Throughout the long drawn out war at sea during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, it was a cardinal principle of British naval strategy to blockade the port of Brest, the largest and most important of the French naval bases that threatened the security of the British Isles. It was a strategy that had been perfected by Sir Edward Hawke during the Seven Years War of 1756 1763, when it culminated in the stunning victory of Quiberon Bay. The American naval historian A.T. Mahan memorably summed up the contribution of the Royal Navy to the ultimate defeat of Napoleon when he wrote: Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the domination of the world. There were many aspects to the blockade of Brest, but always at its centre was the need to frustrate French attempts at the invasion of Britain or Ireland. Most famous of these, of course, was Napoleon s intricate combination that led to the campaign of Trafalgar, in the course of which his invasion plans disintegrated. But there were many other offensive moves which it was the blockading fleet s duty to prevent. Inevitably, there were great sea battles when the French ventured out, though fewer than might have been expected. For many months at a time the British fleet was at sea off Brest facing the considerable dangers of wind and weather without encountering its adversary. There were many remarkable leaders who came to the fore during the long years of war; Howe, Bridport, St Vincent, Cornwallis and Keith were among those who led the Channel Fleet. Nelson described his captains as a band of brothers, but this was by no means a description that could be applied to the quarrelsome, self willed and argumentative group of men who held the destiny of the Royal Navy in their hands, whether at sea or around the boardroom table at the Admiralty. Drawing on the official and personal correspondence of those involved, this book traces the development of British naval strategy, as well as describing the crucial encounters between the rival fleets and the single ship actions which provided the press with a constant flow of news stories for its readers"
Quintin Barry is a solicitor and a retired Employment Judge. He has also held a variety of offices in both the public and private sector, including the NHS and local radio. He is presently Secretary General of an international group of law firms. Following a lifelong interest in history & naval history, he is the author of a number of books on military history.
A strange book, this. It describes the blockade of Brest 1793-1815 in close detail from the point of view of the admirals and the Admiralty. The occasional captain gets attention, if he is troublesome enough or brilliant enough. The ships and men, however, barely register.
I suppose that is what the historical records most easily support, but it all comes across as too cerebral. I’d have preferred a less minute account of the peeves and tantrums of the flag officers – many of them coming across as frightful divas – and a better sense of the timber, cordage and sinew that made the blockade. For instance, a central premise of blockading an enemy fleet in port is that you work your crews up to a high pitch while denying the enemy the chance to do the same. Is that how it worked out in practice? The book is silent.
The ordinary sailors make an appearance in the chapter on Mutiny, and again in the brief final chapter Health and welfare (which draws heavily on other works and doesn’t add much of its own), but the overall impression is of a form of chess played by the Admiralty in London.
The author has gone to the trouble of providing three outline maps at the start of the book, but with a little more trouble they could have shown a greater proportion of the places mentioned in the text.
I really enjoyed this book. I had worried it would be a bit boring and focus on the technicalities of keeping ships in position off France with details of dealing with the wind and the weather, and while this, and how ships were battered by gales and needed constant repairs and refitting, was certainly included, the book went into a lot more detail about the leadership , politics and personalities of the Admiralty and the Channel Fleet and covered in some detail events such as the Glorious First of June and the campaign leading up to Trafalgar, and was consequently a good general read about Britain’s naval history of the period.
One thing that struck me from the details and comments about some of the personalities of senior British naval commanders was what a bunch of spoilt and self indulgent so and sos they were. They seemed to spend more time bickering among themselves and serving their own self interests than collectively working towards defeat of the enemy although this in itself was highly interesting and helped give an idea of the decisions of the period and the types of pressure the navy was under.
If I have one criticism it isn’t really one of the author, it’s just that describing the position and movement of the various naval fleets and squadrons of both the French and the British is so complicated, and it will always be difficult to follow just in text. Perhaps a few more maps and diagrams could have helped, but actually I felt like I could have done with a large scale table-top map with small model ships to have moved around as I was reading to update their progress and relative position. I will have to research whether there are any computer programmes that can be used to do this for next time I read a similar book, or maybe there are already some video clips on the internet that show the fleet movements that I can look up to view alongside reading naval strategy histories in the future.