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The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is a translation of Edmund Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. The first part of the book was originally presented as a lecture course at the University of Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904–1905, while the second part is based on additional supplementary lectures that he gave between 1905 and 1910. In these essays and lectures, Husserl explores the terrain of consciousness in light of its temporality. He identifies two categories of temporality—retention and protention—and outlines how temporality provides the form for perception, phantasy, imagination, memory, and recollection. He demonstrates a distinction between cosmic and phenomenological time and explores the relevance of phenomenological time for the constitution of temporal objects. The ideas Husserl developed here are explored further in his Ideas and were pursued until the end of his philosophical career.
188 pages, Paperback
Published January 1, 1964
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About the author
Edmund Husserl
523 books555 followersEdmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (Dr. phil. hab., University of Halle-Wittenberg, 1887; Ph.D., Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1883) was a philosopher who is deemed the founder of phenomenology. He broke with the positivist orientation of the science and philosophy of his day, believing that experience is the source of all knowledge, while at the same time he elaborated critiques of psychologism and historicism.
Born into a Moravian Jewish family, he was baptized as a Lutheran in 1887. Husserl studied mathematics under Karl Weierstrass, completing a Ph.D. under Leo Königsberger, and studied philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl taught philosophy, as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg im Breisgau from 1916 until his 1928 retirement.
Born into a Moravian Jewish family, he was baptized as a Lutheran in 1887. Husserl studied mathematics under Karl Weierstrass, completing a Ph.D. under Leo Königsberger, and studied philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl taught philosophy, as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg im Breisgau from 1916 until his 1928 retirement.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
September 8, 2018
‘The pre-empirical temporal position of the image is the exhibition of the Objective position; the pre-empirical temporal extension in the running-off of the continuity of images is the exhibition of the Objective temporal extensity of the thing, therefore, its duration.
All this is self-evident.’
But of course it is, Herr professor...you took the words right outta my mouth...
All this is self-evident.’
But of course it is, Herr professor...you took the words right outta my mouth...
April 26, 2022
This book adds interesting insight that can give ground to the many problems of interpretation we face today. However, in the end, the project falls short of its own immensity. Insofar that it seems to recognize it's inability to answer the question it first asked.
October 25, 2019
This work, composed of lectures that Husserl gave in 1905, as well as appended material from the following ten or so years, is essential for an understanding of the constitution of the phenomenological subject and its acts of consciousness. It is also interesting when viewed in light of the temporal ecstasies of Dasein as laid out by Heidegger years later, though obviously still under the influence of these lectures, in Being and Time .
Husserl's thought remains problematic, however, and internally so. For the reliance of consciousness upon its retention of the UrImpression in order to present the object to itself as given in presencing does not seem to suggest what Husserl takes it to suggest. Rather than the retentional feature of the now "stretching" or "extending" the nowness of the now in phenomenological time (and where or when would we draw the retentional limits of this nowness?), Husserl's investigations uncover the implicit lag of consciousness in its temporality. Because the presence or immediacy of the UrImpression is only grasped as given object by consciousness in the protensional instance of its just having-passed, this would imply that the presence of the now is only apprehended by consciousness in terms of its absence as present, as a past having just-passed.
This is, of course, Derrida's critique of Husserl from Voice and Phenomena. Taking the implications of this internal critique a step further, this absence of origin, the temporal absence at the origin of of conscious apprehension of presence, marks every act of consciousness as a sort of après-coup. The immediacy of the UrImpression marks consciousness with a trace of alterity which will haunt it as its pre-consciously experienced yet ever excessive and unreachable, thus ever absent, origin. Because consciousness only apprehends the present in its retentional running-off, the immediacy of the present, the presence of the other, escapes from its grasp in this very running off of excession.
Consciousness is thus ever marked by a fault, a desire to attain or grasp its origins, which remains impossible to it by the very operations of its constitution. The gap or break between the passive impression upon consciousness and its active constitution of its object in or as meaning means that there always remains an excess which has yet to be said - the origin of meaning which cannot be rendered meant. Thus Derrida's deffering amd differing, as well as Levinas' saying which goes beyond the said.
Perhaps I have elaborated nothing new here, nothing original. These thoughts and their implication are still being worked through. In light of this, I apologize for offering up what could be seen as little more than a draft, repetitional inscriptions which may allude to something more, to some original or originary unthought. What shall come remains, as it must, to-come.
How I love my ignorance of the future...
Husserl's thought remains problematic, however, and internally so. For the reliance of consciousness upon its retention of the UrImpression in order to present the object to itself as given in presencing does not seem to suggest what Husserl takes it to suggest. Rather than the retentional feature of the now "stretching" or "extending" the nowness of the now in phenomenological time (and where or when would we draw the retentional limits of this nowness?), Husserl's investigations uncover the implicit lag of consciousness in its temporality. Because the presence or immediacy of the UrImpression is only grasped as given object by consciousness in the protensional instance of its just having-passed, this would imply that the presence of the now is only apprehended by consciousness in terms of its absence as present, as a past having just-passed.
This is, of course, Derrida's critique of Husserl from Voice and Phenomena. Taking the implications of this internal critique a step further, this absence of origin, the temporal absence at the origin of of conscious apprehension of presence, marks every act of consciousness as a sort of après-coup. The immediacy of the UrImpression marks consciousness with a trace of alterity which will haunt it as its pre-consciously experienced yet ever excessive and unreachable, thus ever absent, origin. Because consciousness only apprehends the present in its retentional running-off, the immediacy of the present, the presence of the other, escapes from its grasp in this very running off of excession.
Consciousness is thus ever marked by a fault, a desire to attain or grasp its origins, which remains impossible to it by the very operations of its constitution. The gap or break between the passive impression upon consciousness and its active constitution of its object in or as meaning means that there always remains an excess which has yet to be said - the origin of meaning which cannot be rendered meant. Thus Derrida's deffering amd differing, as well as Levinas' saying which goes beyond the said.
Perhaps I have elaborated nothing new here, nothing original. These thoughts and their implication are still being worked through. In light of this, I apologize for offering up what could be seen as little more than a draft, repetitional inscriptions which may allude to something more, to some original or originary unthought. What shall come remains, as it must, to-come.
How I love my ignorance of the future...
March 29, 2026
“(...) We do not classify lived experience according to any particular form of reality. We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is intended, represented, intuited, or conceptually thought. With reference to the problem of time, this implies that we are interested in lived experience of time. That these lived experiences themselves are temporally determined in an Objective sense, that they belong in the world of things and psychical subjects and their place therein, their efficacy, their empirical origin and their being—that does not concern us, of that we know nothing. (...)” (s. 28-29)
“One might ask, however: Can I not have a memory, even a primary one, of an A which in truth has never existed? Certainly. Something even stronger can be asserted. I can also have a perception of A although in reality A does not exist. Accordingly, we do not assert as a certainty that when we have a retention of A (assuming A is a transcendent Object), A must precede the retention, although we do assert that A must have been perceived.” (s. 55)
“Memory or retention is not figurative consciousness, but something totally different. What is remembered is, of course, not now; otherwise it would not be something that has been but would be actually present. And in memory (retention) what is remembered is not given as now: otherwise, memory or retention would not be just memory but perception (or primal impression). A comparison of what we no longer perceive but are merely conscious of in retention with something outside it makes no sense at all. Just as in perception, I see what has being now, and in extended perceptions, no matter how constituted, what has enduring being, so in primary remembrance I see what is past. What past is given therein, and givenness of the past is memory.” (s. 56)
“Recollection can make its appearance in different forms of accomplishment. We accomplish it either by simply laying hold of what is recollected, as when, for example, a recollection ‘emerges’ and we look at what is remembered with a glancing ray [Blickstrahl] wherein what is remembered is indeterminate, perhaps a favored momentary phase intuitively brought forth, but not a recapitulative memory. Or we accomplish it in a real, re-productive, recapitulative memory in which the temporal object is again completely built up in a continuum of presentifications, so that we seem to perceive it again, but only seemingly, as-if. The whole process is a presentificational modification of the process of perception with all its phases and levels, including retentions. However, everything has the index of reproductive modification.” (s. 59)
“In order now to understand the disposition of this constituted unity of lived experience, ‘memory’, in the undivided stream of lived experience, the following must be taken into account: every act of memory contains intentions of expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present. Every primordially constitutive process is animated by protentions which voidly [leer] constitute and intercept [auffangen] what is coming, as such, in order to bring it to fulfillment. However, the recollective process not only renews these protentions in a manner appropriate to memory. These protentions were not only present as intercepting, they also intercepted. They have been fulfilled, and we are aware of them in recollection. Fulfillment in recollective consciousness is re-fulfillment [Wieder-Erfüllung] (precisely in the modification of the positing of memory), and if the primordial protention of the perception of the event was undermined and the question of being other or not-being was left open, then in the recollection we have a pre-directed expectation which does not leave all that open. It is then in the form of an ‘incomplete’ recollection whose structure is other than that of the undetermined, primordial protention. And yet this is also included in the recollection. (...) Recollection is not expectation; its horizon, which is a posited one, is, however, oriented on the future, that is, the future of the recollected.” (s. 76)
“The principal differences between memory and expectation, however, are to be found in the manner of fulfillment. Intentions of the past are necessarily fulfilled by the establishment of nexuses of intuitive reproductions. The reproduction of past events permits, with respect to their validity (in internal consciousness) only the confirmation of the uncertainties of memory and their improvement by being transformed in a reproduction in which each and everything in the components is characterised as reproductive. Here we are concerned with such questions as: Have I really seen or perceived this? Have I really had this appearance with exactly this content? All this must at the same time dovetail into a context of similar intuitions up to the now. Another question, to be sure, is the following: Was the appearing thing real? On the other hand, expectation finds its fulfillment in a perception..” (s. 80)
“The now-phases of perception constantly undergo a modification. They are not preserved simply as they are. They flow. Constituted therein is what we have referred to as sinking back in time.” (s. 88)
“With the preservation of the individuality of the temporal points in their sinking back into the past, we still do not have, however, consciousness of a unitary, homogeneous, Objective time. In the occurrence of this consciousness, reproductive memory (in its intuitive capacity, as in the form of empty intentions) plays an important role.” (s. 94)
“Actually present time is oriented, is ever in flux and always oriented from a new now on. In recollection, time is indeed also given as oriented in every moment of the memory. But every point exhibits an Objective temporal point which can be identified again and again, and the interval of time is formed from purely Objective points and is itself identifiable again and again.” (s. 144, appendix IV)
Husserl undersöker hur tid framträder som en struktur i medvetandet; hur dåtid, nutid och framtid hålls samman i ett kontinuerligt flöde. Enligt Husserl framstår exempelvis det som nyss inträffat fortfarande närvarande som en retention (en form av kvarhållning av det där nyss förflutna i nuet), medan nuet redan är öppet mot vad som komma skall genom protention (nuets riktning mot det som ännu inte inträffat). Det rör sig inte riktigt om isolerade ögonblick, utan om ett konstant flöde av tid. Husserls ställning är strikt fenomenologisk, även om min lilla hjärna så gärna vill dra det hela mer åt det kognitiva hållet där reflektion och tolkning av medvetandet och tiden skulle kunna få träda fram på en annan nivå (absolut inte är poängen för Husserl dock hehe). Oavsett himla intressant läsning!
“One might ask, however: Can I not have a memory, even a primary one, of an A which in truth has never existed? Certainly. Something even stronger can be asserted. I can also have a perception of A although in reality A does not exist. Accordingly, we do not assert as a certainty that when we have a retention of A (assuming A is a transcendent Object), A must precede the retention, although we do assert that A must have been perceived.” (s. 55)
“Memory or retention is not figurative consciousness, but something totally different. What is remembered is, of course, not now; otherwise it would not be something that has been but would be actually present. And in memory (retention) what is remembered is not given as now: otherwise, memory or retention would not be just memory but perception (or primal impression). A comparison of what we no longer perceive but are merely conscious of in retention with something outside it makes no sense at all. Just as in perception, I see what has being now, and in extended perceptions, no matter how constituted, what has enduring being, so in primary remembrance I see what is past. What past is given therein, and givenness of the past is memory.” (s. 56)
“Recollection can make its appearance in different forms of accomplishment. We accomplish it either by simply laying hold of what is recollected, as when, for example, a recollection ‘emerges’ and we look at what is remembered with a glancing ray [Blickstrahl] wherein what is remembered is indeterminate, perhaps a favored momentary phase intuitively brought forth, but not a recapitulative memory. Or we accomplish it in a real, re-productive, recapitulative memory in which the temporal object is again completely built up in a continuum of presentifications, so that we seem to perceive it again, but only seemingly, as-if. The whole process is a presentificational modification of the process of perception with all its phases and levels, including retentions. However, everything has the index of reproductive modification.” (s. 59)
“In order now to understand the disposition of this constituted unity of lived experience, ‘memory’, in the undivided stream of lived experience, the following must be taken into account: every act of memory contains intentions of expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present. Every primordially constitutive process is animated by protentions which voidly [leer] constitute and intercept [auffangen] what is coming, as such, in order to bring it to fulfillment. However, the recollective process not only renews these protentions in a manner appropriate to memory. These protentions were not only present as intercepting, they also intercepted. They have been fulfilled, and we are aware of them in recollection. Fulfillment in recollective consciousness is re-fulfillment [Wieder-Erfüllung] (precisely in the modification of the positing of memory), and if the primordial protention of the perception of the event was undermined and the question of being other or not-being was left open, then in the recollection we have a pre-directed expectation which does not leave all that open. It is then in the form of an ‘incomplete’ recollection whose structure is other than that of the undetermined, primordial protention. And yet this is also included in the recollection. (...) Recollection is not expectation; its horizon, which is a posited one, is, however, oriented on the future, that is, the future of the recollected.” (s. 76)
“The principal differences between memory and expectation, however, are to be found in the manner of fulfillment. Intentions of the past are necessarily fulfilled by the establishment of nexuses of intuitive reproductions. The reproduction of past events permits, with respect to their validity (in internal consciousness) only the confirmation of the uncertainties of memory and their improvement by being transformed in a reproduction in which each and everything in the components is characterised as reproductive. Here we are concerned with such questions as: Have I really seen or perceived this? Have I really had this appearance with exactly this content? All this must at the same time dovetail into a context of similar intuitions up to the now. Another question, to be sure, is the following: Was the appearing thing real? On the other hand, expectation finds its fulfillment in a perception..” (s. 80)
“The now-phases of perception constantly undergo a modification. They are not preserved simply as they are. They flow. Constituted therein is what we have referred to as sinking back in time.” (s. 88)
“With the preservation of the individuality of the temporal points in their sinking back into the past, we still do not have, however, consciousness of a unitary, homogeneous, Objective time. In the occurrence of this consciousness, reproductive memory (in its intuitive capacity, as in the form of empty intentions) plays an important role.” (s. 94)
“Actually present time is oriented, is ever in flux and always oriented from a new now on. In recollection, time is indeed also given as oriented in every moment of the memory. But every point exhibits an Objective temporal point which can be identified again and again, and the interval of time is formed from purely Objective points and is itself identifiable again and again.” (s. 144, appendix IV)
Husserl undersöker hur tid framträder som en struktur i medvetandet; hur dåtid, nutid och framtid hålls samman i ett kontinuerligt flöde. Enligt Husserl framstår exempelvis det som nyss inträffat fortfarande närvarande som en retention (en form av kvarhållning av det där nyss förflutna i nuet), medan nuet redan är öppet mot vad som komma skall genom protention (nuets riktning mot det som ännu inte inträffat). Det rör sig inte riktigt om isolerade ögonblick, utan om ett konstant flöde av tid. Husserls ställning är strikt fenomenologisk, även om min lilla hjärna så gärna vill dra det hela mer åt det kognitiva hållet där reflektion och tolkning av medvetandet och tiden skulle kunna få träda fram på en annan nivå (absolut inte är poängen för Husserl dock hehe). Oavsett himla intressant läsning!
October 8, 2024
THE FOUNDER OF PHENOMENOLOGY LOOKS AT THE CONCEPT OF “SUCCESSION”
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938) was a German philosopher who established the school of phenomenology. He was born into a Jewish family (which later caused him to lose his academic position when the Nazis came to power in 1933), but was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886. He wrote many books, such as 'Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,' 'The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,' 'Cartesian Meditations,' etc.
The Editor’s Foreword states, “The following analysis of the ‘phenomenology of internal time-consciousness’ falls into two sections. The first includes the past part of a four-hour lecture course held during the winter semester in Göttingen, 1904-1905. The course was entitled: ‘Important Points Concerning Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge.’ While the second volume of Logical Investigations (1901) has as a theme the interpretation of the ‘higher’ act of cognition, these lectures were to investigate ‘the most deeply underlying intellective acts: perception, phantasy, figurative consciousness, memory, and the intuition of time.’ The second section is derived from supplements to the course and from later studies (to 1910).”
Husserl says, “Because our ideas do not bear the slightest trace of temporal determinateness, it is conceivable that our sensations could endure or succeed one another without our being aware of it in the least. If we observe, for example, a particular instance of succession and assume that the sensations disappear with the stimuli producing them, we should have a succession of sensations without a notion of a temporal flow. With the emergence of the new sensation we should no longer have any memory of the having-been of the earlier. In each moment we should have only the consciousness of the sensation just produced and nothing further.
"But even the continued duration of the sensation already produced would not help us procure the idea of succession. If, in the case of a succession of sounds, the earlier ones were to be preserved as they were while every new ones were also to sound, we should have a number of sounds simultaneously in our imagination, but not succession… We arrive at the idea of succession only if the earlier sensation does not persist unaltered in consciousness but in the manner described is specifically modified… from moment to moment…. This modification, however, is no longer the business of sensation… But the sensation itself now becomes productive.” (§3, pg. 31-32)
He points out, “Temporal determinations do not define; they essentially alter in a manner wholly similar to determinations such as ‘imagined,’ ‘wished,’ etc. … Only the determination ‘now’ is an exception. The A existing now is indeed a real A. The present does not alter, but on the other hand it also does not define. If I add ‘now’ to the idea of man, the idea acquires no new characteristic thereby; in other words, the ‘now’ attributes no new characteristic to the idea of man.” (§5, pg. 34)
He states, “if we call perception the act in which all ‘origination’ lies, which constitutes originarily, then primary remembrance is perception. For only in primary remembrance do we see what is past; only in it is the past constituted, i.e., not in a representative but in a presentative way. The just-having-been, the before in contrast to the now, can be seen directly only in primary remembrance. It is the essence of primary remembrance to bring this new and unique moment to primary, direct intuition, just as it is the essence of the perception of the now to bring the now directly to intuition.” (§17, pg. 64)
In Appendix IX to the later section, he asserts, “Retention is not a modification in which impressional data really remain preserved, only in an altered form. Rather, retention is an intentionality, in fact, an intentionality of a special kind. When a primal datum, a new phase, emerges, the preceding one is not lost but is ‘retained in concept’ … and thanks to this retention a looking back to what has expired is possible. Retention itself is not an act of looking back which makes an Object of the phase which has expired. Because I have the phase which has expired in hand, I live through the one actually present, take it---thanks to retention---‘in addition to’ and am directed to what is coming (in a protention).” (Pg. 161)
While this book is often not considered as one of Husserl’s “major” works, I’ve always thought it one of his most interesting. Persons studying Husserl, Phenomenology, or the philosophical/psychological concept of Time will probably find it equally fascinating.
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938) was a German philosopher who established the school of phenomenology. He was born into a Jewish family (which later caused him to lose his academic position when the Nazis came to power in 1933), but was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886. He wrote many books, such as 'Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,' 'The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,' 'Cartesian Meditations,' etc.
The Editor’s Foreword states, “The following analysis of the ‘phenomenology of internal time-consciousness’ falls into two sections. The first includes the past part of a four-hour lecture course held during the winter semester in Göttingen, 1904-1905. The course was entitled: ‘Important Points Concerning Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge.’ While the second volume of Logical Investigations (1901) has as a theme the interpretation of the ‘higher’ act of cognition, these lectures were to investigate ‘the most deeply underlying intellective acts: perception, phantasy, figurative consciousness, memory, and the intuition of time.’ The second section is derived from supplements to the course and from later studies (to 1910).”
Husserl says, “Because our ideas do not bear the slightest trace of temporal determinateness, it is conceivable that our sensations could endure or succeed one another without our being aware of it in the least. If we observe, for example, a particular instance of succession and assume that the sensations disappear with the stimuli producing them, we should have a succession of sensations without a notion of a temporal flow. With the emergence of the new sensation we should no longer have any memory of the having-been of the earlier. In each moment we should have only the consciousness of the sensation just produced and nothing further.
"But even the continued duration of the sensation already produced would not help us procure the idea of succession. If, in the case of a succession of sounds, the earlier ones were to be preserved as they were while every new ones were also to sound, we should have a number of sounds simultaneously in our imagination, but not succession… We arrive at the idea of succession only if the earlier sensation does not persist unaltered in consciousness but in the manner described is specifically modified… from moment to moment…. This modification, however, is no longer the business of sensation… But the sensation itself now becomes productive.” (§3, pg. 31-32)
He points out, “Temporal determinations do not define; they essentially alter in a manner wholly similar to determinations such as ‘imagined,’ ‘wished,’ etc. … Only the determination ‘now’ is an exception. The A existing now is indeed a real A. The present does not alter, but on the other hand it also does not define. If I add ‘now’ to the idea of man, the idea acquires no new characteristic thereby; in other words, the ‘now’ attributes no new characteristic to the idea of man.” (§5, pg. 34)
He states, “if we call perception the act in which all ‘origination’ lies, which constitutes originarily, then primary remembrance is perception. For only in primary remembrance do we see what is past; only in it is the past constituted, i.e., not in a representative but in a presentative way. The just-having-been, the before in contrast to the now, can be seen directly only in primary remembrance. It is the essence of primary remembrance to bring this new and unique moment to primary, direct intuition, just as it is the essence of the perception of the now to bring the now directly to intuition.” (§17, pg. 64)
In Appendix IX to the later section, he asserts, “Retention is not a modification in which impressional data really remain preserved, only in an altered form. Rather, retention is an intentionality, in fact, an intentionality of a special kind. When a primal datum, a new phase, emerges, the preceding one is not lost but is ‘retained in concept’ … and thanks to this retention a looking back to what has expired is possible. Retention itself is not an act of looking back which makes an Object of the phase which has expired. Because I have the phase which has expired in hand, I live through the one actually present, take it---thanks to retention---‘in addition to’ and am directed to what is coming (in a protention).” (Pg. 161)
While this book is often not considered as one of Husserl’s “major” works, I’ve always thought it one of his most interesting. Persons studying Husserl, Phenomenology, or the philosophical/psychological concept of Time will probably find it equally fascinating.
November 14, 2024
philosophy: from philosophia, greek; philo = love, sophia = knowledge
sophistry: from sophistēs, greek; meaning: a wise person; connotative turn: superficially plausible, yet deceptive reasoning
so how much philosophy is actually sophistry? the apprehension towards philosophy as a discipline may have substantial grounds in the fact that much of it is esoteric, and also convoluted. the philosophy that could be popularized has been popularized, for good reasons, i believe: plato, machhiavelli, nietzsche, camus, beauvoir, sartre, butler (?). i believe i believe. yet most of it remains somewhere hidden in the dusty annals of no library shelves or libgen. does libgen have shelves? it should, no? how much philosophy is actually sophistry?
tony morrison's beloved or sethe had nowhere advocated for reading out of spite. i think i now agree with her. beloved was always correct, much of it dawns on me with time. how could a person be so true, so prophetic? i didn't understand this book for the most part, to be honest. but i tried, and that doesn't count. you try so hard, you come so far, but in the end, it doesn't even matter. with time, it will keep coming back to me, i want to believe, so should tony morrison.
i should, however, also be wary in saying that i don't understand somebody. understanding is not necessary. acceptance and love is. in not being able to understand, we should also consider how ignorant we are. love is not ignorance, love is acceptance of ignorance, in knowledge. maybe. i believe. i am wrong.
"noor"/14.11.2024
happy children's day
sophistry: from sophistēs, greek; meaning: a wise person; connotative turn: superficially plausible, yet deceptive reasoning
so how much philosophy is actually sophistry? the apprehension towards philosophy as a discipline may have substantial grounds in the fact that much of it is esoteric, and also convoluted. the philosophy that could be popularized has been popularized, for good reasons, i believe: plato, machhiavelli, nietzsche, camus, beauvoir, sartre, butler (?). i believe i believe. yet most of it remains somewhere hidden in the dusty annals of no library shelves or libgen. does libgen have shelves? it should, no? how much philosophy is actually sophistry?
tony morrison's beloved or sethe had nowhere advocated for reading out of spite. i think i now agree with her. beloved was always correct, much of it dawns on me with time. how could a person be so true, so prophetic? i didn't understand this book for the most part, to be honest. but i tried, and that doesn't count. you try so hard, you come so far, but in the end, it doesn't even matter. with time, it will keep coming back to me, i want to believe, so should tony morrison.
i should, however, also be wary in saying that i don't understand somebody. understanding is not necessary. acceptance and love is. in not being able to understand, we should also consider how ignorant we are. love is not ignorance, love is acceptance of ignorance, in knowledge. maybe. i believe. i am wrong.
"noor"/14.11.2024
happy children's day
Read
December 27, 2023Good. Will have to return to it after the logical investigations I imagine, since much of this flew over my head. Probably to do with some of the jargon that feels unnatural compared to some other Husserl I have read. We'll see.
February 6, 2026
One of, if not the greatest, philosophical lecture I have read. Uniquely insightful, profoundly accurate, and eye-opening to a world of questions and possibilities to be discovered in our understanding of time-consciousness.
Just a shame the Brentano lectures can’t be uncovered directly.
Just a shame the Brentano lectures can’t be uncovered directly.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews