Wittgenstein

by David Pears

The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a strange product of hard reasoning and brilliant imagination, immediately captivating but deep and often difficult to fathom. Besides, Wittgenstein produced not one but two highly original philosophies at different times in his life. Both must be understood, and reconciled; and it is a reconciliation as well as an exposition that David Pears offers in this book. He analyses Wittgenstein's two major works - the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations - emphasises their limitations as well as their merits, and sets his conclusions against the background of the striking changes in the nature of philosophy in this century. His conclusion is that taken together the two books amount to something truly great, an achievement of the highest philosophical genius, which in spite of its frequent difficulty, never loses contact with the thought and images of those who have not read any academic philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

188 pages, Paperback

First published October 9, 1970

Reviews

[Jon Stout · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pears’ book on Wittgenstein, originally prepared for the New York Review of Books, is more philosophically technical than Hartnack, for example, meaning that it is harder to follow, but also that it pursues some of the philosophical debates farther into interesting territory. Pears was one of the translators of the Tractatus, so one might expect that he would know his material very thoroughly.

Rather than survey, I want to zero in on one statement that I found extremely interesting. Giving the later Wittgenstein’s view on religious language, Pears says, “the meaning of a religious proposition is not a function of what would have to be the case if it were true, but a function of the difference that it makes to the lives of those who maintain it.”

This is a remarkable statement, which makes me want to read the original Wittgenstein (Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief). If Karen Armstrong (who I think is wonderful) had made that statement (as well she might), I would think that it was a general observation from the history of religion. For Wittgenstein to make such a statement, it becomes a technically precise linguistic analysis. The mystical side of Wittgenstein, resisting the hegemony of science, is often underemphasized (as in my review of the Tractatus). Not for nothing does Wittgenstein seem most to resemble Kierkegaard in his personal style.

[Sabeena · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pears has a mission on his hands in this short book with a huge personality. The huge personality is that of Cambridge-Alumni Ludwig Wittgenstein, a modern philosopher which went on to make significant ripples in the field of language and linguistics. I'm a novice in this branch of philosophy, which has some unavoidable overlaps with ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics and ontology (probably many others) but to look at linguistics, philosophically, in the way that Wittgenstein wanted for us to, is truly new for me. Therefore, from the outset, I want to make clear that my interpretation of this rather technical text is probably rather off the mark. However, no one delving into Wittgenstein's work for the first time is going to get it straight away! The whole point of his argument seems to be that language cannot be taken at face value; words, meaning and understanding are all contextual. It's complicated.
From what I understand, he had two major books which divide two different philosophies that he transitioned between. The first was the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the second was called Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953).
It appears that while he was declared a 'genius' for the first (By another Logico giant, Bertrand Russell) he caused a lot of people great confusion with his second.

Pears describes that Wittgenstein's purpose was to explain to language users the 'limits of language' and that 'the nature of language itself dictates what you can and can't do with it'.
Essentially, earlier Wittgenstein took rulers, scales and measuring tapes of all kinds to language, to establish limits, draw demarcations, map out the structure, the grounds on which something can be said and the understanding of what cannot, or should not be, said i.e. if it is unanalyzable or unsayable but should remain so (yikes).
I would liken it to a high end tailor, measuring and cutting, marking and fitting the limits of a fabric to a wearer (user) with exactly the level of attention it would require to create the parameters of perfection. The later Wittgenstein distanced himself from such measurement!

One of Wittgenstein's ideas that stood out to me was that he believed that 'our language determines our view of reality' and not the other way around. The expression we may have heard 'The limits of my language are the limits of my world' I believe has more than one obvious interpretation. 'Limits' may mean how effective we are at describing our world but it could also mean a measure in terms of rules and parameters.

Touched briefly in this book, was another of Wittgenstein's ideas that we get the meanings from society and the culture we share with others, rather than moving from within us, outwards. Again, it's complicated but a fascinating theory to get your head around. He probably didn't agree with Descartes belief 'I think, therefore I am', Wittgenstein felt that language, expression and meaning began in the public and then allowed us to learn more individually how to implement and use it.
A majority of the book describes Pears' thoughts on Wittgenstein's take on logic. There is another view that stands out which is that Wittgenstein was resistant to philosophy being encroached by science! Pears writes 'All his philosophy expresses his strong feeling that the great danger to which modern thought is exposed is domination by science, and the consequent distortion of the mind's view of itself'. His views aligned with Kant's and Schopenhauer's and many others, building on theirs occasionally but making his own.

Very complex Wittgenstein theories that would still be interesting to explore were his views on how we assign symbolic interpretation to language. It is not what is actually being said that is interpreted but how we assign symbolic associations to it (I have greatly oversimplified this idea!).

There's a lot to unpick in Wittgenstein's language philosophy. There is discussion of positivists and realists, acknowledgement of systems and then the discarding of them. Either way Wittgenstein is not for the window shopper but for the loyal customer. He warrants exploring further.
Pears didn't write this book for the layman, you would need to be slightly well versed in the field. I had to rely on many sources to get a grasp on the technicalities.

A good place to start might be learning about Wittgenstein himself, who apparently was an intriguing, if unusual academic. Pears writes of his lecture audiences '...his audience would witness the difficult, and sometimes painful emergence of his new ideas....he drew them into the discussion and dealt with their objections. He conducted the meetings with deep seriousness and relentless determination never to be satisfied with incomplete or superficial solutions'. A man of intense intellect and personality which Pears has made only a little less obscure to us in this text.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE BRITISH ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHER WRITES AN EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF WITTGENSTEIN

David Pears (1921-2009) was a British philosopher renowned for his work on Ludwig Wittgenstein. He wrote other books such as 'What Is Knowledge?,' 'The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy,' 'Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy,' 'Motivated Irrationality,' 'Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of His Treatise,' etc.

In the Introduction to this 1970 book, Pears explains about Wittgenstein's later [post-Tractatus] philosophy, "Wittgenstein's new idea was that the correct method would be to avoid theorizing about language, and to concentrate on assembling facts about language... The idea is that in philosophy to theorize is to falsify, and the facts about language are offered as a corrective. Always we are to be brought back from generalities to the particular case...." (Pg. 32)

He states, "Wittgenstein maintained that all necessity is logical necessity, and that the necessary truths of logic are all empty tautologies. The second of these two theses is his solution to the problem which, according to him, lay unresolved beneath [Bertrand] Russell's great development of logic. The two theses, taken together, amount to a denial that there are any necessary truths about matters of substance; i.e., in the technical terminology, a denial that there are any synthetic a priori truths." (Pg. 42)

He explains about Wittgenstein's early theory of logical necessity, "A contradiction tries to move into the whole of the relevant logical space and a tautology leaves the whole of it empty. It follows that tautologies and contradictions lack factual sense. But though they lack it, they express the necessary connections between other propositions which do not lack it... To put the same point negatively, an argument is valid if the combination of the premises with the negation of its conclusion produces a contradiction. This is a beautifully simple theory of logical necessity." (Pg. 80-81)

He asks critically, "[Wittgenstein] was trying to make the point that reality must have a certain character which he specified. But why must it have this specific character? Because the essential nature of language indicates that it must have it. But how is the essential nature of language discovered? And, however it is discovered, what is the status of the propositions which describe it? It is clear that these questions cannot be avoided by giving Wittgenstein's theories the transcendental treatment which he gave solipsism." (Pg. 87)

He observes, "He maintained that the right method in philosophy is to collect facts about language, but not because of their own intrinsic interest... The facts are to be collected because they point beyond themselves. They point back in the direction from which critical philosophy has traveled in the last two centuries. They have, therefore, a significance which cannot be caught in any scientific theory." (Pg. 112)

He notes, "A religious tenet is not a factual hypothesis, but something which affects our thoughts and actions in a different kind of way. This sort of view of religion fits very naturally into his later philosophy: the meaning of a religious proposition is not a function of what would have to be the case if it were true, but a function of the difference that it makes to the lives of those who maintain it. Religious beliefs, unlike scientific beliefs, are not hypotheses, are not based on evidence, and cannot be regarded as more or less probable. So he criticizes Frazer for supposing that religious observances embody rudimentary scientific insights. Religion and science neither overlap nor conflict with one another." (Pg. 187)

This is an excellent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy, by a person who is himself a noteworthy philosopher. It will be of great value to anyone---beginners, or more seasoned students---wanting to learn more about Wittgenstein's philosophy and its development.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the kind of book that shouts out,"I'd like to recommend you, but...". David Pears, late professor of philosophy at Cambridge, who gushed "I saw Wittgenstein walking across the quad once!", has written an introduction to the master thinker that perplexes as much as it enlightens. After a rousing first chapter covering Wittgenstein's British years, his formation under Bertrand Russell, the influence of contemporary mathematics and engineering on his thought (Wittgenstein told Russell he would "one day be an aerodynamic engineer or a philosopher"), the modernist architecture of the home he designed for one of his sisters in Linz, Austria, the TRACTATUS and its subsequent repudiation in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Pears launches into a study of "this genius who proposed two totally different philosophies, at odds with each other". Here Pears falters. The rest of this slim but dense study of language, silence, private language and language games is nearly all Pears and very little Wittgenstein. Do we really need to be told, in the most arcane academic language imaginable, and in every other sentence, where the author disagrees with the master? This is the kind of specialist language Wittgenstein called "the curse of the modern age". One exception is the discussion of Wittgenstein in the interwar years when he published nothing but was greatly influenced by new theories coming from the continent on the social construction of mathematics, particularly L.E.J. Brouwer. Could this insight be applied to the philosophy of language? This development contradicted the picture-theory of language found in the TRACTATUS. Perhaps nothing in language referred to an objective realty. An epiphany produced Wittgenstein the doctor out to cure philosophy from its mistakes. Brace yourself, read a good biography of Wittgenstein, such as Ray Monk, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS, and if Pears has peaked your curiosity leap into ON CERTAINTY.

[Mark Lisac · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bought this one a few decades ago and stopped reading because it was so daunting. Finally started again and got all the way through. It may deserve more than 3 stars technically. For a general reader like me, the ideas were interesting but so complicated that I will forget all but two or three of the most basic concepts in a day or two. Also, Pears says Wittgenstein's basic approaches "produced something truly great," but concedes that a number of his ideas were left generally sketched rather than fully explored, and that he often or usually failed to produce examples of what he was talking about. More generally, while the ideas are interesting, they have as much application to ordinary life as ideas about the nature of the universe or of sub-atomic structures. In fact, near the end, Pears writes, "It is evident that philosophy, unlike religion, is not a part of ordinary life, but a kind of excursion from it." Besides that, it seems like a big leap to say religion is a part of ordinary life. Wittgenstein himself was at great pains to try to defend religion and morality against the trouble caused by the apparent impossibility of setting either on the same philosophical foundation (such as that may be) as the factual rest of the world. I can see going to the effort for morality, but why about religion?
The book refers a number of times to the work of Kant, which in comparison seems more accessible. I suppose it says something about philosophy that Wittgenstein's ideas, despite not always being fully explained and despite being considerably revised by himself, have been highly influential among philosophers. In sum: interesting and possibly important, but for very determined readers only.

[Fahad Khan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not sure who this is aimed at, beginners or experts. At different points Pears' book seems to target one and not the other and vice versa, ending up very likely dissatisfying both. The exposition is often obscure and difficult to follow and I suspect it's because the author was unclear himself about some vital elements of Wittgenstein's thought (something which the afterword, written as a result of critiques of earlier editions, does little do dispel). However, if you manage to get through the whole thing (and especially don't skip the afterword) it does feel like you end up with something of a basic grasp of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

[Frank Ashe · Rating 3 out of 5]

Part of my autodidactic youth. His philosophy sounded profound - all philosophical problems are problems in linguistics. But when I studied it I couldn't make out what was profound. I read both the major works - I still occasionally use the methods of the Investigations - but it couldn't lead anywhere in a philosophical sense.

Language? Much better to take a more scientific view of the subject. Language evolved for a reason - look at that deeper reason, and the structure of language. Language is an epiphenomenon of reality. You can't get to reality by dissecting language.

[Lysergius · Rating 4 out of 5]

A useful introduction to the major themes in Wittgenstein's thought.