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Filosofía de la ciencia natural
Al igual que muchos de los iniciadores de la moderna teoría de la ciencia -Rudof Carnap y Karl Popper, entre otros-, Carl Hempel (1905) permaneció ligado durante su juventud al movimiento del empirismo lógico, en su caso por su incorporación durante la década de los 30 al «grupo de Berlín», representante en la capital alemana del neopositivismo del Círculo de Viena.
This volume explores the logic and methodology of scientific inquiry rather than its substantive results.
This volume explores the logic and methodology of scientific inquiry rather than its substantive results.
168 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1966
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews
September 8, 2017
Good bye Hempel see you never
October 10, 2017
Very useful, but super hard to understand.
September 26, 2018
The book was technical and dry. Most of it involved the hard sciences where definitions and data are precise.
Hempel clarifies that to describe phenomena and predict its behavior is not the same thing as explaining why it operates as it does. We have a “strong grounds for believing” that “galaxies recede from our local one at enormous speeds, yet [this] does not explain why.” Hempel also cautions that a scientific law “cannot be adequately defined as a true statement of universal form” without specifying the accompanying conditions (laws “are known to hold only approximately and with certain qualifications”). As an example of a qualified form pertains to “probabilistic laws” such as the possibility that measles might be contracted under certain conditions. Hempel does not discuss whether there are implications of quantum physics for the “philosophy of natural science.”
For humans, as natural phenomena studied scientifically, Hempel uses the “mind-matter psycho-physical problem” to specifically illustrate the division between reductionism (psychological phenomena that “can be reduced to those of biology, chemistry, and physics”) and something that exists beyond this. Hempel uses behaviorism as an example of reductionism that rejects “all reliance on methods such as introspection, which can be used only by the subject himself in a phenomenalistic exploration of his mental world; and it does not admit as psychological data any of the ‘private’ psychological phenomena – such as sensations, feelings, hopes, and fears – that introspective methods are said to reveal.” I am not clear whether he is supporting this kind of reductionism but, if he is, he misses a good part of who we are. It could be that Hempel is saying that there is no mind-matter problem (in the sense of an inherent division), but rather, that science has not identified how chemical-electrical signals are [‘mechanically’] transformed into the representation of reality and encaptualized as memory.
At the end of the book, Hempel refers to “methodological individualism” in the social sciences that explains individual behavior in terms of “individual psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics” but Hempel casts it outside of the realm of science. Or, rather, he says that this is a problem for the “philosophy of the social sciences,” not “the philosophy of natural science,” which is the scope (and title) of his book.
Hempel bumps into a problem with biology. It’s almost like he’s saying that biology is not a science. As it now stands, life phenomena are deemed to be “manifestations of underlying teleological agencies of a nonphysical kind, referred to as entelechies or vital forces.” Hempel cautions against the import of mysterious life forces that neither describe nor explain life phenomena with the precision necessary to be viewed properly as science. Biology remains, he says, a neo-vital discipline and science must continue to “persist in the search for basic physico-chemical theories of biological phenomena rather than resign himself to the view that the concepts and principles of physics and chemistry are powerless to give an adequate account of the phenomena of life.”
A clue to Hempel’s views on biology is given in this description: “Living systems…display a variety of striking features that seem to be distinctly purposive or teleological in character,” he writes. This “that seems to be” reference is interesting given that living beings are clearly purposeful. They do what needs to be done to survive. Acknowledging that biological processes are highly varied and not as neat and tidy as the non-life sciences, “it seems to be” a step too far to exclude life science from natural science. Is there a problem with the definition of natural science? Is hard science criteria appropriate for the “life sciences?” In this book, Hempel appropriates the “natural science” terminology when, perhaps, the book should have been titled the “philosophy of physical science” which, like biology, would be then a subset of “natural science.”
Hempel clarifies that to describe phenomena and predict its behavior is not the same thing as explaining why it operates as it does. We have a “strong grounds for believing” that “galaxies recede from our local one at enormous speeds, yet [this] does not explain why.” Hempel also cautions that a scientific law “cannot be adequately defined as a true statement of universal form” without specifying the accompanying conditions (laws “are known to hold only approximately and with certain qualifications”). As an example of a qualified form pertains to “probabilistic laws” such as the possibility that measles might be contracted under certain conditions. Hempel does not discuss whether there are implications of quantum physics for the “philosophy of natural science.”
For humans, as natural phenomena studied scientifically, Hempel uses the “mind-matter psycho-physical problem” to specifically illustrate the division between reductionism (psychological phenomena that “can be reduced to those of biology, chemistry, and physics”) and something that exists beyond this. Hempel uses behaviorism as an example of reductionism that rejects “all reliance on methods such as introspection, which can be used only by the subject himself in a phenomenalistic exploration of his mental world; and it does not admit as psychological data any of the ‘private’ psychological phenomena – such as sensations, feelings, hopes, and fears – that introspective methods are said to reveal.” I am not clear whether he is supporting this kind of reductionism but, if he is, he misses a good part of who we are. It could be that Hempel is saying that there is no mind-matter problem (in the sense of an inherent division), but rather, that science has not identified how chemical-electrical signals are [‘mechanically’] transformed into the representation of reality and encaptualized as memory.
At the end of the book, Hempel refers to “methodological individualism” in the social sciences that explains individual behavior in terms of “individual psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics” but Hempel casts it outside of the realm of science. Or, rather, he says that this is a problem for the “philosophy of the social sciences,” not “the philosophy of natural science,” which is the scope (and title) of his book.
Hempel bumps into a problem with biology. It’s almost like he’s saying that biology is not a science. As it now stands, life phenomena are deemed to be “manifestations of underlying teleological agencies of a nonphysical kind, referred to as entelechies or vital forces.” Hempel cautions against the import of mysterious life forces that neither describe nor explain life phenomena with the precision necessary to be viewed properly as science. Biology remains, he says, a neo-vital discipline and science must continue to “persist in the search for basic physico-chemical theories of biological phenomena rather than resign himself to the view that the concepts and principles of physics and chemistry are powerless to give an adequate account of the phenomena of life.”
A clue to Hempel’s views on biology is given in this description: “Living systems…display a variety of striking features that seem to be distinctly purposive or teleological in character,” he writes. This “that seems to be” reference is interesting given that living beings are clearly purposeful. They do what needs to be done to survive. Acknowledging that biological processes are highly varied and not as neat and tidy as the non-life sciences, “it seems to be” a step too far to exclude life science from natural science. Is there a problem with the definition of natural science? Is hard science criteria appropriate for the “life sciences?” In this book, Hempel appropriates the “natural science” terminology when, perhaps, the book should have been titled the “philosophy of physical science” which, like biology, would be then a subset of “natural science.”
September 25, 2015
This is a great, classical introduction to some traditional issues of the philosophy of natural science. There are, of course, better, more comprehensive and serious introductory books on this subject, but Hempel's could still be used as a starting point.
September 22, 2022
Read this for class. The best thing about it is that it's over.
December 19, 2024
Obra estrella del filósofo alemán Carl Hempel, imprescindible para comprender su archiconocido modelo de cobertura legal desde el que se pretende fundamentar la explicacion cientifica. También incluye disertaciones acerca de la construcción y contratación de hipótesis así como de la formación de los conceptos científicos y la reducción de las teorías. Es interesante y amena de leer, pero la historia ya ha demostrado en reiteradas ocasiones las limitaciones del programa neopositivista.
August 8, 2013
Again a study book I read 35 years ago. Hempel is old-school standard model philosophy of science. But I must admit that he shows a decent level of relativism, he is not preaching nor black and white in his prescriptions regarding the scientific process. He discusses hypothesis forming, concepts, theory and briefly, really briefly, in the last chapter, the discussion about reductionism.
Hempel doesn't have a very colorful style of writing, and he presents the topic in a quite abstract fashion. I assume there are better introductory texts if you need to get into it.
Folkert
Www.ExcitingTechnology.net
Hempel doesn't have a very colorful style of writing, and he presents the topic in a quite abstract fashion. I assume there are better introductory texts if you need to get into it.
Folkert
Www.ExcitingTechnology.net
January 23, 2012
Philosophy of Natural Science was a delightful balance of brevity and depth. It was a lucid as well as rigorous account of the foundations of scientific thought and method. I found wonderful insight into the nature of scientific hypotheses and theories.
October 18, 2009
Science, Faith, and Technology.
Really confusing, and could be much less wordy. Conclusions are good, though!
Really confusing, and could be much less wordy. Conclusions are good, though!
June 12, 2023
Hempel te como la boquita. Primer libro de filosofía de la ciencia que me leo. Super interesante (y accesible)
December 21, 2023
I enjoyed this book more than Laudan, probably because I read it earlier in the semester (lol). The way he broke down how Semmelweis examines the infant mortality rate of a hospital in one division compared to another and uses logic to conclude that Doctors need to wash their hands was the most interesting part of the book to me. It is a challenging read if you are not deeply into philosophy and science.
I'm not sure I agree with some notions I derived from the book. For instance, Hempel argues that if Testability cannot predict or explain, then it is not scientifically useful. I do not agree with this because we can at times look at our failures and shortcomings we can still learn procedurally from these outcomes or we can learn how to derive the correct answers. Hempel relies solely on explanatory relevance and testability, whereas I suppose ad hoc hypotheses are lazy, they still could lead to interesting results that might explain some other phenomenon, I don't know. Hempel argues that ad hoc hypotheses are generated for the sole purpose of saving an evidentially threatened hypothesis, not called for by other findings, which then leads to no additional test implications. I suppose he's correct but is this not a more traditional way of philosophical thinking? Maybe we shouldn't save hypotheses if they are incorrect or invalid?
I'm not sure I agree with some notions I derived from the book. For instance, Hempel argues that if Testability cannot predict or explain, then it is not scientifically useful. I do not agree with this because we can at times look at our failures and shortcomings we can still learn procedurally from these outcomes or we can learn how to derive the correct answers. Hempel relies solely on explanatory relevance and testability, whereas I suppose ad hoc hypotheses are lazy, they still could lead to interesting results that might explain some other phenomenon, I don't know. Hempel argues that ad hoc hypotheses are generated for the sole purpose of saving an evidentially threatened hypothesis, not called for by other findings, which then leads to no additional test implications. I suppose he's correct but is this not a more traditional way of philosophical thinking? Maybe we shouldn't save hypotheses if they are incorrect or invalid?
November 26, 2025
This short volume is an introduction to the philosophy of natural science. It is part of a series the "Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series". It offers an interesting survey of the then basic concepts of the field and some of the controversies around them. Much of the text is taken up with how scientific hypotheses are formulated and tested, with examples from history including Semmelweis's development of antiseptic practices in medicine and Pascal's experiments with mercury barometers to establish theories of atmospheric pressure. There is also extensive discussion of ideas of scientific explanation and in particular reduction. The discussions while brief and often in a very different context from later debates in the field still often nicely introduce and talk around various positions in the field such as realism and antirealism about the contents of theories. Hempel's own ideas about explanation and reduction are succinctly presented here.
The book contains an interesting further reading section. Also the in text references can be interesting, and includes a very brief mention of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions that would significantly reshape the field.
The book contains an interesting further reading section. Also the in text references can be interesting, and includes a very brief mention of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions that would significantly reshape the field.
August 22, 2025
Filosofía de la ciencia natural de Carl G. Hempel es una introducción clara y rigurosa a los principales problemas de la filosofía de la ciencia. Representante del empirismo lógico, Hempel expone con precisión temas como la naturaleza de las hipótesis científicas, la función de las leyes generales, el papel de la observación y la importancia del lenguaje lógico en la construcción del conocimiento. Su célebre modelo nomológico-deductivo, que entiende la explicación científica como la deducción de un fenómeno a partir de leyes y condiciones iniciales, se presenta aquí de manera accesible para estudiantes y especialistas.
Aunque la obra refleja los límites del positivismo lógico, sigue siendo fundamental para comprender los debates contemporáneos, pues permite apreciar cómo se pensaba la ciencia en el siglo XX y qué críticas posteriores abrieron nuevos caminos. En suma, un texto breve, sistemático y altamente recomendable, que merece una sólida calificación de cuatro estrellas
Aunque la obra refleja los límites del positivismo lógico, sigue siendo fundamental para comprender los debates contemporáneos, pues permite apreciar cómo se pensaba la ciencia en el siglo XX y qué críticas posteriores abrieron nuevos caminos. En suma, un texto breve, sistemático y altamente recomendable, que merece una sólida calificación de cuatro estrellas
December 24, 2025
Very clear and well-organized, super useful pedagogically. Good for assigning intro readings on induction, confirmation, and the deductive-nomological model of explanation. Students seem to find the Semmelweis case study in Ch. 2 very helpful in understanding naive inductivism and its problems, as well as the context of discovery/context of justification distinction. Discussions of operationalism in Ch. 7 are a nice springboard for discussions of verificationism/empiricism. Thinking of also maybe throwing in Ch. 8 and using it as an introduction to Nagelian reduction, if I ever teach HPS again.
January 14, 2018
ja sam ovo čitala zbog ispita iz filozofije nauke ali moram priznati da mi nije žao što sam pročitala! pošto je meni ovo bio prvi put da se susrećem sa filozofijom nauke, rekla bih da je ovo skroz ok za stvaranje slike neke početne! ipak, 4 zvezdice jer bilo puno pozivanja na neke koncepte iz prirodnih nauka (baš čudno, pa knjiga se zove filozofija prirodnih nauka!) ali na način kao da se pretpostavlja da se to već zna.. a ja eto mnogo toga od ponuđenog nisam znala pa onda guglaj i slično. zato 4⭐ inače, kao osnova super a i stil je ok, za razliku od kunovog npr.
August 3, 2019
La palabra "filosofía" es empleada aquí como "un conjunto sistemático de razonamientos".
En otras palabras, es un tratado del método científico y sus formas, con ejemplos excelentes e interesantes para mantener la atención del lector cuando el tema se pone demasiado denso.
A veces, se siente que Hempel se ensaña demasiado con otros autores científicos. Si se lo merecen o no, queda fuera de mi jurisdicción.
En otras palabras, es un tratado del método científico y sus formas, con ejemplos excelentes e interesantes para mantener la atención del lector cuando el tema se pone demasiado denso.
A veces, se siente que Hempel se ensaña demasiado con otros autores científicos. Si se lo merecen o no, queda fuera de mi jurisdicción.
November 30, 2025
Hempel es uno de los filósofos de la ciencia más relevantes del siglo XX, y uno de los iniciadores a su vez del empirismo lógico, corriente filosofía madura de la llamada Concepción Heredada de la Ciencia.
Este obra tiene un carácter puramente divulgativo, tratando de forma didáctica la concepción que propone de la ciencia. Hempel defenderá el método hipotético-deductivo (nomológico deductivo) como método propio de la ciencia, y expondrá una serie de cuestiones relacionadas especialmente con el tema de la contrastación y la explicación.
Este obra tiene un carácter puramente divulgativo, tratando de forma didáctica la concepción que propone de la ciencia. Hempel defenderá el método hipotético-deductivo (nomológico deductivo) como método propio de la ciencia, y expondrá una serie de cuestiones relacionadas especialmente con el tema de la contrastación y la explicación.
April 23, 2025
An important and influential work in the philosophy of science. Hempel described the empirical sciences as containing the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology) and the social sciences (psychology, sociology, economics). At the end of his book he describes the reducibility of the social sciences to physical-chemical concepts. Most of the book, however, is devoted fundamental aspects of science such as experimental methods, hypothesis testing, requirements of explanations, general characteristics of theories and much more in a short book.
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September 9, 2019if i had to wade through this whole book i am damn well counting it towards my reading challenge
January 19, 2020
Bardzo przegadana i bardzo fizyczna
Want to read
February 10, 2020Science
February 5, 2022
Aspects of Scientific Explanation is better (because more in-depth & developed analysis of same issues). This might be a good intro book though.
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February 10, 2025Va, pero entonces la astrología cuenta como ciencia o no?
February 24, 2025
Useful, but not a life changing text. A resource I may come back to, but one that is just acting as a consolidation piece and partially seeing things from a different point of view.
May 31, 2025
Insightful but Kuhn btfos
September 5, 2025
Lihtne raamat mida kirjutati liiga keeruliste sõnadega...
September 17, 2025
Hempel's analyses zijn nauwgezet en systematisch, en bij tijden erg verhelderend, maar hij maakt er te veel woorden aan vuil.
August 29, 2023
Capítulo 5. LAS LEYES Y SU PAPEL EN LA EXPLICACIÓN CIENTÍFICA.
July 11, 2019
Exhaustive
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April 24, 2016Must be read by everyone who studies science and philosophy matters. A simple and clear idea in the structure of the book, supported by goundbreaking empirical evidence.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews