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Island No. 10: Struggle for the Mississippi Valley
By February 1862 Confederate forces in Kentucky and Tennessee were falling back in disorder. Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River fell to combined land and naval forces under Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote. These losses necessitated the abandonment of the Rebel stronghold of Columbus, Kentucky. The entire upper Mississippi Valley lay open to Federal invasion. Toward that end, a new Union army under Major General John Pope began organizing at Commerce, Missouri.
Confederate Major General John P. McCown was sent to plug the breach by fortifying Island No. 10, a one-mile-long island positioned in a bend in the Mississippi River that straddled the boundaries of Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky. Pope's army had to be held in check long enough for the main Confederate force, under generals Albert Sidney Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard, to concentrate and launch a counterattack against Grant's advancing army. The ensuing campaign at Island No. 10 created the first extensive siege of the Civil War. The ultimate capture of the garrison resulted in a new army command for Pope in Virginia. As for the Confederates, the campaign pointed to a faulty western strategy. Simply to concede the rivers and their adjoining cities to the Federal navy was politically unacceptable. Garrison after garrison was captured, however, in the attempt to defend the rivers to the last extremity. Between February 1862 and July 1863 the Confederates lost 64,400 troops, some nine divisions, in defending the rivers. This strategy was a significant contributing factor for Confederate defeat in the West.
Confederate Major General John P. McCown was sent to plug the breach by fortifying Island No. 10, a one-mile-long island positioned in a bend in the Mississippi River that straddled the boundaries of Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky. Pope's army had to be held in check long enough for the main Confederate force, under generals Albert Sidney Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard, to concentrate and launch a counterattack against Grant's advancing army. The ensuing campaign at Island No. 10 created the first extensive siege of the Civil War. The ultimate capture of the garrison resulted in a new army command for Pope in Virginia. As for the Confederates, the campaign pointed to a faulty western strategy. Simply to concede the rivers and their adjoining cities to the Federal navy was politically unacceptable. Garrison after garrison was captured, however, in the attempt to defend the rivers to the last extremity. Between February 1862 and July 1863 the Confederates lost 64,400 troops, some nine divisions, in defending the rivers. This strategy was a significant contributing factor for Confederate defeat in the West.
215 pages, Paperback
First published April 30, 1996
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
July 2, 2023
It’s difficult to make a case for a little-known Civil War battle’s importance when even its very name comes across as obscure and unimaginative. “The Battle of Island Number Ten” sounds about as literal and exciting as “The Battle of Interstate 95 North, Exit 36B” would today.
So the authors of this book don’t overdo it in stressing why the battle was important and why it should be better-known today than it is. But maybe they could have, just a little.
This is a short and serviceable book that takes you through what happened and where and to whom, but doesn’t really attempt to lay out a case for why the book ought to be read and why the battle mattered.
The island itself was so named because it was the tenth Mississippi River island south of the Ohio River, though it no longer exists today due to erosion and the river’s shifting currents. It was where Confederate forces massed in an attempt to prevent Union forces from making any progress down the Mississippi into the Confederate interior. Right on the heels of the Union victories at Forts Henry and Donelson in central Tennessee, where the Union’s ironclad gunboats played a crucial role, the Union aimed to - and ultimately did - echo that success on the Mississippi, by capturing the island and removing an impediment that cleared the way for them to move southward toward Memphis and beyond.
The narrative mostly focuses on how the battle played out, from its early stages, to what became the first protracted siege of the war, to the eventual Union victory. Unique to this book among the Civil War battle narratives I’ve read so far, is a look at the role of the press as the battle played out. There were numerous reporters covering the conflict, and Daniel and Bock describe how competitiveness or a simple desire to liven up a slow news day sometimes caused them to report rumors and bad information, or leak sensitive details that could have jeopardized plans and lives.
The writing is mostly straightforward and unadorned, though there are a few instances where the authors let their imagination take over a bit - at one point, as Union troops approached a Southern settlement, “panic erupted in the village with slaves yelling, children crying, and women darting in every direction" - is that really literally what happened? Was there a better way to convey the sense of panic than describing “slaves yelling” and “women darting in every direction,” which I have a hard time picturing or believing?
The final chapter summarizes the casualty figures, counts up how many Confederate guns and horses and mules were captured, and describes whatever happened to the major players. There’s relatively little about the battle's overall importance in the grand scheme of things, as the authors almost seem resigned to their topic’s obscurity instead of trying to elevate it. What happened at Island Number Ten was not long remembered, they conclude, because it was "squeezed in between two of the largest battles fought in the West - Fort Donelson and Shiloh."
But the battle was important, not only because it helped to open up the Mississippi to Union forces, but, like the battles for Forts Henry and Donelson, it demonstrated the offensive advantage of the Union’s gunboats, a lesson the Confederates never seemed to learn. "The Southerners committed the same mistake over and over again," the authors write, as they continued to rely on fixed fortifications and continued to lose Island Number Ten-like battles. “This failed strategy proved a significant factor to Confederate defeat in the West."
That’s the closest that Daniel and Bock come to putting this battle in the context of the wider war, and explaining why this relative obscurity merited an entire book. The Battle of Island Number Ten is “perhaps the best-kept secret of the American Civil War," they write. Despite its importance at the time and its impact on the outcome of the war, though, the battle has instead disappeared from popular memory - just like the island itself.
So the authors of this book don’t overdo it in stressing why the battle was important and why it should be better-known today than it is. But maybe they could have, just a little.
This is a short and serviceable book that takes you through what happened and where and to whom, but doesn’t really attempt to lay out a case for why the book ought to be read and why the battle mattered.
The island itself was so named because it was the tenth Mississippi River island south of the Ohio River, though it no longer exists today due to erosion and the river’s shifting currents. It was where Confederate forces massed in an attempt to prevent Union forces from making any progress down the Mississippi into the Confederate interior. Right on the heels of the Union victories at Forts Henry and Donelson in central Tennessee, where the Union’s ironclad gunboats played a crucial role, the Union aimed to - and ultimately did - echo that success on the Mississippi, by capturing the island and removing an impediment that cleared the way for them to move southward toward Memphis and beyond.
The narrative mostly focuses on how the battle played out, from its early stages, to what became the first protracted siege of the war, to the eventual Union victory. Unique to this book among the Civil War battle narratives I’ve read so far, is a look at the role of the press as the battle played out. There were numerous reporters covering the conflict, and Daniel and Bock describe how competitiveness or a simple desire to liven up a slow news day sometimes caused them to report rumors and bad information, or leak sensitive details that could have jeopardized plans and lives.
The writing is mostly straightforward and unadorned, though there are a few instances where the authors let their imagination take over a bit - at one point, as Union troops approached a Southern settlement, “panic erupted in the village with slaves yelling, children crying, and women darting in every direction" - is that really literally what happened? Was there a better way to convey the sense of panic than describing “slaves yelling” and “women darting in every direction,” which I have a hard time picturing or believing?
The final chapter summarizes the casualty figures, counts up how many Confederate guns and horses and mules were captured, and describes whatever happened to the major players. There’s relatively little about the battle's overall importance in the grand scheme of things, as the authors almost seem resigned to their topic’s obscurity instead of trying to elevate it. What happened at Island Number Ten was not long remembered, they conclude, because it was "squeezed in between two of the largest battles fought in the West - Fort Donelson and Shiloh."
But the battle was important, not only because it helped to open up the Mississippi to Union forces, but, like the battles for Forts Henry and Donelson, it demonstrated the offensive advantage of the Union’s gunboats, a lesson the Confederates never seemed to learn. "The Southerners committed the same mistake over and over again," the authors write, as they continued to rely on fixed fortifications and continued to lose Island Number Ten-like battles. “This failed strategy proved a significant factor to Confederate defeat in the West."
That’s the closest that Daniel and Bock come to putting this battle in the context of the wider war, and explaining why this relative obscurity merited an entire book. The Battle of Island Number Ten is “perhaps the best-kept secret of the American Civil War," they write. Despite its importance at the time and its impact on the outcome of the war, though, the battle has instead disappeared from popular memory - just like the island itself.
February 9, 2017
Daniel, with aid from Bock, meticulously recreates the siege that began the Union drive to secure the Mississippi River. In results the operation was decisive, leading to the capture of 7,000 Rebels and over fifty irreplaceable heavy guns while opening the river; only Shiloh prevented the Union from doing more. Yet, with Grant, Sherman, Lee, and Jackson absent, the siege has been forgotten. Also, Pope's victory was nearly bloodless, and therefore undramatic. This book fills a vital hole in the scholarship, but Daniel's typically tight and energetic prose is a bit lacking here, although he continues to be gleefully generous in discussing officer back-biting and high command errors.
August 23, 2026
Island No. 10 is a campaign you'll occasionally hear about in the ACW, but not one that ever really gets to be the focus of the action. There's a few reasons for this, I imagine. It's in the West. The most prominent name involved is Pope. And the final act happened the same time as Shiloh. Also, it was a siege, without a lot of action, but it was well known at the time, as it attracted a large number of newspaper correspondents.
Bock and Daniel's book is short (150 pages, discounting end-matter), but very informative.
The situation is certainly interesting enough, with the Confederates looking for ways to hold the Mississippi Valley, and the S-bend at New Madrid on the Missouri-Tennessee seems a good spot. At the apex of the first bend is the tenth island in the Mississippi past where it joins the Ohio River. A fortified battery of guns on the island will close it to (unfriendly) navigation.
Of course this means protecting said battery from being cut off, and that proves more troublesome. The Confederacy is not exactly well supplied with men or equipment. In fact, the units that are shipped for the garrison are in horrible shape, some not having nearly enough weapons, and many of the ones they do have are prone to breaking.
Outside of small arms, things are a bit better, and number of batteries are established. There's a "floating battery", a converted floating drydock mounted with nine fairly powerful cannon (with Wikipedia sourcing another book with a figure of 20), and with no motive power, anchored in the lee of Island 10, as well as a small squadron of gunboats. One battery is sited to fire up the length of the Mississippi as it enters the S-bend. The main positional problem is the opposite shore, where someone could potentially come up on the Missouri side, and cross below the protected point and cut off the position. So, a garrison is installed in New Madrid, to protect the apex of the second bend.
This is all a bit much to protect for an army that's having problems putting together a decent field force. There's a fair amount of indecision to go around, including how extensive any outer "shell" of defenses should be. Beauregard makes contradictory statements on the entire matter, saying Island No 10 must be protected, and implying that it's just a delaying position to cover Fort Pillow (some 50 miles further downstream). He also mentions the idea of keeping these posts relatively small, with the field army being available to relieve them when threatened.
This is a good idea, but there's a couple of problems. First, when the Union does approach, the main army is busy elsewhere dealing with Grant. Second, and something that the authors never mention, is if an army is to march to the relief of Island No. 10, how is it going to get there?
The entire siege of these defenses is something of a slow motion disaster for the Confederates. With a fair amount of trouble, and after repairing a railroad from Bird's Point, Pope approaches New Madrid, and despite effort and time, the defenses aren't ready to match his force, and the town is abandoned. There follows a period of 'sitzkrieg', largely because the naval commanders of both sides consider their commands to valuable to risk to enemy guns. Nonetheless, a steady bombardment of the defenses is kept up, largely by number of mortar boats.
Flanking the position could have used some discussion in the book, but the reality is that the New Madrid earthquakes (a series of seven quakes ranging from about 6.0 to 7.5 magnitude over the course of two months) five decades earlier had formed Reelfoot Lake, and drowned large areas into timber covered bayous. The entire area is drowned and marshy, and hard to move about in. The Confederate garrison was installed by moving up the river. When Union forces do eventually cross below the area, there's no good way out, with troops having to swim or float through bayous behind the position.
Which shows how hard it would be to march a large army into the area, and presumably crossing the Mississippi above Island No 10, and marching down to the battery at the initial bend would be similarly impracticable. The Union success eventually rested on creating a canal of sorts between the Mississippi and Wilson's Bayou, which lets out next to New Madrid, and lets them get a number of transports past the island
I could use a better look at some of the area around Madrid Bend, and discussions of what approaches to the area were available. But, short of that, this is a good account of a too-little studied part of the ACW.
Bock and Daniel's book is short (150 pages, discounting end-matter), but very informative.
The situation is certainly interesting enough, with the Confederates looking for ways to hold the Mississippi Valley, and the S-bend at New Madrid on the Missouri-Tennessee seems a good spot. At the apex of the first bend is the tenth island in the Mississippi past where it joins the Ohio River. A fortified battery of guns on the island will close it to (unfriendly) navigation.
Of course this means protecting said battery from being cut off, and that proves more troublesome. The Confederacy is not exactly well supplied with men or equipment. In fact, the units that are shipped for the garrison are in horrible shape, some not having nearly enough weapons, and many of the ones they do have are prone to breaking.
Outside of small arms, things are a bit better, and number of batteries are established. There's a "floating battery", a converted floating drydock mounted with nine fairly powerful cannon (with Wikipedia sourcing another book with a figure of 20), and with no motive power, anchored in the lee of Island 10, as well as a small squadron of gunboats. One battery is sited to fire up the length of the Mississippi as it enters the S-bend. The main positional problem is the opposite shore, where someone could potentially come up on the Missouri side, and cross below the protected point and cut off the position. So, a garrison is installed in New Madrid, to protect the apex of the second bend.
This is all a bit much to protect for an army that's having problems putting together a decent field force. There's a fair amount of indecision to go around, including how extensive any outer "shell" of defenses should be. Beauregard makes contradictory statements on the entire matter, saying Island No 10 must be protected, and implying that it's just a delaying position to cover Fort Pillow (some 50 miles further downstream). He also mentions the idea of keeping these posts relatively small, with the field army being available to relieve them when threatened.
This is a good idea, but there's a couple of problems. First, when the Union does approach, the main army is busy elsewhere dealing with Grant. Second, and something that the authors never mention, is if an army is to march to the relief of Island No. 10, how is it going to get there?
The entire siege of these defenses is something of a slow motion disaster for the Confederates. With a fair amount of trouble, and after repairing a railroad from Bird's Point, Pope approaches New Madrid, and despite effort and time, the defenses aren't ready to match his force, and the town is abandoned. There follows a period of 'sitzkrieg', largely because the naval commanders of both sides consider their commands to valuable to risk to enemy guns. Nonetheless, a steady bombardment of the defenses is kept up, largely by number of mortar boats.
Flanking the position could have used some discussion in the book, but the reality is that the New Madrid earthquakes (a series of seven quakes ranging from about 6.0 to 7.5 magnitude over the course of two months) five decades earlier had formed Reelfoot Lake, and drowned large areas into timber covered bayous. The entire area is drowned and marshy, and hard to move about in. The Confederate garrison was installed by moving up the river. When Union forces do eventually cross below the area, there's no good way out, with troops having to swim or float through bayous behind the position.
Which shows how hard it would be to march a large army into the area, and presumably crossing the Mississippi above Island No 10, and marching down to the battery at the initial bend would be similarly impracticable. The Union success eventually rested on creating a canal of sorts between the Mississippi and Wilson's Bayou, which lets out next to New Madrid, and lets them get a number of transports past the island
I could use a better look at some of the area around Madrid Bend, and discussions of what approaches to the area were available. But, short of that, this is a good account of a too-little studied part of the ACW.
February 20, 2022
In the spring of 1862, the Confederacy received several critical blows, including the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, the reverse at Shiloh, and the loss of New Orleans. To these must be added the loss of Island Number 10 on the Mississippi River. Its loss resulted in Union control of the Mississippi River down through Memphis.
The book does a good job of telling the battle from both Union and Confederate perspectives. The maps were adequate. This is one of the few books on this overshadowed battle and is recommended for those wanting to learn more about it.
The book does a good job of telling the battle from both Union and Confederate perspectives. The maps were adequate. This is one of the few books on this overshadowed battle and is recommended for those wanting to learn more about it.
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