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World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute Vs. Relational Theories of Space and Time
Newton's Principia introduced conceptions of space and time that launched one of the most famous and sustained debates in the history of physics, a controversy that involves fundamental concerns in the foundations of physics, metaphysics, and scientific epistemology.
This book introduces and clarifies the historical and philosophical development of the clash between Newton's absolute conception of space and Leibniz's relational one. It separates the issues and provides new perspectives on absolute relational accounts of motion and relational-substantival accounts of the ontology of space time.
Earman's sustained treatment and imaginative insights raise to a new level the debate on these important issues at the boundary of philosophy and physics. He surveys the history of the controversy from Newton to Einstein develops the mathematics and physics needed to pose the issues in sharp form and provides a persuasive assessment of the philosophical problems involved.
Most importantly, Earman revitalizes the connection of the debate to contemporary science. He shows, for example, how concerns raised by Leibniz form the core of ongoing debate on the foundations of general theory of relativity, moving the discussion into a new and vital arena and introducing arguments that will be discussed for years to come.
John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. A Bradford Book
This book introduces and clarifies the historical and philosophical development of the clash between Newton's absolute conception of space and Leibniz's relational one. It separates the issues and provides new perspectives on absolute relational accounts of motion and relational-substantival accounts of the ontology of space time.
Earman's sustained treatment and imaginative insights raise to a new level the debate on these important issues at the boundary of philosophy and physics. He surveys the history of the controversy from Newton to Einstein develops the mathematics and physics needed to pose the issues in sharp form and provides a persuasive assessment of the philosophical problems involved.
Most importantly, Earman revitalizes the connection of the debate to contemporary science. He shows, for example, how concerns raised by Leibniz form the core of ongoing debate on the foundations of general theory of relativity, moving the discussion into a new and vital arena and introducing arguments that will be discussed for years to come.
John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. A Bradford Book
- GenresPhilosophyPhysics
250 pages, Hardcover
First published December 20, 1989
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
January 21, 2009
earman likes to intimidate people away with his mathematics.
March 13, 2023
This book is certainly beyond my capabilities so I cannot meaningfully evaluate its content. For someone with a physics a background it probably provides a good overview of the absolute vs relative space-time argument.
My key takeaway is that the problem isn’t resolved even today, and none of the perspectives can offer a resolution to the remaining problems.
My key takeaway is that the problem isn’t resolved even today, and none of the perspectives can offer a resolution to the remaining problems.
August 27, 2025
liked this. earman is opinionated, and spends most of the book (fairly, as it appears to me) attacking classical relationism and its various defensive postures. the last chapter problematises substantivalism with the hole argument nicely, giving way to productive aporia. i especially appreciate earman's attention to kant, even as he is difficult to place
October 30, 2025
This book largely comes down in favour of a substantivalist view, but not based on any very convincing arguments. Much of it seems to come from a natural empiricist bias in line with the approach of analytic philosophy. He seems to make every opportunity to steelman Newtons absolutist positions about space and time, even confounding them with much more modest substantivalist claims at times. While Strawmanning the efforts of Leibniz at every opportunity, including peremptory dismissals of some principles such as PSR and PIID. The motivation behind this seeming to be little more than a bias in favour of the supposed empirical methods of Newton, compared to the rationalism of a Leibniz.
On one point he is correct, in that Leibnizean style relationalism, based on a Machian principle, was not vindicated by General Relativity. But neither was any aspect of substantivalism of any substance that Earman seems to be able to come up with. The indications of Essentialism near the end based on the hole argument, seem to be one last desperate attempt to salvage Substantivalism when all else has failed. He acknowledges the failure of Manifold Substantivalism. Though since this book Earman has tried to argue for a substantive form of General Covariance, based on very limited support. The mathematical symmetries of gauge invariance seem an unlikely ground on which to argue for any philosophically fundamental account. Conservation laws representing a nice empirical methodological principle, but they tend to dissolve when it comes to substance. He will ultimately have to appeal to empirically detected or observed energy, and this, absent the whole presumptive theoretical framework supporting it, will not entail the kind of ontological conclusions he wants to draw.
The problem for Earman is that he seems to be so focused on letting current scientific tools determine his ontology that he forgets they must have some basis in solid philosophical principles if he wants to do philosophical work with them, beyond adopting a mere uncritical deference to the current paradigm of science.
On one point he is correct, in that Leibnizean style relationalism, based on a Machian principle, was not vindicated by General Relativity. But neither was any aspect of substantivalism of any substance that Earman seems to be able to come up with. The indications of Essentialism near the end based on the hole argument, seem to be one last desperate attempt to salvage Substantivalism when all else has failed. He acknowledges the failure of Manifold Substantivalism. Though since this book Earman has tried to argue for a substantive form of General Covariance, based on very limited support. The mathematical symmetries of gauge invariance seem an unlikely ground on which to argue for any philosophically fundamental account. Conservation laws representing a nice empirical methodological principle, but they tend to dissolve when it comes to substance. He will ultimately have to appeal to empirically detected or observed energy, and this, absent the whole presumptive theoretical framework supporting it, will not entail the kind of ontological conclusions he wants to draw.
The problem for Earman is that he seems to be so focused on letting current scientific tools determine his ontology that he forgets they must have some basis in solid philosophical principles if he wants to do philosophical work with them, beyond adopting a mere uncritical deference to the current paradigm of science.
August 12, 2020
John Earman manages to present the rather technical and metaphysical issues of the Absolutist-Relationalist debate in a readable, and accurate manner.
During the first half of the book, one can't help but feel that Earman is being a bit biased towards the absolutist side of the debate, but during the later chapters where Einstein's hole argument is introduced, this bias vanishes completely leading to the impression that Earman is simply being critical of fallacious arguments.
The conclusion Earman offers in the final chapters presents the state of the debate in a very convincing light given the arguments presented on both sides, for Earman the classical forms of both the absolutist and relationalist fail to hold, and that we must move forward to reveal a third position.
The somewhat avoidant conclusion is not as unpleasant as it might be on other questions. Incredibly powerful counterarguments are presented against both positions, most notably that relationalism cannot account for centrifugal forces and the field theory approach of modern physics, while absolutism cannot rescue determinism from the jaws of the hole argument. Thus, Earman's conclusion is derived quite convincingly form the arguments presented.
This is both a wonderful introduction to the contemporary discussion and an engaging and lovably readable historical survey of the debate.
During the first half of the book, one can't help but feel that Earman is being a bit biased towards the absolutist side of the debate, but during the later chapters where Einstein's hole argument is introduced, this bias vanishes completely leading to the impression that Earman is simply being critical of fallacious arguments.
The conclusion Earman offers in the final chapters presents the state of the debate in a very convincing light given the arguments presented on both sides, for Earman the classical forms of both the absolutist and relationalist fail to hold, and that we must move forward to reveal a third position.
The somewhat avoidant conclusion is not as unpleasant as it might be on other questions. Incredibly powerful counterarguments are presented against both positions, most notably that relationalism cannot account for centrifugal forces and the field theory approach of modern physics, while absolutism cannot rescue determinism from the jaws of the hole argument. Thus, Earman's conclusion is derived quite convincingly form the arguments presented.
This is both a wonderful introduction to the contemporary discussion and an engaging and lovably readable historical survey of the debate.
August 7, 2011
Une inspiration sans cesse renouvelée.
January 21, 2014
Thorough, but hard to read at one sitting.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews