At the Water's Edge, by Melvin Small, is about the role that domestic politics played in US Strategy towards Vietnam. To some extent it also covers the exploitation of the US political system by the North Vietnamese. Its a really interesting story in the sense that so much of the modern political dynamic really begins with the Vietnam War.
The antiwar movement is really what colors the modern Democratic party -- its weak on defense, captured by minority interest groups, and generally anti-American. Of course, as a Democrat, I am not saying that this is true in anyway. I am just saying that the origins of that mindset begging here.
Similarly, the contemporary caricature of the Republican party begins here. They are demagogues who are saying one thing and doing another. They are a white men's club made up of the priviledged for the priviledged. They cloak themselves in the flag to justify their sinister objectives. Again, I am not assigning reality, but just echoing that our modern political dialog is still very much wrapped up in the parameters set by Vietnam.
To these observations, you can add distrust of the media, cynicism about government and authority figures. Yet, also a real disdain for protestors and those disaffected from the political system.
The Water's Edge is filled with clever little anecdotes about the machinations of LBJ and Nixon during Vietnam. One thing that struck me in particular, is that Nixon's reputation as a domestic "liberal" really results from Halderman. Nixon was so in the weeds on Vietnam, he just stopped caring about domestic programs. That left the whole realm of policy to the surprisingly progressive Halderman.
The prose is clean if uninspired. But the pull of the narrative is compelling, and at points, chilling, given the modern parallel's between the Iraq war and Vietnam. As an aside, what in the hell was George Bush thinking when he analogized withdrawl from Iraq to withdrawl from Vietnam? Did he really think that most Americans thought we should have stayed in Vietnam longer?
The most interesting conclusion from this work is that the antiwar movement in Vietnam was a failure. It may have checked the unlimited escalation of the war in Vietnam, but it did not bring it to an end much sooner than it would have otherwise. All three affected presidents were on the same timeline. They all wanted out, but for all of them, it had to come after reelection. No one wanted to be the guy who "lost Vietnam." That meant, the war would have to end in their second term. It also meant that it went on needlessly for something like 8 years. Our terms of withdrawl were attainable much earlier. What's worse, by the time we left, Congress was in no mood to assist South Vietnam any further. We stood idly by as our sattelite fell out of orbit. Perhaps had LBJ successfully negotiated a conclusion to the war, our resolve as a country to help South Vietnam may have been stronger.
In any case, for those of you not interested in the subject matter for its own sake, let me say that someone once described Iraq as Vietnam on crack. I think a read of this book will illustrate the insight of that remark.