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At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault
Book by Gatchel, Theodore L.
266 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 1996
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 24, 2017
At The Water's Edge explores a specific approach to amphibious warfare: how to defend a shore against an amphibious attack. Using the modern historical record from the British campaign in Gallipoli in the Great War through the battle between the United Kingdom and Argentina in the Falklands, author Theodore Gatchel posits that despite popular belief, it is more difficult to defend against an amphibious assault than to successfully execute an amphibious assault. As the author points out, this flies in the face of all conventional wisdom on the conduct of what is generally considered the most complex military operation possible. By using the defender’s viewpoint to explore the major amphibious assaults of the last century, he creates an excellent, if somewhat outdated, primer on the factors of success in executing an amphibious assault.
Gatchel, a retired USMC colonel, opens the book with a quote from General Eisenhower that “Successful Penetration of a defended beach is the most difficult operation in warfare”. His view is that this is contradicted by a seemingly unending string of amphibious successes, making a successful defense against an amphibious assault to be a subject more in need of exploration. The book is structured in chapters exploring landings in Gallipoli, WWII in both the Atlantic and Pacific, and then finally the Korean and Falklands Wars. With the obvious exception of Gallipoli, all these appear to support Gatchel’s premise. The reasons given by Gatchel are several: Attackers will often gain at least partial control of the sea and air around their intended landing target, and can often choose their landing site or even decide to not engage in an operation based on unfavorable conditions. The defender must choose from three paradigms: Naval defense (disrupting the attacker at sea, preferably before he disembarks onto his connectors), defense at the water’s edge (as they land), and mobile ground defense (massing dispersed forces once the enemy’s landing is underway), or a combination of the three. But the defender must practice close coordination between those paradigms, which means directing disparate naval, ground and air elements, and has the additional disadvantage of having to defend every landable location until the attacker’s intent is known, or if using a mobile defense have the ability to mass against the enemy near any available beaches. They also lack the option of not joining the fight. The only cited example that came close to a defender's success was Wake Island, where the area was so limited that the defenders were able to effectively mass against the enemy, driving off the first waves of their attack. The remaining cases demonstrate a pair of other non-obvious lessons: The attacker in the overwhelming number of cases was faster at massing combat power than the defender; and that conducting attacks ahead of schedule aided the attackers while delays aided the defenders.
The book’s comprehensive review of the largest amphibious landings of modern era, the author’s use of a didactic structuring to include observations and conclusions at the end of each chapter, and its structure that fits chronologically while being grouped coherently by changes in defensive paradigms, make it an excellent single book primer on modern amphibious history. The author goes deep into primary sources like Ellis’s Advanced Naval Bases in Micronesia and even structures his bibliography by document type to encourage further research by the reader. The weakness of the book comes from it’s age, and its lack of any foresight into future shifts in warfare, such as our current fights against irregular, substate actors or our predicted fights against future peer competitors. For example, our current conception of amphibious warfare expects interventions in the growing megacities of the third world coasts. How effective could a defense of the shore be when the terrain 100 meters from the beach is densely built up urban blocks, and the sprawling city has enough disparate militia to effectively cover all of the possible landing sites, or use improved roads and motor vehicles to mass against us? As students of the MEU/MEB paradigm, the book further loses value due to the cases explored being of massed assaults by numerous simultaneous battalions or larger, while our current doctrine and capabilities typically plan for amphibious assaults of less than a battalion of troops. While Gatchel presents in his conclusion what appears to be a realistic plan for how a major amphibious assault can finally be repelled, the age continues to show as it lacks discussion of peer capabilities such as longer range missile or Electronic Warfare.
Despite the age-related weaknesses, At the Water’s Edge provides excellent history and analysis of Amphibious Landings. By utilizing the view of the defender, the book provides lessons that serve the attackers just as well. All Marines studying the employment of amphibious forces would benefit from reading this book concurrent with studying doctrine, both the get the broad survey of modern amphibious assaults, and to learn in depth their challenges and successes.
Gatchel, a retired USMC colonel, opens the book with a quote from General Eisenhower that “Successful Penetration of a defended beach is the most difficult operation in warfare”. His view is that this is contradicted by a seemingly unending string of amphibious successes, making a successful defense against an amphibious assault to be a subject more in need of exploration. The book is structured in chapters exploring landings in Gallipoli, WWII in both the Atlantic and Pacific, and then finally the Korean and Falklands Wars. With the obvious exception of Gallipoli, all these appear to support Gatchel’s premise. The reasons given by Gatchel are several: Attackers will often gain at least partial control of the sea and air around their intended landing target, and can often choose their landing site or even decide to not engage in an operation based on unfavorable conditions. The defender must choose from three paradigms: Naval defense (disrupting the attacker at sea, preferably before he disembarks onto his connectors), defense at the water’s edge (as they land), and mobile ground defense (massing dispersed forces once the enemy’s landing is underway), or a combination of the three. But the defender must practice close coordination between those paradigms, which means directing disparate naval, ground and air elements, and has the additional disadvantage of having to defend every landable location until the attacker’s intent is known, or if using a mobile defense have the ability to mass against the enemy near any available beaches. They also lack the option of not joining the fight. The only cited example that came close to a defender's success was Wake Island, where the area was so limited that the defenders were able to effectively mass against the enemy, driving off the first waves of their attack. The remaining cases demonstrate a pair of other non-obvious lessons: The attacker in the overwhelming number of cases was faster at massing combat power than the defender; and that conducting attacks ahead of schedule aided the attackers while delays aided the defenders.
The book’s comprehensive review of the largest amphibious landings of modern era, the author’s use of a didactic structuring to include observations and conclusions at the end of each chapter, and its structure that fits chronologically while being grouped coherently by changes in defensive paradigms, make it an excellent single book primer on modern amphibious history. The author goes deep into primary sources like Ellis’s Advanced Naval Bases in Micronesia and even structures his bibliography by document type to encourage further research by the reader. The weakness of the book comes from it’s age, and its lack of any foresight into future shifts in warfare, such as our current fights against irregular, substate actors or our predicted fights against future peer competitors. For example, our current conception of amphibious warfare expects interventions in the growing megacities of the third world coasts. How effective could a defense of the shore be when the terrain 100 meters from the beach is densely built up urban blocks, and the sprawling city has enough disparate militia to effectively cover all of the possible landing sites, or use improved roads and motor vehicles to mass against us? As students of the MEU/MEB paradigm, the book further loses value due to the cases explored being of massed assaults by numerous simultaneous battalions or larger, while our current doctrine and capabilities typically plan for amphibious assaults of less than a battalion of troops. While Gatchel presents in his conclusion what appears to be a realistic plan for how a major amphibious assault can finally be repelled, the age continues to show as it lacks discussion of peer capabilities such as longer range missile or Electronic Warfare.
Despite the age-related weaknesses, At the Water’s Edge provides excellent history and analysis of Amphibious Landings. By utilizing the view of the defender, the book provides lessons that serve the attackers just as well. All Marines studying the employment of amphibious forces would benefit from reading this book concurrent with studying doctrine, both the get the broad survey of modern amphibious assaults, and to learn in depth their challenges and successes.
March 24, 2020
Good research material
I'm writing a novel and needed a book focusing on the defense planning against amphibious assaults, and this book delivered. Written by a retired Cold War-era US Marine, published by the Naval Institute Press, it explores the contradiction in military history that amphibious landings have a statistically very high success rate, even though the attacker should theoretically have the more difficult job than the defender. It deals with every major amphibious assault from Gallipoli to the Falklands, with copious footnotes for further research. Excellent work.
I'm writing a novel and needed a book focusing on the defense planning against amphibious assaults, and this book delivered. Written by a retired Cold War-era US Marine, published by the Naval Institute Press, it explores the contradiction in military history that amphibious landings have a statistically very high success rate, even though the attacker should theoretically have the more difficult job than the defender. It deals with every major amphibious assault from Gallipoli to the Falklands, with copious footnotes for further research. Excellent work.
April 4, 2025
I hope the Taiwans are reading this, and the Chinese are not.
This is the most thoroughly explained analysis of how amphibious assaults are won or lost, I've ever read, including military publications.
This is the most thoroughly explained analysis of how amphibious assaults are won or lost, I've ever read, including military publications.
October 22, 2023
A comprehensive look at how militaries have unsuccessfully defended against amphibious operations over the past 100 years.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews