو طاقتك لتعمل من أجل مصالحه
تلك قضية حيوية
حتى كلمة أحبك التي يقولها الشاب لفتاة
هل يعنيها هي في ذاتها أم يعني توجهه إليها بوصفها موضوعا استحواذيا
والعكس صحيح بالطبع
الكتاب مهم من ناحية ربط الفلسفة باستراتيجيات الحياة
واستكمال مفهوم الظاهرة بوصف تحديدها هو علاقة بين الذات والموضوع
وأن الإدراك هو سعينا لتأمل ما لانستطيع امتلاكه
لنفهمه ونستخدمه فيصبح أداة لتحقيق الذات

[Apio · Rating 4 out of 5]

In some ways this may be the most phenomenal philosophy book that I have ever read. In it, Merleau-Ponty attempts to present a description of how human beings perceive the world in which they live. He is often surprisingly successful. The evidence for me came in a startling manner. While reading the section about perceiving the body, I had an experience for which I have no words, but that perhaps comes closest to what certain mystics would call enlightenment. But it was a completely bodily enlightenment, a full consciousness of myself as a specific unique bodily being. For several moments, I didn't want to read or touch my coffee, because I wanted to fully digest this feeling. The feeling stayed with me to a noticeable degree for two weeks thereafter. The main reason this book loses a star (down to a mere four) is because in the later chapters, when Merleau-Ponty goes into human perception of the social, he lets his marxian sympathies get in the way of his phenomenological method, and this weakens his arguments on these questions considerably.

[Katia N]

To understand is to experience the accord between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the realisation- and the body is our anchorage in a world.

That was a very fascinating reading experience and a significant intellectual endeavour for me. But at the end i felt as if I was reading a mystery with a very intricate, branchy challenging plot. It was thrilling. It will be sometime before I can 'reflect on it all’ properly, and there would be a lot of stuff which I would have missed after a single read. But for now I just say it was a great investment of time and effort.

I’ll just write down few ideas for future (hopefully - more detailed review). My personal interest was in the phenomenon of consciousness. And M-P delivers a lot on this front. His main belief is that consciousness is very likely purely perceptual. And therefore is impossible without a body. In fact it stems from behaviour of the subject through the body acting in the world. Also it is intentional: it is always the consciousness of or about something (this he takes from the earlier phenomenological tradition).

The book is a critique of empiricism and its scientific method - always a third person perspective that comes after reflection (work with data or abstract calculations) and the tendency 'to atomise' sensations into some separate qualities. On the other hand, M-P critiques idealism (or he calls it 'intellectualism') when detached 'ego' is floating above illusory world doing 'cogito'. He claims that this is impossible without the body as perception conduit coming before 'cogito'. Idealism claims that everything sensory might be an illusion while he claims that to know what is an illusion one needs to know what is real (or what is not sn illusion to be able to make a difference and define it).

According to him the body is not an object as we cannot move away from it (we can do this from any other object). It is not a subject either in a Descartes sense for obvious reasons. So the body is a kind of relational system that allows us to explore the world and therefore be conscious. Therefore the world in a way is a nested system where the subject is imbedded in the body that inhabits the environment and orients itself towards certain objects, events or event, other bodies or even absences.

‘I observe external objects with my body, o handle them, inspect them and walk around them. But when it comes to my body I never observe if I self. I would need a second body to be able to do so which would itself be unobservavle.'

Interestingly, according to him the objects as well are kind of signalling to our bodies:

a sensible that is about to be sensed poses to my body a sort of confused problem. I must find the attitude that will provide it with the means to become determinate … I must find the response to a poorly formulated question. And yet I only do this in response to its solicitation… . The sensible gives back to me what I had lent to it, but I received it from the sensible in the first place.

This reverberates with a theory of ecological psychology developed by James Gibson in the US. He claims that an object or more broader the environment 'effords' an organism an ability to act through the direct perception. 'Affordance' in this context means for example if you are tired you would be looking for a chair, but a log in a forest would do as it 'affords' you to become less tired. So an organism and environment (the body and the world in M-P's speak) would constitute a dynamic adaptive system.

Traditional cognitive science stems from idealism of Descartes and tries to look for 'representations' of real world in brain's computations. However, both M-P and Gibson seem to think that body plays much bigger role even in cognition. All of this is very relevant to current developments in AI, cognition and possibility of the artificially created conscious systems.

It was supposed to be just a few lines of initial impression, but I am going on and on. It requires more profound and engaged conversation otherwise I risk trivialising the argument of both of these thinkers. Still I think I’ve created a broadly accurate but very thin sketch. I am signing off until I can do better. But I find it fascinating they thought about this during the WW2 and merged with such similar theories incorporating embodiment into their theories. This seems to focus the minds on the bodies.

I can only escape from being into more being; for example, I escape from society into nature, or from the real world into an imaginary that is made up of the debris of the real.

[William2]

A slow read. Lots of conceptual learning involved. What is empiricism, etc. I never was highly philosophical. Enjoying it precisely because it’s so unlike my usual fare. Sarah Bakewell speaks highly of it in her At The Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails —a very worthy book and far more readable than the present text.

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “[Merleau-Ponty’s] constant points of historical reference are Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The characteristic approach of Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical work is his effort to identify an alternative to intellectualism or idealism, on the one hand, and empiricism is or realism, on the other, by critiquing their common presupposition of a ready-made world and failure to account for the historical and embodied character of experience.”

[Kamakana · Rating 5 out of 5]

if you like this review, i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com

210818: this is on my 'read twice or more' shelf. i believe i have read only the first half twice, and that about eleven years ago, though i remember the powerful effect. it is part of the merleau-ponty-m shelf which includes now 74 works that have something to do with him, several of which are art, which reflects one of the reasons he is favourite, that he uses art as examples, though Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings is more global, more extensive, includes his final works. for this is m-p's original masterwork from 1945 and his thought continues to develop until his unfortunately early death in 1961...

introduction: extensive analysis of traditional philosophical/psychological prejudices of perception, here m-p investigates ideas of 'sensations' as 'units' of experience and finds theories of 'gestalt' more descriptive, over 'association' and 'projection of memories', over 'attention' and 'judgement', resulting in concept of 'phenomenal field'. rather than atomistic 'quale' there is holistic, reversible, gestalt relationships of ground fore and back. m-p argues against extremes of both empiricism and idealism, which only appear opposite metaphysics but both presuppose the same abstracted, separate, concept of perception, which can be 'objectively' measured without reference, without sense, of the embodied perceiver. m-p asserts neither perception is in any sense real. he refers to the muller-lyer illusion, which of course only works in parallel and not isolation. m-p asserts this is model of all our perceptions and why they must be 'field', and this field is developed by the human body...

the body: for this is m-p's greatest concern, greatest contribution, to 20th century continental philosophy. the body. this is the longest section of the long book. first m-p poses it as a problem. how can objective body be reconciled with subjective, analytic thought. m-p says we have erred in conceiving 'substances' or dualism of mind and body, rather there is substance and style or 'how', we are body, and embodied consciousness, we are being certain way, and this is sensed through perception. how this body image is not merely the physical, anatomical, 'mechanistic', which we as bare consciousness inhabit, but how this body is always, ever, where our world begins, how it precedes cartesian certainty, or maybe reverses the order- not 'i am because i think' but 'i think because i am', how there is necessary 'motility' of how we can sense the world, by movement, by focus, through our 'intentional arc'... this is his signal innovation to phenomenology inherited from husserl, beyond his 'cartesian meditations', continuing where husserl left off- the fact there is the body to fulfill his insistence that as humans, in addition to the 'tacit cogito', there must be a body that serves the 'i am', not simply a thinking cogito, but an 'i am able to', for there is 'pre-predicative' essence, there is being, there is body, before all else. m-p observes the body as object and mechanistic physiology, then experience of the body in classical psychology, then spatiality and motility of own body, then synthesis of own body, then sexuality of own body, then body as expression and speech. here m-p investigates implications of 'phantom limb'. here m-p builds his arguments philosophically and not through the causality of natural science, which he does not deny but places after perception, that is, after our being in the world. m-p seems to describe and elaborate from scientific experiments, primarily to demonstrate that, if not simply mistaken, they are incomplete because they remain abstracted from the perceiving subject. he does engage in some speculative interpretation of sufferers of brain injuries, of the essential difference between abstracting, thinking, oneself, and the more primordial, originary, embodiment, in other words, the difference between 'pointing' and 'grasping'. m-p refers to how perception has become emptied of meaning, that is, provokes or enables no emotional qualities, in stories retold, in sexual possibilities. m-p sees that as we human bodies have similar capabilities, so our expressions, our speech, will be derived from our style of being and perception. i have no idea what current psychological interpretations are...

the world as perceived: m-p says that the theory of the body is necessarily, essentially, theory of perception. this might be as far as i read the first time. certainly if 'gestalt' is key term in the introduction, m-p uses 'ambiguity' and 'style' extensively here. in sense experience m-p offers another model of sense rather than scientific, cause-effect, of any indefinite form, but rather than sensor and sensible in opposition they are unified, invaded, such that it is not blue sky above me but that i am of that blue sky, that there is sense to which i am attuned. space is next up, with m-p contrasting monocular and usual human binocular vision, insisting it is not after the fact we integrate images but that the image is necessarily seen that way, as he demonstrates with certain experiments conducted altering perceived walls/floors according to eyes and balance. again i have no idea what current psychological interpretations are. he also argues about our human perception of depth, and how this is not merely width turned sideways, but a different sense. then m-p looks at the thing and the natural world, and again how he insists there must be human perception to introduce meaning, causality, time, as the world is 'timeless' and 'meaningless' without. against solipsism m-p then talks of the other and the human world, and how we are implicated in shared perceptions...

being for itself and being in the world: here is the most directly philosophical explorations of m-p, of the cogito, of temporality, of freedom. if you have read this far, you have good idea of how m-p will look at these. i have read many philosophers since, but for me, throughout this text, i find fulfilling that he can argue and offer exemplars through the arts. because i have always had some skill in the arts, but my father was scientist and i was convinced science was truth, i had undervalued art as intellectual appreciation of the world. m-p cured me of said affliction. this book, then everything else i read of m-p, helps me to better understanding, even as i cannot say i understand it all...

200201: more Merleau-Ponty's Ontology
Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings
The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting
Merleau-Ponty's Existential Phenomenology and the Realization of Philosophy
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology: The Problem of Ideal Objects
The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty
The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology
The Visible and the Invisible
Merleau-Ponty's Last Vision: A Proposal for the Completion of "The Visible and the Invisible"
Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception
bonus
Ark of the Possible: The Animal World in Merleau-Ponty

[Andrew]

From what I comprehended of the Phenomenology of Perception, it is a stunning, absolutely stunning work of philosophy-- rigorous and scientific while at the same time very aware of the limits of human knowledge, radical without devolving into cant, deeply humanistic, and, unsurprisingly, exceptionally perceptive.

For Merleau-Ponty novices: our minds are nested within our bodies which are nested within the world, and any attempts to reduce the world to an "idealist" or "materialist" conception rely on the same false assumptions about the nature of knowledge. This book is a seriously steep climb, laden as it is with multi-page arguments and reports of neurological research, but that climb delivers the reader to a very high Alpine meadow of intellect.

[Uroš Đurković · Rating 5 out of 5]

Telo je vozilo bitka u svetu. (97)

Telo je i jemac duše – ovaj saodnos transponuje puku biološku egzistenciju u ličnu. Telo je i sidrište utisaka – u svetu koji nema značenje po sebi, značenje se upravlja prema njemu. Tako je i sa nekim očiglednim relacijama poput onoga što je levo/desno, odnosno gore/dole. (267) Nešto može da bude situirano samo u odnosu na predupisani referentni sistem centriran u samom telu.

Prostornost tela je način na koji se ostvaruje kao telo, ono je značenjsko jezgro, čvor egzistencije, ali naše telo nije u prostoru, već ono pripada prostoru – ono je prostorovo. (163) Kao obuhvat živih značenja i kao individuum u kome se ne može razlikovati izraz od izraženog, telo je uporedivo sa umetnošću. Ja tela moguće je samo uz ne-ja – ono nije objekat za jedno dekartovsko „mislim”, već je celina proživljenih značenja koja ide prema svojoj ravnoteži. Telo je i ono što čini da jedan čovek ima prošlost – utelovljenost uvremenjuje.

„Mišljenje je međuljudski život onakav kakav on sam sebe shvaća i tumači.” (187) Ali misao nije ništa unutarnje – ona ne opstojava izvan svesti i izvan reči, iako ne može biti svodiva na svest odnosno reč. Tako razumljen smisao nekog komunikacionog gesta nije iza njega, već se on stapa sa strukturom sveta. (201) Reči nisu obuća za misli, već produžetak dijalektike tela kao subjekto-objekta.

„Vlastito je tijelo u svijetu kao srce u organizmu: ono neprekidno održava u životu vidljiv prizor, ono ga oživljava i iznutra hrani, ono tvori s njime jedan sistem.” (217)

Da bi objasnio svoje stavove, Merlo-Ponti se neretko poziva na sasvim specifična senzorna i psihopatološka stanja – od konzumiranja meskalina koji donosi žive sinestezije, do opisivanja heautoskopije – stanja u kome svoje telo vidimo kao drugo. Bavljenje graničnim slučajevima pokazuje unutrašnju dinamiku neke oblasti – kao kada znamo granice države, znamo njeno realno prostiranje. Proučavanje oboda percepcije, kao i krivih puteva, objašnjava ono što doživljavamo kao pravilo. Tako se dolazi do zaključka da sinestezijska percepcija nije izuzetak već pravilo (242), kao i da u percepciji mi ne mislimo obejakt – mi mu pripadamo. (252)

U tom svetlu zanimljivo je utemeljenje boja (Maori imaju 3000 naziva boja, ne zato što ih mnoge percipiraju, već naprotiv, zato što ih ne identificiraju kada pripadaju objektima različite strukture (319)), vremenitosti (memorija je neprekidni prelaz jednog trenutka u drugi (280)), ili odnos sna, mita i bitka („Mit drži bit u prividnosti, mitski fenomen nije predodžba engo istinska prisnost. (303)).

Telo je polazište i odredište, a svet nije suma stvari koje bi se mogle osporiti, već neiscrpiv rezervoar odakle se vade stvari (358), stvari koje su korelat mog tela, a sva priroda jeste mizanscen našeg vlastitog života ili naš sagovornik u nekoj vrsti dijaloga (334). I ima tu nešto zanimljivo sa etimološke strane – tvar je drevni slovenski izraz za materiju. Reč s (sa poluglasnikom) predstavlja pokaznu zamenicu (to se održalo u primerima jutroS (ili ovog jutra), letoS (ovog leta), danaS i sl.) – tako je stvar određena tvar – materija na koju se ukazuje, a time što se ukazuje na nju, ona se konkretizuje. I dve su velike zablude postojale u istoriji filozofije koje se tiču fenomenologije percepcije, i sa obe je Merlo-Ponti raskrstio – prva je „senzualistička” zabluda po kojoj se pretpostavlja je jedini mogući svet – svet po sebi, a u drugoj, „intelektualističkoj”, suviše značenja se pridaje samoj svesti, bez koje svet, navodno, ne postoji. Zbog pomirenja krajnosti, Merlo-Ponti je neverovatan mislilac – fenomenologija je učinila nešto što se čini nemogućim – spojila je ekstremni subjektivizam i objektivizam, a fenomenološki svet nije objašnjenje nekog prethodnog bitka, nego zasnivanje bitka. Radi se o tome da je povratak samim s-tvarima povratak svetu pre spoznaje, o kojem već sama spoznaja uvek govori.

Piše Merlo-Ponti i o prirodi slobode, Sezanovom slikarstvu, prirodi ljubavi, Balzaku i Prustu. Piše i o samom činu pisanja. Spominje i Umwelt, ali, iz meni neznanog razloga, ne upućuje na Ikskila, ni u samom tekstu ni u popisu literature.

Jedna od knjiga posle koje doslovno drukčije gledate svet. Delo koje oslobađa i otvara mogućnosti. I u njegovoj argumentaciji ima nečeg stamenog, ali gotovo magičnog, hipnotičkog.

A to je, ako mene pitate i cilj filozofije – iznova dobro videti. (460)

[Joshua Stein · Rating 4 out of 5]

Merleau-Ponty is, for me, the best writer in phenomenology since Husserl, who created the damned thing. While Phenomenology of Perception is clearly a product of its time, and the available psychology, the amount of interesting work that Merleau-Ponty is able to do in what is essentially proto-cognitive science is very impressive. His work is carried forward in the writing of Alva Noë and others, and I do think that the ways that Merleau-Ponty gets updated and the ways that he more-or-less stays the same are pretty important to the reading of history of philosophy of mind.

One of the things that really struck me in reading Merleau-Ponty was the realization of how extensive his impact is on what is easily just written off as an "analytic" philosophy of mind. Many of the case studies that he discusses are a major part of the writing of Dan Dennett and the arguments that he lays out against neuro-centric views of mind are basically the same as the views that contemporary neuro-centrists are still arguing against. Writers who focus on the debates in philosophy of mind are still unable to shake the influence of Merleau-Ponty, and as someone very interested in that discussion, it was pretty incredible to look at what has stayed the same, in many ways, in contemporary study.

There are a lot of good ways to enter into this book, as a reader. If you're new to philosophy of mind, but not to continental philosophy, it will give a nice preface to early philosophy of mind and discussions of consciousness. If you're experienced in philosophy of mind, but just starting off in continental philosophy, this gives a nice bridge that maintains a good portion of the data that you're familiar with and shows how the data can be assessed through the processes of phenomenology. If you're engaged with both, this makes a great read as a point of interest in the history of philosophical traditions. I strongly, strongly recommend the read.

I do think that the most important thing to attend to, as a reader of the book, is Merleau-Ponty's lengthy footnotes. The most interesting one, for me, is the extensive discussion of dialectical materialism and the way that phenomenologists who aren't sympathetic to Marx understand the metaphysics of that approach. Merleau-Ponty is very philosophically dense, so this really isn't good for those who are just entering philosophy. I do think that it is useful to have a background in some phenomenology, even if it is just a passing familiarity with Husserl or Heidegger.

[Ronald Morton]

When we want to analyze perception, we transport these objects into consciousness. We commit what psychologists call “the experience error,” that is, we immediately assume that what we know to exist among things is also in our consciousness of them. We build perception out of the perceived. And since the perceived is obviously only accessible through perception, in the end we understand neither.

What begins as an exploration of perception - one which interjects the body between consciousness and the world (and institutes it as both Subject and Object, simultaneously) - and (through much of part two) restructures the way one views their interaction with the world and their relation with the world - eventually attempts to encompass the complication of the perceptive Other (which mostly closes part two). Part three then goes on to incorporate the first two parts into a restatement of the cogito ("The fundamental truth is certainly that “I think,” but only on condition of understanding by this that “I belong to myself " in being in the world."), and to reorient ourselves (and our perception) in a temporal flow (yes, M-P attempts to redefine time), and then eventually closing on a truly triumphant note.

I'll admit, some of the stuff M-P tackled towards the end of part two and the beginning of part three went over my head; that's okay, I always aim to take what I can away from these texts and hopefully revisit them renewed some later day to gain more from them. Some of that later stuff I felt was reaching, but I reserve that judgment based on my own imperfect understanding.

In its own way this book has altered the way in which I at least think about my interaction with and my interaction in the world. I suppose that's all I ask.

*unrated as I have no idea how to rate something like this*

If the synthesis could be actual, if my experience formed a closed system, if the thing and the world could be defined once and for all, if spatio-temporal horizons could (even ideally) be made explicit and if the world could be conceived from nowhere, then nothing would exist. I would survey the world from above, and far from all places and times suddenly becoming real, they would in fact cease to be real because I would not inhabit any of them and I would be nowhere engaged. If I am always and everywhere, then I am never and nowhere.Thus, there is no choice between the incompleteness of the world and its existence, between the engagement and the ubiquity of consciousness, or between transcendence and immanence, since each of these terms, when it is affirmed by itself makes its contradiction appear. What must be understood is that for the same reason I am present here and now, and present elsewhere and always, or absent from here and now and absent from every place and from every time. This ambiguity is not an imperfection of consciousness or of existence, it is their very definition.

[Lance · Rating 5 out of 5]

First, I must admit it took me many months to read this book. Frankly, I can only handle one chapter at time. But like many such books, the work pays off as one slowly reflects on the slow, detailed exposition of a philosophy. In some ways, I see this book as a sequel to Schopenhauer's World of Will and Representation (a book that takes even longer to read). Merleau-Ponty takes the world of representation -- or perception -- and deeply explores how consciousness arises, not as a thing itself, but within the world.

Most importantly for me, Merleau-Ponty is revising the Cartesian subjectivity, which is the foundation for much of Western philosophy, science, and comparative work -- and also the root of many ideologies and problems we've struggled with for several centuries. As the world becomes more "globalized" and interrelated, it will be important that new approaches to science, theory, and cultural studies start with this revised Cartesian subject. In short, Merleau-Ponty shows that our consciousness can not exist in and of itself; the very core of consciousness is intersubjectivity. This may seem like a small point, but it completely revolutionizes how we think and act in the world, particularly as academics and scientists. What many religions have asserted for a very long time, Merleau-Ponty gives philosophical and methodological weight.

[Alina · Rating 5 out of 5]

Merleau-Ponty has taken Heidegger's existential phenomenology and given it body! Heidegger's theory of dasein and the various ontological features that constitute it are abstract is ill-defended, even if it is intuitively appealing. From my reading, Merleau-Ponty covered all of Heidegger's main ontological themes and adds even more (e.g. sexuality, freedom). Moreover, he was up-to-date with the psychological and neurobiological findings at his time, and even if he ultimately rejects that scientific methods could ever get at the ultimate truth of our human condition, he is nonetheless scientifically minded and respectful of making his theories naturalistic and plausible. I would like to add that his theories have panned out in natural science; there is a movement in cognitive science called "embodied cognition" that is primarily inspired by Merleau-Ponty's embodied existential phenomenology and has provided solid analytic and empirical grounding to it. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty writes beautifully, with unexpected, effective metaphors and examples. Compared to Heidegger, he rarely uses obscure jargon and takes time to carefully elaborate on any terms he introduces. Overall, Heidegger broke much more new ground in philosophy compared to Merleau-Ponty, but I feel that Merleau-Ponty importantly refines and elaborates on Heidegger, as well as crucially makes Heidegger's philosophy naturalistic and scientifically plausible.

My favorite chapters are "The Body in Its Sexual Being", "Space", and "Freedom". Uniquely, Merleau-Ponty draws on cases studies in psychiatric and neurobiological pathology and uses these empirical facts about abnormal minds and perceptual realities as springboards for his theories. I found Merleau-Ponty, unlike many other theorists who attempt this method, deeply compassionate, respectful, and accurate to these individuals with such pathologies. With this method, Merleau-Ponty both makes his theories more scientifically plausible and immensely poignant or powerful to the reader. I found myself even at tears in his chapter on sexuality, no joke! In this chapter, he explained how behavioral and somatic symptoms are not mere indicators of foul mental states, but rather they are concrete, literal manifestations of unusual, detrimental ways of relating to the world. The mistake of taking them as mere symptoms is the result of sticking to an empirical framework, and the truth of their existential nature is revealed when we access the deeper existential realm, from which all theoretical frameworks are derived.

In the chapter on space, Merleau-Ponty makes the striking point that the world, which we find ourselves in, is presented by our body in continuous dynamical coupling with environmental structures since our time of birth (in other chapters, such as the one on temporality, he focuses more on our body's coupling to cultural traditions and sociality). It is important to remember this book is, foremost, a response to the question "how can the world appear for us?", and this chapter directly answers it especially. From earliest infanthood, our body learns, on the demand of its needs and motivations, the patterns of activities that lets us fulfill these intentions. This process, at the same time, discovers new features of the world. All objects and features of the world are thoroughly intentional and relevant to our activities and ways of life. Every discovery and acitivty is made possible by previous "schema" (general potential ways of being in the world that are always indeterminate and open to change) and at the same time adds to this schema, or provides further detail or a new alteration into the schema. These processes demonstrate how our body is in constant, reciprocal co-determination (coupling) with the environment; the world shows up in terms of the schema held in the body, an the schema of the body is constituted and determined by the world. So, whenever we focus our attention on a part of the world, and it appears for us instantly, it is given by our body-world, as a dynamical system. My conscious awareness is always less than and distinct from this deeper level of the body-world, although the two are fundamentally integrated and determine each other.

Interestingly, although Merleau-Ponty doesn't explicitly mention this point, I see that his theory can be extended to our evolutionary history. When we are born into the world, our genetics bound to the billions of years of innumerable individual creatures who have lived in dynamical coupling with this environment. Our lives are not our own in two senses; one is our own body and world in perceptual interaction; another is our body and genetic predecessors in causal determination since the beginning of life itself. I find this deep, substantive interconnectedness a secular source of sublimity and belongingness - or "spirituality" in banal terms.

In the chapter on freedom, Merleau-Ponty resolves the debate on free will and determinism. He reveals how this quibbling is the result of a blind commitment to a combination of empirical causality and logical thinking. Genuine freedom can be understood only from an existential perspective, the most fundamental of all. Freedom is found in existential commitment - any commitment to a way of life, such as even philosophers' commitments to rationalism or empiricism. The status of any object or event in this world as being an obstacle or an enabler depends strictly on our existential commitments. Only when we have taken on a way of life and are concerned about it, then certain events will come with the significance of hindering or helping us on this project. For example, jagged rocks on a mountain will be a hinderance only to a person with an existential commitment to mountain climbing. To anyone else, these rocks would have other meanings or no significance at all. So, what we take to be obstacles to our freedom are in fact direct manifestations of our a priori freedom to pursue existential commitments.

I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in how people can see such utterly different things while standing in the same room. Or, how people can end up committing atrocious deeds or experience spirituality. Ultimately, if you have been dissatisfied with philosophical accounts of space and time, or other metaphysical problems, that are devoid of culture, meaning, or our human conditions, this book is perfect.

[Ant · Rating 5 out of 5]

O κόσμος δεν θα είναι ποτέ ξανά ο ίδιος αφότου διαβάσετε τη Φαινομενολογία της αντίληψης. Η πραγματικότητα θα διαθλαστεί μπροστά στα μάτια σας. Οι ορίζοντες και τα σημεία θα αποκτήσουν ξαφνικά άλλες διαστάσεις και θα είστε σε θέση να αντικρύζετε τα αντικείμενα σε χιλιάδες κομμάτια, μικρομερώς και ταυτόχρονα αδιαλείπτως. 

Η συζήτηση με έναν φίλο δεν θα είναι όπως άλλες φορές, αφού πλέον θα ξέρετε πως αυτό το πρόσωπο, όπως το γνωρίζετε τόσα χρονια, με όλες τις ευκολίες της οικειότητας, δεν είναι τίποτε παραπάνω από μια δική σας αντανάκλαση, όπως, εντέλει, και ολόκληρος ο κόσμος. Ακόμα και το τσίμπημα ενός κουνουπιού, το οποίο θα μπορείτε να υποδείξετε με κλειστά τα μάτια θα είναι κάτι το καινοφανές, όπως άλλωστε και η αντίληψη των χρωμάτων ή το βλέμμα με το οποίο περικλείετε ένα αντικείμενο ή έναν άνθρωπο. Η πραγματικότητα θα μεταμορφωθεί και ο κόσμος, τον οποίο αντικρίζετε με την διαρκή παρουσία της μύτης σας, μέσα από δύο ξεχωριστά μάτια που ενώνουν αποσπασματικές και κατακερματισμένες εικόνες σε μία, θα είναι πια ένας κόσμος που μπορείτε να διαμορφώσετε μέσα στα χέρια σας, σαν βρεγμένη άμμο, σε απατηλά οικοδομήματα που ίσως μείνουν στέρεα για καιρό αλλά ίσως και διαλυθούν στο επόμενο κύμα.

Θα είστε ακομα σε θέση να καταλάβετε πως το παρόν είναι από μόνο του μια αιωνιότητα και πως κάθε στιγμή, ακόμα και η πιο μικρή και αδιάφορη πράξη, δυνητικά διεκδικεί να καθορίσει τη ζωή σας. Ο χρόνος δεν είναι ούτε παρελθόν ούτε μέλλον, αλλά μια στιγμαία και ταυτόχρονα αιώνια χρονικότητα που σας καθορίζει και την καθορίζετε. 

Με σημείο εκκίνησης τον καρτεσιανό δυϊσμό  και τα ρεύματα του εμπειρισμού και της νοησιαρχίας, ο Πόντυ ανατρέπει όλα όσα έχουμε στο νου μας ως αντίληψη και μας αποδεικνύει, πως ο κόσμος, όπως τον αντιλαμβανόμαστε είναι ένας κόσμος ιδιωτικός και ταυτόχρονα πολυσήμαντος, ένα απείκασμα της μοναχικής μας φαντασίας που με κάποιον τρόπο καταφέρνει να γίνει οικουμενικός. 

Η αναγκαιότητα της νεωτερικότητας για καθαγιασμό της πραγματικότητας από τη βία των μεγάλων συρράξεων του 20ου αιώνα οδηγεί τη φιλοσοφία μακριά από τις αόριστες φαντασμαγορίες της μεταφυσικής, πίσω στον ανατοχασμό μέσω της απλότητας, στην απλή, αν και όχι απλουστευμένη, περιγραφή των πραγμάτων. Σε ανοιχτό διάλογο με τον Χάιντεγκερ και τον Χούρσελ, η Φαινομενολογία της αντίληψης του Πόντυ, είναι ένα κείμενο διαχρονικά επίκαιρο που αγγίζει με θαυμαστό και πρωτοποριακό τρόπο αμέτρητα επιστημονικά, φιλοσοφικά και καλλιτεχνικά πεδία. Ένα βιβλιο που πρέπει να αναγνώσει κανείς ξανά και ξανά. 


Οι εκδόσεις Νήσος έκαναν άρτια δουλειά στην μετάφραση και συνολικά η έκδοση, παρά τις κάποιες μικρές αστοχίες, είναι άριστη. Θα ηταν ωστόσο χρήσιμη μια εισαγωγή και πιο εκτενής αποσαφήνιση ορισμένων φιλοσοφικών όρων που μεταφράζονται για πρώτη φορά στην ελληνική.

[Morgan Blackledge · Rating 5 out of 5]

Maurice Merleau-Ponty explores the nature of perception, embodiment, and consciousness.

Merleau-Ponty challenges artesian MIND/BODY DUALISM.

Merleau-Ponty argues (convincingly) that PERCEPTION is not just a PASSIVE reception of sensory stimuli, but rather an ACTIVE/EMBODIED engagement with the WORLD.

Merleau-Ponty offers profound insights into the phenomenological approach to understanding human EXISTENCE/CONSCIOUSNESS.

I only gave this a superficial read.

The book could be READ/STUDIED for a YEAR or more and you wouldn’t fully wring it out for all it’s worth.

Not only is it profound and dense.

It’s very advanced.

Merleau-Ponty explores issues that neuroscience and psychology have only recently begun to unpack.

This book certainly deserves more.

But this is all I can currently muster.

GREAT (DIFFICULT/LONG/REWARDING) BOOK.

5/5 🤩

[Giorgos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Πέρα από προσωπικές κρίσεις (…), η Φαινομενολογία της αντίληψης είναι ίσως η πιο σημαντική και φιλόδοξη φιλοσοφική απόπειρα στη Γαλλία, μετά τον Bergson. Πιο στιβαρή από το Είναι και μηδέν του Sartre και πιο σοβαρή από τις μεταμοντέρνες πενιές. Τώρα, ότι ποτέ δεν ήταν της μόδας, κι αυτή και ο συγγραφέας της, παρά τις τόσες εναλλασσόμενες παριζιάνικες μόδες, έχει ενδιαφέρον. Πάντως, εάν θέλει κάποιος να μάθει σύγχρονη γαλλική φιλοσοφία, δεν μπορεί να προσπεράσει αυτό το μείζον κείμενο. Βέβαια, δεν είναι υποχρεωτικό να το θέλει, ούτε ο Μερλώ-Ποντύ είναι ιδιαίτερα γνωστός. Έπειτα, είναι τεράστιο βιβλίο, 750 σελίδες η πυκνοτυπωμένη ελληνική έκδοση (550 η γαλλική) –που ήδη με τρομάζουν οι 100άδες σελίδες ιστορικών και άλλων μυθιστορημάτων. Και είναι και φιλοσοφικός λόγος, άλλοτε με το ιδιόλεκτο (της εποχής ή/και του συγγραφέα του), άλλοτε με τον κυκλοδίωκτο τρόπο της φαινομενολογίας (γύρω γύρω από ένα ζήτημα, τα φέρνουμε από δω, τα φέρνουμε από εκεί, κι άλλοι μένουμε στο τίποτε κι άλλοι στο γενικά…). Όμως, άλλοτε πάλι, με ένα υψηλό ύφος ευαίσθητο στην ανάλυση των ανθρώπινων συναισθημάτων, στους συσχετισμούς της φιλοσοφίας και της καθημερινότητας με την τέχνη, με έναν λόγο που ξέρει να εκφράζει τις ιδέες με τρόπο που πλησιάζει το μυθιστόρημα, καθώς υποβάλλει έμμεσα τα πράγματα. Δύσκολο ανάγνωσμα, αλλά ευτυχώς το έχουμε επιτέλους στα ελληνικά, μεταφρασμένο από την Κική Καψαμπέλη –ότι κατάφερε να το αποδώσει με μεγάλη επιτυχία είναι άθλος από τους λίγους στον χώρο της φιλοσοφίας.
Δεν μπορεί να συνοψιστεί το έργο αυτό! Ποια είναι η στόχευσή του; Ο Μερλώ-Ποντύ μένει ανικανοποίητος από τις απαντήσεις της έως τότε σκέψης και αυτό που θεωρεί αδιέξοδό της: η δυτική φιλοσοφία, όταν επιχειρεί να κατανοήσει τον κόσμο, είναι δυιστική: χωρίζει υποκείμενο και αντικείμενο, άνθρωπο και κόσμο, αίσθηση και νόηση. Και στη Φαινομενολογία αναζητά την αληθινή φιλοσοφία, δηλ. το να ξαναμάθουμε να «βλέπουμε» τον κόσμο, τα πράγματα και τις ιστορικές καταστάσεις. Πρέπει πρώτα να ξανασκεφτούμε τι σημαίνει η κύρια διαδικασία γνώσης του κόσμου, η αντίληψη, τι σημαίνει η αντιληπτική εμπειρία. Να αναζητήσουμε τον κόσμο πριν από τη μεταφυσική του θεώρηση ή την επιστημονική του έρευνα –πριν από τη γλώσσα που χρησιμοποιούμε για να καταλάβουμε και να μιλήσουμε για συμβάντα και καταστάσεις, πριν από τη γνώση γι’ αυτόν. Άρα, επιστρέφουμε στην αντίληψη. Τι είναι, όμως, αυτό που γνωρίζει; Δεν είναι απλώς ένα σκεπτόμενο πράγμα (όπως το θέλει ο καρτεσιανός ορθολογισμός). Είναι ένα σκεπτόμενο ον και ταυτόχρονα ένα σωματικό εγώ: το υποκείμενο συλλαμβάνει τον εξωτερικό κόσμο μέσω του σώματος, αλλά είναι ήδη μέσα σ’ αυτόν τον κόσμο όπου προσπαθεί να εκφράσει τον εαυτό του.
Γι’ αυτό ο Μερλώ-Ποντύ, πρωτοπόρος εδώ, δίνει τεράστιο βάρος στο σώμα και τη σωματικότητα: το σώμα μου κινείται και μετέχει στον ορατό κόσμο, η όραση είναι μια κίνηση που επεκτείνει το σώμα μέσω της πράξης του οράν, το σώμα βλέπει και βλέπεται. Εδώ διαρρηγνύονται τα όρια υποκειμένου-αντικειμένου, παρατηρητή-παρατηρούμενου, πραγματικού-φανταστικού. Το σώμα (μας) δεν είναι σαν ένα αντικείμενο φυσικής τάξης, μπορεί να συγκριθεί με το έργο τέχνης: «Σ’ έναν πίνακα ή σ’ ένα μουσικό κομμάτι, η ιδέα δεν μπορεί να μεταδοθεί με άλλο τρόπο πέρα από την εκδίπλωση των χρωμάτων και των ήχων. […] Ένα ποίημα περιλαμβάνει μεν μια πρώτη σημασία, μεταφράσιμη σε πεζό λόγο, ωστόσο διάγει στο νου του αναγνώστη μια δεύτερη ύπαρξη, που το προσδιορίζει ως ποίημα. […] Η ποίηση είναι κατ’ ουσία ένας μετατονισμός της ύπαρξης. […] Ένα μυθιστόρημα, ένα ποίημα, ένας πίνακας, ένα μουσικό κομμάτι είναι άτομα, δηλαδή όντα όπου δεν μπορεί κανείς να διακρίνει την έκφραση από το εκφρασμένο, που το νόημά τους είναι προσβάσιμο μόνο μέσω μιας άμεσης επαφής. Το σώμα είναι συγκρίσιμο με το έργο τέχνης: είναι ένας κόμβος ζωντανών σημασιών» (σ.270-2). Το νόημα δεν προϋπάρχει στον κόσμο, αλλά το σώμα μας, η δραστηριότητά του στον κόσμο είναι που το καλεί στην ύπαρξη –και το σώμα, όπως το έργο τέχνης, δεν αναπαριστά μια πραγματικότητα, δημιουργεί το ίδιο μια πραγματικότητα.
Πολλές φορές ο Μερλώ-Ποντύ προσφεύγει στην τέχνη για να εξηγήσει (καλύτερα) τις θέσεις του για τον κόσμο (φυσικό και ανθρώπινο) και το σώμα. «Δεν κοιτάζω τον πίνακα με τον τρόπο που κοιτάζει κανείς ένα πράγμα, δεν τον περιορίζω στον συγκεκριμένο τόπο του. Το βλέμμα μου περιπλανιέται στον πίνακα σαν να ήταν αυτός το φωτοστέφανο του Είναι. Βλέπω σύμφωνα ή μάλλον μαζί με αυτόν, παρά τον βλέπω αυτόν». Όπως, λ.χ. ο Σεζάν διαπίστωνε την ανάγκη να δημιουργεί μια νέα οπτική, έτσι και ο φιλόσοφος ψάχνει αυτήν την «έλλογη όραση». Ο ζωγράφος βλέπει την ύλη καθώς παίρνει μορφή, τα πράγματα τη στιγμή που γεννιούνται, τον «πρωταρχικό κόσμο» και να εναποθέτει με το πινέλο στον καμβά –εκεί πάνω οι αισθήσεις, τα αντιληπτικά αισθήματα συμπλέκονται λογικά και φανερώνεται μια ενότητα αισθητικότητας, φαντασίας και σκέψης. Το έργο τέχνης θεωρείται ένα σημείο που μεταφράζει και εκφράζει το είναι-στον-κόσμο.
Με τη βοήθεια των πρακτικών της τέχνης (ο Σεζάν περισσότερο, αλλά και ο Προυστ, αναφέρονται συχνά στο βιβλίο) και της μορφικής ψυχολογίας, ο Μερλώ-Ποντύ θέλει να ξεφύγει από τα έως τότε φιλοσοφικά διλήμματα (εμπειρισμός ή νοησιαρχία, ύλη ή μορφή, υποκείμενο ή αντικείμενο). Σαν τον Σεζάν που μπροστά στο δίλημμα Κουρμπέ ή Μονέ, νατουραλισμός ή ιμπρεσσιονισμός, το θεώρησε ψευδές και το ξεπέρασε. Και αναλύει το σώμα, τη χωρικότητα και την κίνησή του, τον κόσμο της αντίληψης, τον άλλον, το cogito, τη χρονικότητα και την ελευθερία. Αυτές είναι οι κεντρικές θεματικές του βιβλίου. Και τις εξετάζει έχοντας στο νου του ένα παράδοξο: από τη μία συγκροτούμε τις δομές νοήματος της εμπειρίας και από την άλλη βρίσκουμε ότι η εμπειρία είναι κιόλας συγκροτημένη με όρους νοήματος που υπήρχε ανεξάρτητα από εμάς! Εγώ είμαι υποκείμενο της αντίληψης πραγμάτων, συμβάντων έξω από μένα, ανεξάρτητων από μένα. Αλλά και ενόσω έχω συνείδηση ότι βλέπω π.χ. ένα εξωτερικό αντικείμενο, έχω συνείδηση ότι υπήρχε και πριν να το δω –εγώ απλώς το βρήκα. Ακόμη και μέσα στον εαυτό μου, στην υποκειμενικότητά μου, υπάρχουν πράγματα, κομμάτια μου που δεν μπορώ να τα συλλάβω, μού αντιστέκονται. Είμαι εγώ αυτά, όμως δεν τα κατανοώ πλήρως –σαν να προέρχονται από έξω, είναι η φύση. Άρα, δεν είναι μια (γνωστική) συνείδηση που δίνει αυτή το νόημα στον κόσμο, στον εαυτό, αλλά ούτε το νόημα είναι εξαρχής δεδομένο –γιατί τότε, πού θα πήγαινε η ελευθερία μας; Σαν έργο τέχνης, ο κόσμος (μάλλον κι ο εαυτός μας) δεν είναι ένα περατωμένο έργο –παραμένει ένα ανολοκλήρωτο έργο, ένα non-finito. Και μένει να βρούμε τον χώρο (και τα μέσα) της δικής μας ελευθερίας, πάντα μέσα στον κόσμο: ο ζωγράφος πάνω στον μουσαμά (με τα χρώματα), ο φιλόσοφος στο χαρτί (με τις λέξεις), ο κάθε άνθρωπος στη ζωή (με τις πράξεις).
Γράφοντας για τον άνθρωπο και τον κόσμο, καθώς η Γαλλία είχε μόλις βγει από τις φλόγες του πολέμου, ο Μερλώ-Ποντύ αποφαίνεται ότι για τα μεγάλα ερωτήματα της ελευθερίας και της πράξης δεν υπάρχει θεωρητική απάντηση, και μας ξαφνιάζει κλείνοντας έτσι το έργο του: «Εδώ όμως πρέπει να σωπάσουμε, γιατί μόνον ο ήρωας ζει μέχρι τέλους τη σχέση του με τους ανθρώπους και με τον κόσμο, και δεν αρμόζει να μιλήσει άλλος στο όνομά του» (σ. 752). Και παραθέτει, διόλου τυχαία, από τον Πιλότο του πολέμου του Σαιν-Εξυπερύ: «Τύλιξαν το γιο σου οι φλόγες· θα τον σώσεις. Αν υπάρχει εμπόδιο, θα έδινες το χέρι σου για να το ρίξεις με μια σπρωξιά. Είσαι ολόκληρος μέσα στην πράξη σου. Η πράξη σου είσαι εσύ. Δίνεις τον εαυτό σου για αντάλλαγμα. Αυτό που σημαίνεις αναδεικνύεται, εκθαμβωτικό. Και είναι το καθήκον σου, το μίσος σου, η αγάπη σου, η σταθερή σου πίστη… Ο άνθρωπος δεν είναι τίποτε άλλο από ένας κόμβος σχέσεων, μόνο οι σχέσεις μετράνε για τον άνθρωπο».

[Chant · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most *analytic* Continental philosopher/phenomenologist you’ll find around! Absolutely the best in terms of doing *good* phenomenology. The GOAT, as the kids would say.

[Jeroen Vandenbossche · Rating 4 out of 5]

Le philosophe croit savoir ce qu’il perçoit, dans la réflexion, mieux qu’il ne le sait dans la perception

Depuis quelques années, j’ai développé une petite tradition estivale : chaque été, pendant les vacances, je lis un classique phénoménologique. Ce choix, qui n'était au départ qu'une simple coïncidence, est devenu un rituel précieux. J'ai constaté au fil des ans que ce type de lecture aiguise mon attention au monde et affine ma perception quotidienne.

Mon rythme est désormais bien rodé. J'adore lire très tôt le matin, dans le calme absolu de la maison pendant que les enfants dorment encore. Puis, le reste de la journée, au cours des promenades en famille, je laisse ces lectures mûrir et méditer en arrière-plan. Après L'Imaginaire , Sein und Zeit , L'Être et le Néant et Totalité et Infini , c'était au tour de la Phénoménologie de la perception de Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

J'avais naturellement déjà entendu parler du philosophe et j'abordais donc ce texte majeur avec certaines idées préconçues. Pourtant, j’avoue que je ne reconnaissais pas tout de suite l’originalité de sa pensée. Si j’ai beaucoup aimé l’avant-propos, l’entrée en matière proprement dite m’a semblé un peu lente et la manière dont Merleau-Ponty renvoie dos à dos l’empirisme et l’idéalisme (ou l'intellectualisme) dans les trois premiers chapitres introductifs du texte me semblait peu originale. J’avais l’impression d’avoir déjà lu ces mêmes arguments ailleurs, chez Husserl et Sartre, et je me demandais quand l'ouvrage allait enfin trouver son souffle propre.

Néanmoins, une fois que, dans le quatrième chapitre de l’introduction, Merleau-Ponty aborde le thème du « champ phénoménal » et, encore plus, dès que, dans la première partie, il s’attaque au problème du corps, l’originalité de sa pensée m’est vite devenue évidente. A mon avis, cette originalité réside au moins à trois niveaux étroitement liés de sa pensée : dans le dépassement du dualisme entre la conscience et le monde qui caractérise toute la philosophie transcendantale ; dans la modernité frappante de sa théorie du langage ; et enfin, dans la conceptualisation d'une liberté véritablement incarnée.

Paul Cézanne (1883-1885) Vue sur L'Estaque et le Château d'If


1/ La conscience, le monde et le corps : au-delà du dualisme transcendantal

Le dualisme entre la conscience et le monde trouve ses racines dans le rationalisme de Descartes, qui séparait radicalement la chose pensante (res cogitans) de la chose étendue (res extensa). La tradition transcendantale s’inscrit dans cette filiation et ne parvient pas à surmonter le clivage.

Chez Kant, d’après ce que j’ai retenu de mes cours d’antan, les phénomènes sont constitués par les structures a priori de la sensibilité et de l'entendement du sujet transcendantal, maintenant ainsi un abîme infranchissable entre le sujet connaissant et le monde qu’il se représente.

Husserl, malgré la découverte féconde de l'intentionnalité — l’idée que toute conscience est « conscience de » quelque chose —, reconduit le même dualisme. C’est que, du moins dans les Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie l’intentionnalité de la conscience est principalement pensée sur le modèle de la visée théorique ou de la représentation. Elle vise le monde à la manière d'un regard qui pose un objet devant soi (Vorstellung), maintenant ainsi une distance de survol entre l'esprit qui perçoit et la chose perçue. La distance est même telle que Husserl en arrive à concevoir l'expérience de pensée vertigineuse d'une « destruction du monde » qui laisserait intacte la conscience pure.

Enfin, chez Sartre, la fracture entre le monde et le sujet prend la forme presque dramatique d'une étanchéité absolue entre l'En-soi (la matière brute, opaque) et le Pour-soi (la conscience pure, conçue comme un néant et une liberté totale).

Comme le démontre de manière convaincante Merleau-Ponty dans les deux parties centrales de son ouvrage, un tel dualisme ne permet de rendre compte ni de l’expérience vécue du corps propre ni du la perception concrète du monde. Il ne permet de rendre compte de l’expérience du corps propre parce que celui-ci n'est pas un objet extérieur que la conscience contemple ou commande à distance:

« En tant qu’il voit ou touche le monde, mon corps ne peut […] être vu ni touché. Ce qui l’empêche d’être jamais un objet, d’être jamais ‘complètement constitué’, c’est ce qu’il est ce par quoi il y a des objets. Il n’est ni tangible ni visible dans la mesure où il est ce qui voit et ce qui touche.

Le dualisme entre le pour-soi de la conscience et l’en-soi des choses ne permet pas non plus de rendre compte de la perception concrète du monde, car celle-ci n'est pas une prise de possession intellectuelle ou une somme de jugements logiques, mais un ancrage immédiat, une co-présence sensible où le percevant et le perçu s'enroulent l'un dans l'autre.

En faisant ainsi de la description de l’expérience vécue du corps et du monde la pierre de touche de toute sa réflexion, Merleau-Ponty affranchit la phénoménologie du dualisme qui sous-tendait jusqu’alors toute la tradition transcendantale. Or, bien qu’elle ne découle pas d’un parti pris théorique abstrait, mais du constat inévitable auquel mène l’analyse rigoureuse de la perception, sa conclusion est sans appel: quoi qu’en disent Husserl et Sartre, la conscience n'est jamais un vide pur projeté sur le monde, mais une réalité toujours déjà prise dans la matière. L’être humain n’est ni un esprit détaché qui contemple le monde, ni un simple objet passif : nous sommes notre corps vécu, ce lieu primordial où la conscience et le monde s'interpénètrent.

Loin d'être une nuance académique ou une querelle de spécialistes, cette divergence de point de vue entre Merleau-Ponty et Sartre est cruciale. C’est la conception du corps comme chair commune et espace d'intercorporéité qui permet au premier de repenser véritablement l’intersubjectivité, là où Sartre peinait à en rendre compte autrement que sous la forme du conflit ou de la réification (le fameux regard d'Autrui qui me transforme en objet). Parce que mon corps est à la fois voyant et visible, il appartient au même tissu que le monde et que le corps d'autrui : la rencontre n'est plus un choc frontal entre deux consciences absolues, mais un dialogue sensible au sein d'un même monde partagé.

Et pourtant, malgré l'enjeu philosophique colossal de ce tournant, ce différend capital est abordé par Merleau-Ponty de manière étonnamment implicite, presque timide. Jamais il ne livre de charge frontale ni ne nomme explicitement L'Être et le Néant comme une cible à abattre. Merleau-Ponty procède par de légères inflexions, des retouches conceptuelles et des remarques en filigrane. Voici un passage assez typique qui illustre bien le contraste frappant entre la portée philosophique révolutionnaire du propos de Merleau-Ponty et la manière discrète dont il exprime ce qui le sépare de Sartre :

« La réflexion doit éclairer l’irréfléchi auquel elle succède et en montrer la possibilité pour pouvoir se comprendre elle-même comme commencement. Dire que c’est encore moi qui me pense comme situé dans un corps et comme pourvu de cinq sens, ce n’est évidemment qu’une solution verbale, puisque moi qui réfléchis je ne peux me reconnaître dans ce Je incarné que donc l’incarnation reste par principe une illusion et que la possibilité de cette illusion demeure incompréhensible. Il nous faut remettre en question l’alternative du pour soi et de l’en soi qui rejetait les ‘sens’ au monde des objets et dégageait la subjectivité comme non-être absolu de toute inhérence corporelle. C’est ce que nous faisions en définissant la sensation comme coexistence ou comme communion. [etc.] »

Cette retenue dans le ton m’a frappé tout au long du livre et j’ai noté plusieurs exemples tout à fait analogues. Tout se passe comme si, plutôt que de vouloir attaquer frontalement ses maîtres à penser par de grands coups d'éclat polémiques, Merleau-Ponty ait préféré laisser à son lecteur le soin de mesurer à quel point sa phénoménologie de la perception fait vaciller les fondations mêmes de la tradition dans laquelle elle s’inscrit.

2/ Le langage, la culture et la conscience décentrée

L'autre grande révélation de l'ouvrage réside pour moi dans la modernité saisissante avec laquelle Merleau-Ponty conçoit le langage, bien loin des schémas classiques. Ce deuxième niveau d'originalité découle d’ailleurs organiquement du premier : de même que le corps n'est pas un simple instrument piloté par l'esprit, pour Merleau-Ponty le langage n'est pas un pur outil, il n’est pas qu’un « accompagnement extérieur de la pensée ». En prolongeant sa phénoménologie de l'incarnation sur le terrain de l'expression, Merleau-Ponty arrache le langage à la tradition intellectualiste pour en faire un véritable geste corporel et culturel.

Encore une fois, il prend le contre-pied de Sartre qui dans, Qu’est-ce que la littérature ? introduira une dichotomie stricte entre la « prose » » — conçue comme un outil utilitaire et transparent au service de l'action — et la « poésie », où les mots seraient traités comme de la matière brute. Pour Merleau-Ponty, au contraire, toute parole authentique possède une épaisseur charnelle. Parler n’est pas traduire une pensée déjà mûre dans un code neutre, mais accomplir un acte où la pensée se cherche et s’invente au moment même où elle s'énonce. Le mot n'est pas le simple véhicule d'un concept, il en est l'incarnation:

«Personne ne contestera que [dans l’art et par exemple dans la musique] l’opération expressive réalise ou effectue la signification et ne se borne pas à la traduire. Il n’en va pas autrement, malgré l’apparence, de l’expression des pensées par la parole. La pensée n’est rien d’«intérieur », elle n’existe pas hors du monde et hors des mots. Ce qui nous trompe là-dessus, ce qui nous fait croire à une pensée qui existerait pour soi avant l’expression, ce sont les pensées déjà constituées et déjà exprimées que nous pouvons rappeler à nous silencieusement et par lesquelles nous nous donnons l’illusion d’une vie intérieure. Mais en réalité ce silence prétendu est bruissant de paroles, cette vie intérieure est un langage intérieur. La pensée « pure » se réduit à un certain vide de la conscience, à un vœu instantané. »

De tels passages (et il y en a bien d’autres dans l’ouvrage), où Merleau-Ponty souligne la matérialité de la parole et la façon dont le sens échappe à la maîtrise du sujet parlant, m’ont rappelé certains textes de Maurice Blanchot et de Lévinas qui, eux, annoncent les théories dites « post-structuralistes » du langage quoique de l’intérieur de la tradition phénoménologique. Pour Merleau-Ponty comme pour ces derniers, la parole cesse d'être la possession d'un Je souverain pour devenir un espace d'expérience où le sujet s'efface au profit de l'avènement du sens. C'est l'un des aspects les plus vertigineux de l'ouvrage : en montrant que le langage nous devance et nous traverse, la Phénoménologie de la perception anticipe de façon visionnaire la conception du langage qui sous-tend la déconstruction de Derrida et l’analyse du discours foucaldienne.

3/ Liberté et situation : l’existence incarnée

Le troisième et dernier niveau d'originalité réside dans la manière dont Merleau-Ponty réinvente la notion même de liberté. Là encore, le contraste avec Sartre est saisissant. Dans L'Être et le Néant, Sartre décrivait une liberté absolue, vertigineuse et sans fondement : l'homme est «condamné à être libre» à chaque instant, dans une rupture permanente avec son passé et ses déterminations. Pour Merleau-Ponty, cette vision d'une liberté pure est une illusion intellectuelle qui fait abstraction de notre ancrage corporel.

Parce que nous sommes notre corps, notre liberté n'est jamais un choix abstrait survolant le monde, mais une possibilité située. Notre corps a une histoire, des habitudes, une assise biologique et un ancrage socioculturel qui dessinent des horizons d'action concrets. La liberté ne consiste pas à nier ces pesanteurs ou à décréter un néant au cœur de l'être, mais à reprendre à notre compte cette situation donnée pour lui donner un sens nouveau. Le corps n'est pas ce qui enchaîne notre liberté, il en est le seul véhicule réel : nous ne sommes libres que dans et par le monde.

Deux références me venaient tout de suite à l’esprit en lisant les derniers chapitres de Phénoménologie de la perception.

La première était la phrase célèbre de Marx, dans Le 18 Brumaire de L.Bonaparte , selon laquelle « Les hommes font leur propre histoire, mais ils ne la font pas arbitrairement, dans les conditions choisies par eux, mais dans des conditions directement données et héritées du passé. »

La seconde référence, c’était le théâtre de Sartre lui-même. J'ai trouvé assez ironique de constater qu’en tant que dramaturge Sartre semble avoir bien mieux compris la vérité de l'existence incarnée qu’en tant que métaphysicien. Des pièces comme Les Mains sales ou Le Diable et le bon Dieu ne mettent pas en scène des consciences pures mais des êtres englués dans la matière, lourds de leur passé, traversés par des pesanteurs sociales, politiques et corporelles. Au théâtre, je n’ai jamais perçu la liberté sartrienne comme une abstraction théorique: elle y présentée comme une possibilité située, un choix poisseux et difficile pris dans la chair des circonstances réelles. Sans le vouloir, le dramaturge donne ainsi de façon éclatante raison à Merleau-Ponty sur le philosophe : la liberté n'est pas un survol, elle est un engagement incarné dans le monde.

En fin de compte, bien que cette lecture m'ait absolument fasciné par sa profondeur conceptuelle, je dois avouer que je n'ai pas toujours été séduit par le style d'argumentation de Merleau-Ponty, parfois laborieux, ni par son écriture un peu académique. D'un point de vue purement esthétique et littéraire, la prose de Lévinas — plus poétique, vibrante et incantatoire — conserve une place à part dans mon cœur. Quoi qu'il en soit, cette première expérience de lecture m'a donné envie d'explorer plus avant l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty, à commencer par ses écrits consacrés à l'art et à la peinture, et tout particulièrement ses essais sur Cézanne.

[Leslie Wexler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Coming to Merleau-Ponty through Heidegger was a kind if shock to my system. I was not prepared for the deeply rational language of MP's study. Still, he brought to Heidegger's inherence, or being-in-the-world a very full-"embodied" discussion of our indissoluble link to that world via our own bodies. In most respects, MP's conception of being-in-the-world follows Heidegger's original, yet there are three starkly divergent thoughts I can identify from a first read:
1. Merleau-Ponty wanted phenomenology to take centre stage as the main focus whereas Heidegger turned more towards ontology with phenomenology as his method. This creates a difference between philosophical motives.

2. Merleau-Ponty bequeaths us our thoughts on embodiment, which does not come into Heidegger. This makes MP feel much more reflective about biological concerns without compromising his stand with regards to either scientific or objectivist methods. For MP, the phenomenal body is an experience from the inside that rises towards the world to create meaning. The body for MP is a natural subject and expresses the existence of being-in-the-world.

3. Pre-reflective states. Our being-in-the-world is not a dualistic relation between an objective body and disembodied consciousness; rather it is a pre-objective perspective. The intertwining between consciousness and nature. I, as body-mind, am both open toward the and am part of the world.

All in all, I certainly have a more robust understanding of phenomenology ala Merleau-Ponty. In particular, a big lightbulb went on when I finally read the words "all consciousness is consciousness of something." Intentionality transformed in that moment from some exercise goal in yoga to a lived, embodied and meaningful world that allows me understand my experience without feeling that I'm forever constituting or appropriating it through intellectual acts

Just first thoughts.

[Linus Ragnhage · Rating 5 out of 5]

This work is - together with Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil" and Heidegger's "Being and Time" - a perfect cure for anyone who has overdosed on abstract thinking. Its message has yet to be heard by a wider audience and is bound to gain new appreciation as the currently dominant mode of thinking begins to falter. A thorough background in philosophy might be required to understand much of what Merleau-Ponty writes, but, then again, if you have not already spent a substantial amount of time in the realm of rational thinking, then it is unlikely that you require the relief that this work can bring.

[Xander · Rating 4 out of 5]

Review will follow.

[Sajid · Rating 5 out of 5]

A marvellous achievement in philosophy

“Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that origin [of silence], so long as we fail to find, beneath the chatter of words, the primordial silence, and as long as we do not describe the action which breaks this silence. the spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world.”

First of all, i have to say this book isn’t for casual reading, it demands so much of our time and effort. It is more of a study—of course a difficult one—where you have to think a lot on your own to make out what Merleau-Ponty was talking about. That's why we have at least need some background knowledge on Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, Bergson and Kant. But i would say without Heidegger,this book wouldn’t have been written at all. Because Merleau-Ponty modified Heidegger's thinking in a lot more interesting and thrilling twists and turns.

Until Merleau-Ponty, or Henri Bergson,philosophers never focused philosophically on our body. But in this book,Merleau-Ponty makes a big deal out of our. He centralizes his whole phenomenological approach on the body. And Perception is the background of experience which guides every conscious action. The world is a field for perception, and human consciousness assigns meaning to the world. We cannot separate ourselves from our perceptions of the world.

Merleau-Ponty argues that both traditional Empiricism and Rationalism are inadequate to describe the phenomenology of perception. Empiricism maintains that experience is the primary source of knowledge, and that knowledge is derived from sensory perceptions. Rationalism maintains that reason is the primary source of knowledge, and that knowledge does not depend on sensory perceptions. Merleau-Ponty says that traditional Empiricism does not explain how the nature of consciousness determines our perceptions, while Rationalism does not explain how the nature of our perceptions determines consciousness.

Perception may be structured by associative forces, and may be focused by attention. Attention itself does not create any perceptions, but may be directed toward any aspect of a perceptual field. Attention can enable conscious perceptions to be structured by reflecting upon them.experience.Perception is not purely sensation, nor is it purely interpretation. Consciousness is a process that includes sensing as well as reasoning.Experience may be reflective or unreflective. experience which guides every conscious action. The world is a field for perception, and human consciousness assigns meaning to the world. We cannot separate ourselves from our perceptions of the world.

So all these basic phenomena of human experience is grounded on the basic structure of our Being-in-the-world,Heidegger's popular term. Our body always already finds itself in a world,it is already submerged in a primordial relationship with our surrounding;even before our coming into grips with objective thought and science, we are always already transcending our existence.

Thus throughout the book he goes on explain so many psychological and physiological illness, or varieties of medical conditions by his exploration of our lived body,rather than the objective one. And that's how the book challenges us on so many technical levels,and unfamiliar experiences.
Despite of its being a challenging experience, it is equal in rewards as well. So i would say, it is one of most important books of twentieth century philosophy, especially in phenomenology, alongside with Heidegger's Being and Time

[0 · Rating 4 out of 5]

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[Reeb · Rating 4 out of 5]

Enjoyed reading The World of Perception more than this book. It's more of a textbook I was required to read for my studies. Maurice's is just one opinion among many about how we perceive the world through our bodies and I guess how the world perceives us. I admit it took two readings to fully understand what he was on about.

[Carlo · Rating 5 out of 5]

This should required reading for humans. and robots.

[Cait]

okay I'm calling it, I am almost certainly never finishing this. I keep trying and retrying through cycles of my hold expiring and then just eyeing it on my libby shelf again without opening it back up, especially given that, at a comfortable text size, this is 1,506 ebook "pages" and that's unfathomable for phone-reading lol. don't remember why I added this to begin with and knowing my dumb ass it is honestly entirely possible that I thought it had something to the linguistic horror film pontypool, which I thought was okay but could have been better? anyway I'm writing this while on the phone with a friend who is about to move abroad as like an ambassador and as we all know multitasking does NOT work so this is probably even less coherent than usual!!!

[Ann Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not an easy read, but a thought-provoking book. Merleau-Ponty essentially sets forth reasons to rethink philosophy's approaches in an age of science and psychology; not a call to end philosophy or render it irrelevant, though. He suggests that philosophy as a discipline can become MORE relevant if philosophers admit of phenomena and look to the ontology of being as an aspect of phenomena. He's not a reductionist; though he is often classed with the existentialists, he's not that, either. Nor would he agree with E.O. Wilson's empirical "consilience." Highly original and interesting--he died young, I wonder how his ideas would have matured had he lived past 1952.

Might be a great book to read along with the works of Oliver Sacks.

[Robyn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Finally finished this thing! No insightful comments at this time, but this two-month reading experience was a good one. Reading phenomenology is especially good in a variety of settings, mindsets, fevers, loud rooms...

Anyone who's having trouble don't put it down. It's not really that hard to read, it just might take a while. Philosophy is metabolized slowly. (And poo poo to the reviewer who said she "read it in a few hours." A novel can be read and enjoyed in a matter of hours, but not this.)

[Gizem Kendik Önduygu]

ve yani abi size bikaç sene verdim belki bizi şu bedene bağlı sınırlamalardan kurtarırsınız diye. hollywood bilkmkurgularından öteye taşıyamadınız. hala bedenime ve yeteneklerime bağlıyım, seçtirtmediniz ki raftan beğendiğimi alayım. ayrıca kan, kemik, damar falan seviyorum. alakasız. Atın artık goodreadsten beni atın. selamlar merleau ponty.